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CIAO DATE: 03/04
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Russian-Chinese Relations: At Their Peak?
M. Margelov *
Many experts are convinced that the main international developments in the new century will somehow or other be affected by U.S.-Chinese political and economic rivalry. In the meantime, Russia could end up at the epicenter of a rather complex and tricky intertwining of interests, policy courses, and related processes. The task is to get the right perspective on the character and essence of our relations with the PRC and the United States in a global political context. The purpose of the present article is to make a step in this direction and identify, for a start, a number of essential factors in the evolution of Russian-Chinese relations.
Today, foreign policy moves by the world's sole superpower as well as major regional players are predetermined by an interrelation of and rivalry between two types of policy - realpolitik (based on the use of force) and plurality policy (liberal). In following mainly traditional geopolitical guidelines, the U.S. administration is increasingly gravitating toward realpolitik. This policy consists in the use of force to resolve international issues with military and economic power being a main criterion in appraising both allies and opponents. Contemporary global situation assessment purely in terms of classic U.S. policy (in line with H. Morgentau postulates), today, proves inconsistent and largely contradictory. This may be why contemporary works by both foreign and domestic authors make no reference to Morgentau while his principles are being adapted to the new system of international relations and to the U.S. role within this system.
Amid ongoing globalization, this system so evolves that any, even successful, use of force by any one country leads to unpredictable and hard-to-control results. In a globalizing, and therefore "small," world, a local effect is increasingly dissociated from a systemic effect. A case in point are the consequences of U.S. policy in the wake of September 11, 2001, in particular the "act of retribution" in Afghanistan and the "preventive punishment" of Iraq. These actions had a less than favorable impact on the United States in the world at large - from a rise in anti-American sentiments to disagreements with its main European allies to - in a certain sense - even protective action, taken not only by major regional players. Orientation toward the world's superpower following a realpolitik course prompts national governments to upgrade and give higher priority to one of the main criteria of this policy - the military might.
To China, the operation in Afghanistan is, above all, the deployment of U.S. forward based military units on its borders and the subsequent deployment of PLA forces in adjacent areas. Furthermore, it is China's activity within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). As for the operation in Iraq, its main implications for Beijing are primarily the U.S. tightening control over Middle East oil while China's need for this oil steadily grows just as its economy grows. In this context, experts see as hardly accidental North Korea's nuclear demarche, followed by consultations with U.S. participation and, in effect, under China's aegis. The impression is that China and the United States are beginning a major horse-trade in a number of areas, including oil and, possibly, the extent of U.S. interference in Southeast Asia. Thus far it is hard to tell whether the process will also affect the issue of Taiwan.
Both Russian-Chinese relations and China's military doctrine, as presented in a White Book, can be used among the Chinese arguments in this dispute. This doctrine provides, in particular, for strengthening the country's national defense without reliance on any allies or participation in any blocs. But whereas China, in its defense policy, had for a long time placed a bet on the PLA's numerical superiority, now priority is to be shifted to military hardware and equipment, and personnel training. 1
This reorientation is necessitated not only by the pragmatic requirements of economic reform, but also by the perception of the contemporary world order as "unjust" and "basically unchanged." Speaking at the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of China (November, 2002) Jiang Zemin described the present-day world as "highly unstable." This world issues "formidable multiple challenges," bringing about terrorism and "new forms of hegemonism in politics." As usual, no countries were specified. Jiang Zemin spoke about border and territorial disputes, contradictions between North and South, and "local conflicts arising from ethnic-communal contradictions." 2
Everything to do with defense and nuclear weapons in China is shrouded in a veil of secrecy and disinformation. Even so, China is generally believed to have a limited amount of nuclear and missile weapons. Yet it is China - the sole of the legally recognized nuclear powers - that is building up these weapons. China's air and sea based nuclear systems are thus far designed to protect the country's borders, not to engage intercontinental targets. Nonetheless, its ground based forces, although comprised of a small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (from six to 24, according to various sources), are capable of hitting targets in Russia and the United States. Furthermore, over the past two decades China has been intensively modernizing its strategic weapons. 3
According to U.S. China-watchers, the number of missiles aimed at targets in Taiwan, Japan, and on the territory of other U.S. allies is growing. In the summer of 1999, the DF-31 missile was successfully tested. The missile is a new generation of mobile solid-propellant intercontinental missiles with a range covering the western part of the United States. Before 2010, China is planning to deploy DF-41 missiles, capable of hitting targets on the entire territory of North America. Moreover, China is in a position to arm all intercontinental ballistic missiles on alert duty with multiple warheads.
