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CIAO DATE: 12/03
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Russia and U.S.: Partners, No Matter What
A. Iurin *
THE FINAL DECLARATION the presidents, Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush, signed at the end of the Russian-American summit in Moscow and St. Petersburg in May 2002 says: We are partners. The head of the global power did not pass up the chance to demonstrate the new perception of Russia by the Americans as a friendly state and that this is the basis for resolving all problems in the future. Whereas only recently it was bandied about in Washington that relations with Russia are not as important as they used to be, nobody counts out Russia today. It is with Russia that the United States has signed a treaty reducing strategic nuclear potentials that has an international legal character. We can argue about the price of this victory because even the reduced number of strategic warheads (1,700 to 2,200) is big enough for total mutual destruction. At the same time, it is not to be forgotten that it became possible to prevent the dismantling of the arms control regime despite vigorous opposition from the group of American politicians who think that this control hamstrings the United States alone. Besides, Russia would have to reduce its strategic potential anyway for financial reasons - we cannot compete with the United States that raises its defense spending annually by sums comparable perhaps with Russia's annual budgets. Thus, the treaty benefits us because it curbs the growth of American superiority to a certain extent.
The two countries have in fact agreed at least on three key points of the Russian-American program of action: war on international terrorism, nonproliferation of WMD, and economic cooperation. Russia has rendered the U.S. unprecedented assistance in combating terrorism by sharing with it its intelligence on Afghanistan. More, the elimination of the Taliban has proven to be the two countries' common goal. Sharing concern about the threat of terrorism, the leaders of the United States and Russia signaled heightened interest in joint efforts in nonproliferation. In the wake of Sept. 11 we do not have to guess at the possible disastrous consequences of nuclear weapons or materials falling into the hands of those who would go and destroy civilian populations on a monstrous scale without a moment's hesitation.
The stability and predictability in military-political relationships between our countries increasingly highlight a vital need for making at least some progress in the economic component of the growing real partnership. First Washington and then the EU recognized that the Russian economy is a market economy, but so far no real benefits can be derived from this. Russia's attempts to join the WTO continue to come up against a great number of unreasonable demands first of all from the EU. The Americans stand on the sidelines as it were, although if there is goodwill on their part, they could have given Russia the needed backing in this matter and in restructuring the Russian foreign debt. The Americans' influence in this field remains unchallenged. This means that either something does not work in the mechanism of partnership or that the whole thing is largely hollow words.
Indeed, Russian-American cooperation is still fragile and it is only gathering momentum. There is no institutional framework for partnership. Too much, if not all, depends on personal chemistry between the leaders of the two countries. If Washington and Moscow do have common interests and a common enemy, cooperation should be stepped up. First, neither country is interested in proliferation of WMD and even less in seeing any other country achieve a greater nuclear arms potential. Second, both Washington and Moscow are trying to prevent regional conflicts in the same way they are trying to settle the Middle East crisis within the framework of the "quartet." But the most important thing for building up the partnership is the search for mutual interests in the economic field. The positive consequences of recognizing that Russia is a country with a market economy are extremely limited, the volume of trade cannot increase on its own and there has been no increase in investments.
What unites Russia and America in this area is working for international energy security. Cooperation in power engineering, business circles in America think, will lessen the United States' dependence on oil supplies from the Middle East and at the same time increase investments in Russia. This is a perfectly good matter for discussion. First steps in this direction have already been taken. The majority of Russian companies attending the Houston energy summit in October 2002 said they were ready to supply their products to the United States and America jumped at this opportunity. Next to Yukos, the pioneer of Russian oil supplies to the U.S. market that will continue to operate independently also in 2003, the TNK, or Tiumen Oil Company, will begin shipping fuels for U.S. reserves.
