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CIAO DATE: 01/04
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
The U.S. vs. Rogue States of the Middle East
A. Shumilin *
The lightning American victories in Afghanistan and Iraq considerably changed the world order: from that time on other large countries will have to bear in mind that the United States has become resolved to carry out similar large-scale military operations single-handedly in disregard of the United Nations. Those who from the very beginning wanted strong and "multiplied pressure" to be used against the traditionally anti-American countries (the "axis of evil" in the first place) strengthened their positions in the American corridors of power. Today, with the Hussein regime in Iraq out of the way, Iran and North Korea are two officially recognized rogue countries. Syria blacklisted by the Pentagon as a sponsor of international terrorism and, partly, Saudi Arabia are very close to this status. The latter, recently one of the key strategic allies of the United States in the region, is now dismissed by the American media as the main financial sponsor of Islamic terrorists.
Will any of them feel "multiplied pressure" or be even subjected to a military operation? Will Washington deem it wiser to refrain from using force and rely on the effects of its military interference and the regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq (designed, among other things, to deter the rest of the notorious "axis")?
Washington has straightforward answers to none of the above. Certain contradictions inside the Bush Administration (between the Pentagon and the State Department, in the first place) notwithstanding, it is commonly believed that the political, economic, and psychological pressure on Iran, North Korea and, to great extent, Syria should be stepped up. Demonstration of force is deemed advisable though a military operation is seen as a last resort. It is planned to actively use their neighbors' potential and to encourage an advent to power of pro-Western politicians there. Significantly, Washington has more or less clearly articulated the task of regime change in Iran and North Korea; nothing has been said so far about Syria and Saudi Arabia. When talking about them American politicians favor an internal evolution of the ruling regimes. It should be said that the latter are sending more and more clear signals about their readiness to cooperate with Washington.
In short, "multiplied pressure" is tailored to fit domestic policies in each of the rogue countries, the degree of their anti-Americanism, and America's regional and global strategies. In all cases discussed below Washington is ready with a stick and a carrot - something that was absent from its treatment of Iraq. Regime change in Iraq became a national task soon after the 9/11 events-both parties and public opinion agreed on this and ruled out possible compromises-the methods and means alone caused certain disagreements among the political elite and in the Administration.
Iraq: Why a War?
Any guess about possible American steps to tame Iran and Syria (the North Korean problem is not discussed here) should rest on a clear understanding why after 9/11 Americans staked on regime change and the large-scale use of force. This happened for a number of international-legal and political-strategic reasons inapplicable to Syria, Iran, and North Korea. The Iraqi problem cannot be reduced to WMD (other "axis" countries have as much chemical weapons while Teheran and Pyongyang have moved much closer to a nuclear bomb than Iraq under Hussein).
From the very beginning, Iraq was the "weakest link" in the "axis of evil" and, therefore, much easier to deal with. Indeed, psychologically, politically, and strategically the problem of Iraq was perceived at all levels in the United States as the final stage of the 1991 uncompleted Operation Desert Storm. First, the aggressor that had attacked Kuwait escaped punishment and continued threatening its neighbors. Second, Washington was convinced that throughout the 90s the regime continued ignoring 16 resolutions of the UN Security Council. Third, the sanctions proved ineffective: they damaged the vital interests of the common people but did no harm to the Iraqi leaders. Fourth, Saddam Hussein started claiming a more important role in the Arab world by stepping up militant anti-Americanism, fanning anti-Israeli feelings and openly supporting Palestinian terrorism by paying $25 thous to the families of suicide bombers. Fifth, having got rid of the UN inspectors in 1998, the Iraqi leaders failed to prove beyond doubt that they had destroyed chemical weapons the inspectors discovered; they were allegedly experimenting with biological weapons. In short, the United States looked at Iraq as a "black hole" where all types of WMD (nuclear weapons including) could have been produced. Washington's inference is well known: Iraq was the most dangerous country whose WMD potential and terrorist contacts (allegedly it was giving shelter to several prominent Al-Qaeda figures) negatively affected the prospects of Israeli-Palestinian settlement.