The pace of China's strategic weapons modernization has been influenced by the vulnerability of its missile launchers, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and its intention to deploy a national missile defense system, and the U.S. achievements in building non-nuclear precision guided weapons. Another factor in the intensification of China's nuclear military programs is its increasing concern over Russia's nuclear forces. The Chinese leadership is also closely watching Japan's "nuclear future."
What is important, however, is that it is not Russia but the United States that China sees as a source of possible threats, above all, the threat of a conflict around Taiwan. It would seem that this orientation of Chinese military planning is conducive to Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that in the nuclear weapons sphere, China has set itself quite a feasible task: within the next 15 to 20 years, to draw level with the United States and attain superiority over Russia.
China supports all international treaties on nonproliferation and arms control whenever this concerns other countries. But it is extremely wary of any application of these treaties that could affect Chinese interests. At any rate, despite all efforts by the United States, a Chinese-U.S. nuclear arms control agreement has yet to be signed.
Another major factor in the evolution of Russian-Chinese relations is the apparent continuity of the course pursued by the new Chinese leadership. Many experts believe that the purported contradictions between different generations of Chinese politicians are greatly exaggerated.
Of course, in a dynamically developing China, different points of view on the further course of reform are inevitable. But politico-ideological differences are typical of any country: Conservatives, moderates, and radicals exist everywhere. The conservative wing within the Chinese leadership is represented mainly by top army and intelligence service officers. They see themselves as loyal adherents to and followers of Mao Zedong's ideas. Radicals and reformers favor an accelerated liberalization of economic reform. Finally, moderate politicians are those who have been conducting reform on the ground over the past several decades. They are looking for a "golden mean" between reforms ensuring economic growth and liberalization that could cause social tension in the country, including as a result of growing unemployment, which is already rather high.
Inner-party differences within the Communist Party of China ahead of the 16th Congress were settled by bureaucratic methods, in two stages. At stage one (spring-summer 2002), it became clear that Jiang Zemin would resign as general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the congress, and as PRC president in March 2003, at a parliamentary session. In his time Deng Xiaoping proposed Vice Chairman Hu Jintao of the Military Committee of the CPC Central Committee as his successor. And this was what in fact happened. The change of generations was balanced out by Jiang Zemin's getting the position as chairman of the Central Military Council.
Stage two: the search for consensus at the 16th Congress, in November 2002. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao sought to co-opt as many of their supporters into the party's supreme political body - the standing committee of the Central Committee Politburo - as possible. In a compromise formula, it was decided to enlarge the body from seven to nine members. Entire party power in China is concentrated in the hands of Hu Jintao. In the top political body, however, there is a complete - four to four - balance of "moderate reformers" (Jiang Zemin and Li Peng followers) and "committed reformers" (Hu Jintao and Zhu Rongji people). 4
The 16th Congress of the CPC made no substantial changes to China's foreign or domestic policy. It was announced that China was ready to counter terrorism in all of its manifestations. Understandably, the main hotbed of terrorism for China is the Eastern Turkestan Liberation Front, which, like all modern terrorist organizations, has a network in Central Asia and Europe. Beijing's antiterrorist rhetoric received an impetus from a calculated move by the U.S. administration that included the Front on the list of terrorist organizations. Experts noted that China reacted in a rather restrained manner to Washington's policy in Iraq: There were no anti-American statements or meaningful references to the veto power at the UN Security Council, etc.
At the same time, China is in no hurry to abandon its long-standing role as leader of the developing world suffering from "hegemonism." The Congress reaffirmed Beijing's traditional view of the democratization and equity of international relations - in particular, preservation of the diversity of the world and of national development models, and resolution of political problems without the use of force, through negotiations. "Internal problems of each particular country should be decided by its own people while global issues should be addressed on the basis of equal to equal consultations by all countries," a Congress resolution said.
China is a significant and active participant in the globalization process. Yet Jiang Zemin, in his report at the congress, said nothing either about global government or about global, or universal, international law. Instead, he spoke about China's multilateral diplomacy and its role at the UN and other international organizations. In other words, despite its apparently neutral rhetoric, the Chinese leadership understands and is ready to take on the "challenges of globalization," in particular, by putting a thrust on multilateral diplomacy and economic interaction.
