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CIAO DATE: 12/03
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
The Iraq War and Its Implications
A. Bessmertnykh *
The strangeness of the U.S.-Iraq war with an excessive concentration of naval and air armadas and awesome land divisions; with battle cries from Congressmen in Washington; with TV footage of the unnatural serenity of the Iraqi clique in green uniforms, hanging on every word spoken by Saddam Hussein, reclining in an armchair; with the congested streets of the besieged capital of Baghdad with its 6-million population; with sandstorms hindering television crews from shooting this footage; with missile strikes against Saddam palaces, watched by gawkers from their hotel balconies; with the ceremonial march of U.S. troops into the Iraqi capital, where, like the proverbial thief of Baghdad, Hussein's elite guard dissolved in the crowd and where the dictator himself, surfacing near some shabby eating house, then got lost in the nooks and crannies of the ancient city - all of that strangeness, mixing an Eastern bazaar with a demonstration of Western military hardware, obscured, in the minds of observers, the need to look into the possible implications and lessons of the first major military operation by the great power in the early 21st century.
After all, those who could, and should, have made a realistic assessment of the event are, as though by prior agreement, quietly consigning the subject of the Iraq war and its outcome to the dustbin of history - meaning that it is now a fait accompli so there is really nothing to talk about here now. Furthermore, the task of appraising the distant implications of the establishment of a de-facto occupation regime in Baghdad is complicated by, among other things, the perennial difficulty of making reliable forecasts about the course of international developments even in terms of two to three decades, let alone centuries. This is only natural. Eyewitnesses of important events, even being at their epicenter, tend to either overstate or understate their importance. This human weakness was especially pronounced at the turn of the millennium. The thick mixture of hopes, fears and concerns, aroused by these calendar changes, obscures and weakens the human ability to get a clear picture of upcoming events.
Here is a good case in point. Consider the misleading view that contemporaries had of the impending 20th century. It sneaked - crawled into history quietly and inconspicuously, like a snake, with only the distant rumbling in the south of Africa (the war between the Boers and the British) heard in the eerie quiet. There was no reason to suspect that mankind was entering one of the most bloody and devastating centuries in its history.
Russia, weakened by her internal economic and political troubles, got involved in an unnecessary and hopeless war with Japan. The United States, which had strengthened its economic positions, staked out a claim to the role as yet another - sixth - great power in the world: The hour had struck for the United States to exercise control - for the same reason and in the same manner as Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Italy - and determine the fate of the world. That was the keynote of the statement by Theodore Roosevelt who came into the White House in 1901. 1 (Subsequently, Germany and Italy lost that status, to be replaced by the United States and China.)
The subsequent course of events is well known. Russia's defeat in the war against Japan threw the seeds of Revolution into the empire's historical soil. The Russian monarchy collapsed, giving way to a new social system - socialism. Those events caused major upheavals and repercussions throughout Europe, bringing about World War II, which led to World War III - i.e., the Cold War. The Soviet socialist system broke up, having lost the ability to adapt to a changing world. The Soviet Union as a state epitomizing that system ended up buried under its debris.
We are not always in a position to see the consequences of ongoing developments because we are too absorbed in our own, contemporary reality. Furthermore, history, notorious for its fickleness, turns possible analogies of events into an intriguing web of contradictions, an intricate array of arcane intentions and actions. Sometimes it sends signals, but we, as a rule, are not able to interpret them correctly. So analysis of the 21st century, which, unlike its predecessors, began so dynamically, and so menacingly, with terrorist acts and the war in Iraq, is a task up to posterity.
As for more foreseeable, not over-the-horizon, prospects, it is well within our scope to explore them.
The war in Iraq resulted from a combination of subjective rather than objective causes and factors. In other words, this war could have been avoided and therefore its consequences, far from conducive to relaxation of international tension, could have been prevented. That said, as often happens in such cases, there were also some positive results, the main one being the toppling of yet another dictatorial regime and the removal of anxieties over the possible presence in Iraq (and therefore use) of weapons of mass destruction. Such fears, if they were allowed to continue for a long time, could have had a far more devastating effect in the restive Middle and Near East, where tensions remain at a red-hot point.
