CIAO DATE: 07/04

International Affairs:
A Russian Journal

No. 2, 2004

 

The Breaking of Nations: Reflections on the Book by Robert Cooper

E. Kuznetsova ^*

Instability and unpredictability are two hallmarks of the world political system today. Political scientists find it hard, if not impossible, to provide theoretical substantiations for the new system of international relations while politicians are nearly defeated in their empirical quest for new solutions. A lack of clarity in theory is reflected in unpredictable actions – as a result, the fog becomes even denser. It is extremely important, therefore, to outline the methodological principles of analyzing international relations, on the one hand, and, on the other, to supply politicians with a conceptual framework within which their actions and possible repercussions of the latter can be more objectively assessed.

In recent years many of the prominent Western academics and practicing politicians have formulated new principles of the contemporary political theory. S. Huntington, R. Kagan, H. Kissinger, J. Naye Jr, J. Ikenberry, and C. Kupchan, together with scores of others, have contributed to the common effort yet today one can say that the discussions of the turn of the 21st century revealed widely varying approaches rather than contributed to a common point of view. The book by prominent British diplomat Robert Cooper The Breaking of Nations ¹ demonstrated this with special clarity. It substantiates the de facto disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance and the West: the conclusion suggests itself–the author does nothing to impose it on the reader.

An Effort at Conceptual Assessment

Robert Cooper’s book differs from the majority of contemporary writings not so much by originality of approach and exposition even though this allowed Ikenberry to call him a herald of the future world order and liken him to the American heralds (Fukuyama, Huntington, and Kagan). ² Robert Cooper, former Blair’s foreign policy guru, is out to restore the classical approach to the analysis of the entire system of international relations. Certain commentators pointed out that he proceeded from John Stuart Mill’s division of the states into civilized, Barbarian, and savage. ³

In his book (that consists of three essays) the author looks at the world that took shape in 1989 when the bi–polar world fell apart, from various points of view. He has correctly pointed out that the world order of the Cold War era was not a fundamentally new system but an apogee of the former in which the old multi–sided balance of forces was replaced with a “balance of terror” on the world scale. ⁴ He says that as soon as the bi–polar world disappeared the principle of “intimidation” or “terror” based on the nuclear deterrence doctrine stopped influencing inter–state relations.

It would be highly naïve to expect that “balanced terror” will be promptly replaced with “post–historical” understanding. The “disbalance of terror” is our reality: there is a new force, which can be hardly rebuffed, equally threatening the first and third worlds. Cooper offers a subtle observation that “outer–systemic” terrorism was not a random phenomenon: it was born by the fact that the West had lost control over the worldwide situation.

The diminishing confrontation between the East and the West created new confrontation lines inside the West. The U.S. is locked in struggle against the “axis of evil” denounced by President George W. Bush. It was busy building up a vague “coalition of the willing” rather than a powerful alliance to start a war against Iraq. Europe is splitting into an “old” Europe that “consists of governments that took the sa-me position over the war on Iraq as most of their populations,” and a new one wishing “to follow orders from Crawford, Texas, disregarding, in most cases, an even larger majority of citizens who were against the war.” ⁵ What caused this split commented on by the majority of the political scientists? It seems that an answer is Cooper’s main task and the cornerstone of his conception.

I have already written that the author borrowed Mill's division of the states into the civilized and Barbarian ones, and savage peoples to reproduce it nearly in its pristine form (even though adjusted to contemporary sociology and political correctness). He has divided all states into three groups: the failed states, and modern and post–modern states.

The states of the first group are not states at all: their power structures proved unable to retain state control over violence inside the state and guard their borders. Somalia, Afghanistan, and Liberia are few examples of the degrading states and their degeneration into pre–state social forms. The future of these “failed states,” aptly described by O. de Rivero as “ungovernable chaotic entities” ⁶ is pitiable: as in the past they will have to choose between empires and chaos (p. 17).

The states of the second group are arranged according to the principles of the epoch of modernity; below they will be called “modern” states. The nation–state is their cornerstone while interstate relations are shaped under the impact of force; within this system state security is ensured by military might. The author says with a great deal of regret that within the categories of this essay America should be counted among the modern states (see p. 46). Cooper proceeds from an analysis of America’s role in setting up a “balance of terror” system of the modernity epoch that the U.S. administration exploits to realize America’s national interests, to deal with international institutions, etc. In fact, America’s “modern” nature is evidenced by its dedication to the use of force and reliance on military alliances. While betraying no alarmist sentiments where American policies are concerned that author predicts that the U.S. global hegemony will not be a peaceful one (see p. 49).

