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CIAO DATE: 02/03
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
America: Imperial Ambitions Rekindled
A. Utkin *
The tragic events of 11 September 2001 produced, together with a lot of compassion, a bitter fruit the international impact of which is ripening by the hour. Gripped by convulsions and a very understandable urge of retribution American society turned a willing ear to the “Sirens of imperial patronage of the world.” The country has developed a view of the outer world that Rudyard Kipling, Theodore Roosevelt, and Alfred Maham could have approved in their time. There is a shared conviction that the country should not reject the burden that has fallen on its shoulders contrary to its will, that it should assume leadership of the chaotically developing world, bring imperial order to it, and push back all forces cherishing different values. History, geography and economy dropped in Washington’s lap a chance that in the past belonged only to Rome and London.
Political correctness, the US code of intellectual behavior, has performed a U-turn: for the first time in one hundred years The New York Times and Wall Street Journal, two moderate publications, dropped their habitual condemnation of the empire, the imperial style of thinking, and the imperial burden. They started discussing them as a reality to be comprehended and optimized. Here is what everybody saying: we the people of the United States never wanted an empire, never tried to build up one and never designed it–it dropped onto the shoulders of Americans all of a sudden when the “second world” collapsed and when (in the conditions of post-11 September mobilization) Western Europe, Russia, China, and India (144 countries in all) chose to support America rather than those who had struck at it.
After 11 September, America abandoned its negative or even derogative attitude to the “imperial thinking” concept in favor of its positive and constructive perception. History became a popular science: the history of the Roman and British empires are read as bestsellers, the Latin came into fashion and acquired a new meaning (to the extent that Harry Potter was translated into it). Articles about a positive impact of Pax Romanum are a feature of the day. The message is simple enough: a new Roman Empire is coming into being and it is for the world to detect the signs of and conditions for progress in it. Today, Pax Americana, at least among the Americans, is losing its negative connotations.
Those who have visited America after 11 September all agree that there is new mentality of the “Roman legions:” even NATO has been abandoned (the British complain) for the sake of harsh unilateral actions. The axis of evil and strikes at Iraq and similar operations are openly discussed. The “brain trusts” in Washington are eagerly discussing the strategy of unilateral strikes along the world’s perimeter. Senators John McCain (the 2000 republican presidential candidate) and Joseph Lieberman (the democratic vice presidential nominee in 2000) are ready to discuss how to build up an empire and do their best to help President Bush Jr. to play the worldwide policeman.
The New York Council for Foreign Relations, the most prestigious US political club that is, at the same time, the most influential structure of the establishment, has assumed the role of an intellectual leader of the imperial project. The neo-Conservatives also called to support the imperial values. The U-turn was felt far outside the elite: editors of newspapers and magazines between the two coasts became aware of the changed rules of political correctness.
Brzezinski, former presidential national security advisor, Kissinger, former state secretary, and Huntington, who used to head the State Department’s policy planning staff, are now shaping the ideology of an American empire. Under presidents Kennedy and Johnson they provided an ideological substantiation of Washington’s Vietnamese epopee.
The first of them has openly described the United States as an imperial hegemon of our day that, for the next twenty-five years will know no rivalry. In a series of articles that appeared in a neo-Conservative journal National Interest (and were published in 2001 in book form) he called on America to block off the “instability salient” in Southeast Europe, Central Asia and in enclaves in South Asia, Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. He pointed to the “seizure of Eurasia as the main prize” so that to ensure that none of possible combinations of Eurasian countries would be able to challenge the United States. In the past he saw the Americans’ unwillingness to tie their fate to these far-away and unstable countries as the main stumbling block on the road to this aim. September 2001 removed this obstacle. Today, Brzezinski is willingly comparing America with the Roman and British empires and the empire of Genghis-Khan and points out with elation that there are no equal rivals where the global scope of the American empire and its purely physical might are concerned.
It was for a long time that Henry Kissinger has been engaged in a polemic with theoretical opponents of Winston Churchill who pursued imperial policies contrary to Franklin Roosevelt’s much more liberal strategies. Many of his publications, including his famous speech in the Royal Institute of International Relations in London, were intended as another proof that the world needed a leader and has got it.