Globalization of China's foreign policy is borne out by practice. In this context, experts mention China's admission to the WTO, its active participation in building the SCO (with a special emphasis on the organization's antiterrorist component), and China's activity within the APEC. Observers point to such Chinese initiatives as consultations within the ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea format, creation of an ASEAN plus China zone of free trade, and a number of others.
At the SCO heads of government meeting in September 2003, China came up with the initiative to create a free trade zone within the organization's framework. Experts see this as a new line of economic policy pursued by the Chinese leadership, as formulated by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. The Chinese prime minister placed a special emphasis on improving infrastructure for trade and investment in the region. It was proposed to form a free trade zone by 2020. Mikhail Kasyanov, representing the Russian side at the meeting, supported the proposal, especially given that the program of trade and economic cooperation within the SCO framework, approved in Beijing, was calculated exactly until 2020.
Nonetheless, in building relations with China, it is important to take into account the corresponding priorities that were set at the CPC Congress. In accordance with the country's economic interests, top priority was given to the West; friendly neighboring countries come second (experts believe that Russia is among them), followed by the developing world. Before, friendly neighboring countries came first.
Observers point to contradictions in the proclaimed conditions for the stability of Chinese society. The political system, kept intact since the Mao Zedong era, holds back the liberalization of the country's economic life. Meanwhile, liberalization is key to resolving various, including social, problems. So to consolidate society, China still needs an "external enemy," even if an unspecified one. This is due to the fact that China's policy is subordinated to economic tasks. According to Chinese experts, to maintain stability and to control unemployment, the country needs an annual GDP growth of at least 7 percent. This is possible, however, only with the ongoing investment, above all foreign investment volumes. This imposes serious constraints on China's foreign policy with regard to the United States, Japan, and the West as a whole on the one hand, and Russia, on the other.
It should be noted that any "statistical judgments" about China's economic situation are perforce contradictory. Thus, according to one set of figures, in the 1979-2001 period, total capital investment in China's economy was approximately $400 billion. According to other sources, 5 it was $654 billion, $350 billion of which was actually tapped. Other indicators can provide a better clue to judgment on China's economic problems. As of 2000, the Bank of China's gold and currency reserves were in excess of $160 billion, excluding the reserves in Hong Kong (approximately $120 billion). Foreign debt, however, stands at $130 billion with a peak of payments until 2005.
Today Russian-Chinese relations have reached the highest point in the last 40 years. Yet in assessing these relations, it is essential to factor in the interdependence of the Russia-U.S.-China triangle, complicated by the relationships between each of its apexes and Japan, India, the Middle East, Central Asia, and countries of the Asia Pacific region. Although of course Russia and China have in the past decade managed to overcome a period of ideological wars and tensions.
Experts believe that border and territorial issues remain key in China's relations with its neighbors. 6 Delimitation of the Russian-Chinese border goes back to what historians regard as the disputable Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689. It was followed by a large number of more specific agreements with tsarist Russia. But the Chinese side declared all of them "rapacious." That enabled Mao Zedong, in his time, to say that there were 1.5 million square kilometers of "disputed territory" while 1969 saw armed clashes in the region of the Damanskii Peninsula and Lake Zhalanshkol'. Negotiations began, and in 1991 a coordinated state border was established (the Agreement on the State Border between the USSR and the PRC of May 16, 1991). The Soviet Union made territorial concessions (more than 1,000 square kilometers). But the sides failed to agree on two sections - the Bolshoi island on the Argun' and the Bolshoi Ussuriiskii and Tarabarov islands on the Amur.
Border issues were discussed also after the breakup of the Soviet Union. In 1995, a Russian-Chinese agreement on cooperation in border protection was signed. Two years later, a Russian-Chinese declaration on a multipolar world and formation of a new international order was adopted. That same year, 1997, an agreement on mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area was signed and its demarcation from Mongolia to the Turmangan River completed. In 1998, a joint declaration, Russian-Chinese Relations on the Threshold of the 21st Century, and a joint statement on Russian-Chinese border issues were signed. In March 1999, the demarcated border was marked on the ground, with a length of 4,195.2 kilometers in the east and 54.7 kilometers in the west. The status of the three islands remained unsettled.
In the course of his visit to China in September 2003, RF Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said "a formula has today been found" on a section of border that "until recently has been a big issue, and the problem will be resolved in the foreseeable future."
In the summer of 2000, in the course of RF President Vladimir Putin's visit to China, a joint statement on missile defense and a Beijing declaration were signed. Finally, in July 2001, at a summit meeting in Moscow, the Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and China was signed. The document provides, in particular, that the sides will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other, will not target their strategic missiles against each other, and will come into contact in situations jeopardizing peace or threatening aggression against either side.