Also on the positive side was the fact that international terrorist groups received credible confirmation of the reality of warnings coming from Washington and a number of other capitals, to the effect that any contemplated acts of terror (even though Baghdad was not particularly suspected on that score) would be met with unrelenting preemptive action. The Americans, more effectively and more bluntly than others, showed their readiness to use force as soon as they felt a threat to their interests or an imperative to advance these interests.
Yet it was in fact a source of great anxiety for the governments of the majority of states and of concern and embarrassment for U.S. allies and partners - not even the sheer use of force, but its use beyond the bounds of the existing rules of international law and without sanction from the UN Security Council.
There is a view in the capitals of many states (some of them this author has visited recently) that the Iraq war marks a serious turning point not only in the strategy and tactics of major world powers, but also in the thinking of world leaders, which substantially differs from that which prevailed, at least, in the second half of the 20th century. The Iraq war is seen above all as a symbol of an undesirable approach to international affairs that calls into question the basic principles of world politics - the supremacy of international law, the leading role of international organizations and institutions, and compliance in good faith with the UN Charter as one of the fundamental documents that has not lost its relevance to date. It is generally recognized that the world cannot afford to see the crumbling of buttresses underlying civilized world politics. Without them, a risky vacuum will emerge, leading to chaos, until a new system regulating the conduct of states on the international arena has evolved.
The Iraq war has once again highlighted the issue of correlation of morality and pragmatism in foreign policy strategies. The impression, shared by the majority of foreign policy experts, is that it is impermissible to remove the moral/ethical component from world politics. The power of pragmatism is a poor substitute for the power of moral values, ensuring a civilized character of international relations. From this perspective, the most critical comments concern the U.S. military action in Iraq, which is seen as a pointed demonstration of superiority over the rest of the world.
While agreeing that the U.S. operation under review contains a serious pragmatic interest (control of Iraqi oil and consolidation of strategic positions in the Middle and Near East), this author does not however share the view that the United States has irretrievably abandoned the moral principles and values that have to some extent or other been characteristic of the country's policy. As soon as a conflict arises between ethical (moral) and pragmatic objectives in the foreign policy sphere, both are equally affected.
In the new world that we live in today, these two major foreign policy ingredients should merge into a contemporary diplomacy of enlightened national interest. This refers to the need to ensure not only the survival of one's own country but also the future of the international community as a whole.
As for the United States, after the 9/11 terrorist attack, its public opinion saw a serious shift in the attitude toward the use of force in international affairs. It is a near unanimous view there that in the fight against those who encroach on U.S. security, the American nation is ready to pay any price and make any sacrifice to destroy them. International terrorism is seen as far and away the main enemy. We in Russia should not underestimate these strong sentiments that exist within U.S. society, especially since we have ourselves been confronted with dire manifestations of terrorism in our own land.
President George W. Bush, responsive to the mood of his people, vowed to do his utmost to wipe out the forces of terrorism. And he went into action. Thus a political newcomer immediately emerged as a popular, effective, and credible leader. A certain risk for him, however, lies in the political need to demonstrate, now as in the future, that America is at war, and is winning this war. Meanwhile, the enemy is still viable and strong, avoiding direct confrontation, acting stealthily, like a dangerous predator, and lurking in the "jungle" of large cities, caves and mountains. Its combat forces are never seen on the battlefield. Modern armed forces, equipped with high-tech weapons, are unable to deliver a direct strike on this adversary that is dispersed throughout the world. Demonstration of ongoing victories over terrorism becomes a very difficult and tricky task. This can lead to a risky need to attain just any victorious goals. The shifting of emphasis in this fight toward liquidation of undemocratic regimes (although their unpalatability is obvious to all, still they should be dealt with by their own nations) could gradually undermine the united front of states that pledged to do everything to eradicate the scourge of the 21st century - international terrorism. As a result, terrorism will get a new lease on life to commit more acts of aggression against democratic states.