Huntington has pointed to a combination of the “Confucian-Islamic” countries as the United States’ most probable potential foe and forecasted a future confrontation between Washington and Beijing and Teheran. The closer the contacts between cultures the more probable is a conflict between them. America today is facing two major threats: demographic growth in the Islamic world and China’s economic growth.
All of them (Brzezinski, Kissinger, and Huntington) are admirers of Sir Halford Mackinder who was the first to postulate the need to control the “Eurasian heartland.” The cover of Huntington’s book carries positive assessments of only two fighters. They are political scientists Kissinger and Brzezinski. September 2001 removed all obstacles on the way to a material embodiment of their ideas.
Imperial America also relies on the ideas of politicians who are standing much closer to civil service: Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and William Kristol. The first of them when member of the Elder Bush Administration formulated an “axiom:” the United States should always oppose any attempts to create in Eurasia a power or a bloc of powers strong enough to challenge America. He is another admirer of Sir Halford Mackinder. Appointed in 2001 deputy secretary of defense he busied himself with realizing the US military policy based on the use of force across the world. Perle who cooperates with the American Enterprise Institute (Washington) heads the Defense Policy Board, a consultative body at the US Defense Secretary and enjoys all-round support of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Kissinger and the former House speaker Newt Gingrich known as the leader of a conservative revolution are also Board members. Kristol publishes Weekly Standard, a mouthpiece of the neo-Conservative revolution and an openly imperial thinking. Washington Post wrote about a Kristol’s cabal, a vast neo-Conservative plot inside the administration of Bush Jr. 1 The newspaper pointed to Bolton, deputy state secretary, Abraham, energy minister, Libby, the head of the vice presidential chancellery, and several White House speechwriters as members of the same plot.
They concentrate on the main question: How should America’s huge might be applied so that to stem the threatening global trends? There are no doubts that America can do this. We should not dupe ourselves, says Englishman M. Sorrel, president of one the world’s largest communication companies. He has said that the world is not becoming global, it is going American. In many industrial sectors the United States accounts for nearly 50 percent of the world market. What is even more important is the fact that the United States controls (or influences) over half of business activity. In advertisement and marketing its share is up to two-thirds. Look at the investment sphere. It is dominated by American giants Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Goldman Sacks, Solomon Smith Barney, J. P. Morgan. 2 All other American and European firms were swallowed by these giants of the American business world.
On 1 April 2002, Richard N. Haass, Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, offered his idea of an American empire on The New Yorker pages. The very title of his contribution, “Limited Sovereignty,” was eloquent enough. This was what the formerly sovereign countries could expect under the leadership of the country that is building a new world order. The article also registered the only superpower’s new imperial powers. The person responsible of the US foreign policy planning has said that sovereignty presupposes responsibilities one of which is a responsibility to protect one’s own population from mass destruction. Another is a responsibility not to support terrorism in any way. If a government is unable to carry out these responsibilities it thus undermines the pillars of its sovereignty. This gives other governments, the American government in the first place, the right to interfere. In case of terrorism this creates a right to preventive self-defense. 3 In other words, concerned with its security the United States has declared its right to use force against anybody whose actions look suspicious to Washington.
In March-April 2002 Foreign Affairs, an influential American journal published by the Council for Foreign Relations, carried an article by S. Mallaby, member of the new imperial caste, under a tale-telling title “The Reluctant Imperialism: Terrorism, Failed States and the Case for American Empire.” It asks: Can imperial American go as far as to fill in the vacuum? And answers: The logic of neo-imperialism is too convincing for the Bush Administration, it cannot go against such logic… Chaos in the world is too dangerous to be ignored, the existing methods of its putting to order proved insufficient. Time for an empire has come. By the logic of its might America is duty bound to play the leading role. 4 The author further suggests that a certain worldwide structure be set up under the US domination according to the pattern of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to replace the inefficient United Nations Organization. The new structure should have armed forces at its disposal strong enough to control the planet under the pretext of chaos control and to deploy its forces where the central council working under the US decides to send them.