Yet this new treaty is nothing like the treaty of alliance that was signed in 1950 (the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance). The new document does not contain any obligations on joint defense in the event of aggression. It is only noted that the sides have no territorial claims to each other, that the established borders will be respected while negotiations will continue on disputed sections of the border with the status quo preserved in the meantime. Yet the Chinese side has its own understanding of "the absence of territorial claims." "China has never maintained that it ever had, or now has, territorial claims to us, but only the just demand that its legitimate rights be restored." 7
A part of the Chinese elite tends to blame the outstanding border problems of China and Central Asian states on tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. It is also essential to take into account China's approach toward border disputes. If it fails to obtain an advantage, China accepts the status quo, then using the situation for diplomatic games. Many Sinologists are concerned by the prevalence of nationalist views in Chinese scientific and political literature.
Nonetheless, enshrining of Russian-Chinese strategic partnership in the 2001 Treaty is nothing short of success. Experts attribute the 2001 Treaty to a commonality of Chinese-Russian interests in several important spheres: preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of the two countries, the need to ensure global strategic stability and integration into the world economy with due consideration for the national interests of both Russia and China. This concern for essential stability was demonstrated by Hu Jintao's first state visit broad, to Moscow, which should not of course be seen as preference to the relationship with Moscow over the relationship with Washington. 8 The best evidence of the two countries' friendly relations today is the advancement of economic contacts, including military-technical cooperation. This cooperation between Russia (USSR) and China was interrupted in the 1950s and resumed in the 1990s.
China, in the process of military reform, gives high priority to the combat readiness of its armed forces. In the first half of the 1990s, China took delivery of two shipments of Su-27SK and Su-27UKB fighters. According to official Russian sources, the first shipment was comprised of 26 aircraft. In 1996, China received another 16 one-seat Su-27SK and six two-seat Su-27UKB fighters. That same year a contract was signed granting China license to produce Su-27 fighters (200 fighters at the Shenyang factory). Experts put the contract at up to $2.5 billion.
In 2001, another contract (signed in 1999) for delivery of several dozen (up to 40) Su-30MKK fighters was carried out. According to reports in the press, a new contract on this model of aircraft was signed with the Russian side in 2001.
Modernization of China's armed forces is proceeding along all lines. Russia reportedly supplied two large surface vessels and four submarines to China. Under a 1997 contract, in 2000-01, two Sovremennyi class destroyers (Project 956E) arrived in China. In 2002, a $1.4 billion contract for delivery of several more destroyers (upgraded Project 956EM) was signed. That same year, Russian media also reported a contract under which China was to get eight Project 636 diesel submarines. Experts point out that new supplies of Russian arms and equipment (naval antiaircraft systems) to the Chinese Navy will enable Chinese warships to enter the middle oceanic zone (operating outside of Japan, Taiwan, and the western coast of Borneo).
To strengthen China's air-defense system, in the 1992-99 period, Russia supplied medium and shorter ranger antiaircraft missile systems (SA-10 and SA-15, respectively). Today cooperation in this sphere continues as China imports more advanced systems from Russia. PLA modernizers are less interested in Russian weapon deliveries for the Ground Forces. 9
Experts believe that with the ongoing pace of military modernization China could within the next 10 to 15 years emerge as a global competitor to the United States, as the Soviet Union was in its time. Thus, China aspires not only to attain military domination not only over Taiwan, but also to control the situation in the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. More than half of all oil imported by China is shipped through the strait. 10
One priority in Russian-Chinese economic relations is cooperation in the nuclear sphere. Thus, in the summer of 2003, the Seventh Session of the Russian-Chinese Sub-commission on Nuclear Matters discussed joint building of a floating nuclear power station using Russian atomic shipbuilding technology. The project is worth $150 million. The sub-commission also discussed construction of the Tianwang nuclear power station and a uranium enrichment plant. China is currently building an experimental fast-neutron reactor with Russian participation as cooperation in the conversion sphere continues. Other joint priority projects include high capacity computers and laser and materials technology. There are good prospects for joint Russian-Chinese projects in space nuclear engineering. Work is also in progress on designing an energy saving thermal-emission reactor/transformer for spacecraft.
On September 25, 2003, in Beijing, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said that the RF government is ready to grant China a credit to build the second stage of the Tianwang nuclear power station. The Russian side expects China, by 2005, to hold a tender on a contract to build the second stage of the station. Kasyanov expressed confidence that the contract will be awarded to Russian companies.