To avoid such an unacceptable fallout from the events in Iraq, it is necessary for the world's leading powers to more clearly prioritize their strategies, putting the main thrust on avoiding a lack of synchronization in planning and implementing joint actions against terrorism. One of the difficulties involved is that, just as was the case with aggression in the past, today there is not a clear understanding of terrorism. Is it a mutating manifestation of religious protest or just a tool in the hands of all sorts of extremist forces, using it to attain their political and economic goals? Recently, there has been increasing evidence that terrorists are beginning to look for joint forms of organization, together with radical groups not only in the Muslim but also in the rest of the world, including in Europe.
Without a sufficient level of mutual understanding on this score, above all on the level of the world's major powers, it will be an uphill struggle in the future to pursue a common antiterrorist strategy.
To ensure an adequate level of consensus, it is vital to put in place a viable mechanism (operating not only in a smooth, peaceful environment, but also in times of crisis) to harmonize efforts and activities within the framework of the antiterrorist coalition - for a start, at least between the leading strategic partners whose leaders have already been able to convince their nations that by becoming U.S. strategic partners they have joined the top caste of the world's high priests. Now, time and again forced to follow in the wake of U.S. policy, these leaders have to defend themselves and justify their position, which is politically embarrassing to them. Meanwhile, partnership with the United States today is indeed a correct line of diplomacy. The task is for the United States and its allies to translate it into reality. In the aftermath to the Iraq war, some of the humiliated leaders had to pretend that everything was as it should be. But the hidden, suppressed resentment remains. And it is just a matter of time before it comes out into the open.
Hence the pressing need to elaborate a coherent concept of partnership, which, modified by the descriptive attribute "strategic," acquires a meaning close to allied relationship, even though it is not such.
So it is not quite correct to rely on it on the working level. When, during his recent visit to Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell watched a blitz phone-in poll in the Ekho Moskvy radio studio on the subject "What is the United States - an ally or an adversary?" and when the majority of Muscovites said that the United States was Russia's ally, the head of the U.S. foreign service set the record straight by saying the United States and Russia are "friends and partners."
Partnership is without a doubt a privileged level of interstate relations that is slightly above normal, but clearly below allied relations. To reach a purely formal level in this relationship, it is necessary, at least, to agree that a new form in interstate affairs contains a substantial component of mutual responsibility, active interaction in critical situations, and credible information sharing before such situations occur. Countries and their leaders that have entered into partnership will then seek to avoid unpleasant surprises for each other, let alone use tricks, intrigue or bluffing. It goes without saying that the status of partnership should not affect natural vigilance and reasonable caution.
On May 22, 2003, summing up the results of the Iraq crisis, as it were, President V. Putin, in a message to President George W. Bush, stressed Russia's readiness to advance cooperation along all lines as well as the fact that Russian-U.S. partnership is really working for the benefit of global stability and security.
The war in Iraq put preservation of the role of the UN and the Security Council in ensuring international security high on the international agenda. One major negative fallout from the events in Iraq could be a serious weakening of the role of international law. This issue has become a source of considerable misunderstanding between Russia, China, India, and a substantial part of Europe on one side, and the United States, on the other. Amid the flurry of activity and the hullabaloo of preparations for the operation in Iraq, somewhat impatient with the Security Council's performance, Washington made a number of embarrassing, ill-considered statements concerning the UN and its present and future role. One of the most striking statements on that score was a comment by the U.S. president on September 12, 2002, to the effect that Washington would go it alone should the UN fail to cooperate in working out the necessary resolutions. That was interpreted as refusal to interact with the UN, which hindered the pooling of efforts by the United States, Russia, and other leading nations in the face of the threat of terrorists acquiring mass destruction weapons in Iraq (that is to say, should it have any).
Furthermore, one of the potentially risky consequences of the Iraqi crisis is the precedent that was set in the use of military force without Security Council sanction and, in effect, without convincing and well-argued justification for the use of force.
