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CIAO DATE: 02/03
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Russia in the System of International relations of the 21st Century
V. Inozemtsev *
The talks about Russia’s integration in the world economic system that at time sound as ritual incantations that have been going on for the second decade pushed to the background the problem of its positions in world politics and the question about our allies and partners. I am convinced that political choice is a much more challenging task than finding an adequate place in the economic sphere that is determined, to a great extent, by objective economic trends inside and outside the country. A set of political alternatives is much wider in any context.
Our past objectively complicates the task of finding the right place for Russia in the world. Even in the periods when Russia was not an economically developed country (in the 18th and 19th centuries) it was one of the most prominent actors on the European stage and one of the key figures on the world political scene. One can even say, with certain reservations, that throughout the last 200 years of Russian history the country consistently traded its economic might for political influence. This ended in an economic collapse of the power that was one of the two key subjects of worldwide confrontation. Today, we are living through a difficult process of achieving a correspondence between the economic potential and foreign policy influence therefore Russia should decide, first and foremost, whether it can or cannot restore its former role of a great power.
This problem has much more sides than one can imagine. If Russia has decided, through economic modernization, to restore its past role (a consolidating core of one of the world centers) rather than becoming an ally or a component of one of such centers this will amount to an admission that the Western development model is not the best one and a claim to its own new vision of world progress. This explains why the restored great power ambition, regrettably or luckily, is equal to its radical opposition to the rest of the world. If Russia decides to join any of the emerging world centers of economic and political might (European or American) it will have to part with the great power illusions. Put in a nutshell, the choice is between an opposition to the major trends of world development or radical changes of the ideas that have been dominating the minds and public opinion in Russia for the last several centuries.
There is a question that should be answered before the problem is addressed: Which states can be included in the orbit of Russia’s influence if it tries to create an alliance able to claim any noticeable influence in the world? Obviously, only economically weak countries completely dependent on Russia (Byelorussia and Tajikistan) or those with lower economic per capita indices seeking political closeness with it to obtain a reaction in the West (China in the first place) can be tempted. When trying to knock together a coalition of several highly diverse countries (that may include several other former Soviet friends–Cuba, Libya, Iraq, etc) Russia will inevitably be confronted with China’s unwillingness to subordinate, with a very painful response from the West and, finally, with defecting of some of the members to an economically and militarily stronger side. (This happened when in the wake of 11 September 2001 Uzbekistan preferred to develop closer relations with the United States than with Russia.) Even if such alliance is created Russia will find itself on the one side with the countries (China, for example) that are developing through large-scale investments from abroad and a considerable demand on their industrial products on the world markets. A strategic alliance with them will not push forward Russia’s economy–it will push it back to the road of traditional extensive development.
I believe that today Russia should follow the political course of one of major economic and political centers. (The Asian region with stagnating Japan and China that is still very poor according to the world standards cannot be counted as such.) This creates another dilemma that until quite recently has not been formulated in Russia and the importance of which remains underestimated.
For many decades Soviet political science spoke about the balance of forces in the world in the terms of confrontation of two blocs–Western and Eastern. The former comprised the United States and Western Europe, the latter–the USSR and its allies in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Even when confrontation had been abandoned, the step associated with President Gorbachev, no attempts were made to look at the Western world as a complex geopolitical reality not free from contradictions. Despite the fact that in the 1970s and 1980s the EU countries were demonstrating considerable economic dynamism (in 1973-1989 an annual increase of GDP in the UK and France was 1.8 percent; in Germany, 2.1 percent; in Italy, 2.6 percent while in the US the figure was not more than 1.6 percent 1 ), that they were catching up with the United States in many other respects (while back in 1950 labor productivity in Italy was merely 34 percent of the American level, in Germany, 35 percent, in France, 45 percent by the early 1990s the figures were 85, 95 and 102 percent respectively 2 ), that by the 1996 results the EU for the first time surpassed the US where the GDP was concerned both according to PPP and current foreign exchange 3 Russia continued looking at the US as the only worthy partner. The Soviet Union never established diplomatic relations with the European Union probably because Soviet and Russian leaders orientated themselves by the military might figures. (By the end of 1980s, the European countries controlled merely 4.6 percent of the world reserves of nuclear weapons while the United States controlled 46.8 percent and the Soviet Union, 45.8 percent. 4 ) Defense spending in Europe comprised 3.5 percent of GDP, while in the United States, about 6.5 percent. 5 ) Still those who never realized that post-Cold War Europe no longer divided by the iron curtain would strengthen its positions betrayed their short-sightedness.