The idea ignited the hearts along the entire political horizon. The adepts of imperial activity of the past started up. R. Kaplan who has been known for his imperial ideas for a long time found himself in the limelight: he was invited to the White House where he briefed the president and his entourage on America’s world leadership and its global imperialist hegemony. In 2002, on the crest of the imperial wave he published a book Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, a hymn to the Roman and British empires. One of the chapters is devoted to the “amazing” emperor Tiberius whose pro-consul Pontius Pilate sanctioned crucifixion of Jesus Christ. This cannot quench the author’s admiration: Tiberius was a despot sometimes yet he knew how to skillfully combine diplomacy and the threat of force for the sake of peace that favored Rome . . . The empire had its positive side. In a certain sense it was the best form of order. 5
In March 2002, Kaplan wrote with satisfaction in the Atlantic Monthly Magazine that the United States had grown more ruthless when dealing with economic turbulence as well as in relation to the demographic problems of the developing countries and to their natural resources. 6 Emily Eakin has written an article most impressive of all, “All Roads Lead to D.C.” that hints at the old formula “All Roads Lead to Rome.” She writes that America today is neither a superpower nor a hegemon. It is a full-blooded empire, like the Roman and British empires were before it. Eakin says that at least this is what the nation’s most prominent commentators and scholars are thinking and adds that this was what Charles Krauthammer had to say: ‘The nation is moving away from a limited expanse to a world empire. Since the time of the Roman Empire the world has not known a world force dominating in the cultural, economic, and military fields.’ 7
The Wall Street Journal is never far behind. An article by its one of its editors, Max Boot, entitled “The Case for American Empire” 8 says that Washington should occupy not only Afghanistan and Iraq but also other troublesome countries in need of an enlightened leadership. The scholars of Classical Antiquity, says he, are free to express their indignation when democratic America is likened to tyrannical Rome under August and Nero. The imperial camp points out that no matter how unexpected the comparison America is behaving like a victorious empire.
The respectable Times of London published an article by the guru of the British Foreign Office Lord Reese-Mogg. The expert in official Washington extols President Bush Jr. as “Emperor August” who has resolved to restore and extend Pax Americana. 9 This is supported by R. Cooper from Foreign Office who placed his article “Why We Still Need Empires” in Observer. He argues that in ancient world order meant empire . . . and that we should return to the harsh methods of the previous epochs–force, preventive strikes, and misleading the enemy. The need in colonies is as great as it was in the 19th century . . . all conditions for revived colonization are ripe. All we need is a new form of colonialism, he concludes. 10 A pamphlet on the same subject was introduced by Premier Blair.
Even those who believed in the United States’ “enlightened leadership” are losing confidence. Soros writes in the Foreign Policy journal that the United States has been carried away by its successes, it is unable to understand that its interests should be made second to certain abstract general principles. The United States is vigilantly guarding its sovereignty and will behave as the only arbiter able to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong. 11 It will build up a world of its own, an empire that will belong to it. This means the following:
American theoreticians are quite open about their ideas of an ideal world: this is a world dominated by the United States in the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres, and in the sphere of the use of the environment. 13
We would like to know how will the new empire be structured? How will the new Rome-Washington organize its relations with old and new allies, Russia in the first place?
For five centuries Russia has not been paying tribute to any other country and has not been obliged to ask how to act on the international scene. Two processes–Russia’s slipping down that began under Shevardnadze and Kozyrev, on the one hand, and a phenomenal rise of the trans-Atlantic republic, on the other–left their traces.
Nominally the American president came to Moscow and Petersburg in May 2002 because he was interested in the Treaty on Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials and the prospects of bilateral relations and cooperation between Russia and NATO. In actual fact, he wanted to know how to contain possible proliferation of weapons and technologies of mass destruction from Russia. Americans are trying to stem the contacts between Russia and Iran in the sphere that can potentially bring Teheran closer to the plutonium components and missile technologies.
What was important was the ritual: the world leader deemed it possible to have exclusive contacts with Russia. The emphasis is on the last remaining element of the recent super-power status. Those in Russia who supported the treaty argued that it was the only means to force the Americans to reduce their nuclear and missile potential together with Russia. The American side, though, openly stated that it had no intention of destroying neither carriers nor warheads (part of the warheads will probably be destroyed). The Financial Times wrote on that score that the United States agreed on a formal treaty only when the majority of its articles had been written to their dictation. 14
In many respects credit is a parapsychological phenomenon: in 1997 Russia’s decorative membership in G-8 was exchanged for the first wave of NATO’s expansion. We are exchanging essence for hot air. The Joint Permanent Russia-NATO Council has been exchanged for “NATO at 20.” Meanwhile, by 2003 at least five out of fifteen former Soviet republics will either join NATO or will allow American military presence on their territories (Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kirghizia, and Tajikistan.)