As a result, deep anxiety arose in the capitals of a number of states located in risk zones, with raging or smoldering pockets of tension, including the old ones, such as the Middle East, the Balkans, South, and East Asia, and new ones, such as the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Africa.
The activated might-is-right principle revived the memory of many tragic pages of history - say, the way U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, in the early 20th century, did not deem it necessary to explain the U.S. seizure of the Panama Canal zone, limiting himself to saying that he had established control of the canal, leaving Congress to debate the issue. 2
Another dark page came in 1979, when a small group of CPSU Politburo members decided to bring Soviet troops into neighboring Afghanistan, clearly relying on superiority of force but neglecting the lesson of the U.S. invasion of "weak" Vietnam, almost two decades prior to that.
History shows that acquisition of military power often leads to an almost irresistible temptation to use force. Should a party to a long-standing dispute succumb to the temptation we will once again witness dangerous outbreaks of violence the like of which have plagued whole regions for decades. Consider the Machiavelli maxim: You will have reliable allies if you have reliable troops.
The only, although not perfect but viable, mechanism of containing aggression is the Security Council, duly authorized to consider and sanction the use of enforcement action, including military force, with respect to states using violence in breach of the UN Charter. This mechanism is entrusted with the main responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security.
In preparing the military operation against Iraq, Washington, faced with the prospect of one or several permanent Security Council members using the veto power, preferred to act without sanction from this international body, which aroused the greatest wave of protests by the world public as well as on the part of U.S. NATO allies, primarily France and Germany, which were joined by Russia.
Still, it should be borne in mind that the protracted debate in the UN Security Council, against the backdrop of White House efforts to prove the urgency of military action against Iraq (meanwhile, aircraft-carrying groups, bombers, armor, paratroopers, amphibious landing forces, and infantry were being deployed near the Iraqi borders), resulted in deep resentment of, and even marked aversion to, the UN within U.S. public opinion. At the same time the White House's statements to the effect that it would go it alone should the UN fail to cooperate in passing the necessary resolutions were received within the United States with approval. On October 2, 2002, the U.S. Congress adopted a resolution allowing the administration to use force against Iraq without preliminary sanction by the UN. In March 2003, the U.S. president said that the UN risked becoming an ineffectual, irrelevant discussion club.
Paradoxically, Washington's disregard for Security Council procedure effectively saved NATO from a serious split among the allies. Their use of veto on the proposed U.S. action could have eliminated the leader of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, which was unacceptable, causing irreparable damage to the alliance itself. If Paris and Berlin (or either of them) were just bluffing and not really going to take an open and tough stand against Washington at the Security Council, the U.S. single-handed move (discounting Britain) saved the allies from an inevitable loss of face.
As for Russia, it has from the outset refused to accept as cause for action against Iraq the U.S. contention that Baghdad posed a threat to the United States and had weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons. Neither UN inspectors nor U.S. intelligence services provided conclusive evidence to that effect. President V. Putin in conversation with British Prime Minister T. Blair in that connection remarked that "we are only being shown some empty containers, and nothing else." Nor was there any evidence confirming Iraq's support for international terrorism. Nonetheless, it was tactically inexpedient for Moscow to see things come to a point where veto power would have to be used, so strange as that might be, the aforementioned U.S. line of conduct (acting without UN sanction) was a means of escape also for us.
Even so, proceeding from positions of principle and probably relying on an inaccurate forecast of the U.S. administration's conduct, Moscow opted for strong, tough declarations. The unambiguous threat coming from Russian politicians to veto any resolution opening the way to the use of force against Baghdad did not enable Moscow to adjust that position should the United States have pressed for a vote in the Security Council, which was not entirely ruled out: Washington believed that the United States could attack Baghdad even if veto power was used in the Security Council.
Because the risk was real, Moscow should have clarified its position, stressing that it had moved away from instinctive support for Saddam's Baghdad and was in that situation acting not against the United States or for preservation of the Hussein regime, but in the interest of preventing war in the Middle East which was already drowning in blood and violence. At some point there briefly emerged a misperception that Russia was going to join a certain European alliance directed against the United States. It was soon dispelled, when it transpired that neither France or Germany or Russia in fact sought that option.