What are the points on which the national interests of the United States and Russia diverge? First of all this is the Iraq issue. When the Bush administration gave the whole world to understand that war with Iraq cannot be avoided, observers predicted a worsening in Russian-American relations. This did not happen. Members of the UN Security Council hammered out a unified approach to disarming Iraq formalized in Resolution 1441. Both Russia and the United States made concessions. Washington realizes very well that Russia has special interests in Iraq. Many rumors are being spread in this regard to allege that Moscow and Washington have agreed on division of interests in a post-Saddam Iraq, on having Iraq's debt to Russia paid, and on reserving for Russian companies the oil field development contracts. Most certainly, we would like to have this sort of guarantees, but who is going to give them? Furthermore, unlike Washington, Moscow does not aim to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein with whom Moscow has been able to find a common ground so far. LUKoil's conflict with Iraqi authorities had been sparked by the company leaders' attempts to hedge against the possibility of war in Iraq and secure at least some guarantees from the United States. Can the still legitimate regime in Baghdad like such maneuverings behind its back? Besides, no matter how important the ambitions of the Russian oil lobby in Iraq are, they cannot be equated with Russia's interests in this region. As for Iraq's debt, more often than not, Russia is obliged to write off such debts accumulated during the Soviet era instead of hoping for compensation.
The generally clear skies of Russian-American relations now and then become darkened with clouds, some of which are thunderclouds. One of them has been long obscuring the Russian horizon where the West is or, more accurately, where NATO is. Yet another wave of NATO expansion has finally swept through part of what used to be Soviet territory, next to the Russian border. The November NATO summit in Prague did not make any clearer the reason for continued existence of NATO in the absence of "Soviet threat" for guarding against which NATO was created in the first place. The "Russian threat" has long been gone but NATO Secretary-General George Robertson found nothing better to say that the expansion is good for Russia because it brings a "zone of stability" closer to its borders.
To Moscow's credit, it took this round of NATO expansion calmly. But Washington was actively discussing how this was going to benefit America which is increasingly worried about the growing differences with its allies. First, the adviser to Canada's Prime Minister Jean Chretien referred to the U.S. leader using a scathing epithet that translates as "idiot" to put it mildly. Next, Bush muttered his welcome to Chancellor Schroeder giving the main critic of the U.S. policy toward Iraq the cold shoulder.
President Bush ruined the pleasure of the Baltic newcomers: He flew right from Prague over the friendly Baltic states making his first stopover in Tsarskoe Selo to met, for what is the seventh time in two years, with President Putin, and that was their second meeting of the year on Russian soil. The American president, who prides himself on his ability to see which people are good and which are not and prizes one-on-one relations with his foreign counterparts, is not on record perhaps to have displayed such attention and affection with regard to any European or NATO allies. This suggests that he finds it much nicer and simpler to find common ground with Putin than with the traditional partners. The visit was brief but busy in a significant way for the prospects of Russian-American partnership.
In the wake of the Moscow theater tragedy on Dubrovka, President Bush took an important step by recognizing Chechen terrorists an inalienable part of international terrorism. The U.S. president, of course, followed the advice of his aides when he mentioned in passing that search for a political solution in Chechnya should go on, but these words are worth much because Bush fully supported the resolute actions being taken by Russian authorities against the terrorists. Judging from his attitude, had a similar situation arisen in America, the American leader would have acted precisely in the same manner as his Russian counterpart. How can we speak about putting any pressure on Russia if Bush refuses to admit even the possibility of dialogue with bin Laden and even with Hussein? It should be pointed out that far from all members of the U.S. administration and the Department of State share their boss's attitude. Responding to a reporter's request to comment on Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's rhetorical question during the OSCE in Portugal about what would Europe do if it were Osama bin Laden in place of Zakaev, a Deportment of State staffer I know suggested that these two men cannot be compared because they are from different sandboxes. Translated from the language of American diplomacy the meaning of this phrase is quite obvious: Zakaev has no blood of American nationals on his hands and he is no threat to the United States (when I meet him once again, I should ask him what he thinks about the recent arrest in the United States of three terrorists who admitted to having received special training in Chechnya). Thus, politicians still cling to the possibility of bringing back from oblivion Maskhadov with whom "it is possible to conduct political dialogue" if his accomplice Zakaev manages to once again extricate himself from the snare reluctantly set up by Western justice under Russia's and the world community's pressure, failing which the concept of political dialogue with terrorists would be pronounced ineffective also by this part of the American establishment.