Meanwhile, in the recent years and especially months the world is becoming more and more aware that the political interests and behavior stereotypes of the US and Europe are far from identical and are even opposite in certain respects. Indeed, “the core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states.” 6 Americans, on the other hand, continue thinking (and they are even more convinced than ever) that “the United States is the only power able to manage international justice not as a function of its own national motives but in the name of global right . . . ” 7 This is one of the reasons why tension between Europe and the United States is increasing. In the last months of his life, in 1996 French President Francois Mitterand was to remark: “We are at war with America . . . They are hard, those Americans. They are voracious. They want undivided power over the world.” 8 Today European politicians say: “The history of the twentieth century has left the United States engaged in Europe. This does not give it the rights of a sixteenth members of the EU.” 9 In these conditions Russia has to answer the most important question: should it orientate itself on the Western world as a whole and disregard the fact that there is no single Western identity but two identities–American and European. 10 In other words, time has come to chose between the United States and the European Union.
This is an exceedingly important problem. With a certain degree of conventionality I can say that politically (and idealistically) the Unites States remains a priority while closer relations with the European Union are economically substantiated and supported with a number of realistic considerations.
The United States, still the only classical superpower, is more and more frequently confronted with the fact that it can no longer play the role of a superpower that pays a disproportionately high price for the continued existence of a system of which it is the main beneficiary. 11 Its developed economy has not saved the country from a gigantic deficit of the investment (about $150 billion a year 12 ) and trade (about $450 billion a year 13 ) balance. The country buys its high economic efficiency with growing poverty and social inequality for (the correlation between the incomes of 20 percent of the most well-to-do and 20 percent of the poorest citizens is about 6: 1 in the EU and nearly 13 :1 in the United States. 14 ) This efficiency is a product of the maximal use of cheap labor (during the current economic slowdown unemployment in America increased by nearly 40 percent and remained nearly the same in the EU.) As a result the higher growth rates of the 1990s that created American superiority over Europe have melted away: in 2001, the growth rates increased by 1 percent in the US and by 1.5 percent in the EU. The forecasted figures for 2002 are 0.7 and 1.2 percent respectively. 15 I believe that the next decade will see a decline of the US economic and geopolitical influence.
Throughout several decades the Americans have been doing their best to present modernization as Westernization or, worse still, as Americanization. 16 In this way the country was proving to itself and to the rest of the world its economic, political, and cultural superiority. The American politicians, however, ignored either deliberately or not that the European countries were as successfully mastering the new world realities. (According to the latest globalization index eight out of ten top places belong to European countries while the US was left outside the top ten. 17 ) American political elite seems to be unaware that the country is doomed to lose its individuality in the world shaped to its own image. “Because the Europeans have withstood the barrage of America’s products and culture, because they have been able to preserve to some extent their national and ethnic identities while participating fully in the modern global economy, they might now be in a position to teach the Americans a more valuable lesson than the Americans ever taught them.” 18
It should be said that the aggressive nature of Americanization caused and is causing negative response in Europe and elsewhere. Meanwhile American politicians have chosen to ignore this and to console themselves (like Kissinger) with: “Dominant power evokes nearly automatically a quest by other societies to achieve a greater voice over their decisions and to reduce the relative position of the strongest.” Kissinger believes: “These reactions are the inevitable result of America’s unique position as the sole remaining superpower” and would exist no matter how the United States conducts its diplomacy. 19 The Americans prefer to turn a blind eye to the fact that in the last twenty years their geopolitical positions were boosted by the communist bloc’s disintegration and the Soviet Union’s collapse, an economic slump in Japan, and a pronounced crisis in Southeast Asia and that “their [American.–V.I.] domination was fueled by others’ fiascoes, which seemed to justify the providential role–so-called manifest destine–they had ascribed to themselves.” 20 As a result, the scale of US possibilities is not always translated into its greater influence in the world. One is tempted to ask: If American domination obvious in all respects has failed to be transformed into reality what is the meaning of the “superpower” concept? 21 This explains why the American attempts to speak to the EU in the same manner as to the rest of the world are doomed to failure.