Viewed from a broader perspective, the situation where a war was waged against a sovereign state without Security Council sanction - to reiterate - sets not only a dangerous precedent that could be used by other militarily strong states, but also poses a real threat of the breakup of the established architecture of the existing world order, one that is based on compromise and has far from outlived its usefulness.
Unfortunately, swarms of pundits descended on the subject of the "collapse" and "demise" of the UN, declaring categorically that the world could in fact live without that "Cold War product," especially in a situation when novus imperio americanum was emerging that would in fact assume the role as master of the contemporary world, in one of whose cozy corners - the way they saw it - Russia could find refuge, even if based on vassalage.
Reality however, as always, upsets pundits' predictions. The George W. Bush administration returned to the UN, aware that the use of force in international affairs by a great power - moreover, one raised in the spirit of respect for the law - could be justified in the future. So its return to the UN addressed a triple task: first, legitimize the military occupation of Iraq as a fait accompli; second, uphold the image of the country that does not want to destroy the mainstay of the present international security system, and third, give France and Germany a convenient chance to revise their former negative position toward the U.S. action against Iraq while enabling Russia to reaffirm its strategic course toward strengthening relations with the United States. It was certainly a clever move.
Hurt by the U.S. attitude (punish France, ignore Germany), the allies nonetheless readily backed Security Council Resolution 1483, effectively approving the U.S. operation in Iraq and its subsequent role as an occupation power in a "liberated country." The same was done by Russia, encouraged by the fact that its game of a "tripartite alliance," even though it aroused a certain measure of mistrust among the Americans, did not eventually cause any serious changes in its partnership with the United States ("Russia will be pardoned").
Still, the task of bringing about a rapprochement with the United States does not in any way weaken Russia's line toward strengthening contacts in Europe. "If Europe wants to be an independent powerhouse in the world, in its own right, the shortest and the most effective way to attaining this goal is by building a good relationship with Russia," the Russian president said recently. Thus the Iraq crisis has been shifted into a different phase - cooperation in rebuilding Iraq, which in the late 1980s was an area of covert struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The strangeness of that behind-the-scenes struggle lay in that it was conducted not over an accustomed objective in the Cold War - to weaken an adversary's positions, but over quite a realistic one - oil. To the Soviet Union, Iraq had not so much a political significance (preference in that respect was clearly given to Syria and before it, to Egypt) as economic value: As one of the largest oil producers in the Middle East, Iraq paid meticulously for Soviet supplies of equipment, weapons, and hardware. True, in the last few years it ran up a debt of about $8 billion to the Soviet Union. As a military-political ally bound to the Soviet Union by a corresponding treaty, Baghdad, as it turned out, was not a reliable, let alone loyal, friend.
For many decades, the United States has been building its foreign policy so that its pragmatic component - ensuring vital national interests - constituted its core, oftentimes hidden behind politico-ethical declarations. This stratagem has existed as long as diplomacy itself. Washington has always given special priority to providing the domestic economy with energy resources. Earlier, much was written to the effect that U.S. diplomacy "reeks of oil."
Based on these considerations as well as its support for Iraq in the war against Iran, which the former began in 1979, the Reagan administration decided to bring about a rapprochement with Baghdad that the following year Washington struck off the list of states sponsoring international terrorism. After a 17-year hiatus, diplomatic relations were restored. The United States provided Iraq with credit lines to buy U.S. goods and foodstuffs, especially grain. Intelligence information began to be exchanged between the two countries on a regular basis. Containment of Iran, to Reagan, was another factor in the rapprochement with Iraq.
The administration of George Bush, replacing Reagan in the White House, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to bring Iraq into the U.S. political fold. It is difficult to say what gave the White House cause to hope that Saddam Hussein could be compelled to move away from its long-standing friend - the Soviet Union, and take Washington's side, which until recently had been seen by the Iraqis as a hostile nation. The dictator's weak character or the power of money?