Common sense prompts us: do not perpetuate your weakness, avoid at all costs any agreements concluded from the positions of diminishing importance. It seems that the new world leader has his reasons to enter into agreements with Russians. In similar circumstance while their countries were slipping down political geniuses Churchill and de Gaulle instructed their comrades-in-arms: There is a challenge in every defeat.
Russia’s potentials are great enough–this is recognized even by those who object to “drawing closer at a fast pace.” According to former US Defense Secretary William Perry all efforts of the United States to limit nuclear armaments proliferation can be easily reduced to naught by Russia if it decides, for example, to sell nuclear technologies, arms systems or fissionable materials. 15
Russia’s share in the new balance of forces is considerably smaller though not absolutely small. Russia has preserved quite a lot of what it inherited from the Soviet Union: permanent membership in the UN Security Council and the nuclear-missile sword. It is free to choose the road to follow and its allies and partners. No pro-Western bias of part of the Russian elite can change all of a sudden the nation’s genetic code that commands: do not become anybody’s satellite, be prepared to sacrifice everything for the sake of an independent place in history, freedom of choice for this and future generations. The absolute Westerners will retreat to allow more principled and more unambiguous defenders of national interests to take their place.
S. Blank, professor of strategic research of the US Army College, has concluded that moved by domestic processes Russia rejected the place in the new world order that was its and thus cast doubt on Western strategy. 16 If the West fails to recognize the dangers of Russia’s bitterness new anti-Western trends may become obvious in the world balance of forces. Besides, the dreams of the Russian Westerners will be finally buried.
Indecision and weakness will come to an end. Russia will revive. This explains why the United States is closely following the dialogue between Russia and China and tries to identify the comparative importance of the roles in the colossal Moscow-Beijing axis. Time will come when Russian investments will return to Eastern Europe. This will create closer relations with the “second Europe,” with those of the East European countries that will soon see for themselves that the “first Europe” is not prepared to greet them, that economic rivalry is going on in earnest and that the West has not admiration for their markets and resources. A backward movement is nearly inevitable–it will not result in another CMEA but Hungarian buses and Czech Skoda cars will be greeted on our market, and on it alone. Mutually advantageous contracts are sure to produce positive results: after all, the East European civilizational factor is at play there. The ties that existed for fifty years should not be destroyed for the sake of a childish pleasure of destruction. Eastern Europe and Russia are on an approximately the same technological level. The gap between the EU, on the one hand, and Russia and Eastern Europe is more or less the same. We can supply energy fuels and open our market. The past cannot be restored–neither it disappears without trace.
In this context NATO will look like a dinosaur. So far, the Americans having failed to find a modus operandi with Russia has concentrated on the Caspian oil so that, according to The Financial Times, to set up an American sphere of influence in the Caucasus and on the Caspian to control oil. 17 On its part, Russia may considerably weaken Western Europe’s dependence on the United States that controls the Middle Eastern oil by selling gas and oil to Western Europe. This is what West Europeans themselves say. 18
This is all in future while today State Secretary Colin Powell who wants closer relations with Russia is losing its battle for Russia being moved closer to the West to the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz trio. A large part of the American establishment is insisting that Russia’s integration is critical for the US foreign policy as a whole, it should become a key element of American politics in relation to Russia because America’s possibility to attain one of its most important aims depends on Russia’s agreement to participate in the globalization process. 19 This says that America has not yet reached its major aim. By keeping Russia out America is running a risk of provoking a self-sufficient trade bloc between the Atlantic and the Pacific. 20
What is important is the fact that in Russia the feelings of the elite and the majority of common people coincide. This is true even of the most-Western-minded group. The president has reached the state’s highest post by doing the only correct thing–he relied on the voters’ patriotism. A mere hint of this idea was enough to create the second largest faction in the Duma and the second largest party.
The national feeling mobilized in this pretty obvious way will hardly lead to heroic creative efforts. We are talking about something infinitely sadder, closer to earth and much more important: national survival. We are facing four serious challenges: massive flight of capital; the broken mechanism of state administration that results in separatism; massive unemployment; and a much harsher outside world.