Amid the ongoing globalization, China and Russia are equally interested in integrating into the global economy. In particular, both countries, with varying success, are developing economic relations with countries in the Asia Pacific region. Furthermore, invigoration of trade and economic relations with China helps Russia address an important internal problem - socio-economic development of the remote parts of Russia's East Siberia and Far East bordering China.
Today, China is Russia's third largest non-CIS trading partner, after Germany and the United States. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said that Russia's trade with China in 2003 was worth $13 billion to $14 billion. China is adjusting its foreign economic contacts to WTO requirements. China's admission to the organization has brought it more benefit than problem. It secured preferences and the right to participate in shaping the world's economic order and to uphold its interests through negotiations. There is good reason to say that the pace of China's integration into the global economy is far higher than Russia's.
Except for nuclear programs and military-technical cooperation, the structure of Russian-Chinese trade is antiquated. With other partners China trades in modern, quality goods. Russia supplies China with ferrous and non-ferrous metals, timber, and fuel with a shrinking share of machinery and equipment. China exports to Russia foodstuffs and consumer goods. Experts believe that the structure of trade can only be improved through joint investment in machine-building, energy, and high-tech projects. China, however, does not show particular interest in this. Chinese economists suppose that regional and cross-border cooperation will remain the mainstay of economic relations with Russia in the foreseeable future. The high level of political relations between Russia and China has yet to be matched by their relations in the economic sphere. 11
Nonetheless, shifts for the better are possible here. In the course of Mikhail Kasyanov's visit to Beijing this past September, the Russian prime minister set out priorities for foreign economic relations with China, which are designed to improve the structure of trade. Within the SCO as a whole, Kasyanov singled out such areas of economic cooperation as development of transport infrastructure, the energy sector, environmental protection, and the drinking water problem. At the same time, Mikhail Kasyanov placed a special emphasis on Russian supplies of machinery, above all, energy and aviation equipment, to the Chinese market. "Our military-technical cooperation is making good progress," the prime minister observed. Another priority is creation of timber, fish and sea-food processing enterprises in border areas. True, the Chinese still called for stepping up supplies of raw materials from Russia. So the RF prime minister mentioned the oil and gas sector as the third priority in Russia's economic relations with China.
China's developing economy has an acute shortage of oil. It is strategically important for Russia to expand oil export not only to China but also to other Asia Pacific countries, a more promising oil market than Western Europe. It would be wrong to say that Russia shows no interest in developing the Asia Pacific energy market. A draft energy strategy covering a period until 2020 says: "Russia's presence on the Asia Pacific energy market is necessitated by the building of the Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline (with capacity of up to 50 million tonnes a year) with a link to the city of Daqing (China)."
Experts note that Russia's oil export capacity is not backed up by the requisite transport infrastructure. In particular, Russian oil companies have no access to deep-water terminals and therefore no opportunity to develop new oil markets in the United States and the Asia Pacific region. It is planned to build such terminals, but there is no consensus among Russian companies about the priority of such projects.
Transneft company proposes a route leading to a deep-water port in Russia's Far East: an Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline. Implementation of this project could revitalize the economy of Russia's Far East, which borders China, and expand the Russian oil market to include the United States and Asia Pacific region.
For all of the project's strategic importance, oil companies have yet to provide firm guarantees that they will ship sufficient oil to operate the oil pipeline to Nakhodka at capacity. This includes Yukos, a leading oil producer, which shows far greater interest in a projected oil pipeline that goes directly to China - Angarsk-Daqing. This project raises no objections from the point of view of advancing Russian-Chinese relations. Furthermore, in addition to Yukos, other companies - e.g., Rosneft, Sibneft, and Lukoil - are ready to ship oil for the pipeline.
The "eastern" route (to Nakhodka) and the "Chinese" route (to Daqing) differ in their strategic potential. The route to Nakhodka ensures access to a sea transshipment terminal than can handle 300,000-tonne tankers. This helps further diversify Russian oil importers in the region with Japan, South Korea, and other Southeast Asian nations, and the western coast of the United States. The Angarsk-Daqing oil pipeline is designed only for oil export to China which will itself control the flow, including possible transit to third countries. A final decision has yet to be made. One thing is clear, though: Foreign policy intertwined with economic interests is rather capital intensive. If the Chinese model is followed, foreign economic priorities should coincide with foreign policy priorities. It should be borne in mind that the energy - i.e., oil and gas - component is a very high priority in what is today called globalization.