In fact American policy towards the European Union is increasingly influenced by the disparity between the American ambitions and the country’s real possibilities. On the conceptual level this is seen in the terms that are coming to replace the traditional one - “superpower:” Americans themselves are demonstrating a bias towards “omnipower” while the Europeans prefer the “hyperpower” term 22 as less exalted. It means, in particular, that America can no longer play its role of a superpower. The positions of Europe look preferable also in the context of the transfer of key international role from the superpowers to international alliances–the process that is unfolding before our eyes. This was what Brzezinski had in mind in 1997 when he wrote: “Hence, America is not only the first, as well as the only, truly global superpower, but it is likely to be the very last” 23 because it had not scored many victories in creating wide inter-state alliances.
Today the United States can be hardly regarded as the best partner of Russia’s because each stage of the dialogue with America is interpreted as a confirmation of Russia’s status. 24 I believe that this creates an illusion among the Russian political establishment about the Americans’ relatively clear position: they look at Russia as a second- (if not third-) rate player on the international scene 25 unable to push them towards a revision of their egotistical foreign policy principles of unilateralism or first-ism 26 (as those who prefer accuracy say.) The top political leaders of Russia who consider the relations with the United States their foreign policy priority are obviously entertaining illusions of their country’s great power status and are equally obviously ignoring the fact that Russia’s economy is much closer connected with the European Union than with the United States.
As distinct from the US the European Union’s economic and political positions are much stronger: its members account for up to 40 percent of the world trade turnover against 13 percent of the United States. The EU controls a much greater share than the US in the world’s total amount of foreign investments, 27 in 1999 the netto-export of capital from the UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland amounted to $250 billion. 28 Eighty-four percent of foreign investments comes to the United States from Europe: European companies are investing in Texas more than Japan invests in the United States as a whole. 29 Between 1994 and 2000, the total cost of the American companies bought by Europeans increased by nearly 100 times (!), from $2.7 to 263.9 billion. 30 European economy depends much less than American economy on the developing markets (that was amply illustrated by the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Argentinean collapse of 2001-2002). Politically, in the last decade Europe became independent from the United States to the extent that causes concern across the ocean: by the turn of the 21st century, the leading American political scientists have realized that it is important for their country to preserve Atlantic partnership as the key element of world stability. 31
No matter how enthusiastically European politicians are extolling American military might the European Union is one of the most serious military-political blocs in the world. Today, when a possibility of a deliberate nuclear attack in an armed conflict with Western involvement is close to zero the US nuclear priority is practically useless. At the same time the combined armed forces of 15 EU members are larger than the American armed forces by a third (1.79 million as against 1.37 million) 32 while in 1999 51 weapon suppliers out of 100 largest firms were based in Europe and only 40 in the United States. 33 Recently, Europeans have concentrated on a defense strategy for Europe based on the common European armed forces that will be created. This will inevitably decrease the importance of US-dominated NATO. Back in December 1998, the call to set up European armed forces to keep order on the continent that came from the French-British summit in St. Malo remained unheard. In December 1999, the European summit in Helsinki passed a decision to create, by 2003, the 60 thousand-strong rapid deployment force as a prototype of a European army able to act in any corner of the world at any time of the year (the events of 11 September 2001 sent the proposed numerical strength up to 100 thousand). The United States strengthens the European resolution to pursue an independent foreign policy by its steps that create a negative impression. It has already refused to take part in many international organizations, it failed to approve the treaty banning antipersonnel mines, it withdrew from the Kyoto protocol, goes on with its unilateral efforts to create a national ABM system and refused to attend the UN conference on racism. These are but few steps of American diplomacy that give the European politicians ground to believe that moderate anti-Americanism can become a rational part of the united Europe’s image. While dwelling on the fact that American policies are nearly unacceptable European experts point out that Mr. Bush proved to be luckier than Jean Monnet in his time in drawing the British, French, Germans, and Italians together. 34
Experts on both sides of the Atlantic comment on the changed European policies. On the European shore the process is regarded as absolutely natural and as proving that the chosen route is the correct one. On the American shore it is seen as a dangerous trend and “as a means of creating a counterweight to the United States” 35 that may put an end to the role America has been playing for over half a century.
