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CIAO DATE: 12/03
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
European Values and American Interests
V. Inozemtsev, E. Kuznetsova *
Along with the Cold War the world order in which the liberal and communist ideologies competed for domination and which since the 15th century remained Eurocentrist became a thing of the past.
For five centuries the fortunes of nations were mainly settled in European capitals. Colonial expansion undoubtedly proved Europe's superiority over the rest of the world while the clashes at the world's periphery were frequently used for maintaining intra-European balance of power. The Westphalian system owing its stability to the principles of European diplomacy was attuned to this balance. Over time, the extending might of European powers projected continental conflicts into worldwide military turmoil. As a result Europe lost its economic leadership as well as its overseas possessions, becoming America's junior partner in the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Finally Europe turned indifferent to world politics as the global political center was shifting steadily from Europe to Washington.
What is Europe's place in the contemporary world? Can it re-establish its former role as a key geo-political actor? Does it want this role to be re-established? Can it offer a new vision of a world order not built on the balance-of-power principle?
In Search for Alternatives
A thirst for world domination is nothing new - the history provides many instances of it. Today, the United States has gained an unprecedented power over the world expressed mainly through non-violent means. In the past, the goal of world domination justified all the means available. The present hegemonic superpower is simply enjoying its victories and does not bother about soul-searching. So far, little has been done to forecast future developments or to comprehend in detail what should be done next on the world arena.
No wonder, nearly all prominent American political scientists start their works with stating a seemingly obvious fact of U.S. dominance. For Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America stands supreme in the four decisive domains of global power: militarily, economically,.. technologically, and culturally . . . It is the combination of all four that makes America the only comprehensive global superpower;"1 for Henry Kissinger, "At the dawn of the new millennium, the United States is enjoying a preeminence unrivaled by even the greatest empires of the past;"2 for John Ikenberry, "In both economic and military spheres, the United States leads its nearest rival by a larger margin than has any other leading state in the last three centuries;"3 for Joseph S. Nye, Jr, "No since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the other;"4; for Robert Kagan, "By historical standards, America's post-Cold War military power, particularly its ability to project that power to all corners of the globâ, remained unprecedented."5 Andrew Bacevich has summarized the above by saying that among all Americans "except among a crabbed minority on the far right and far left, a concept of the United States shaping a new global order in its own image evoked more satisfaction than complaint."6
Inside George W. Bush's administration there are no doubts about the country's stance. This explains why having won the Cold War the United States uses force on average twice a year (as against an average of 1.1 times a year during 1890-1989) to interfere in domestic affairs of other nation-states; it does not question its right to impose unilate-rally sanctions on 75 countries or groups of countries, accounting for 52 percent of the world's population.7 America has demonstratively refused to join international agreements and conventions that may limit its own freedom of action: on banning landmines (signed by 148 states and rejected by 2); on setting up an International Criminal Court (120 countries for, 7 against); the convention on global warming, better known as Kyoto Protocol (signed by 178 states, rejected only by the U.S.). President of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Jessica T. Matthews has the following to say: "With the exception of Israel and India, not a single democracy shared the U.S. views on any of these issues." The American attitude towards the U.N. causes indignation in many parts of the world. Between 1986 and 2000, the United States used its veto in the U.N. Security Council 30 times (twice as often as in 1946-1982) comparing with 15 vetoes imposed by its four other permanent members combined. The trend culminates in the U.S. refusal even to submit the vital issue of an anti-Iraqi military operation to the U.N. Security Council in March 2003.
What are America's geopolitical aims and intentions? According to President George W. Bush "America has no empire to extend or utopia to establish." If he really means it, his words do not explain the nearly paranoid desire "to reassert American freedom of action."8 Are they prompted by the fear that as Charles A. Kupchan put it "America's unipolar moment and the global stability that comes with it will not last"9 and that sooner or later the U.S. will have to accept that genuine freedom requires efficient international bodies of indisputable authority and power?