There were other important strategic considerations. According to Geoffrey Kemp of the Nixon Center, one of the leading American Middle East experts: "One of the reasons argued for action to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein is that it would remove the need for a major American military presence on the landmass of Arabia, [in particular, in Saudi Arabia, the territory all Muslims regard as sacred. - A.Sh.] which in turn, was one of the primary justifications Osama Bin Laden used for attacking Americans." 1 The same author has written that back in early 2002 (several months after the terrorist attacks in the United States) the While House was finally resolved to remove the Hussein regime "before the end of the president's first term in 2005." 2
Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institute, another leading American authority on the Middle East, had the following to say about Iraq when describing the main foreign challenges to the future president on the eve of presidential campaign of 2000: "One approach, promoted by many in Congress and some in the Republican presidential campaign, would be to seek more aggressively to topple Saddam: using heavy military force to respond to his provocations, promoting the detachment of the southern part of his territory as has effectively been done in the Kurdish north, and providing more funding and training for the Iraqi opposition. This approach might well increase the chances of ousting Saddam (though not by much), but it would find little support among Arab neighbors or European allies." 3
It was the national consensus that allowed the Bush Administration to resort to resolute measures against Iraq. The American establishment regarded the Hussein regime as a direct threat to (a) the U.S. security; (b) its interests in the Middle East where the Israeli-Arab settlement was concerned as well as stability of the Gulf monarchies. People in Washington were convinced that American control over Iraq would inevitably produce an "encirclement effect" on Syria (that borders on hostile Turkey in the north and on Israel in the south) and Iran (Afghanistan controlled by the U.S and NATO in the east and on the whole hostile Arab monarchies across the Gulf). America's military presence in Iraq is intended as an instrument of pressure on the Syrian and Iranian regimes.
The sanctions that considerably undermined Iraq's military might and an impressive number of UN resolutions (allegedly unfulfilled according to Washington) made it much easier to remove the Hussein regime. In case of the other "rogue states" - Iran, Syria, and North Korea - no such circumstances exist.
The Sword of Damocles over Damascus
As the second week of the Iraqi war was drawing to an end the relations between Washington and Damascus worsened dramatically. According to the Pentagon Syria refused to seal off its borders with Iraq thus allowing Arab fighters cross into the country to join the fighting. Washington regarded Syria's de facto involvement in the hostilities as a continuation of its pro-Iraqi position in the UN Security Council.
On 29 March Defense Secretary Rumsfeld voiced warnings to Syria; on 31 March Secretary of State Powell followed suit with "Syria would bear the consequences of its support for Saddam Hussein and for the terrorist groups." 4
As soon as the war in Iraq was over Colin Powell hastened to Damascus to remove the local concerns over possible American military moves against Syria. Assad reciprocated with tightening control along the Iraqi border and handing over several fairly prominent figures from Hussein's government who had found shelter in Syria. Premier Blair followed with a statement that neither Washington nor London planned a military operation in Syria. Condoleezza Rice and President Bush made similar statements. It seems that alternating harsh and conciliatory statements reaching Damascus from the other side of the Atlantic were intended to keep the local regime on tenterhooks so that to give it a chance of acquitting itself by acting positively in postwar settlement in Iraq and the Israeli-Arab settlement. In other words, "the effect of Iraq" serves the sword of Damocles suspended over Syria, President Assad, and his cabinet.
In fact, the United States has no more or less weighty reasons to move its army against Syria. Military and financial considerations apart (occupation of two countries is costly) there are no political reasons either. The Syrian president who inherited power from his father in 2000 had been educated in Great Britain and lived there for a long time. He is no "Arab revolutionary dictator" of the Hussein or Kaddafi type. Even if in two years of his presidentship he has done nothing to change the regime and its foreign policies Washington still looks at him as a "new generation Arab leader" who has not yet completely disappointed the U.S. and the West. In short, President Bush and his team believe that the "promising leaders" should be protected and "educated" rather than removed from office with unpredictable results. The Iraqi crisis, at the same time, created many new concerns over Syrian policies therefore the American hawks never hesitated of reminding about Syria's previous record that had put it on top of the State Department's "black list of terrorist supporters."