Starting with 1999-2000, the alarmist sentiments in the community of American political scientists and experts became even more pronounced. Brzezinski has written, for example, that at stake today is the very essence of the European-Atlantic community as the central element of world stability. 36 George Soros has demonstrated a much wider approach when he called on the US, the European countries and other states devoted to the principles of democracy to unite into a so-called the Open Society Alliance that “would be concerned with establishing and preserving those preconditions: a democratic constitution, the rule of law, freedom of speech and press, an independent judiciary, and other important aspects of liberty.” 37 The western press and research writings are brimming with similar ideas.
There are a number of reasons why closer relations with the European Union should be treated as a priority.
First, Russia and Europe have been, and remain, connected with numerous threads. United Europe is Russia’s main trade and investment partner; for a long time European economy has been developing as socially oriented market economy. This is much closer to the Russian minds than the unlimited market ideology of the United States. When planning future reforms Russia will not be able to ignore the European achievements in the social sphere. Europe has accumulated valuable experience of mutual cultural enrichment from which Russia as a multinational country can learn. There is another important thing: Europe has been and remains the world’s cultural center that has been attracting Russia for many centuries.
Second, Europe today is a symbiosis of national states and supra-national structures. It is much easier for Russia to establish relation with a union of several large countries than with one superpower. Russia will be more comfortable as an equal partner among other dwellers of the European “home” than as a former great power standing opposed to one the mightiest forces in the world. Dynamic development of big and small European countries should convince Russia that economic and social progress has nothing to do with the scopes of political expansion and that it should gradually get rid of all elements of a superpower ideology both in its policies and in public minds.
Third, one should not ignore the fact that no matter how great are the US geopolitical ambitions it is the European Union that is actively moving eastwards and that in 2004 people in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (Soviet citizens some 15 years ago) will send their deputies to the European parliament. According to the EU clear strategy the countries wishing to get access to its economic resources should abandon a considerable part of their sovereignty. True, with each new addition the growth rates of its GDP declines from 32 percent after the 1973 enlargement to 22 percent after the 1986 enlargement to mere 9 percent after the planned 2004-2006 enlargement when 11 Central European states become EU members. The average per capita GDP showed a steady decline of 3 to 6 and finally to 16 percent respectively. 38 What the European Union gained as a result of its enlargement was a steady growth of its international prestige. Jacques Delors in his time pointed out that the EU was not preaching expansion but responded to requests of its neighbors; in this case it was not the West moving eastwards but the East moving closer to the West, 39 which provides a sharp contrast to America’s policies. European economic integration is a concerted process that creates obvious economic advantages and proceeds from the principles elaborated and approved by all members rather than by one leader. The history of the euro in 12 EU countries and the dollar in Argentina and Ecuador graphically illustrate two different approaches to economic problems. The Soviet Union and Russia let a unique chance to slip between their fingers when they failed to condition the unification of Germany by their participation in integration processes, though, not everything is lost in this respect. Europe is clearly moving eastwards–in these conditions Russia’s voice will be better heard in Europe than its deliberative opinion at the negotiations table with the United States.
