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CIAO DATE: 07/04
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Saddam Hussein Was Advised to Resign and Hold Democratic Elections
Ye. Primakov *
I would like to make a few considerations as the world has entered the post–9/11 era. I will say from the start that I am not in favor of dividing the world by such a Rubicon: before 9/11 and after 9/11. Even though these events made a great impact on the evolution of the international situation, they are not a boundary that separates the past and the present. This view is held mainly by those who, under the pretense of adaptation to a new reality, would like to set the stage for a shift in international relations, abandoning the “old,” proven mechanisms of joint action.
Nonetheless, these events continue to make an impact. A self–sufficient, self–financing terrorist organization has evolved that operates in many countries and is not affiliated with any one state or government. This is an entirely new phenomenon. Whereas earlier, major international players were states or international organizations created by those states, now a new kind of "player" has emerged. Had such an organization as Al Qaeda been directly linked to any particular state in the Near East, one of the world’s intelligence services would have had far more information about it than there is now.
How did the international community react to the 11/9 tragedy? The United States set out to wipe out terrorist bases in Afghanistan. We wholeheartedly supported the U.S. military operation, and did the right thing. That also helped address some of our own concerns – not only in combating international terrorism in general but in clamping down on terrorist activity in Chechnya. Terrorist, including Chechen, training camps were liquidated, and channels of their financial support from Afghanistan were disrupted. We also knew that the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan would lessen the pressure that Islamic circles were bringing down to bear on the Central Asian republics. So our support was well substantiated, dictated by objective necessity, and was entirely in harmony with our national interests.
Later on, however, a line toward unilateralism began to prevail in the United States, whose operation in Afghanistan was supported by virtually all states. Importantly, that line did not evolve spontaneously, driven by emotions in the wake of 11/9. Recently, the so–called neo–conservatives, such as Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Pearl, and others, have consolidated their positions there. Back in 1992, they drew up new defense policy guidelines. The document was authored by Wolfowitz. It said in part that with the Cold War over, the United States would be able to ensure its security only with preventive strikes. This included identification of regimes that posed or could pose a threat to the United States.
But even after they had to resign their official positions following Clinton’s victory over Bush Sr., neoconservatives continued their efforts, setting up the Project for the New American Century that in 2000 issued a document on reforming the U.S. defense system – in effect, a follow–up on the defense policy guidelines.
After Bush Jr. came to power, the group considerably strengthened its positions within the U.S. establishment. Unilateral decision–making and action became not only theory but practice. In Iraq, that was done in circumvention of the UN. The purpose of the operation was periodically reviewed. At first it was to destroy weapons of mass destruction, then to wipe out Al Qaeda. As a matter of fact, there was no conclusive evidence of the presence of either WMD or Al Qaeda bases there. But the operation was carried out, and we can now see on the practical level the consequences of unilateral policy, including the abandonment of joint decision–making and joint efforts.
What has happened in Iraq is well known. The Iraqi army was quickly routed. And it could not have been otherwise. The military hardware on the two sides was incomparable. The United States made a successful use of its high mobility and information technology. Special priority was given to personnel protection. U.S. intelligence operations were apparently of tremendous importance.
The Russian president sent me with his oral message to Saddam Hussein shortly before the military operation began. That was a little more than three weeks before the outbreak of the war. I conveyed President V.V. Putin’s message to him. As it was impossible to prevent U.S. strikes, Saddam Hussein was recommended to resign as president and ask parliament to hold a democratic election. He refused. He tapped me on the shoulder and left. As a matter of fact, I was stunned by his calm. I thought he probably hoped that salvation would come at the last moment and that the United States and Great Britain would not go ahead with the strike. Or maybe he had already sacrificed himself.
Now that the military operation is over, it seems to me that there was a kind of a collusion.
Be that as it may, there are still many question marks. First of all, why were the bridges over which tanks entered Baghdad not blown up? Where were Saddam Hussein’s aviation and tanks? Why did the national guard, which was combat–worthy enough, give up resistance virtually overnight? Finally, why did Saddam Hussein accuse his generals of treason? It is not ruled out that the Americans had established contacts with Saddam Hussein’s entourage, cutting a deal with it, including also saving his life. He may not have known about that.
Well, what now? After the war, practically not a single problem has been solved in Iraq. And the United States is very far from solving them. The number one problem is the ongoing guerilla war and resistance. The number of U.S. servicemen killed in Iraq has exceeded the U.S. death toll before May 2003, when Bush announced that the war was over. Therefore, even with the war apparently over, hostilities have in fact intensified. This is not the only problem, but what about Iraq’s state structure? Some U.S. experts believe that the country should be organized as a federation with the Shi’ites getting autonomy. Shi’ites account for 60 percent of Iraq’s population; they are concentrated not only in the south but also in other areas. But if a Shi’ite autonomy is established in the south of Iraq, this will strengthen the radical Islamic element. Shi’ite parties hold radical positions with strong aspirations to taking power in Baghdad. All of this is happening next to Iran, a Shi’ite country, which could seriously affect the internal lineup of forces, strengthening Islamic extremism in the country. As we know, there are two main powerhouses in Iran – President Khatami as a rallying figure for pro–reform forces, and Qum, the religious center. This will lead to a consolidation of anti–presidential forces. Or take the Kurdish problem. How to deal with it? The Kurds already had autonomy under Saddam Hussein. Now they will certainly want to have more than that – either a newly independent state or accession to the Qirkuk and Mosul autonomy with their rich oil fields. Turkey says that in either case it will bring its troops into northern Iraq. In other words, the situation is extremely complicated.