As of now, neither route to China has yet undergone environmental appraisal. During his visit to Beijing, Mikhail Kasyanov reassured the Chinese side, saying that oil pipelines to China will be built no matter what. Meanwhile, the RF prime minister promised to increase crude oil supplies to China by rail up to 5.5 million tonnes in 2005.
In addition to energy export, Russia's transport complex can play a major role in Russian-Chinese relations. Oil export stimulates the development of new oil and gas fields in Eastern Siberia and the Far East, which is bound to contribute to advancement of these regions. But Russian transport routes, which could link China, Japan, and Korea with Central and Eastern Europe, can drastically change international trading routes in favor of Russia.
As is known, the traditional commercial route from Europe to Asia is by sea, via the Suez Canal. This is due, in particular, to the transport flow stimulating policy of multinational shipping companies: The average tariff for cargo shipment from Europe to Far Eastern ports is today half the average railway tariff. The cost-effectiveness of shipment is not only a factor of tariffs but also of time. The Suez Canal is becoming a bottleneck, and international carriers are giving increasing attention to rail transport. Cargo shipment by rail from Europe to the Far East is 40 percent faster than by sea. Also, there is a possibility for an appreciable reduction in the cost of container shipment by rail. The market situation is generally conducive to development of the TransSiberian Railroad for transportation of cargo from Europe to Asia and from Asia to Europe. The railroad has capacity of up to 100 million tonnes a year, including 140,000 containers.
Development of the TransSiberian Railroad is necessitated by China's plans to build a new "Silk Route" to Europe bypassing Russia and Kazakhstan. It is 1,300 kilometers shorter than the TransSiberian route, beginning at Shanghai and leading on to Turkey and Eastern Europe. This "Silk Route" attracts China in that it can link its transport system to the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz. A 200-kilometer section, from Osh to Kashgar, needs to be built for the Trans-Chinese railroad to go into operation. Understandably, Japan, South and North Korea, and other Asia Pacific countries are interested in the rail project.
It should be noted that the new "Silk Route" passes through territories that are not characterized by a level of political stability that is necessary to guarantee safe and secure cargo shipment. In this respect, the TransSiberian Railroad has an advantage. Experts see the main impediment to the development of this route in the imperfection of Russian laws, in particular, the long and convoluted customs procedure that scares off carriers operating on the time-is-money principle. Furthermore, transit cargo moving from East to West is subject to import duty that is refunded on Russia's western border. This is done to counter smuggling, but even a temporary immobilization of carriers' assets sharply lowers their competitiveness. Another inexplicable problem is double customs clearance of cargo on the Russian and Belorusian border - this, given that the two countries purportedly have a common customs area. In order not to miss out on potential advantages from the Russian East-West route, it is critical to harmonize the existing regulations with laws that are in effect in neighboring countries. This would give Russia a new window of opportunity to invigorate business activity in its Far East and Maritime region - say, developing shipment to China and the United States by using the transport system and ports of Russia's Far East. There are also various projects designed to optimize East-West and East-U.S. routes. Russian experts, however, believe that many of them only dissipate resources, spreading them thin on the ground, so the thrust should be placed on developing the TransSiberian Railroad with an option of building an Irkutsk-Chita line to Ulan Bator with access to China and Korea. As for the "Silk Route," it is not designed to undermine the importance of the TranSiberian Railroad. These routes link different territories in Europe and Asia while in the context of globalization, they complement each other, helping put in place an integrated transport system.
Thus far active economic (and therefore, also political) contacts with China can only be seen as potentialities. Tapping them comes up against formidable obstacles. This century, East Asia will possibly emerge as one of the main regions of competition in the post-Yalta world, primarily between the United States and China. The future of Russia's Far East and Maritime region and the development of relations with Asia Pacific countries is to a very large extent contingent on Russia's policy in this situation.
One impediment to Russia's full-fledged participation in APEC is its perception by Asian countries. To them, Russia remains an alien civilization, oriented toward Europe, and seeking a rapprochement with Asia exceptionally as a means of strengthening her positions in relations with the United States, the EU, and the Islamic world. From this perspective, Russia's position is ambiguous: To the Europeans, geographic presence in Europe is not a sufficient reason to see Russia as a European country. On the other hand, Russia's vast tracts of land on the Asian continent do not make Russia an Asian country in the eyes of Asian nations. Incidentally, the United States is also a foreign state to Eastern Asia whose involvement in Asia Pacific regional affairs is only justified by its huge military and economic power.