Fourth, the Europeans are steadily increasing their influence in all remote corners of the world through humanitarian aid. In 1999, the EU countries spent $26.8 billion on the programs of aid to developing countries that is three times as much as the United States. Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark are spending on these programs $190, 203, and 331 per capita respectively, while the US merely $33. 40 Today, individual European states and the European Commission account for 66 percent of the total amount of aid to the developing countries. 41 It should be added that the share is steadily growing: between 1950 to 1993, it increased in Sweden from 0.04 to 1.01 percent of GDP; in Germany, from 0.11 to 0.38 percent; in the Netherlands, from 0.27 to 0.84 percent. 42 In the United States this share has dropped from 0.56 to 0.08 percent of the GDP over the same period. 43
It seems that the world is treating differently the United States and Europe. The American press gives much space to enumerations of anti-American terrorist operations crowned with the attacks of 11 September 2001 while anti-European sentiments in the world are practically non-existent. Obviously, Russia has to clearly define its foreign policy priorities. In the wake of the attacks against the United States Russia displayed more resolute support of the United States than its NATO allies 44 58 percent of their population being convinced that the terrorist acts had been provoked by the US short-sighted and hegemonic policy; 66 percent believe that the US retaliatory measures had nothing to do with the interests of the world community or defense of Western values. 45
A mere comparison of the priorities and methods of American and European policies of the early 21st century suggests that they will be hardly compatible and that in the foreseeable future the positions of Europe will become much more popular in the world than those of the United States. How will this affect Western civilization and the international political system in the long term?
A superficial observer may imagine that these greatly divergent foreign policy goals and the methods employed on the international scene may trigger a more or less open conflict between the European Union and the United States. This will hardly happen. On the one hand, they have common historical roots and share nearly all liberal values even if they differ on the values’ prospects in the world today. On the other, the two super-regions produce a larger part of the world GDP and the world trade turnover with the greater part of international trade and investment flows belonging to the trans-Atlantic cooperation. This makes the European nations and the Americans mutually dependent–one should not expect that the degree of this mutual dependence will decline.
Obviously, if positioned as a new superpower the European Union will manifest certain elements of opposition to the United States. Many experts have already pointed out that common European identity will undoubtedly create a need of an opposition to some other community. The United States perfectly fills this role. Today, an alliance between the EU and the US based on the Europeans’ blind acceptance of American values and their readiness to follow in America’s footsteps quite possible in the 1960s can hardly happen. Cultural and social distinctions between them have already formed an obvious trend that is growing more pronounced as the world is increasing its opposition to American policies.
The above shows that the relations between Europe and America have hit a stage of indefiniteness caused by the sides’ different approaches to the principles on which the world order in the 21st century should rest and by an absence of a clear idea of how these different approaches can be productively used.
Meanwhile this conflict-free opposition between the EU and the US may, and should, become the cornerstone of a new world order in the 21st century. The system of international relations we have today that has taken several centuries to shape is a modification of the Westphalian system readjusted in the categories of opposition and bi-polarity so that the world as a whole and its parts could accept it. This explains why it is frequently noted that the post-Cold War world has grown less predictable and less balanced than it was during the years of enmity between two political systems. One can surmise that the European Union’s stronger positions are best suited to the needs of a restored bi-polar world with two poles, both found in the West. This makes a serious conflict between them practically impossible therefore a real bi-polarity fraught with considerable risks will be substituted with a structure that while reproducing the old world order will prevent international relations from reaching a dangerous level of tension. This will be a training structure of sorts that will help politicians find their bearings in the world drifting from the Westphalian principles towards more complex political configurations.
What is more, the highly divergent approaches of the EU and the US to the countries on the world’s periphery will make them two centers of attraction for the states with less economic and political influence and more subdued ambitions. As a relatively new player on the world political arena the united Europe (that we are watching to take shape) will inevitably become a cherished partner in all sorts of alliances. One can even surmise that it will find common language will many regions ranging from Latin America and Africa as the recipients of European aid on a massive scale and former European colonies to Southeast Asia that needs European markets, investments and technologies and Russia connected with Europe culturally and historically. Since the United States has traditional and close relations with many countries in various regions the EU-US moderate opposition may lead to a division of the spheres of influence as a result of which the most consistent American supporters will find themselves in the American zone of influence while the countries less inclined to side with the United States, in the European zone. The European Union can play a positive role by consolidating, to a certain extent, all moderately anti-American forces and by guiding their actions so that to quench the US imperialist ambitions and to keep these forces within the limits of Western values. If the West manages to realize this scheme it will be able to form a world in which the regimes rejecting both the American and European forms of western civilization will find themselves in the minority. They will become the “rogue countries” with no hope of international support.
