CIAO DATE: 04/03

International Affairs:
A Russian Journal

No. 1, 2003

 

Hostage-taking in Moscow and Tehran

B. Piadyshev

On November 4, 1979, a mob broke into the U.S. Embassy in the Iranian capital of Tehran. Muslim fanatics were running riot, sacking the diplomatic mission of the "Big Satan" and harassing and humiliating embassy employees and members of their families. Diplomatic immunity was conveniently forgotten. "Allah Akbar!" And so it was anything goes.

The U.S. diplomats in Tehran were living in grand style: the vast embassy premises, comprised of 14 buildings, official as well as residential. All of them — more than 60 Americans — were driven into one place. As luck would have it, the charge d’affairs and his two subordinates at the time were having a meeting at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, which proved their salvation. They managed to get out of the country.

A harrowing 444-day ordeal began for the U.S. hostages.

On October 23, 2002, in Moscow, near the climax of the wonderful show Nord-Ost, the first musical ever staged in the Russian capital, a group of Chechen bandits broke into the theater. They were even more fanatical, thuggish, and bloody-minded than those who seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Unlike the Chechens, the Iranians did not have such a meticulously elaborated, murderous plan of action; such extensive training under the guidance of the top leaders of international terrorism; or such weapons, equipment, and technology that enabled them to communicate with any country in the world from the theater building.

In Tehran, the Americans were sealed off, but on their embassy premises, in their own home so to speak. They had freedom, even if rather limited, to move about and communicate with each other, and they had food, even if meager.

In Moscow, several hundred theatergoers, not only Russians but also foreigners, ended up at gunpoint — forced to sit in their armchairs immobile and without any food — just a little soda water. Chechen women — the "daughters of Allah" — stood on the perimeter of the house wearing belt pouches with explosives. Combined with the mines planted in several places of the auditorium, there was enough explosive to demolish the theater building with the adjacent structures, taking a toll of hundreds if not thousands of lives. The bandits were driven by bestiality. "Kill her," their leader said offhandedly, and a woman from the audience that he for some reason did not like the look of was killed with four shots.

Neither 20 years ago, in Tehran, nor now, in Moscow, the bandits had the slightest intention to negotiate; if anything, they wanted to see the United States burn in hell and Moscow sink into the ground. Both at the White House, within the J. Carter administration, and in the Kremlin the working assumption must have been that since the terrorists were not prepared to consider any options to resolve the crisis by peaceful means, there was only one viable scenario for action — freeing the hostages by storming in. There was, however, a substantial difference in the conditions under which Washington and Moscow had to act.

In Tehran, no deadlines were being set for the Americans: The main demand was the extradition of Shah Mohammed Reza Pehlevi, who had taken refuge in New York. So they could take their time, months if need be, to mount a hostage-freeing operation.

The Kremlin had just a few hours. It had to act quickly and decisively, constantly looking at the clock.

The White House, the Pentagon, and the CIA were thoroughly, and over a long time, preparing an operation to free the U.S. hostages in Tehran. The storming of the U.S. Embassy, where the Americans were being held, was to be a culmination of large-scale, concerted efforts, including an amassing of a great military power around Iran. The adjacent sea waters were controlled by a powerful group of more than 30 warships, led by a formidable aircraft carrier. U.S. aviation ringed Iran. A 100,000-strong rapid reaction corps was to be deployed in the region. Newsweek magazine was writing at the time that a major bloodshed was expected, including substantial collateral damage — casualties both among civilians and the hostages themselves. It could so happen that there would be no one left to free anymore.

In the lead-up to Zero Hour, "25 successful training operations" had been conducted. Finally, on April 11, 1980, at a National Security Council session, President Carter endorsed a military operation code-named Eagle Claw. There was a less bellicose fall-back plan, code-named Rice Bowl, but the world was to understand, even through sheer wording, that the United States would balk at nothing.

The "Eagle" was to fly through several stages. At Stage 1, transport rotary and fixed wing aircraft with commandos aboard were to invade the Iranian air space and land in a remote area of Tebes, in the Deshte-Kevir desert, approximately 200 miles from Tehran. After refueling, the helicopters were to move on to the mountains near Tehran, where off-road vehicles would be waiting to take the commandos at night to the U.S. Embassy; the latter would storm in and free the hostages. By the time helicopters were to fly in to Tehran to take the freed Americans and a part of the commandos to the transport aircraft. From then on it was going to be a piece of cake: a triumphant return home.

The operation was carried out amid the utmost secrecy. The media were kept in the dark. On D-Day, President Carter and all White House officials were going about their daily routine, to create the impression that it was business as usual.