The states of the third group are living through a period of transformation of two fundamental principles: inviolability of state sovereignty and the factor of force priority. Rather than relying on the balance of power in their relationships they voluntarily limited their sovereignties and accepted meddling in their internal affairs if their previous agreements are violated. Cooper further says that the post–modern system does not rely on the balance of power, equally it does not stress the need to delimitate the domestic and foreign policy spheres (see pp. 29, 30). He has classed the EU members as post-modern states that he regards as a highly organized system of mutual interference in domestic affairs (see p. 27). Outside Europe Japan alone belongs to the post–modern world and will remain within it if (says the author) the threats emanating from its neighbors so far on the lower development stages (the modern world) are stemmed on time by Japan's allies.

Robert Cooper has pointed to Europe’s very special place in the emerging universal geopolitical configuration. This is not new: another prominent academic Robert Kagan in his famous article “Power and Weakness” later published in book form also described Europe as a “post–modernity paradise.” ⁷ In fact, however, their positions are totally different: while the former arrives at his conclusion within an integral classification system the latter proceeds from a trite and superficial opposition of certain features of the American and European foreign policy doctrines. This is where European and American analysts differ.

Even though Cooper and Kagan agree about certain things (and even quote one another): for example, that the European “post–modernist paradise” is rooted not in the balance of power but in a rejection of force and that its prosperity is guaranteed by the “modern” superpower (the United States), the deeper principles of their approaches are different. While Kagan interprets Europe’s devotion to the principle of multilateralism as the Europeans’ desire “to oppose allowing others to do what they cannot do themselves” ⁸ Robert Cooper believes that this devotion stems from the Europeans’ desire to use “soft power” at their disposal to the maximum. The European Union has been and remains an unchallenged leader in this respect. Their assessments of the causes behind the much worsened relations between the two sides of the Atlantic are no less obvious: Kagan believes that the Western world split because of Europe’s reluctance to share the burden of military spendings with the United States camouflaged as a strategy of the “weak” and Europe’s harsh criticism of America's double standards. Cooper, in his turn, discerns the conflict sources in the U.S. revived policy of the use of force after the 9/11 terrorist acts.

The indirect polemics between two prominent experts both representing the Western community about the ways and means of bridging the trans–Atlantic split has confirmed once more that the relationships between Europe as an oasis of post–modernism and the United States as the bulwark of modernism remain one of the top priorities for politicians and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic.

This gives ground for optimism yet does not remove problems. Europe’s rejection of Machtpolitik and its preference for diplomatic means rather than the use of force as well as its desire to abide by the principles of international law demonstrate that the split is not a superficial one. Yet it is precisely the “Western” world that remains the pole and guarantor of stability in the world; the efficiency of the struggle against global threats and the efforts to bring order to the regions where “failed states” predominate (that Cooper has termed terrum nullum) depends on the West’s ability to save its unity.

The above suggests that the causes behind the mounting tension in trans–Atlantic relations should be urgently comprehended while the unifying elements able to consolidate the West in the face of numerous challenges causing increasing concern among the political elites identified. Cooper, like many other analysts before him, has arrived at the need to discuss the problem of “Western” identity.

On Values and Interests

The problem is: Is there a single “Western” identity rooted deep enough to unite Americans and Europeans? Do they share certain values that can bring them together?

Identity influences inter–state relations: people belonging to the same community are less prone to conflicts among themselves therefore it is in the interests of states to educate their citizens in the spirit of belonging to a community much wider than a national or ethnic one. Today, a supra–national identity is being formed within the European Union. “Western civilization” has an identity of its own too: throughout the latter half of the 20th century it ensured the “Western” world’s ideological and political unity.