What can urge the United States to take resolute measures against Syria? First, Damascus' continued support for the extremist organizations of the Hezbollah type in Lebanon, HAMAS and Islamic Jihad in Palestine that have their offices in Syria. Americans insist that several hundreds of volunteers wishing to fight on the side of Hussein were stopped at the Iraqi border. Hezbollah remains the main destabilizing factor in the north of Israel (after Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000) and the main irritant for Washington because of its involvement in the barrack blasts in Beirut in 1983 that claimed 241 American lives. Second, Syria's active political opposition to the U.S. military operation in Iraq: mass rallies in Damascus protested even against the vague position of Arab countries on the Iraqi issue. Third, Syria has failed to demonstrate flexibility on the Israeli-Arab issue: having agreed in principle with the Saudi plan of two coexisting states (Israel and Palestine) the Syrians blocked the road to a common Arab position with numerous conditions of its own. Forth, the U.S. and West European special services are convinced that Syria has stockpiles of locally produced chemical weapons as well as of Iraqi WMD. 5
Why does Washington refrain from harsh measures in relation to Damascus? First, it does not perceive Syrian policy as directly threatening the United States; it is believed that as long as Syria continues supporting regional rather than global terrorism its policy does not call for military measures and can be corrected with political, diplomatic, and economic pressure (or aid if needed such as renewed oil supplies from Iraq on easy terms) especially in view of the U.S. victory in Iraq. Second, large-scale use of force against Syria will undoubtedly raise a wave of protest across the Arab world. Iraq and its regime were popular mainly among the Arab extremists while an attack against Syria will be regarded as completely unjustified and will devalue the American arguments in favor of the "liberatory operation in Iraq." Third, regime change in Syria will create a much more unpredictable situation than in Iraq that the U.S. and the West will find to be less favorable. Everybody knows that in the basically Sunni country the Assad family that belongs to the Muslim Alaouite sect (in many respects close to Christianity) is maintaining political and religious stability by granting equal rights to all religious minorities including Christians. William Dalrymple, one of the American Middle East experts, has written: "In the Assad's Syria, Christians have done particularly well: in his final years, five of Hafez's seven closest advisers were Christians. The Christians are openly fearful that if the Assad regime should fall, their last real haven in the Middle East will disappear and be replaced by yet another fundamentalist government." 6 Fourth, public opinion in the United States that accepted the war against Iraq is not ready to accept hostilities in Syria; the Bush Administration has nobody to replace the Assad regime with. Fifth, the White House is fully aware that Damascus' regional policies are to a great extent coordinated by Teheran keeping alive the Syrian's irreconcilable position toward Israel.
No wonder, viewed from Washington Iran looks like the main Middle Eastern evil: Damascus will become much more flexible if the Iranian regime is removed or changed.
Washington-Teheran: End of the "Containment Policy"
In its confrontation with Iran the United States is following a logic that has little to do with the latest Iranian developments. It has been perfected and readjusted throughout the last 25 years. After the failure in 1979 of special operations designed to rescue the American diplomats imprisoned in Teheran, all U.S. administrations consistently tightened the laws regulating the relations between the two countries (or rather ensuring the economic and political boycott of Iran). The result was a vast body of laws applicable in America and outside it. For example, the American domestic market is closed to the oil foreign companies dealing with Iran to the sum of over $20m. For a long time both Republican and Democratic administrations have been doing their best to limit Russia's cooperation with Iran in Boucher and arms trade. America has already obtained similar results from Europeans and China.
