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CIAO DATE: 04/03
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Korean Peninsula and Russia
G. Toloraia *
The Korean Peninsula is again in the focus of world politics. The sharp deterioration of the situation jeopardized what had been achieved over recent years in bringing North Korea out of isolation and developing peaceful coexistence and fruitful economic cooperation on the Korean peninsula and in the entire northeastern Asia. This is precisely what Russian diplomacy has devoted so much energy to.
The sudden crisis is causing concern, not surprise: the situation on the Korean peninsula over recent decades has remained very difficult, liable to bring surprises, full of ups and downs in relations between the two Koreas, international differences over clashing interests of the leading world players in the region and the absence of tools to harmonize these differences.
Changing Configuration of Forces Surrounding Korea
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the confrontation on the Korean peninsula remained deadlocked owing to the established balance of relations between the major world powers (USSR, USA, China, and Japan). The system of relations in the Cold War context, however, sustained stability and predictability there.
The 1990s marked the development of a system of relations toward the Korean peninsula characterized by growing tensions and conflicts owing to the actors’ attempts to secure for themselves the most favorable conditions of the new status quo. Luckily, unlike the other world regions, Korea avoided a military conflict. This restraint, it should be noted, did not result from good intentions alone but rather from the fears as to the military potential of the DPRK, which was in a position to inflict unacceptable damage upon its adversaries, and from the factor of China whose reaction to a conflict in Korea with the U.S. participation could have been rather strong.
The sea change came in 1994 when the mounting pressure on the DPRK to end its plutonium nuclear program brought the peninsula to the brink of military conflict. The 1993-94 "nuclear crisis" over suspected secret production by the DPRK of plutonium was resolved by an agreement between the DPRK and the United States on freezing the former’s nuclear program in exchange for the construction of a nuclear power plant by the KEDO international consortium led by the United States. This greatly enhanced the United States’ role in Korean affairs. China, which in fact was Pyongyang’s only protector, also gained greater importance there. There emerged coordination of policy toward the DPRK between the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan that enabled the Japanese to advance their interests in the Korean problem. As for Russia, it did not spell out its interests in resolving the "nuclear crisis" and ended up with a lower prestige on the Korean peninsula. Its objective interest – continued peace and stability in Korea – was served however.
The subsequent course of events showed that such a stance on Moscow’s part was seen by the other participants in the "Korean game" as evidence of weakness and loss of leverage. The 1953 armistice agreement was replaced in 1996 by a new armistice agreement between the two Koreas, the United States, and China, excluding Russia and Japan. Russia’s arguments that the final solution to the Korean problem was possible only in the context of settling all concerns and it was essential to take into account the interests of all states involved (back in 1994, Russia proposed an idea of a hexalateral agreement) were ignored.
In the late 1990s the dialogue between the United States and North Korea was in fact the main modifier of the geopolitical situation on the Korean peninsula. The so-called Perry process started in 1999 (it was essentially about getting concessions from the DPRK with regard to weapons of mass destruction in exchange for a more relaxed U.S. attitude to this country) made the United States the sole sponsor of the peace process in Korea with the exclusion of the other players on the Korean side.
This displeased other players to some extent. Saying it was a U.S. ally, South Korea pressed Washington for being consulted. Japan voiced similar concerns. China became seriously worried about the prospect of increased American influence in a strategic region next door to it. Russia – despite the welcome relaxation of tensions in Korea – was increasingly worried about "monopolization" of Korean settlement processes and the making of long-term decisions without considering its legitimate interests.
The coming to power in the Republic of Korea in 1998 of the opposition leader Kim Dae-jung who proclaimed his Sunshine Policy toward the North, created new possibilities for intensifying the inter-Korean factor. Pyongyang must have thought it was necessary to find a new approach to safeguarding the DPRK’s interests. During their meeting in Pyongyang 13-15 June 2000, the leaders of both Koreas de facto agreed to recognize each other so as to end the standoff. They produced a political framework for peaceful coexistence and further search for a mutually acceptable form of reunification, although the question of its timeframe remained open (at the same time, both pursue radically different objectives: the North’s objective is the regime’s survival; the South’s objective is transforming the North and reunification on South Korea’s conditions).