Late in the evening of April 24, six USAF transport airplanes and eight helicopters with 90 commandos on board and approximately just as many technical personnel crossed the Iranian border, heading for Tebes. The beginning was successful with Iranian radars detecting nothing. The Eagle landed at the designated spot in the desert. The Americans had thoroughly studied the sandy terrain as to its suitability for landing, coming to the conclusion that the sand was even and as firm as concrete. They were not mistaken in that regard.

At that point, however, fortune stopped smiling on the Americans. Things started to go wrong with tragicomic failures piling up.

Even before landing, one helicopter had to return to base owing to a technical malfunction. Another helicopter overshot the landing area, and it took a long time to find it. The crew was evacuated, but the helicopter had to be abandoned in the desert — as a memory to the Iranians. It so happened that the third marvelous machine was also out of order.

That was not the end of it however.

All of a sudden the Americans saw a vehicle moving stealthily through the desert, and decided that the Iranians had spotted them and the operation was in jeopardy. The commandos — the cream of the U.S. military — gave way to panic. One of the helicopters, spasmodically maneuvering in the vast desert, hit a transport airliner with its rotor, killing several people, exploding and bursting into flame. The fire spread to other aircraft. Meanwhile, hand-to-hand combat began. As a result, eight people were killed and five seriously wounded. Several helicopters and one airplane burned down.

All of this without a single shot being fired. There was no threat from the Iranians for dozens of miles around. The elite special-task troops did it all with their own hands, killing each other and burning their helicopters.

(As far as the mysterious off-road vehicle is concerned, it later transpired that it belonged to smugglers who were moving toward the border, but on seeing the military hardware, got scared and fled.) Sure, there was no way that the courageous Eagle could have continued its flight toward Tehran. It had to clear out before things got even worse.

In the morning, the Americans, having abandoned the remaining helicopters, boarded the transport planes and flew home.

U.S. military history probably does not know of a more humiliating debacle. The hostage freeing operation had to be canceled in effect before it even began.

The White House sought to hush up the scandal. It was more expedient to forget about the hostages. Word was out that the president had decided to leave them to the mercy of fate.

In Iran, too, passions around the hostages began to subside gradually. The situation was slowly turning around. Ex-Shah Mohammed Reza Pehlevi, whose extradition was the fanatics’ key demand to the United States, died. In September, a war with Iraq began — initially successful for Iran, but before long ending in defeat. At last Iran agreed to open negotiations with Washington.

President Carter touched on the issue of the hostages mainly in the context of the upcoming presidential elections, due on November 4, 1980 — a date, by a quirk, coinciding with the first anniversary of the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. He desperately needed the hostages to be freed before election day. The Iranians refused to accommodate him however.

Having lost the presidency to Ronald Reagan, Carter was ready to settle for the lesser thing. He wanted the hostages to be freed, at least, before January 20 of next year — that is to say, before inauguration of President-elect Reagan. So that he, Carter, could tell the U.S. people: It is I who brought freedom to our fellow citizens. He was prepared to pay well for the privilege.

Tehran, however, decided to finish off Carter, giving him no chance. It did not announce its readiness to free the hostages until 40 minutes after Carter turned over the presidency to Reagan and the new U.S. president swore an oath of allegiance on the Capitol.

Reagan magnanimously asked his erstwhile rival to go as his personal representative to the FRG, where the former hostages were to arrive. The offer was accepted.

In the evening of January 21, Carter met with the freed Americans at a military hospital. Some of them made no secret of their disappointment with the administration’s performance over the past 14 months. Irked after the meeting, Carter flew directly to his hometown of Plains without stopping over in Washington. He sent a memo to the White House that he had written aboard the airplane.

The former president gave vent to his pent-up irritation. He described the Iranians as terrorists who had perpetrated outrageous acts of cruelty that could not be forgiven. They had behaved liked barbarians until the very last minute, when they forced the hostages, at the airport, through a human corridor, subjecting them to verbal and physical abuse. The former president advised Reagan never to give in to the thugs who had persecuted the "innocent American heroes." Carter’s recommendations drew ironic comments in the press.

Speaking at a White House reception in honor of the freed hostages, the new U.S. president said that international terrorism was emerging as a main danger and that terrorists must meet with an effective rebuff on the part of the United States should similar acts be repeated.

The aforementioned events in the United States and the recent Nord-Ost hostage crisis in Moscow have a common logic and dynamics.

The United States failed to teach terrorists a lesson: Quite the contrary, the scandalous debacle in the Iranian desert only encouraged them.

In Moscow, the bandits got their just deserts although a high price was paid for this. President Reagan was right. International terrorism is emerging as a main danger. After the September 11, 2001 tragedy in New York this is clear even to the most slow-witted. Terrorism is terrorism everywhere, be it in the Caucasus, the Middle or Near East, the Old or the New World.