Today, the traditional American policy of containment is being gradually replaced with the "limited interference policy" under pressure of the American "hawks" (the Cheney-Rumsfeld group) inspired by the military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, two neighbors of Iran's. The American establishment is obviously disappointed with President Khatami who "has so far proved unable to challenge the Iran's hardliners." 7
The terrorist act in Riyadh in May 2003 against Saudis and Americans marked a turning point in the U.S. Iranian strategies. The U.S. special services are convinced that it was Iranian-based Al-Qaeda supporters who were behind the blast. American experts believe that the Iranian mullahs' "global missionary project" remained the same and that they still rely on global terrorism that presents direct threat to the United States. "Hezbollah is an Iranian creation, and the Revolutionary Guards Corps operates a 'foreign legion' that sends Muslims of dozens of nationalities as far afield as North Africa and South America. And Iran's support of the hard-core Palestinian terrorists, from Hamas to Islamic Jihad, is one of the major obstacles to any hopes for a viable peace settlement," 8 writes Michael Ledeen, author of The War Against the Terror Masters.
The American strategists have to reappraise the problem of Iran under the pressure of spasms of student and non-student unrest that are happening more and more often. The opposition to the Muslim clerics that has been mounting since the mid-90s and confirmed twice by the election and reelection of Khatami is spilling over into the streets. These sentiments can be partly stimulated by Iraq's forcible "democratization." American analysts believe that the resultant qualitatively new situation in the country makes a regime change possible. No wonder, on 15 June George Bush expressed his support for the protesters by describing their actions as a "step toward freedom."
In short, Washington is convinced that time to act has come. A large-scale military operation is not contemplated: the administration plans to change the regime through political, diplomatic, and economic pressure supported by special units in case of need with the help of the opposition inside and outside the country. Destruction of the Iranian nuclear objects is another major task, together with the regime change: Washington is convinced that neither the ruling regime nor the local opposition is willing to voluntary abandon the nuclear plans, the "Islamic nuclear bomb." On 11 June Donald Rumsfeld said: "The intelligence community in the United States and around the world currently assess that Iran does not have nuclear weapons. The assessment is that they do have a very active program and are likely to have nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time." 9
Western experts have got hold of a certain document saying that if the situation in Iran would be developing in a wrong direction (that is, if the clerics overpower the reformers in the aggravating confrontation between them) military strikes at Iran (from the territory of Iraq) cannot be excluded. The document further says that the U.S. will rely not "on the NATO partners but on the former Soviet republics Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Pentagon is planning soon to deploy its military bases there." 10
The "nuclear threat" and the mounting unrest as a sign of future changes that the Americans prefer to control themselves are not the only reasons why Washington's military strategy is shifting toward Iran. There is another reason: American experts believe that the Iranian ayatollahs are inciting the Iraqi Shiites (60 percent of population) to seize power and turn Iraq into an "Islamic republic." In other words, the U.S. and Iran have entered another stage of confrontation over the future of Iraq. American public opinion is prepared to accept this that makes it easier for the Bush Administration to plan its involvement in Iran. "It is only a matter of time before the coalition has to come to grips with the Iranian campaign in Iraq," writes Michael Ledeen. "But the showdown is inevitable. Three governments are fighting for survival in Iraq: the Iranian, the American, and the British. If Iran drives the coalition out of Iraq and establishes an Islamic republic there, George Bush and Tony Blair will be humiliated and defeated, and we will have lost a major battle in the war on terrorism. If we defeat the mullahs and freedom triumphs in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, we will have to change the world, and the terrorists' days will be numbered." 11
Russia is reading itself to save its political and economic positions in Iran in case of a "domestic coup" or an American military interference. In Moscow all interested departments are working on a single coordinated position on Iran, many of its components can be discerned today in official statements. The Kremlin never tires of repeating that Iran is the closest neighbor with which Russia intends to cooperate rather than to play political games by inciting ruling groups against one another. Iran has been and remains the zone of Russia's special interests. Nuclear cooperation (the Boucher project) should be monitored by IAEA. It is for the first time that Russia voiced its concern over Iran's possible nuclear weapons and declared that it would oppose this possibility for the sake of its own security. Moscow will continue its cooperation with Washington on non-proliferation of WMD on the global scale.