In these conditions, the United States started retreating from its earlier statements on Iraq. At first, when the Americans had entered Iraq, the keynote of their statements was this: No UN. No UN flags. What now? The Security Council has already adopted three resolutions on Iraq, which were also supported by the United States. Even if these resolutions fall short of a setup wherein the UN comes to replace the occupation force, as we would like it to be the case, this is definitely a step forward. It is a step toward getting the UN involved in the process and recognizing that the United States will not be able to do anything single–handedly.
By attacking Iraq the United States objectively weakened the antiterrorist effort – not only in that certain states refused to support U.S. policy in Iraq. But they turned their back on Afghanistan where terror is still a problem. Karzai with his government is virtually in control of Kabul and its suburbs. In the periphery, Karzai’s control is far from absolute. As is known, Karzai wants to create a regular army. But this is rather a tall order. Field commanders in their majority are not ready to submit. The former Northern Alliance, comprising ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks, controls both security services and armed formations. So all is not so simple in Afghanistan. There are even terms on which the Taliban could return to power – perhaps under somebody else’s flag. At any rate, Pushtu tribes, which play a major role in Afghanistan, retain control of a vast area on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to some reports, this is where both Al Qaeda headquarters and bin Laden himself are still based. Please note that Pakistan is not carrying out any operations in this zone, which also extends to its own territory. Neither is the United States conducting any military action there. One major reason for this is that the United States is too deeply involved in Iraq.
How is Russia supposed to act in these conditions? There were three main options. The first option is to stick to its guns, refusing to support any U.S. operations in Iraq and seeking no contact with the Americans. This option is unacceptable. Why? Because we would have rolled back into a Cold War era and an arms race as it was then. The second option was to accept everything that the United States was doing, just as certain states had. Apart from other things, that would have done nothing to precipitate the evolution of the U.S. position. But most importantly, this option would have been a step toward an extremely dangerous division of the world – this time not on ideological but on civilizational/religious grounds.
The threat of such division is very serious indeed. S. Huntington, one of the leading U.S. experts on international relations, says bluntly that the future world order will be based on the existence of one superpower, several big powers, and a number of small states. The superpower will be calling all the shots. On the other hand, contradictions within the system of international relations are not contradictions between states anymore but, according to Huntington, between civilizations. This scenario would be disastrous for mankind, feeding terrorism and going nowhere.
Finally, the third option is what I believe is the solely correct solution: to preserve our position of principle – i.e., to treat the U.S. actions in Iraq as a gross historical mistake, but at the same time not allow it to slip into anti–Americanism.
This solution takes many important factors into account. Without the United States, it is impossible to combat international terrorism. Without the United States, it is impossible to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Recent events show that the United States is reviewing its position even toward North Korea, making it more flexible and agreeing to drop its demand that the DPRK first abandon its nuclear program as a prerequisite to everything else. Washington also is talking about the possibility of a formal document being signed – true, within the framework of the group of six, but still a formal non–aggression pact, as North Korea insists. None of these problems can be solved without the United States.
Public opinion in the United States is shifting and there is a measure of opposition to its action in Iraq. Had we adopted not a balanced but an anti–American position, this mood may not have evolved in the first place. At the same time that would have prodded those European countries, which refused to follow the United States, into the American neo-conservative fold.
Had Russia’s position on Iraq slipped into anti–Americanism that would also have impaired the effort to resolve regional conflicts, above all the conflict in the Middle East. It has already provided breeding grounds for international terrorism. After 11/9, the United States took steps – not immediately though – showing that it somewhat reviewed its Middle East policy. There is reason to say that it accepted our idea of moving away from its mediation monopoly to expanding the mediation mission to include Russia which, together with the United States, is co–chair of the Madrid Conference, also bringing in the EU and the UN. And so this quartet went into action. Thus the United States moved away from the monopolization idea.
Many prominent Western figures – U.S. but even more so European – strongly support the recent Israeli–Palestinian peace plan. It was signed by parties that had reached agreement on all acute issues. But the signatories on the Israeli side are people who are now out of office. They are not the ones who call the shots in Israel today. It is the Sharon–led right that does. Its positions are in effect consolidated by terrorist acts perpetrated by Palestinian suicide bombers. Those who think that Arafat is behind all of this are wrong. In the final analysis, Palestinians do not stand to gain from this. I believe that more and more people, including among the Israeli public, tend to embrace the ideas set forth in this document. It is essential, in some form or other, to interlock the main provisions of the agreements that were reached between the Israeli left and Palestinians with the road map to peace, which was adopted by the Middle East Quartet. This, however, requires harmonization with, above all, the United States.
* Yevgeniy Primakov, President of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The article is based on a lecture that Mr. Primakov gave in accepting an honorary doctor diploma at the RF Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Academy.