All this may explain why the American political scientists are doing their best to convince the world and (possibly) themselves that "the Unites States is the only power able to manage international justice, not as a function of its own national motives but in the name of global right [italics ours. - V.I., E.K.]."10 From time to time, however, they blurt out that "America's destiny is to police the world."11 The countries that were banned from political decision-making and the nations for which "the U.S. has simply made it too difficult to exist"12 will probably step up their efforts to challenge America's global hegemony and to restore the world order based on a more or less just distribution of power and influence.
It is these efforts, sometimes civilized sometimes barbarically cruel, that have become one of the most glaring features of the first decades of the new hyperpower's dominance. Can the traditional balance-of-power principle, a sort of a new bipolar world be restored? Who may wish to set up a checks-and-balances system to counterbalance American hegemony? Can the world community at least articulate its common will even if unable to create a mechanism to translate it into life?
In recent days, the most influential American experts show no concern over the hope of some self-proclaimed "great powers" to organize an anti-American opposition. They argue that Russia cannot lead the movement for it lost the Cold War, for its economic potential may be neglected given the scale of global economy and because the developing countries have become seriously disenchanted with it. China, likewise, can hardly initiate the movement: its growing might notwithstanding the country remains highly dependent on the United States as the main market for its goods and the main source of incoming foreign direct investment. In addition, it has never before exercised global political influence. The Islamic world, America's most aggressive "opponent", is even less able to rally the opposition because of its economic inconsistency and political extremism.
There is, however, one fatal error in this geo-political analysis: nearly all American experts neglect Europe as a possible "foe." There are certain reasons for this but not military (the widely acclaimed writings by Robert Kagan are based on a consideration that European military potential is very modest13) or civilizational (regarding Europe and America as elements of a single Western civilization). Contemporary Europe, or rather the European Union, is not so much unable as unwilling to position itself as a counterforce opposed to anyone within the framework of the "great power politics" (to borrow an expression from John Mearsheimer14).
Today when both Europe and America are becoming increasingly aware that there exists no such thing as a single Western identity, more and more believing in two different identities - European and American,15 when "Americans and Europeans - agree on little and understand one another less and less,"16 and when European intellectuals proudly reject American policies17 while indiscriminate and scathing criticism of Europeans has become a vexatious national habit with the Americans, the Europeans, as distinct from the Americans, are still regarding the world as a source of challenges rather than threats.18 Confronted with mounting instability and threats originating from rogue regimes in distant corners of the world, the European Union still rejects the use of force in international politics and does not concentrate on building up its military might. At the same time, from 55 up to 78 per cent of the citizens of "weak" Europe feel themselves safe while in "strong" America less than 40 per cent do.19
This betrays deep-cutting distinctions, a sort of cultural gap between the United States and European Union fraught neither with geopolitical confrontation nor with military conflicts. The Europeans are irritated by the fact that the American political doctrine treats the world in a simplified way in which force is mainly taken for power. Europe has never wanted and does not want to oppose America within the framework build upon the balance-of-power principle - any impartial observer can say this. It merely refuses to regard force as a source of justice. If this position of the principal U.S. ally pinches the United States, it is its problem rather than Europe's. European Union's opposition to the United States is constructive in its nature and is not intended to reduce America's role and influence. It wants the only hyperpower to recognize the merits of a civilized foreign policy and do its best to act accordingly; uniting Europe itself has been successfully applying this principle to itself for several decades so far.
Scoring new points in developing the European Union is one thing, while trying to apply to the sphere of international politics some principles originating from this process is quite another. By offering an alternative to America's political doctrine the Europeans agree to respect U.S. interests but remain devoted to values and priorities of their own. While outlining them the Europeans should probably make things clear to identify those dwelling a European (even if not common European) identity and those objectively attached to the American vision of the world. This is not a simple and straightforward task.