Russia's position is a fairly balanced one: in view of the world community's concern over the Iranian nuclear programs it has distanced itself from Teheran while trying to preserve its economic presence in the country. Russia's economic interests are vast: besides the Ministry of Nuclear Energy Stroigaz is becoming more and more active there; oil giants (LUKoil being one of them) plan to use the local pipeline system to move their oil to Europe. Obviously, no matter what political changes may take place in the country the Russian companies working in Iran should preserve their positions.
Washington-Riyadh: An Ambiguous Partnership
The 9/11 tragedy spurred on Washington's determination to build up its opposition to Iraq, Syria, and Iran. The relations between two recent strategic partners in the Middle East - Washington and Riyadh - though cooling off remained outwardly (on the official level) the same. Their content, however, changed dramatically; American public opinion makes no difference between Saudi Arabia and Syria and Iran, two blacklisted sponsors of terrorism.
There are two major factors behind this: first, 15 out of 19 terrorists involved in the 9/11 events were Saudi Arabians; second, Riyadh's rather clumsy and spontaneous response to the tragic events when it tried to brush off its share of moral responsibility for the tragedy was bad enough. It went even further by suggesting a U-turn in America's regional policies and a withdrawal of U.S. support to Israel. This was what one of the Saudi princes said at a ceremony when he handed in a check for $10 million to Mayor Giuliani who rejected the gift with a firm and rather eloquent gesture.
Despite the efforts of Washington and Riyadh to keep low profile the press in both countries was shaken by a string of scandals. American publications accused the Saudi family of ideological and financial support to the terrorists through Islamic charities while Saudi "independent" journalists encouraged by the authorities accused the United States of being bought by Israel and of plotting against the royal Saudi family. The wave was rising even higher as bank accounts of real or potential terrorists were discovered in the United States. The larger part of them was connected in one way or another with the Saudi authorities or financial structures. The American press (with the U.S. special services' tacit agreement) accused the wife of the Saudi ambassador of "encouraging terrorists:" she sponsored American education for Saudi students (some of whom turned out to be connected with the terrorists).
As soon as the White House decided to remove the Hussein regime the president's closest advisors set out to stop further worsening of relations with Saudi Arabia. In fall 2002, President Bush received Crown Prince Abdullah (the country's de facto ruler) in his Texan ranch (a sign of special trust) as the first step toward restored partnership.
Riyadh reciprocated with investing into a campaign in the U.S. designed to improve the country's image in the eyes of the Americans over $5m during the first year of crisis. 12 The strategic initiative of Middle East settlement formulated by Prince Abdullah and intended to change American public opinion about the Kingdom was expected to serve the common ground for an Arabic plan of coexistence of two states. This meant that after 50 years of hostility Riyadh officially announced that it was prepared to accept the State of Israel if a Palestinian State within the 1967 borders came into existence. The Beirut summit of July 2002 almost unanimously (Libya being the only exception) approved the plan. While appreciating this in summer and fall 2002 Washington hoped to achieve more: it needed a resumed military-strategic partnership to be able to use the airbases on the Saudi territory to deliver blows against Iraq. The Saudi leaders could not openly agree to this yet they were secretly helping the Pentagon in the anti-Iraqi operation. Officially, the U.S. Central Command regional staff was moved from the Saudi Prince Sultan airbase to an American base in Qatar.
Ambiguity in the U.S.-Saudi relations, too obvious on the eve of the Iraqi campaign, can still be seen. No wonder, many experts in Saudi Arabia are convinced that the United States was seeking not so much regime change in Iraq as regime change in the Kingdom. Here is what London-based Saudi expert Muhammad al-Masri has to say on that score: "The fears are justified. The U.S. was not happy with the Saudis in the 1970s, for ideological reasons, but they tolerated it for pragmatic reasons. But after 11 September they came back to thinking that Saudi Arabia was source of trouble. Now there is a serious school of thought which holds that removing the Al Saud from power is the best way to modernize Saudi Arabia." 13
The American victory in Iraq added to the Saudis' anxiety: there is talk about democratic reforms (parliamentary elections, a constitution, wider women's rights, etc.). 14 The authorities went as far as demonstratively driving extremist clerics from mosques. In mid-June 2003, the government announced that it had dismissed several thousand clergymen and suspended activities of about one thou mullahs because they had preached religious intolerance and extremism, 15 and that the Kingdom was prepared to actively cooperate with the international antiterrorist coalition. Saudi Arabia obviously wanted to comply with Washington's demands; to an even greater degree these steps were prompted by the terrorist act of 12 May in Riyadh that claimed over 30 Saudi and American lives. Investigation revealed that the Al-Qaeda network was behind it. While defusing to a certain extent the tension between the two countries "common grief" could not remove the cause of it altogether.