I would like to conclude by saying the Russia is facing a very difficult choice both in the economic and political spheres. The problem is made even more difficult by the fact than any of the economic choices does not prompt political answers and vice versa. In fact, the political sphere offers more variants than the economic one. What is more any of the motives that might suggest a choice also belongs to the political rather than economic sphere.
Today, the Russian political community is facing the task of consistently formulating realistic approaches to economic and political tasks.
A realistic approach to economic problems suggests that today Russia has no economic and technological potential that will allow it to join the post-industrial world. It also means that Russia should not concentrate, to an excessive degree, on building up such potential. An analysis of the economic processes of the last decades testify that the countries following in a natural way the road leading to the market economy have scored better results than those that are trying to improve their economic systems by importing capitals and technologies. Correspondingly, Russia will act wisely if it tries to move as close as possible, in the economic sphere, to the developed countries and to attract their capitals and technologies mainly to develop its domestic-oriented industry and to upgrade the educational, cultural, and social levels of its citizens. It seems that the most important task of the economic reforms is upgrading Russia’s human potential through its progressive development. This choice will spell a clear rejection of all attempts to return to the economic superpower status.
A realistic approach to politics presupposes that Russia should recognize that the attempts to create a coalition that will state opposed to the West have no future and that the maximally possible close cooperation with the developed democratic states is the only possible option. I believe that Russia should switch from its orientation on America to European orientation. This will beneficially affect the political class of Russia, will help abandon the ideas of Russia’s great power mission and prevent complicated and expensive political initiatives with no real prospects. This change of landmarks will meet Russia’s economic and geopolitical interests. In the economic sphere it will manifest Russia’s readiness to extend cooperation with its most important economic partner and the world’s trade and investment leader and will demonstrate that for the first time in many years Russia’s economic interests will prevail over demagogical ideological considerations. By changing its landmarks Russia will remove itself from America’s policy that is becoming harsher and more lopsided. By the same token Russia will confirm its readiness to abandon hegemonic aims and to pursue peaceful and balanced policy that the European Union is consistently realizing.
Life is much richer than any of theoretical constructs and considerations. It is hard to predict future events but it is equally hard to abandon the hope that the sacrifices the people of Russia had to undergo in the last decade were not in vain and that our much-suffering country will finally join the community of prospering democratic states.
Endnotes
Note *: Vladislav Inozemtsev, Director, Center of Post Industrial Society Research; deputy editor-in-chief of the Svobodnaia mysl journal; Doctor of Sciences (Economics). Back.
Note 1: A. Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development: A Long-Run Comparative View, Oxford, 1991, Table 3.1, p. 49. Back.
Note 2: Europe in Figures, 5th ed., London, 2000, p. 115. Back.
Note 3: Calculated from Main Economic Indicators 1999, Paris, p. 215. Back.
Note 4: R.A. Pastor, “The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century,” A Century’s Journey. How the Great Powers Shape the World, N.Y., 1999, Table 1.1, p. 19. Back.
Note 5: J.S. Nye, Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power, New York, 1990, p. 9. Back.
Note 6: Speech of the Foreign Minister of Germany Fischer in the Humboldt University in Berlin. Quoted from SIPRI Yearbook 2001, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm, 2001, p. 178. Back.
Note 7: M. Hardt and A, Negri, Empire, Cambridge (Ma.), London, 2000, p. 180. Back.
Note 8: Quoted from F. Halliday, The World at 2000, N.Y., 2001, p. 90. Back.
Note 9: H. Vedrine with D. Moisi, France in an Age of Globalization, Washington, 2001, p. 57. Back.
Note 11: Formula belongs to T. Friedman, quoted from A. Johnson, “Europe’s Ties with America: New Cause for Concern.” See International Herald Tribune, August 16, 2001, p. 7. Back.
Note 12: See: Statistical Abstract of the United States 2000, Washington, 2000, Table 1411, p. 855. Back.