Europe Facing a Choice
It is the history of Europe and America that has shaped their present re-lations. In the 20th century Europe was shaken by two world wars while the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington were the first assault on continental America since 1814. This explains two very different approaches to the role and possible use of military force. Its history taught Europe to rely on the principles of non-violence in its foreign policy. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer pointed out: "The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states through the transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions." Also President of the European Commission Romano Prodi said: "We Europeans are neither dominators nor dominated, we are neither outcasts nor conquerors."20 Both believe in non-violence as a fundamental feature of European worldview. Today, the United States that for a long time was keeping away of all sorts of conflicts is pursuing a confrontation policy toward the rest of the world based on the conviction that its power has no bounds and limits.
The recent developments have not weakened but rather reasserted Europe's commitment to its foreign policy imperative. The majority of the EU citizens are convinced that people in many parts of the world do hate the United States due to its aggressive policy and that, to a great extent, America itself provoked the terrorist acts. The Europeans took with a grain of salt the American response to the events of 9/11 shaped as an "antiterrorist coalition" that failed of its main aim: to detain and punish the key figures behind the barbaric acts. Europe rejected the American attempt to compensate for this failure by launching operation designed to "disarm" Saddam Hussein. In February and March of 2003, a wave of antiwar rallies not seen since the early 1980s swept across Europe. According to recent polls from 75 up to 80 per cent of Europeans did not support the U.S. uni-lateral actions against Iraq while nearly 60 per cent of Americans approved the invasion without a U.N. sanction in case their country had at least one ally.21 The warnings coming from Europe that "some know more about war" than the Americans preaching the "zero death" strategy22 were largely ignored. The very first weeks of the war, however, totally confirmed these words. No wonder that on the eve and during the war in the Middle East the ever-increasing number of experts is becoming convinced that Europe looks like a re-establisher of politics while the United States is preaching a shop-soiled ideo-logy23 and that Europe has been and remains "too powerful to be ignored."24
Europe could not adopt the American rules without betraying its own postwar achievements and without facing the risk of becoming another potential target for extremists. Today, "Europe is only secondary, not preferred, target [for terrorists], and . . . this situation is unlikely to change anytime soon." The Europeans are quite satisfied. An impressive example of how "Britain's special relationship with the U.S. turned into a dependency"25 demonstrated to the European leaders that it is very hard to build up equal relationships with such a powerful ally. This created a context in which the EU could offer an alternative to the American political course based both on European traditions and international law. Today, Europe who can oppose the United States as justice opposes force rather than as weakness opposes power. This has added urgency to the task of codifying universal international law and its consistent application to any country and any nation. Being prepared to do this the Europeans have managed to give a start to the International Criminal Court while the International Council of Lawyers associated with the U.N. European Department in Geneva was the only influential international organization that pointed out in its resolution on the American operation in Iraq that this attack was illegal and should be qualified as an aggression.26
While responding to the new challenges Europe cannot resign itself merely to formulating the principles of its relations with the United States. The Old World that has been unifying for the last fifty years needs a common political identity, which, in its turn, requires solidarity on the crucial foreign policy issues. Economic integration that for several decades remained on top of the list of European priorities has not created political unity. None of the key political problems has been resolved in ten years that have passed since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht while EU eastward enlargement created many new problems.
Considering this huge economic, social, and cultural discrepancy between the U.S. and the European Union, American bluntness may rather bring the European nations closer than disunite them. For a while Europeans demonstrated mild anti-Americanism fed by the U.S. refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol and the convention on banning landmines and its active proliferation of genetically modified products together with the glaring narrow-mindedness of the incumbent U.S. administration. As someone said, "Mr. Bush has proved more successful at uniting the British, French, Germans and Italians than Jean Monnet."27 But when the Americans tried to change the routine order of things Europe split into the supporters and opponents of American policies.
While America was preparing its invasion in Iraq, France and Germany announced that they were not willing to support the use of force being con-vinced that the conflict should be resolved peacefully. They insisted that the U.N. weapons inspectors were capable of coping with their mission. Great Britain sided with the United States and announced that it completely supported its anti-Iraqi position. The follow-up (the notorious Letter of Eight published in the Wall Street Journal Europe on January 30, 2003; British and Spanish approval, on March 16, of the American strategy at the Azores summit, technical and even military support of the American and British invasion by some European states) demonstrated that Europe lacked coordinated foreign and defense policy and that the public in the majority of European countries was pacifist-minded. In the largest European states (Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain) from 60 up to 80 percent of population spoke against the war with Iraq, 28 some 45 up to 70 per cent were convinced that control over Iraqi oil urged America to start the war while 50 up to 71 per cent believed that the American values and traditions if adopted would hurt European identity.