So Russia's current presence in APEC and other regional forums is to a very large degree an outsider's presence. Countries in the region are only interested in Russia as a source of raw materials and a vast territory that could one day help solve East Asia's demographic problems. East-Asian leaders see Russia as a potential military and environmental threat. Except for weapons, Russian products are uncompetitive on the Asia Pacific market. The market capacity of Russia's East Siberian and Far Eastern regions is small. There is still the stereotype that historically, Russia's policy in East Asia has been purely aggressive, and in the Soviet era also ideological. Russia's Far East is economically weak, which lessens Russia's economic and political importance in dealing with Asia Pacific problems. Furthermore, the perception of Russia here is strongly influenced by the position of the United States that is afraid of its involvement in East-Asian affairs. To the United States, allied relations with Japan and South Korea and trade and economic contacts with China remain high priorities in its East Asian policy. Russia is not among its 10 foreign policy priorities in the region. The United States (as well as, presumably, the East-Asian countries) sees it as an Atlantic, not Pacific, policy player.
Asian analysts believe that Russia will only be able to develop a full-fledged presence in the Asia Pacific region if it abandons its vision of Asia and the East purely as an instrument in her relations with the West. 12
Russian foreign policy priorities in East Asia in the 21st century are as follows. 13 First of all, participation in international security institutions to ensure regional stability. It is important to bear in mind that unlike in Europe, there is not a common security system in Asia (East and Southeast Asia). So participation in international security institutions involves a complex balancing process to a larger degree than creation of a unified institutional system. Next, implementation of long-term confidence-building and border protection measures. Finally, development of political and economic relations with all countries in the region with a view to thus revitalizing Russia's Far East economy.
In this context, as usual, our diplomacy is faced with nationwide tasks that should take precedence over regional economic matters. Foreign policy today, however, should in equal measure further both state and regional interests.
The fact is that Russia has virtually no presence in East Asia on the state level: This is effectively an unchallenged zone of influence by China and the United States. The regional level is another matter. Russia's Far East, even in its present condition, is important for East Asia in so far as there are ongoing and pending subregional projects that bear directly on the interests of East Siberian and Far Eastern parts of Russia as well as of the adjacent Chinese provinces.
In the course of discussion, in the 1990s, of prospects for Russia's Far East emerging as a full-fledged participant in the process of Asia-Pacific regional consolidation, Russia was seen to have much of what it takes: vast natural resources; favorable geographic position, on East-West commercial trading routes, and proximity to dynamically developing Asian countries with good investment capacity. Nonetheless, socio-economic reforms in Russia's Far East and Maritime region took such a turn that there was no question about either their investment attractiveness or legal framework. As a result, in the late 1990s, far from multiplying, Japanese and Korean capital in the Amur region actually returned to Japan and South Korea.
On the one hand, development of Russia's Far East is predicated on Russia's recognition in the region and on the other, this recognition is contingent on the region's development. The demands are rather tough. Say, Russia must not be oriented exclusively toward the export of raw materials in order so as to become Asia's economic backwater. Russia must give its neighbors access to developing East Siberian and Far Eastern natural resources that it is thus far not in a position to tap herself. Of course, this requires appropriate legal, technical, political, and other conditions facilitating cooperation with East-Asian states. It is also critical to improve the image of the country, in particular, of its Far East: Today both Russia and its regions are seen as zones of instability and unpredictability. The situation is aggravated by the "specifics of national politics and economics" in the Maritime region, which is in fact Russia's window on the Asia Pacific region and, unfortunately, "theater of the absurd" and an area of total lawlessness. 14
There is yet another major contradiction in the relations of Moscow and Russia's Far Eastern regions with East-Asian countries. Moscow is advancing contacts predominantly with China whereas the population of, say, the Maritime region tends to favor Japan, seeing China as a source of the so-called yellow danger. Russia's interests would be better served to have a balanced relationship with all countries in the region. The plan to create a zone of free trade within the SCO framework is of course a breakthrough. But in so far as our full-fledged integration into the region is concerned, experts believe thus far this is only possible on the subregional level. Consolidation processes are especially pronounced in the zone of the Sea of Japan, between parts of China, Japan, and South Korea. Integration here is proceeding in the energy, transport, and tourism sphere. Southern parts of Russia's Far East could well fit into this pattern, but this is certainly not enough for Russia to gain recognition in East Asia.