Note 13: Calculated from Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress, January 2001, Washington, 2001, Table B-104, p. 394. Back.
Note 14: L.R. Brown, Ch. Flavin, H. French, et al., State of the World 1997, N.Y., London, 1997, p. 121. Back.
Note 15: D. Milverton, “IMF Assesses the Impact of Attacks on the World’s Economic Outlook,” The Wall Street Journal Europe, December 19, 2001, p. 3. Back.
Note 16: See F. Zakaria, “The Roots of Rage,” Newsweek, October 15, 2001, p. 23. Back.
Note 17: Newsweek, January 21, 2002, p. 4. Back.
Note 18: R.H. Pells, Not Like Us. How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II, N.Y., 1997, p. XVI. Back.
Note 19: H. Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Towards a Diplomacy for the 21st century, N.Y., 2001, p. 287. Back.
Note 20: H. Vedrine with D. Moisi, op. cit., p. 2. Back.
Note 21: See D. Campbell, “Contradictions of a Lone Superpower,” The American Century. Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power, Oxford, Malden (Ma.), 1999, p. 234. Back.
Note 22: H. Vedrine with D. Moisi, op. cit., pp. 2-3. Back.
Note 23: Zb. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, N.Y., 1997, p. 209. Back.
Note 24: S. Fidler, A. Jack, “High Hopes,” Financial Times, November 13, 2001, p. 16. Back.
Note 25: R. Dornbush, “The Death of a Bad Idea,” Newsweek, November 19, 2001, p. 38. Back.
Note 26: R. Ratnesar, “In Defense of Hegemony,” Time, June 18, 2001, p. 34. Back.
Note 27: Calculated from A. Cross, “Foreign Direct Investment and the European Union,” European Economic Integration, 3rd ed., Edinburgh Gate (UK), 1999, p. 263. Back.
Note 28: Statistical Abstract of the United States 2000, Table 1411, p. 855. Back.
Note 29: J. Peterson, “Get Away from Me Closer, You’re Near Me Too Far: Europe and America after the Uruguay Round,” Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy, Boulder (Co.), N.Y., 2001, p. 47. Back.
Note 30: A.R. Sorkin, “European Companies’ Merger Spree in U.S. Seems to be Waning,” International Herald Tribune, December 20, 2000, p. 22. Back.
Note 31: H. Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 35, 36. Back.
Note 32: Calculated from The Military Balance 2000/2001, Oxford, 2000, Table 38, pp. 297-298. Back.
Note 33: Calculated from SIPRI Yearbook 2001, Table 4D-2, pp. 307-311. Back.
Note 34: See G. Baker, “Leap of Faith that Divides Europe and the U.S.,” Financial Times, August 23, 2001, p. 11. Back.
Note 35: H. Kissinger, op. cit, p. 34. Back.
Note 36: See Zb. Brzezinski, “How to Save the Trans-Atlantic Relationship,” The Wall Street Journal Europe, June 13, 2001, p. 6. Back.
Note 37: G. Soros, Open Society [Reforming Global Capitalism], London, 2000, p. 345. Back.
Note 38: The Economist, May 19-25, 2001, Survey “European Union Enlargement,” p. 4. Back.
Note 39: Quoted from B.F. Nelsen and A.C.-G. Stubb (eds.), The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, 2nd ed., Boulder (Co.), London, 1999, p. 66. Back.
Note 40: Calculated from Human Development Report 2001. United Nations Development Programme, Oxford, N.Y., 2001, Table 14, p. 190. Back.
Note 41: M. van Reisen, “Global Player”: The North-South Policy of the European Union, Utrecht, 1999, p. 42. Back.
Note 42: W. Ryrie, First World, Third World, N.Y., 1995, p. 7. Back.
Note 43: The Economist, June 27-July 3, 1998, p. 123. Back.
Note 44: S. McGuire, A. Nagorsky, “Total Solidarity,” Newsweek, October 1, 2001, p. 32. Back.
Note 45: “How the World Sees the U.S. and Sept. 11,” International Herald Tribune, December 20, 2001, pp. 1, 6. Back.