The oil factor that until recently cemented the relationships between Saudi Arabia and the United States will probably change in future - this cannot but cause concern in Riyadh. Today, nearly 20 percent of America's oil exports come from Saudi Arabia, which means that America is greatly dependent on oil deliveries from this country. There are two factors that may lower the degree of dependence or even remove it altogether: (1) the unfolding export of Iraqi oil and (2) America's desire to buy more oil in Russia. There is an opinion that no radical changes in the relations between the two countries will take place until Americans tap the alternative sources to compensate for 8.6m barrels (the amount supplied by Saudi Arabia). According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency this situation will remain unchanged for the next 20 years. The Agency forecasts the country's continued dependence on imported oil even if new sources of energy fuel are discovered inside the country. The Washington Post wrote that in the nearest future the flexible post-Saddam Iraq would be able to compete with Riyadh where the oil market stability was concerned. 16
The threat of using the oil factor will become the main instrument of pressure Washington will use in its relations with Riyadh in the nearest future.
In the wake of its victory in Iraq, the Bush Administration will go on with the demonstration of force and multiplied pressure on the "rogue countries" in the Middle East in the first place. Success will become George Bush's trump card in the coming presidential campaign while the United States has added the task of WMD non-proliferation to the already formulated aim of fighting international terrorism. This is what dominates Washington's foreign policy.
In the Middle East Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia will feel American multiplied pressure. In relation to the latter two Washington has become resolved to apply political, diplomatic, and economic pressure while the former will be exposed to demonstrations of military force and measures used in special operations. Washington will hardly start a full-scale military operation in Iran similar to that in Iraq. America's different tactics is dictated by continued anti-Americanism and the unfolding opposition movement and unrest. The U.S. Administration is determined to use the disturbances in Teheran to maximally contribute either to the regime change or to the complete transfer of power to the hands of President Khatami. In any case the United States will try to destroy all nuclear objects in Iran. This operation that will probably involve American aviation will inevitably require several variants of full-scale military support. In Saudi Arabia, the United States may exploit the oil factor, the tool that will become usable as soon as Iraq resumes oil export.
Endnotes
Note *: Aleksandr Shumilin, Director, Mid-Eastern Conflicts Analysis Center, Institute for the USA and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.Back
Note 1: Geoffrey Kemp, "Arc of Instability," Naval War College Review, Newport, Summer 2002, Vol. LV, No. 3, p. 67. Back
Note 3: Philip H. Gordon, "No Way Out. The Essential US Role in the Middle East," Brookings Review, Washington, 2000, p. 29. Back
Note 4: Middle East International, London, April 4, 2003, No. 697, p. 24-25. Back
Note 5: UPI, 2.05.2003, "Rice Actions on Syria Disputed." Back
Note 6: The New York Times, 10 June 2003. Back
Note 7: Geoffrey Kemp, op. cit., p. 69. Back
Note 8: The Wall Street Journal, 11 June 2003. Back
Note 9: The New York Times, 12 June 2003. Back
Note 10: Nezavisimaia gazeta, 29 May 2003. Back
Note 11: The Wall Street Journal, 11 June 2003. Back
Note 12: The New York Times, 29 August 2002. Back
Note 13: Middle East International, London, 4 April 2003, No. 697, 4, p. 26. Back
Note 15: The New York Times, 9 June 2003. Back
Note 16: The Washington Post, 3 June 2003. Back