It seems that several recent demarches made as tension between Europe and America was growing might dramatically change the course of European integration and Europe's position in the world arena in the 21st century. Here we have in mind, first of all, the statements President Jacques Chirac of France and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany made in Paris on January 22, 2003 when they announced that France and Germany intended to form a single state with common citizenship, common U.N. membership (and the common right of veto in the Security Council), and a common president; discussion of special relationships between Russia, France, and Germany that took place in February 2003 during President Vladimir Putin's of Russia visits to Berlin and Paris; President Chirac's response to East European states' support of the American position on Iraq when he said that they "had done their best to reduce their chances of entering Europe29;" the joint communique of France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg in which they pointed out that Europe urgently needed united European armed forces, and some other developments.
Two circumstances make the above symptomatically important. First, European politicians recognized that no coordinated foreign policy was possible within a fairly loose European coalition and called on to ponder on the multilayered and deeply-rooted nature of European integration. The very idea of the so-called "core nations" formulated in the statements President Chirac and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany issued on December 6, 1995 and February 27, 1996 was present, in some form or another, nearly in all plans of European extension. The mere fact that it was revived speaks of the triumph of a realistic approach to European integration: there is an obvious desire to translate their economic success into political one. This means that the circle of countries will be gradually extended in the course of their acceptance of coordinated positions. Second, a shared political position is seen as practically the only means of getting "Europe out of its trans-Atlantic predicament," therefore the very process of formulating this common position will inevitably become the key to a new European identity (that may or may not be formed). There is a temptation to accept the American doctrine so that to preserve the unity of Europe rather than to destroy the already mature organism out of a blind hatred of the Americans.30 In this way one has to admit that European political integration is in crisis with very slim chances of leaving it behind.
Europe is living through a very specific period: it seems that to preserve the nature of European integration it should work out a common EU position on foreign policy issues. This will most probably disrupt the European process and will change the European Union's framework. At the same time, the preserved EU configuration will inevitably increase American pressure on European politics. Will Europe disentangle itself from this predicament? It is hard to answer the question today yet one may try to assess the extent to which one of several options is probable.
Three Possible Options
The first can become a reality if the Europeans step up dramatically their criticism of American policies, if the Franco-German union, so far in an embryonic form, develops, if the contradictions between them and the U.K. and other EU members that supported America deepen. This may push European politicians toward a non-American, rather than anti-American, coalition, a course that holds no promise: they may ban the use of the American military bases in some of the European countries in case of military operations; try to put on vote in the U.N. a resolution qualifying the United States as an aggressor; restrict cooperation with the United States in certain areas or even announce their withdrawal from the NATO military structures and development of a single European army. One can even expect closer relations of France and Germany with Russia for the sake of greater economic self-sufficiency of the leading European countries. All this could show the East European nations that no matter how friendly they are with the United States they will never determine the underlying European principles.
This option is vulnerable mainly because it will inevitably challenge America's geo-political domination - something that goes against the European idea of rejecting all efforts to attain a geo-political balance. It is equally obvious that such coalition will not be a stable one: on the one hand, any of the potential allies may alter its position when offered lucrative conditions of economic cooperation (the case of France and Germany) or when offered American support on sensitive domestic issues (for example, on the Chechen problem). On the other hand, both France and Germany are deeply integrated in the European Union that will not include Russia for the next 10 to 15 years and have close economic ties with the United States. Under no conditions will possible gains created by their economic and military-political cooperation with Russia outweigh possible losses incurred by ruptured ties within the Western world. Therefore, each of the members of this coalition will be waiting for a chance to restore its dialog with the United States.