What is the “West”? The idea of the “West” was born in Europe as an opposition to the followers of the Prophet Muhammad, on the one hand, and to the Eastern, Byzantine Christians, on the other. In both cases it was the “West” that outlined the religious community’s geographical limits: Christian in the former case and Catholic in the latter. In fact, historically “western” identity was the first hypostasis of “European” identity. By the time territorial expansion of European powers (Britain in the first place) had “pushed” the West’s geographical limits to the colonies peopled by Europeans (the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia) the ideas of Europe and the “West” blended to the extent that A. Maddison, one of the most original of contemporary historians, speaks about “Western” (!), not European, “offshoots.” ⁹

Today, the West is seen both as a totality of values and a center of power. British historian M. Mazower has remarked that by the West we mean “a community of values, a shared inheritance of Judaeo–Christian and Roman traditions that had, supposedly, bred in the peoples of the Atlantic seaboard a special attachment to liberty, democracy and parliamentary institutions." ¹⁰ B. Lewis, a prominent Orientalist, looks at the West “as a power bloc [that] had . . . moved farther west [from Europe] and now consisted essentially of the United States, leaving an interesting role for continental Europe to assume the opposing role [italics mine. – E.K].” ¹¹

There is no doubt, however, that Atlantic unity is based on shared values. On the other hand, “the ideological and cultural distance typical of the evolution of the American and European societies has become very real.” ¹² W. Hutton has aptly noted: “Around the obligations of the properties to society, the need for a social contract and the centrality of a public realm and government to a happy community – there are sharp differences between mainstream European views and those of American conservatives.” ¹³ The fact that the European model of market economy differs considerably from the American one makes the distinctions between Europe and America even more glaring. Indeed, the European model is concerned with gradual economic growth that requires that certain social problems (the property gap and poverty) be also addressed while in America instant profit is the main concern. As a result the business community is less aware of social needs. This is admitted in America, too. ¹⁴ This inevitably results in a dramatic difference between the inequality scale and the social security models in Europe and America. ¹⁵

Previously, during the Cold War period the question about “Western” unity and “Western identity” was likewise discussed yet in the context of identical geopolitical interests of all members of the Atlantic alliance the subject of the deep–cutting civilizational and cultural distinctions of Europe and America mainly belonged to historians and culturologists. Ten years that elapsed since the disintegration of the bi–polar system of international relations moved apart, to say the least, the political and economic interests of Europeans and Americans thus forcing the subject of the civilizational and cultural unity of the “West” on political scientists and foreign policy analysts. The differences should not be hyperbolized: while belonging to the same “western” world Europe and America may have different interests. R. Harvey puts this in the following way: “Living on different parts of the planet, we [Europeans and Americans] have divergent interests and perceptions of danger.” ¹⁶ R. Cooper agrees with him: “When it comes to security issues and the use of force, it is still largely a world of every country for itself” (pp. 150, 151).

Throughout the latter half of the 20th century it was the U.S.’s lot to ensure security of the “western” world that allowed America to interfere in (and influence), to a certain degree, European affairs. The United States did not remove itself from the European scene when the Soviet threat had disappeared: it interferes (or allows itself to be involved) in European problems. Likewise, Europe never created armed forces of its own to ensure continental security when the Soviet threat had disappeared. At the same time America is increasingly aware of the fact that “as Europe grows stronger and more integrated, it will want a voice commensurate with its new station. Whether or not the United States likes it or not, Europe is becoming a new center of global power.” ¹⁷ Z. Brzezinski is very realistic about this: “In the longer run, the appearance of a truly politically united Europe would entail a basic shift in the distribution of global power, with consequences as far–reaching as those generated by the collapse of the Soviet empire and by the subsequent emergence of America’s global preponderance.” ¹⁸

The terrorist attacks at American cities changed the foreign policy attitudes of the United States and formulated several new tasks. Logically enough, antiterrorist struggle and an opposition to the WMD proliferation demanded increased military spendings: in the last few years they have been gradually growing in the United States; today they amount to over $400 billion a year or half of the maximal military budget of the Cold War era. This has inevitably revived the “free security” subjects in the trans–Atlantic relations. The “old Europe’s” refusal to support the regime change operation in Iraq caused a crisis, which many describe as “one of the most serious developments in the post–Cold War era.” ¹⁹ According to Moisie, a well–known French political analyst, “for the first time since 1947 a mutual decoupling of the United States from Europe is possible.” ²⁰