While in Washington, Chairman of the State Duma International Affairs Committee Dmitrii Rogozin could see this for himself. Speaking at the press conference at the end of his meetings with high-profile members of U.S. legislative and executive branches including Senator Richard Lugar and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, he noted with satisfaction that this had been the first visit where they "did not go into hysterics and did not lecture" him about Moscow's policy in Chechnya as some people still like to do in European countries. The only conclusion is; the Americans heed the opinion of their president and begin to after all equate Chechen terrorists with the so much hated al-Qaida gunmen U.S. special services are chasing all over the world. It remains to hope that this realization will equal the recognition by the American public of the "legitimacy" of the president's executive order under which the special services can independently add names to the lists of heads of international terrorist organizations slated for elimination.
However, one of Putin's phrases to the effect that "we should not forget who bankrolls terrorists" as he pointed his finger straight at Saudi Arabia caused some embarrassment in the American camp. On the one hand, Washington cannot afford to criticize and lose such an influential ally in the Middle East and even less so when it is preparing for a military operation against Iraq. On the other, facts speak for themselves. 16 participants in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks are Saudi subjects. The attempt to hush up the Russian leader's harsh statement and give the lie to the involvement of officials in Ar-Riyad in supporting terrorism did not pan out. Getting this signal from Moscow, meticulous American journalists did a swift investigation to come up with yet another sensation - it turned out that the wife of the Saudi ambassador to Washington had transferred money to bank accounts of the Arabs suspected of links to the above terrorists. The scandal was hushed up only after the royal family intervened and sent its spokesman to Washington. This is one of the few such leads whereas the White House official charges against foreign states with bankrolling and backing al-Qaida gunmen applied solely to the Baghdad regime. Despite the pooling of efforts of its own and allied special services no convincing proofs of such collaboration have been published so far. Evidently, they simply don't exist, otherwise "pieces of evidence" would have been hyped on a scale typical of the Americans so that no one in the world had a shred of doubt about Baghdad having been deservedly added to the axis of evil as an abettor of international terrorism.
Washington's being bent on brandishing weapons was resented even by U.S. European allies. The U.S. became outraged at its partners' "impudence" and accused the Europeans of demagogy that masked their impotence. The United States continues to gamble on the use of force notwithstanding. It has no doubt it would be able to single-handedly solve the problem - to replace the regime in Baghdad under the cover of the UN Security Council resolution that calls for disarming Baghdad. At the same time, Washington sounded out in more than 50 countries the scale and character of possible support to its strong-arm action and came away pleased with the "solidarity" they voiced. The allies are in a quandary over what to do: subscribe to the U.S. position and get their share of the spoils after victory in Iraq, or stand on the sidelines.
Russia faces a similar choice. When in Tsarskoe Selo, Bush supposedly promised to Putin to show respect for Russian economic interests "after Saddam." If this was really the case, this means Bush had to go for the hawks in his inner circle who are inclined to ignore Moscow in this matter since they expect no deal with Russia if a military operation in Iraq becomes "legalized." The problem of Russian oil contract in Iraq is of course discussed in the course of bilateral consultations, but it is premature to say that the Americans are prepared to undertake to guarantee at least stable oil prices in a postwar Iraq. It cannot be ruled out that sooner of later this problem would have to be resolved through an energy talks between the two countries considering the fact that Putin and Bush approve the efforts of Russian and American companies to organize new forms of cooperation and develop the Russian power engineering and fuel transportation systems in the interests of, among other things, of the United States and international energy security.