These developments produced a chain reaction among the states concerned with the Korean issue – the recognition of the DPRK by EU countries, closer relations with Japan crowned by Junichiro Koizumi’s historic visit to Pyongyang in October 2002. Reform processes in the DPRK leading to opening it up and broader international cooperation intensified. The hallmark of the period between 2000 and the first half of 2002 was diplomatic activity and a well-considered and rational approach to defusing international tension in Korea.
Russia’s Korean Policy at the Turn of the Century
Not only was Russia prepared for these changes, it in fact had caused them by its "quiet diplomacy." Increased activity of Russian diplomacy with regard to the Korean issue – one of the hallmarks of Putin’s foreign policy – served to boost Russia’s prestige in Asia and elsewhere.
It had not been easy to rethink the approach to Korea. This was a second attempt over less than ten recent years. No clear criteria of Russia’s interests in the Korean peninsula were formulated in the 1990s mostly because of Russia’s identity crisis on the world scene when Korean problems took a back seat in Moscow. Given its scarce foreign policy resources, Russia still had potential leverage with regard to the Korean situation despite the West’s contrary view, but Russia did not use it because the situation did not warrant that from the point of view of Russian interests.
In all fairness, bilateral relations suffered a setback as far back as in Soviet times when Pyongyang "took offence" at Moscow’s establishing diplomatic relations with Seoul in 1990. Democratization in Russia and the ending of assistance on easy terms to the DPRK further alienated both countries from each other.
The coming to power in Pyongyang of a new leader – Kim Jong Il who, unlike his father, had no scores to settle with Soviet leaders – and the intensification of the U.S. – North Korea dialogue, made Russia reappraise the situation. In the absence of neighborly relations with the DPRK (regardless of Russia’s view of the social and political system in this product of the Soviet system), without taking account of its legitimate interests and cooperation with it bilaterally and internationally, would not serve either Russia’s national interests or stability in the region across its border.
Russia’s current policy toward Korea is based on the premise that a peaceful and independent reunification of Korea should result in Russia having a prosperous neighbor and friendly partner, and for this reason, Russia is fully behind national reconciliation in Korea. The solution to this problem is up for the people of Korea who hardly want to be pushed. Russia’s role in this process is limited to favorable support and constructive collaboration in order to lower tensions and achieve reconciliation between both Koreas, stronger security on the peninsula, multilateral cooperation in accordance with the global trends toward internationalization of economic affairs. In a nutshell, Russia’s national political interest on the Korean peninsula is peace, stability, or preserving the status quo. Nor does this contravene the interests of other countries because there is a possibility to strike a balance of interests.
Thus, some of Russia’s priorities in the Korean peninsula are:
A New Start in Relations with DPRK
The main achievement at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s was putting relations with the DPRK on an even keel. Relations began to pick up in the mid-1990s and the process grew especially intensive in 1998. The DPRK no longer regarded Russia as a hostile state and began to favor neighborly cooperation.
In February 2000, the foreign ministers of both Koreas signed off on a new basic treaty, and political contacts sharply intensified.
The crowning achievement for Russian diplomacy was the first summit in Pyongyang in the history of bilateral relations during Vladimir Putin’s visit to the DPRK in July 2000. The intensive talks with Kim Jong il achieved a major diplomatic breakthrough, softened up the DPRK’s international isolation, took a step toward resolving the missile issue on the Korean peninsula and normalizing bilateral relations.