“Atlantic quarrel” is an evidence of fundamentally different approaches of Europe and America to international problems: “Americans have traditionally sought to overcome a challenge, once it was recognized, in a conclusive manner; European societies have rarely had the resources to do so and have a pre–disposition, honed by history, to seek to manage problems, rather than to solve them.” ²¹ Today, we are witnessing alarming trends in the U.S. foreign policy: Americans reluctantly abide by public opinion, they tend to ignore their allies’ opinions and insist on their right to act strictly according to their own ideas about dangers and threats. For example, the United States in an indirect way is trying to prevent realization of the EU’s foreign policy and the policy of security perceived across the Atlantic as a challenge to NATO domination. This is betrayed by the U.S. desire to impose the American practice of double standards on Europeans, by America's desire to “play on contradictions” between European states in which dislocation of U.S. military bases is presented as a specific favor (the United States has already announced its decision to move their bases from Germany to Poland) and by America’s pressure on the U.K. connected with the plans to set up a EU general staff independent of NATO.

Disintegration of Western unity cripples the relationships between Europe and America, it is hazardous for worldwide stability. The trend speaks of the crisis of traditional Atlanticism, that is, the Cold War–molded allied relations. For many decades Atlantic partnership was a global “stability axis” – today the relationships among its parts should be revised so that the sides’ interests stop threatening the values shared across the western world. Antiterrorist struggle, non–proliferation of WMD, administration of the “failing” and “failed” states depend on the future of trans–Atlantic relations. The differences between Europe and America will be overcome if the EU formulates an alternative model of global governance and transfer its principles into the sphere of world politics.

The New World Order in Born in “Old” Europe

In his book Robert Cooper offered an opinion that “the most far reaching form of imperial expansion is that of the European Union” (p. 71); it is most effectively applied as a post–modernist political model. The integration processes of the last decade of the 20th century have supplied causes for optimism. It took former Soviet satellites less than 10 years to become EU members and influence Brussels’ politics (Malta and Cyprus had applied in 1990). In May 2004, ten more Central and East European states will join the EU the territory of which will thus increase by 34 percent; 105 million will join the present EU population. Turkey has also scored impressive successes: while in 1989 the European Commission had concluded that Turkey’s economic and political situation did not allow to expect that in the medium term it would resolve its problems caused by its Community membership in 2002 the same Commission in its regular report pointed to Turkey’s success, in particular, in developing market economy. ²² On the strength of this last June the European parliament passed a resolution on accepting Turkey’s application for EU membership.

The European “imperial expansion” has one very serious limitation: the European “post–modernist” order is expanding solely through “the lure of membership,” the only EU foreign policy instrument. Meanwhile even in the Balkans, the zone of EU special geopolitical interests, this instrument is not always effective. M. Glenny has said that in the republics of former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania “EU membership often looked (and still looks) like a mirage. Seers from Euroland visit regularly with fables of an opulent and fabulously welcoming city that lies somewhere in the distance. But for the Balkans there is no hard evidence that it really exists.” ²³ On the other hand, financial aid that the United States supplies in exchange of exemption of American citizens from jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on the territories of these countries is very real; the same can be said about the prompt NATO membership in exchange of their respect to American interests.

The situation in the Balkans is another confirmation that the possibilities of expanding the European model of “neo–colonialism” through the enlargement of European Union are limited. Under the basic EU treaties any European country may become a EU member. Where are the geographical boundaries of this enlargement? Is this Muslim Turkey? Or Orthodox Christian Russia the larger part of which lies in Asia? So far, nobody can say whether the future enlargement will succeed. Will the future structure prove equally efficient as the present one of 25 members? The durability test for the European “neo–imperial” model Robert Cooper has offered is still a matter of the future.

EU enlargement is not the only instrument of Europe’s influence on the emerging new world order. Indeed, in post–World War II the Europeans’ ability to suppress old contradictions amid mutual prosperity and dependence, to borrow Churchill’s words, proved to be one of the highest achievements of Europe. ²⁴ The European “post–modernist” system’s tendency to tranquility is its immanent feature while stable and lasting peace relies on legitimacy. This formula is as correct in Europe as elsewhere in the world. Just like force, legitimacy is a source of influence. This is clearly understood in the United States: its leaders asked for international support as represented by the UN as soon as the military phase in Iraq was over. If we take into account the immanent features of the “post–modernist” states (rejection of force as a foreign policy instrument, their readiness to limit sovereignty in favor of supra–national governance, devotion to the principle of consensus in decision–making, etc.) we can say that Europe can mainly influence the shaping of a new world order by strengthening and developing international organizations. Meanwhile, America–s tendency to act unilaterally (unilateralism) that casts doubt on competency and legitimacy of international organizations designed to maintain peace is one of the most alarming in international relations today. How can the Europeans defend their strategic interests? Will they be able to keep the United States within the limits of multisided cooperation?