In short-term run this temporal alliance may produce important results and demonstrate that European countries are resolved to oppose American policies. In the long-term perspective, however, this option does not look promising since it reproduces the bipolar world order of a sort-something that the majority of European politicians are not ready to accept.
The second option is more probable if the war in Iraq turned out to be protracted or if the United States tries to launch similar operations in other regions. In this case the "effect of Saddam Hussein" that has already created a deep rupture between the United States and certain of its key European allies31 could consolidate all EU members into a moderate and partly formal opposition to the United States strictly contained within the European Union. This option suggests great pressure on the candidate countries that sided with the U.S. Their admission to the Union may well be postponed for two or three years. Popular discontent in Great Britain, Spain, and Italy with their governments' pro-American policy may cut short the political careers of war supporters: Prime-Ministers Blair, Aznar, and Berlusconi.
These processes may contribute to molding European common foreign and defense policy (CFDP) as well as to creating a single European army. They may also invite American sanctions born by political considerations that will allow the Europeans to present the U.S. as a supporter of political and economic extremism and to bring closer the positions of EU members. This option may further consolidate the European Union, increase the role and importance of the largest states (first of all France and Germany), impose European common foreign and defense policy and create all-European armed forces. In this case, the demonstrative opposition to the American line would turn out to be a tactical step of those who wanted faster European integration.
The third option may come true if the coalition forces successfully complete their operation in Iraq. In this case, the EU continental members may further alienate themselves from the U.K. and opt for more obvious isolationism. They will concentrate on their domestic issues, on strengthening their self-sufficiency and independence from the "outside" world. By taking distance from the United States and its policy Europe will become even more attractive as a genuine advocate of human rights, peaceful settlement of conflicts, the main donor of the international aid, and the supporter of narrowing the global wealth gap. However, in this case Europe will reap the fruits in distant future when the United States enters into another confrontation with the international community.
All three options presuppose a newly formed European identity in foreign policy issues that will differ from that of the United States. All three options echo the idea widely ac-cepted in Europe and aptly expressed by Britain's Will Hutton: "America, for the moment, has disqualified itself from the fight for security, prosperity, and justice. It falls to Europe to undertake this task. That is a challen-ge and a responsibility that cannot be evaded. We must succeed."32 Meanwhile, as said above, Europe has rejected confrontationist consciousness. This is one of the most distinctive features of European politics of the last decades therefore realization of each of the three options will face considerable difficulties. But there is another possibility that may turn catastrophic for European political identity.
It may turn into reality if the majority of European countries fail to produce any position and start a humiliating and disgraceful bargaining with the United States over the forms and conditions of further cooperation. There are first sign of this: in mid-March when preparing its aggression against Iraq the United States, being aware that the U.N. resolution they needed would fail, did not call a Security Council meeting. It infuriated a lot of countries, France, Russia, and China included. One is tempted to ask: Why did none of them initiate a meeting and insist on voting? Why did the Security Council meet when the fighting had been going on for a week already and do that on the insistence of the League of Arab States? Why did France insist on an open and competitive distribution of contracts for postwar Iraqi reconstruction while it would have been more appropriate for it (taking into account its initial position) proudly to reject them even if offered by Americans? Why did neither Russia nor any other state bring up before the U.N. a question of the nature of American invasion? Why did they never suggest that it should be qualified as an aggression since there were enough reasons to do this? Today, there is too many of "whys." In this context the greatest concern is caused not by the lapsed European political line but by an obvious inaction when it comes to its creation. When justifying the war in Iraq President George W. Bush and other American leaders were quite convincing when they reminded to the world that the policy of appeasement had never been successful. This is true yet this policy will never bring desired results if global instability is caused not by a rogue state but by a rogue hyperpower into which the United States is gradually turning. Time has come to think about that.