Neither, I think. The Iraqi leader probably decided to take advantage of an unexpected turn in the U.S. line to his own ends - at least, to fulfill his long-standing dream: to incorporate the fabulously rich Kuwait into Iraq by cashing in on the favorable disposition on the part of the both superpowers.
On October 2, 1989, President Bush signed off on a national security directive (NSD-26), saying in part that normal relations between the United States and Iraq will serve long-term interests and advance stability both in the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East. It was decided to expand economic and political incentives to Baghdad. 3 In particular, Washington, in a fit of generosity, granted Iraq $1 billion in credits.
Meanwhile, Saddam was playing his own game. To please the Americans even more, he indicated that his country was cooling off toward the Soviet Union. In conversation with John Kelly, undersecretary of state for the Middle East and South Asian, in February 1990, Saddam said that following the demise of the Soviet Union as a great power, the United States was getting an opportunity to advance stabilization in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Baker told Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz that the United States wanted to strengthen and expand relations with Iraq, which it valued greatly. 4
While Washington was courting Baghdad, this author, as first deputy foreign minister, twice met with Saddam Hussein in his palaces in the capital. Since Moscow was not unaware about the U.S.-Iraq contacts, it was interesting to observe the Iraqi leader put a special emphasis on the "exemplary" character of Iraqi-Soviet relations "marked by great proximity, mutual respect, and sincerity." He asked his interlocutor to pass to President Gorbachev his assurances about the long-term character of our contacts, and even the readiness to settle some outstanding problems (in particular, the payment of the several-billion dollar debt).
The more power a leader has, the sooner his self-respect grows into self-assurance. He no longer needs advice from experienced experts, relying exclusively on his "great intuition" - a conviction that is daily strengthened by his cunning courtiers and servile press. So Saddam Hussein, acting on the false premise that both the United States and the Soviet Union would stay on his side, made his first fatal mistake by attacking Kuwait in 1990; then his second mistake, in 1991, by rejecting a negotiated plan for ending the aggression; and then his third mistake, in 2003, convinced that the French-German-Russian threat to veto a Security Council resolution on the Washington proposed use of force would prevent a U.S. attack and allow him to weather the storm as he had done in 1991.
Today, it is critical for Moscow and Washington to stop the further course of the Iraqi crisis from aggravating the suspiciousness that it had brought about. To that end, they should agree that in the event of suchlike situations arising in the future, the partners will notify each other in advance about their upcoming steps, considering the possibility of joint action or other aspects of coordinated conduct (not excluding positive-neutrality options).
In the short term, it is essential to come to agreement about the role of state and especially private Russian industrial organizations and corporations in rebuilding and developing Iraq not only because they have vast experience of operation in the country but also because there are unfinished projects, including those approved and paid for by the UN. At the same time it is necessary that, with U.S. assistance, Iraq's future government - perforce pro-U.S. at the initial stage - assume a formal obligation to pay debt to Russia as successor to the Soviet Union which had been helping not Saddam Hussein and his regime, but the state and the people of Iraq. Resolution of this problem, which is a major concern in Russia, would be an indicator of the stability of a new stage in Russian-U.S. relations.
Many countries have been affected by a post-Iraqi syndrome: increased concern about their own security. One major factor here is the as yet uncodified but growing perception that diplomacy is beginning to give way to military force. All talk about the United States emerging as an "empire" with even other major powers showing "timidity" in international affairs, reinforce the conviction that building up one's own force is a far more viable proposition today. The Europeans do not rule out that Washington's omnipotence enables it not to regard their continent a top political priority anymore. In particular, they were puzzled by the preference that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld gave not to "old" but "new" Europe - the former Soviet East-European allies in the Warsaw Pact now aspiring for NATO membership (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republics are already NATO members) and showing a high degree of loyalty and devotion to the United States. The "old Europeans" (Western Europe) do not even rule out that amid the changes that have occurred in the world, the United States could downgrade their status as the mainstay of Euro-Atlantic security.