The timing and the circumstances of the visit (shortly before the G-8 Okinawa summit) proved to be exceptionally opportune. It achieved a spectacular effect, equally important in diplomacy and in routine spadework. The visit took many people by surprise because it gave the lie to some of the long-held ideas and theories. The first being that North Korea is a state in deep diplomatic isolation, with which it is "impossible to have truck," incomprehensible, unpredictable and for this reason dangerous. The second being that Russia’s role on the Korean peninsula is insignificant because "the Northern Koreans want no contacts with Moscow." The visit indicated that there is an alternative to the carrot and stick policy in the form of stabilizing the situation on the Korean peninsula by ending Pyongyang’s isolation and starting equal cooperation with no pressure and blackmail.
Following this shift, bilateral political cooperation picked up and some progress came in evidence in economic relations. Attempts to find solution to the DPRK’s debt problem resumed and efforts got under way to explore possibilities of Russian part in rebuilding and modernizing the DPRK’s enterprises, especially power and oil refining enterprises, and of participation by Russian business in the North Korea’s special economic zone. After many years, Russian performing artists resumed tours of Pyongyang and North Korean students once again appeared in Russian higher schools.
Russia proposed and persuaded both North and South to accept the innovative concept of trilateral cooperation (its main but not the only tangible result is a plan to restore the rail link between North and South and extend it to the Trans-Siberian Railway) aimed not only at economic effects but also at involving the DPRK into normal international cooperation, make it more open and, therefore, achieve greater stabilization of the political atmosphere on the peninsula and in Southeast Asia.
Kim Jong Il’s visit to Russia in July-August 2001 (a nearly month-long rail journey) and his visit to the Russian Far East in August 2002 were a milestone not only in Russian-Korean relations but also in North Korea’s opening up to the rest of the world. The leader of North Korea visited a post-communist country and became familiar with an experience in reforms. It is for a reason that, returning from his first trip, he wrote an article of directives that started reforms, which are being implemented in the DPRK since July 2002. On 4 August 2002, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Il signed the Moscow Declaration – the foundation of bilateral relations and the official confirmation by the DPRK of the importance of dialogue between both Koreas and progress in relations between the DPRK and the USA, DPRK and Japan. Kim Jong Il confirmed the moratorium on missile tests and readiness to resolve all concerns of the West through dialogue on the basis of equality.
The economic component of relations began to develop through resuming dialogue with the DPRK, including dialogue on the top-level. Major progress was scored after agreement was reached on the construction of the rail link between both Koreas and linking it to the Trans-Siberian Railway. The proposed railway will run along Korea’s east coast. Russia would take care of the designing and planning side. It was agreed to create an international consortium for this project and it was found necessary to discuss the project between Russia, DPRK, and the Republic of Korea. Cooperation was resumed in science and technology, as were contacts with North Korea’s military, which is important for predictability of situation and stability in Korea because of its role in the country’s political system.
"Russian Bear" and "Korean Tiger"
Full-scale cooperation with South Korea at the start of the 21st century is also of growing importance. November 2002 marked ten years of the Basic Agreement between the two countries. The euphoria caused by the very effective start of relations early in the 1990s ended quickly despite the early expectations that the partnership "based on shared values of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and market economy" was cloudless since there were no and there are no real contradictions between our countries. Moscow responded to South Korea’s demands with regard to the downing of its Boeing airliner by declassifying and turning over all the appropriate documents and materials to ICAO, opening to South Korea the archive documents about the start of the Korean War, which appeared to have worked in favor of its South Korean version... The Republic of Korea, however, did not get from Russia the most important thing it was counting on – cooperation in reunification of Korea on South Korea’s terms. No greater understanding emerged from South Korea’s not quite respectful attitude to Russia and its attempts to "shoulder aside" yesterday’s superpower from Korean settlement, as if Russia had no legitimate interests in it.