Development of Russian-Chinese relations, among others, requires above all a well thought-through East-Asian policy. In the East, it is essential to rely on Eastern diplomacy. A case in point is China which stays out of alliances and military blocs, advancing its independence and self-sufficiency, while in upholding its national interests, it avoids confrontation with both Russia and the United States. Russia's national interests with regard to the Far East call for economic development, higher living standards for the population, security, and territorial integrity. It is high time the role of Russia's Far Eastern and East Siberian regions in advancing these nationwide interests be clearly defined.
Moscow should orient its Far Eastern region toward greater independence with more reliance on its own resources and the economic interests of neighboring states. This is well in line with the dictates of globalization. Economic relations break through national borders via subregional, regional, and finally, global associations of corporate entities. Russia's Far East should be helped not with peremptory commands, but by providing a favorable environment for this remote but equal part of Russian territory that is key to Russia's national interests in East Asia.
Today we can of course talk about a high point in our relations with China - that is, if the events on the Damanskii island are used as a reference point. Yet there is still a long way to go to the "peak." Furthermore, within the Russia-U.S.-China triangle, there is no question about the kind of peak that was attained in the 1950 Treaty. Nonetheless, we are well in a position to reach significant new heights in Russian-Chinese relations. And the path to them lies through Russia's Far East.
This view - according to a RIA Novosti report of September 24, 2003 - was reaffirmed by Premier Wen Jiabao, in the course of his meeting with Mikhail Kasyanov in Beijing. He said that our two countries should intensify their cooperation in the investment sphere, restructure their trade, and diversify cooperation between their border regions and industrial enterprises.
Endnotes
Note *: Mikhail Margelov, Chairman of the RF Federation Council Committee for International Affairs. Back
Note 1: See: Makienko K. Voenno-tekhnicheskoe sotrudnichestvo Rossii i KNR in 1992-2002 godakh: dostizheniia, tendentsii, perspektivy. Doklad #2 Rossiiskogo predprinimatel'stva. Tsentr oboronnoi informatsii, M., 2002. Back
Note 2: Mikheev V. "Strategiia "stabil'nosti" (ob itogakh 16 s'ezda KPK)." Analiticheskie zapiski. Institut prikladnykh mezhdunarodnykh issledovanii, #3, vol. 1, Nov. 2001, pp. 12-13. Back
Note 3: See: Makienko K. Op. cit.; Liashenko V.P. Torgovlia oruzhiem: mirovaia kon'iunktura i kon'iunkturnyi analiz. M., 2001. Back
Note 4: Mikheev V. Op. cit., pp. 8-9. Back
Note 5: See, e.g.: Liashenko V.P. Op. cit., p. 95. Back
Note 6: Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 2003, #3, pp. 153-156. Back
Note 7: Galenovich Iu.M. "Podvodnye kamni dogovora." Aziia i Afrika segodnia, 2002, #5, p. 47. Back
Note 8: See: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii, sostoiavsheisia v Institute Dal'nego Vostoka RAN, "Rossiia i Kitai v sisteme mezhdunarodkykh otnoshenii na rubezhe 21 veka." Informatsionnye materialy, seriia B, #10, IDV, M., 2002. Back
Note 9: Aviatsiia, kosmos i oruzhie Rossii, 3.01.2002; 28.12.2001; 14.01.2002; 2.12.2002; 3.12.2002; Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 157, No. 19, November 4, 2002, p. 58; Kommersant, 9.01.2002; Profil, ##1-2, 14.01.2002, pp. 44-45. Vedomosti, 21.05.2002; Rynki vooruzhenii, vol. 2, #11, 2002; Sofronchuk I. "Rossiisko-kitaiskoe sotrudnichestvo i problemy eksportnogo kontrolia." Eksportnyi kontrol v Rossii: politika i praktika, PIR-Tsentr politicheskikh issledovanii, April 2000; Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, #44, 20-26.12.2002, p. 6; Kommersant, 18.11.2002, p. 15 and 6.11.2002, p. 3. Back
Note 10: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum, S.I, 2000. Back
Note 11: See: Kitai: fundament uspekhov 21 veka. M., IDV RAN, 2002. Back
note 12: Ha Yong-Chool. "Engaging Russia for Peace in North-East Asia." Engaging Russia in Asia Pacific. Edited by Watanabe Koji, Tokyo, New York, 1999, p. 42. Back
Note 13: Azizian, Rouben. Russia in Asia: Unwelcomed Intruder or Accommodative Player? /Working Paper 16/00. - www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/working papers/WP16.html, p. 3. Back
Note 14: Economist, September 19, 1998, p. 37. Back