In the course of a recent tour of a number of European countries, this author has heard views to the effect that the United States is slowly but surely moving away from the classic reliance on formal military-political alliances. Even NATO with its consensus rule could seem a liability to a willful Washington. Western Europe was stunned by the U.S. plans to redeploy U.S. troops from their traditional basing areas on the continent to southern and eastern sectors. Therefore, there is a growing realization in Europe that it will have to stand up for its interests that do not necessarily coincide with U.S. interests.
If such concerns have emerged even in Europe, what about the Third World then? The use of force in Iraq without the approval of the UN, which, in the eyes of many countries, has been the most reliable protector of the weak against the strong, compels them to strengthen their own security.
The post-Iraq syndrome could revive an arms race in the world. A real boom is expected on the arms market. There is a growing demand for aircraft, antiaircraft systems, and armor. Military-industrial enterprises can be rubbing their hands with glee. As a result, the level of international security will drop a notch.
Along with revising their rearmament plans, many governments also are beginning to review their defense doctrines. Especially disturbing is the emphasis given to the U.S. formulated concept of preemptive strikes that can be delivered should a country's intelligence service suspect that a neighbor is planning to take military action against it. Preemptive strike is nothing but readiness to use force in response to a perceived (possibly erroneously perceived) hostile intention by another side. It is indicative that, say, Japan makes no secret of its readiness to deliver a preemptive strike against North Korea should the latter decide to use its purported nuclear weapons.
Unless this trend stops, some regions could turn into areas of serious armed conflict.
There is yet another growing danger. The contemporary world, which has failed to stop nuclear proliferation and thus limit the size of the nuclear club, risks seeing the emergence of new nuclear powers.
Russia, in this author's opinion, should recover the status and role as a leading power in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. To this end, it will have to abandon the apparent axiom about nuclear weapons as a viable foundation of reliable defense. This approach, to Russia, is not an exercise in altruism. Once we abandoned the idea of general liquidation of nuclear weapons, before long we found that the country's entire southern "underbelly" had basically turned nuclear. The world has changed but stereotypes of thinking remained unchanged. So Moscow could propose, as a top priority, joint elaboration, together with all overt or covert nuclear powers, of a realistic program toward a gradual, step by step, liquidation of nuclear weapons. This matter should be revisited with the participation of Russia, the United States, China, Great Britain, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel as well as the known "threshold states."
It is also necessary to address all aspects of the problem of using weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium for peaceful purposes. It is critical to jointly work out and apply in practice a credible system of international control over the safe storage of nuclear materials.
There is a pressing need to build global partnership against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons. This partnership should be open to all nuclear and non-nuclear countries concerned.
Russia, which is reasserting its economic and political positions, should remain a leading diplomatic power, skillfully and intelligently making safe paths in the minefields of world politics. The idea that a diplomat is a servant, not a soldier's master 5 is unacceptable to Russia. Both are equally in the service of their state.
Endnotes
Note *: Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, former Ambassador to the United States and Soviet foreign minister, now president of the Foreign Policy Association, chairman of the World Council of Former Foreign Ministers, member of the Russian Academy of Social and Political Sciences, corresponding member of the Chile Academy of Social and Humanitarian Sciences, president of the International Foundation for Reconstruction and Development of Chechen State University. Back
Note 1: J. Bishop. Theodor Roosevelt and His Time. N.Y., 1920, Vol. 1, p. 76. Back
Note 2: H. Hill. Roosevelt and the Caribbean. Chicago, 1927, p. 68. Back
Note 3: James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy. N.Y., 1995, pp. 263-264. Back
Note 5: J. Bishop. Theodor Roosevelt and His Time. The present author's near obsessive quotation of his thoughts is due to his wish to show that the so-called neo-conservatism, which is thriving in the U.S. politics of the early 21st century, is almost a verbatim repetition of concepts born in the early 20th century. "Neo-conservatism" is at least 100 years old. Back