Trade, which was developing dynamically in the early 1990s, did not exceed, even during the best years, one tenth of the Republic of Korea’s trade turnover with China. The goods content of the trade is not quite in Russia’s favor: We are getting South Korean consumer goods (including those brought to Russia by its so-called "shuttle-traders") in exchange for raw material (metals, products of the sea, fertilizers). South Korean business people are reluctant with regard to production cooperation and direct investments pleading an unfavorable investment climate in Russia (which is true but it does not deter some others). The 1997-1998 crisis in the Republic of Korea and the 1998 crisis in Russia caused bilateral trade to fall from $3.3 billion to $2.1 billion. The difficulties in trying to resolve the debt problem (the Soviet debt of $1.9 billion is being paid through shipments of Russian goods, including military hardware, which are not always on schedule) do not add enthusiasm to Korean business community either. Out of the hundreds of joint projects that were discussed in the early phase of bilateral relations, only few now remain. One piece of good news at the end of October 2002 was the beginning by the Lotte company of the construction of a big hotel complex in Moscow. This is, however, a pilot project in more than a decade of bilateral relations.
At the same time, "third basket" cooperation with the "Asian tiger" is rather dynamic. Starting from scratch, cultural and humanitarian cooperation has blossomed (Russian culture science and education have always been popular with South Korea), athletes and ordinary people exchange visits. In the space of just one decade – during the 1990s – these contacts have become an inalienable part of life both in South Korea and Russia, especially in the latter’s Far Eastern regions. Admittedly, these contacts and what we know about each other are not quite satisfactory yet.
The latter part of the 1990s was not an easy period in relationship with the Republic of Korea. Moscow had the uncomfortable feeling because the promises of joint economic prosperity vanished with Seoul being interested in the numerous meetings and contacts mainly as opportunities to put pressure on Pyongyang. The view widely held in Russia that it is unnecessary any longer to stress relations with South Korea and adopt a balanced approach to Seoul and Pyongyang, and instead let their relations with Russia work out independently from each other to an extent permitted by their real potential earned in the Republic of Korea the name of a policy of "equidistance" and it admitted "failure" in its attempts to influence Moscow.
President of South Korea Kim Dae-jung took a wiser and fairer approach to the Russia-Korea relations. This was first in evidence during his visit to Moscow in May 1999. At that time, Moscow could persuade the South Koreans that in order to make the Sunshine Policy effective they should first win the DPRK’s confidence and that confidence should not be based on declarations and good gestures alone. The result was active assistance by South to North. The relations were given a fresh impetus by Vladimir Putin’s visit to Seoul in 2002. The parties agreed to cooperate in the Korean settlement and reached understandings on paying the Russian debt in deliveries of Russian goods. A visible sign of the new standard of relations was that Seoul wanted Moscow’s mediation in the Korean settlement. For example, it was Igor Ivanov’s trip to Seoul in Pyongyang in July 2002 that eased the strained relations in the wake of the incident involving a skirmish between the ships of North and South off the western coast.
Today’s Russia-South Korea relations represent a constructive partnership. The intensity of political dialogue between them comes only next to their dialogues with China, Japan and India, to mention only Asian nations. They cooperate well in international organizations: the UN, APEC (which South Korea helped us to join), ASEAN, ARF, and Asia-Europe Meeting. Military and technical cooperation is developing on a limited scale.
We can face the future with optimism. Trade, regional ties and investment cooperation will be growing (especially if the Republic of Korea provides appropriate government backing). The South Koreans are still interested in our science and technology. Our both countries will have a good chance in this new century to develop really mutually beneficial and necessary to each other partnership. There have been changes in Russia, which is firmly on the road of democracy and liberal market development and is a country where economic growth has begun. This makes Russia still more attractive to the Republic of Korea. There have been changes in Korea, too – having come of age, emerging from crises, it is trying to steer a more independent and balanced policy where friendly relations of trust with Russia are vital. A change of guard in the Republic of Korea in 2003 would hardly change the intention to cooperate, even less so because Russia’s bigger role in Korean issues is generally recognized in the Republic of Korea.