One should admit that the instruments the Europeans can master to influence their American allies are very limited. It is not wise to hope that the world’s mightiest power will demonstrate benevolence even though influential American experts point out that the international organizations, the UN included, should not be longer ignored. ²⁵

It seems that several factors are behind united Europe’s ability to introduce “post–modernist” elements by strengthening international cooperation (thus contributing to the emergence of a genuine world community in which national interests are not be asserted but harmonized through diplomatic moves).

The Iraqi crisis that quarreled Europeans and Americans and split Europe into an “old” and “new” one has changed the European elites’ political mentality. According to French Foreign Minister D. de Villepin “Europeans realized the absolute need for unity and for a strong position on the international scene.” ²⁶ It seems that a common foreign policy strategy for Europe is not easy to achieve and implement. Like the Balkan countries the European states that supported the U.S. on the Iraqi issue regard the United States rather than the EU the main guarantor of their security.

An absence of an effective common EU foreign policy and security strategy robs Europe of a chance to apply other instruments of influence on the United States. For example, only Italy and Austria supported the Greek initiative to transfer the relations with the Balkan states to the European Commission enlargement department so that to extend to them financial and technical aid to the amount of 4 billion euros. Despite the gradually diminishing American military presence in the Balkans the U.S. influence in this corner of the world is still strong. By contrast, in 2003 the Europeans carried out two operations there: they deployed European forces in Bosnia and European peacekeepers in Macedonia ²⁷ where they replaced the NATO peacekeeping detachments. Even though the European troops continue using the alliance's military facilities the very fact that the peacekeeping functions were transferred to Europeans is a huge step toward European military identity. These positive changes notwithstanding the Europeans are losing a diplomatic war over the Balkans. The same can be said about the EU relationship with other countries where financial aid has not yet been translated into political influence.

To improve the situation, Europe has to develop its own armed forces independent of NATO capable of operating on the continent and outside it. Even though the Europeans have rejected the use of force among themselves the majority of the “modern” states, to use Robert Cooper’s term, still look at their military might as an instrument of asserting their national interests. As the unilateralist trends in the United States are strengthening not only the totalitarian regimes and terrorist organizations but also the states in the instability zones find WMD, nuclear weapons included, more and more attractive. This does nothing to improve the situation in the world. While the totalitarian regimes regard WMD as practically the only guarantee against American invasion the states in the instability zones look at it as a means of pressure (or deterrence) on troublesome neighbors.

The world is becoming increasingly hazardous. An inability of the “failed states” to control their borders allows tension to spread to other countries and destabilize wide regions. These problems require a different approach that excludes the use of force: indeed to restore a state is much harder than to topple down political regime. It seems that the EU should develop a military force contributing to restoration of law and order rather than acting as a factor of threat. The Europeans successfully tested this approach in the Balkans and Central Africa (in summer 2003 troops were introduced into the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo that stopped the wave of violence in the region). The recent Franco–British initiative on European Rapid Reaction Force to be used in UN–sanctioned operations breeds optimism.

Despite the contradictions between America and “old“ Europe over the Iraqi invasion the Europeans will not profit from the U.S. defeat and withdrawal of the allied troops. What they object to is not the U.S. strategy designed to stabilize certain regions but the methods used to implement it. They are convinced that the policy of unilateral actions is fraught with certain dangers. First, it undermines the legitimacy of international institutions (that probably need reforms but should be preserved). Second, it is fraught with dangerous isolation of the United States evidenced by the rising wave of anti–Americanism across the world and the U.S. tendency to ignore the threats to stability in the regions outside its strategic interests. Third, it damages America’s relations with Europe that also needs peace and stability.