In summing up the results of Russian-American cooperation in the previous year we can say it was stable and consistent and there was growing trust between the two countries and their leaders. Observers in Washington draw attention to the fact that any important development in the world is instantly followed by an exchange of views between the tandems of George W. Bush - Vladimir Putin, Colin Powell - Igor' Ivanov, and Donald Rumsfeld - Sergei Ivanov. This alone can be some guarantee against ill-considered and rash decisions with regard to some or other situation in the world. This generally positive factor has the reverse side - the political component of the dialogue is developing much faster than all the other components, first of all the economic component. One would like to see greater interest in partnership also on the part of both countries' lawmakers. It is up to them to decide whether they want to catch up with their leaders' thinking or continue putting a brake on growing relations of partnership. Removing Russia from the tired Jackson-Vanik amendment would not only deep-six the Cold War but also end the "Cool Peace" the more so since both the preceding administration and today's U.S. administration have long recognized it a "vestige of the past." The lawmakers' agenda has a more pressing item - the ratification of the Moscow treaty on cutting strategic offensive potentials. Judging from what Richard Lugar - who is starting on his duties of chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - is saying, the thaw in Russian-American relations will finally melt the ice of mutual prejudices and the first signs of progress in lawmaking will be in evidence as soon as in early 2003. Lugar's meetings in mid-December 2002 with his Russian opposite number Dmitrii Rogozin and later with Foreign Minister Igor' Ivanov discussed the synchronization of efforts in ratifying the Treaty of Moscow as one that accords with the national interests of the United States and Russia. Drawing closer every day is the time to act on the Russian initiative for a strong dialogue between parliamentary committees for similar lawmaking activities.
Making predictions in politics is a thankless task, especially if you try to appraise the prospects of relations between the world leaders one of whom is doggedly following in the footsteps of his father and trying to bring to fruition a "family business" in Iraq at any price. George W. Bush has dug up the hatchet, given Iraq (and the world community) time to rest and "repent" for the duration of Christmas and New Year season while canceling before that his trip to Africa scheduled for mid-January 2003 - let everyone guess what that could mean. Plainly, the president of a great power does not want to be distracted by other problems and he focuses his mind on Iraq.
To be or not to be? The answer mostly depends on the United States alone but it would be premature to count out the world community's potential. At this point, there is prevalence of advocates at the White House of pragmatic cooperation with the United Nations, which can still prove legally that the Baghdad regime is violating its commitments with regard to force development. Since this is not Washington's main goal, the final say will remain with the hawks who are ready at any moment to act on orders of the commander in chief of the armed forces to eliminate the main irritant - the regime of Saddam Hussein.
It has been a routine thing for the U.S. administration to give Russia a surprise shortly before every New Year season. This time around the surprise logically followed from the U.S. decision one year ago to pull out of the ABM Treaty. George Bush steadfastly fulfills his election promises to create a missile umbrella for the United States. No matter how they have tried to persuade him that "hitting a bullet with a bullet" reliably is hardly possible even at the cost of billions of dollars and would not it be better to channel this money into combating terrorism, the president's obsession has prevailed. On Dec.16, the president ordered that the Pentagon put in place, within two years, a limited national missile defense system to put a stop in one fell swoop to all argument about the effectiveness of his favorite brainchild. A convenient but less than convincing pretext was provided by North Korea's threats to resume production of plutonium at its mothballed nuclear center. At the same time, Washington ignored Pyongyang's arguments to the effect that it is the United States that had provoked the North Koreans into this move by cutting off supplies of fuel for their thermal power plants.
Notably, the framework of the future missile shield is being built in Alaska and California whereas its radars are sited in Great Britain and Greenland's north. This does not quite make sense from the point of view of getting protection against the nuclear threat from the rogue states and even less from the point of view of protecting the European allies.
But we are partners no matter what. Let us hope that the year 2003 will provide practical proofs.
Endnotes
Note *: Aleksandr Iurin, International Affairs Washington correspondent. Back