New Challenges
The main problem of the Korean peninsula today is the lack of unity among the world community over the place held in it by the DPRK, which continues to cling to a peculiar brand of totalitarian political regime. Is it necessary to assist the DPRK’s integration into the world community or try to achieve the disappearance of this regime, which would be tantamount to elimination of that North Korean state?
Whereas China, Russia, South Korea, EU countries, and Japan have come to the conclusion that the most rational way is to preserve the North Korean statehood and gradually involve Pyongyang into international interaction and cooperation without attempts to undermine the DPRK’s system, today’s U.S. administration, unlike that of Bill Clinton’s, adheres to a different point of view. The sneaking suspicion is that Washington’s hawks are steering toward a change of regime in Pyongyang and are prepared to even apply the "Iraq medicine" never posing to ponder the possible disastrous consequences.
Early in 2002, President George W. Bush declared the DPRK, to everyone’s surprise, a part of the "axis of evil," and subsequent events showed this was not a slip of the tongue. Things came to a head in 2002 when Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly made an accusation against the North Koreans that, "according to intelligence information," they were working for several years on a uranium enrichment program to create nuclear weapons. First Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK Kang Sok-chu responded, after conferring with the country’s leadership, that in the face of American threat the DPRK "can become compelled to have not only nuclear weapons obtained as a result of enriching uranium, but also even more powerful weapons."
Two weeks later, the Americans circulated their own interpretation of this statement to say the DPRK had formally admitted that it was developing nuclear weapons. The North Korean Foreign Ministry statement issued 25 October left the issue as ambiguous as before: Pyongyang did not state plainly that it had no intention to provide itself with nuclear weapons. Let us go back a few years to understand the context of this North Korean move and plan.
Back in 1990, when the Soviet Union gave Pyongyang notice about impending normalization of its relations with Seoul, the North Korean leaders threatened that in the interests of "self-defense" it would have "to develop appropriate retaliation weapons given the presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea...." The DPRK began nuclear research in the early 1960s, and in the 1970s, as was discovered later, it began developing its own plutonium nuclear weapons. In all fairness, South Korea under Park Chung Hee also had a secret nuclear weapon program, which was 95 percent complete by the end of the 1970s. In the wake of Park Chung Hee’s assassination in 1979, the United States succeeded in having the program scrapped.
The DPRK acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as late as 1989 and it was due to pressure from the USSR. This was the Soviet condition on which it would assist with building a nuclear power plant. The verification agreement with the IAEA was signed as late as 1985. The very first IAEA inspections indicated that there was something fishy there. In response to calls to have its nuclear activities placed under IAEA control, the DPRK temporarily withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty in March 1993. This sparked a full-blown crisis. The United States, as it admitted subsequently, was seriously considering a military strike at nuclear facilities in the North, and only thanks to then President Jimmy Carter’s trip to Pyongyang in June 1994 that it became possible to start solving the issue through talks. As a result, the United States and DPRK signed in Geneva on 12 October 1994 the Agreed Framework under which the North Korea was to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for the construction of two light-water reactors (LWR) by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and normalization of relations with the United States.
The LWR project, initially scheduled for completion in 2003, was getting behind schedule as the DPRK was growing suspicious that KEDO had no intentions to complete the construction. The United States indicated it was not going to make up for any delays in meeting its obligations. The flicker of relaxation of tensions between Washington and Pyongyang went out despite the visit to Pyongyang by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the declaration ending the period of bilateral hostility signed in Washington in October 2000.
Initially the George W. Bush administration put on hold the policy of its predecessors only to later put the DPRK on the list of states constituting the "axis of evil" which got Pyongyang seriously worried about its security. In this context, the North Koreans construed the accusations heard from the American emissary of a secret nuclear program as the start of a pressure campaign that would have begun regardless of their rejecting or accepting these accusations. Pyongyang decided to counter the campaign by neither denying nor confirming the presence of a nuclear program in an attempt to make the United States, in order to find out the truth, to get to the negotiating table and settle the whole package of its concerns regarding North Korean WMD in exchange to providing the DPRK with guarantees of security and noninterference.