By way of summing up we should say that many problems the European Union has to tackle with are caused by the fact that the Europeans have not yet probably grasped the scale of changes that occurred in Europe in the last fifty years. They rejected the balance-of-power principle in their political practice yet, as Joschka Fischer put it, but they managed to do this because the ambitions of individual states were limited by the transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions. The whole world outside Europe continued developing according to the old principles. Today, the European Union may either try to apply its internal principles (that, as is often proclaimed, correspond to the conceptions of post-modernity) to global policies or take into account the international political realities and try to go back to the approaches discarded long ago in relation to closest neighbors. The former cannot be realized outside the international community's wide or even comprehensive support that is non-existing and is nowhere in sight. As for the latter the Europeans themselves are reluctant to realize it because if implemented this approach will revive the old political principles on the continent and bury the European integration project. This explains why Europe looks with apprehension at America's political course that brings back the images of its own distant past. The European Union should follow its own path and reject the temptation of becoming another global superpower. If it succeeds time will come when the American policy - a loose remake of European imperialism of the past - will exhaust itself and former European colonies engaged in wars between themselves will turn to Europe as to their one and only tutor.
Endnotes
Note *: Vladislav Inozemtsev, Professor of Economics, Moscow State University; Chairman, Board of Advisors, Russia in Global Affairs quarterly. Ekaterina Kuznetsova, Chairperson, European Integration Project, Post-Industrial Society Research Center Back
Note 1: Zb. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, N.Y., 1997, p. 24.
Note 2: H. Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, N.Y., 2001, p. 17.
Note 3: G.J. Ikenberry, After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton (NJ), Oxford, 2002, p. 10.
Note 4: J.S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power. Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, N.Y., Oxford, 2002, p. 1.
Note 5: R. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order, N.Y., 2003, p. 26.
Note 6: A.J. Bacevich, American Empire. The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Cambridge (Ma.), L., 2002, p. 1.
Note 7: See: Z. Sardar and M.W. Davis, Why Do People Hate America? Cambridge, 2002, pp. 68, 79.
Note 8: Ch. Krauthammer, "The New Unilateralism," Washington Post, June 8, 2001, p. 29.
Note 9: C.A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century, N.Y., 2002, p. 28.
Note 10: M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire, Cambridge (Ma.), L., 2000, p. 180.
Note 11: M. Boot, "America's Destiny Is to Police the World," Financial Times, February 18, 2002, p. 15.
Note 12: Z. Sardar and M.W. Davis, op. cit., p. 195.
Note 13: See: R. Kagan, "Power and Weakness," Policy Review, No. 113, June-July 2002.
Note 14: See: J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Chicago, L., 2001.
Note 15: See: H. Vedrine with D. Moisi, France in an Age of Globalization, Washington, 2001, p. 50.
Note 16: R. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, p. 3.
Note 17: See, for example: B. Emmott, 20:21 Vision. The Lessons of the 20th Century for the 21st, L., 2003, pp. 33-35.
Note 18: See: R. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, pp. 5-7.
Note 19: See: J.F.O. McAllister, "Mad at America," Time, January 20, 2003, p. 18.
Note 20: R. Prodi, Europe As I See It, Cambridge, 2000, p. 41.
Note 21: See: G. Frankel, "Examining Anti-Americanism," The Wall Street Journal Europe, February 11, 2003, p. A2.
Note 22: W. Pfaff, "Some Know More About War," International Herald Tribune, January 26, 2003, p. 6.
Note 23: See: M. Ignatieff, 'Empire Lite,' Prospect, 2003, February, No 83, p. 41.
Note 24: J.S. Nye, Jr., "Europe Is Too Powerful to be Ignored," Financial Times, March 11, 2003, p. 15.
Note 25: See: M. Campbell, "The Key to Washington Lies in Brussels," Financial Times, December 23, 2002, p. 11.
Note 26: See: I. Ramonet, "Illegale aggression," Le Monde diplomatique, No. 589, April 2003, p. 1.
Note 27: See: G. Baker, "Leap of Faith that Divides Europe and the US," Financial Times, August 23, 2001, p. 11.
Note 28: See: B. Crumley, "War Torn," Time, February 17, 2003, p. 23.
Note 29: Quoted from: R. Graham, "Chirac Vents