Europe’s desire to restore a multisided dialogue does not threaten American hegemony. It is rooted in the tragic experience of two world wars, collapse of political ideologies and disintegration of colonial empires. It is supported by the idea that “foreigners are different and to influence them is difficult” (see pp. 88, 113). One should agree with prominent British historian N. Ferguson who has said: “In any case, the United States and the EU [as well as Russia, China, and other poles of power] . . . have more reasons to cooperate than they have to compete, whether the enemy is terror, AIDS or climate change.” ²⁸

The EU should obviously pursue a more active foreign policy yet one can hardly hope that the “modern” states will readily abandon their stockpiles of WMD while the “failed” states will turn away from the U.S. to the European Union and agree to exchange part of their sovereignty for stability and prosperity. Still Robert Cooper has said about the “world community” that it is wrong to believe that “such a community could never exist and that we should not set it for ourselves as an ultimate and very distant goal” (p. 151).

 

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Endnotes

Note *:  Ekaterina Kuznetsova, head of the European programs, Postindustrial Society Studies Center, Institute of Europe, RAS. Back

Note 1:   R. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty&-;First Century, L., Atlantic Books, 2003 Back

Note 2:   See: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, November/December 2003, p. 152. Back

Note 3:   For more details, see: D. Harvey, The New Imperialism, Oxford–N.Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 2003, pp. 209–210. Back

Note 4:   R. Cooper, op. cit., p. 12 (further on references to R. Cooper’s book are given in the text). Back

Note 5:   See: N. Chomsky, Preventive War “The Supreme Crime” Iraq: Invasion That Will Live in Infamy at http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4416.htm. Back

Note 6:   For more details, see: O. de Rivero, The Myth of Development. The Non–Viable Economies of the 21st Century, L.–N.Y., Zed Books, 2001, p. 147 Back

Note 7:   For more details, see: R. Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, No. 113, June/July 2002, p. 8. Back

Note 8:   R. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order, N.Y., Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, p. 38. Back

Note 9:   For more details, see: A. Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Paris, OECD Development Centre, 2001, p. 27, etc. Back

Note 10:   M. Mazower, “Do not Mourn the End of the West,” Financial Times, May 28, 2003, p. 13. Back

Note 11:   B. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam. Holy War and Unholy Terror, L., Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003, p. 47. Back

Note 12:   L. Cohen–Tanugi, Les sentinelles de la liberte. L’Europe et l’Amerique au seuil du XXIe siecle, P., Odile Jacob, 2003, p. 73. Back

Note 13:   W. Hutton, The World We're In, L., Little, Brown, 2002, p. 16. Back

Note 14:   See, for example: J. Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties. A New Story of the World’s Most Prosperous Decade, N.Y.–L., W.W. Norton & Co., 2003, pp. 17–18. Back

Note 15:   For more details, see: V. Inozemtsev and E. Kuznetsova, Vozvrashchenie Evropy. Shtrikhi k portretu Starogo Sveta v novom stoletii, Moscow, Interdialekt +, 2002, p. 42–75. Back

Note 16:   R. Harvey, Global Disorder, L., Constable, 2003, p. 74. Back

Note 17:   C. Kupchan, The End of the American Era. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty–First Century, N.Y., Alfred A. Knopf, 2002, p. 63. Back

Note 18:   Zb. Brzezinski, The Geostrategic Triad. Living with China, Europe, and Russia, Washington (DC), The CSIS Press, 2001, p. 29. Back

Note 19:   R. Harvey, op. cit., p. 74. Back

Note 20:   Quoted from: H. Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Towards a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, N.Y., Simon & Schuster, 2001, p. 295. Back

Note 21:   Ibidem. Back

Note 22:   For more details, see: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_tk_final.pdf. Back

Note 23:   M. Glenny, “Balkan Proxy War,” Prospect, 2003, August, No. 89. Back

Note 24:   W.S. Churchill, The Second World War, L., Cassel, 1965, Vol. 1, p. 26. Back

Note 25:   For more details, see: M. Albright, “United Nations,” Foreign Policy, September/October 2003. Back

Note 26:   D. de Villepin, “Not from Mars,” Newsweek, Special Issue, December 2003–February 2004, p. 16. Back

Note 27:   L. de Barochez, “L’Europe de la défense a besoin de Paris et Londres,” Le Figaro, 24 Novembre 2003, p. 5. Back

Note 28:   N. Ferguson, “American Terminator,” Newsweek, Special Issue, December 2003– February 2004, p. 12. Back