The point, however, was that the American administration was not interested very much in finding the truth. As the US defense secretary admitted, the Washington acted on the assumption ever since 1994 that Pyongyang had a couple of crude nuclear weapons anyway. Another couple of uranium weapons, Washington believed, could not change the situation in a radical way. It was much more important for the United States to secure domination in Korean affairs and Pyongyang provided such an opportunity for knocking together an "anti-North Korea coalition." Pyongyang had also underestimated the power of the Western propaganda machinery that easily persuaded the whole world that the North Korean leaders are "unpredictable and malicious" and that they "have broken all conceivable international obligations" although the words "the possibility of possessing" WMD under certain conditions are politically incorrect, it does not constitute violation. However, based on these words alone, the United States took practical measurers which do constitute a violation of its obligations under the Agreed Framework: The United States succeeded in stopping as of November 2002 the provision of fuel oil to the DPRK dooming its population to a cold and dark winter. Tensions began to escalate.
Having carefully analyzed the entire aggregate of information, including information received from the United States and the DPRK, the Russian leadership has formulated the following approach to this issue:
This provided the basis for Moscow’s vigorous diplomatic activity in its contacts with the DPRK, United States, South Korea and Japan, and within the G-8, UN and AIEA framework. Of great importance was the discussion of the Korean issue between President Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush in St. Petersburg on 22 November. Russia proceeds from the assumption that it is important to settle the issue via a peaceful compromise: The DPRK should be given the desired national security and noninterference guarantees and at the same time it should clarify the question of its WMS and abandon its nuclear ambitions. Obviously, such a package solution can be reliable and stable in the presence of multilateral guarantees. American-North Korean dialogue should play the key role, but the final settlement should take account of the interests of and receive guarantees from interested states, first of all from South Korea, Russia, China, and Japan.
At the start of the 21st century, as it was at the start of the 20th century, the Korean peninsula is once again in the focus of interests of the great powers and world politics. Differences that surrounded Korea one hundred years ago were not resolved peacefully and led to a tragedy for the Korean people – the loss of statehood and occupation by Japan. Those differences remained the source of conflict inside Korea and of international conflicts for the duration of the 20th century.
Today’s situation is different: It is possible to find civilized solutions to the issue of security and peaceful coexistence of the two Korean states, preserve their sovereignty and unify Korea while at the same time taking into account the interests of both parts of the divided nation and of interested states. This, however, calls for abandoning the policy of coercion, pressure and blackmail, for concerted efforts and harmonization of interests. In particular, bringing the North Korea’s economic level up to par so as to enable it to become integrated on equal terms into the system of intra-Korean, regional and international division of labor seems to be the necessary economic prerequisite for national reconciliation and integration of the DPRK into the world community. Moving along this path will necessarily require concerted actions by people in both parts of Korea and collective efforts by interested countries.
Endnotes
Note *: Georgii Toloraia, Deputy Director, First Asia Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; Doctor of Sciences (Economics). Back
Note 1: V.P. Tkachenko. Koreiskii poluostrov i interesy Rossii. M., 2000, pp. 69-72.
Note 2: G. Toloraia. Novyi staryi partner na Dal'nem Vostoke.//"Problemy Dalnego Vostoka", 2000, No. 5.
Note 3: Soobshchenie press-sluzhby MPS Rossii, 15 November 2002.
Note 4: Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, 2000, No. 5, p. 36.
Note 5: Soobshchenie ITAR-TASS iz Vashingtona 17 October 2002.
Note 6: Soobshchenie ITAR-TASS iz Pkhen’iana 25 October 2002.
Note 7: V.P. Tkachenko. Koreiskii poluostrov i interesy Rossii. M., 2000, p. 71.
Note 8: The North Korean Nuclear Program, New York, London, 2000, pp. 21-37, 127-130.
Note 9: Chunang ilbo, 26 September 1993.