The first of them is probably the most urgent: year after year selfish groups have been taking their money out of the country thus depriving it of a development stimuli and turning the scanty national capital that could have saved their country into a source of foreign banks and companies’ wealth. Supported by the life belt of oil and gas exports Russia will keep afloat for some time yet the date of foreign debt settlement is drawing closer. A multimillion illegal outflow of national wealth may cause a lot of problems for the state.
During the Great Depression every ocean liner leaving the United States meant billions of dollars withdrawn from the national market. Aware of this President Roosevelt had to “freeze” the banking system and apply state regulation instruments to stop capital flight. In similar circumstances proud Britain and France refused to pay their foreign debts. The most convinced of all Western democrats will undoubtedly close the frontiers if his country is placed in a situation Russia has found itself in: export of capital considerably exceeds its import thus inevitably depleting the financial and undermining the social system.
As soon as Franklin, Washington and others detected the dangers of the states’ independence they acted not quite constitutionally: a council of 55 “wise men” that gathered in Philadelphia behind the closed doors gave the country a new constitution with a much more powerful federal center. Today, they are the most venerated heroes in the national pantheon while their Constitution is an object of admiration of successive generations of the Americans. In Russia the self-contained subjects of federation are no less dangerous than the members of the old American confederation so we should not be afraid of saying that the Constitution of 1993 that was hastily knocked together is no icon.
Huge unemployment in a country that shouts that it needs to do a lot to improve life across its vast territory is nonsense. An unemployed father of a family slips down together with his family–this is the first step towards social degradation. Franklin Roosevelt organized public works–the result is the roads, bridges, and public buildings America is rightly proud of. In Russia, the country that has no proper roads to speak of, it is criminal to let the unemployed rot. Besides highways we badly need new oil pipelines and terminals in St. Petersburg.
John Dewey, American philosopher who headed a commission on de-Nazification of Germany, warned about the dangerous combination of two factors: a crash of the national economy and nation’s humiliation. This combination is taking shape in Russia where NATO has come close to its western frontiers while the international financial institutes are imposing their conditions. Russia does not ask for a special treatment or privileges yet it has the right to hope that the politicians with a light-minded approach to geopolitics will not use its weakness for their own ends. But if Russia becomes suspicious of the friendly intentions of those who are bringing the second wave of NATO closer to its frontiers, if it feels pressed on the Caspian and if its influence in Europe becomes de-valued the two factors of which Dewey wrote in his time will become a reality. The country may doubt whether friendship with certain Western countries is worthwhile.
Nature lavishly endowed Russia with key strategic raw materials that the industrial West badly needs. The oil factor has come to the fore in the second (after 1989-1991) attempt to reach allied relations with the western countries. Will Russia be able to tap its energy riches to cushion its historic fall, to re-industrialize the country, to create a nationally minded elite, to find reliable allies, to acquire competitive and technologically adequate producers so that to re-join the ranks of those who are determining the course of world development?
According to Huntington, the unipolar system presupposes one superpower, no large powers and a multitude of small countries, 21 which will allow the superpower to efficiently address the major international problems unhampered by any alliance or any combination of other powers.
The most perspicacious authors add “but” to this deliberation. W. Pfaff says that it is not often that the Americans ask themselves where they have enough moral and intellectual resources to play the role of a hegemon. He adds that life and the course of events will eventually pose the question in its full scope even if today it is not popular. 22 There are people wise enough to express their doubts. R. Tucker has written in the National Interest that the great problem of American foreign policy is the contradiction between the country’s desire to remain the main global force and the growing unwillingness to pay for this. 23
When celebrating his 90th anniversary the patriarch of American political scientists George Kennan critically assessed his country’s possibility of becoming a world hegemon. He said that it was facing a highly unstable and dissatisfied world brimming with contradictions, conflicts, and violence. He pointed out that all this was challenging the United States in the way the country was not prepared to deal with and added that for 60 years the leaders and public opinion had been monopolized by absolutely different challenges and that the American statesmen and the public were not prepared to respond to the situation that lacked a clear focus for the US national policy. 24 Kennan also commented that Washington was hardly prepared to deal with the problems of the 21st century and pointed out that the new world was divided, steeped in contradictions, and showed no desire to be managed.
There is no doubt that a combination of economic, military, and political might and information and ideological impact on the world has given America a chance of global influence unprecedented since the Roman Empire. This is one difference, though: in the Roman Empire (like in any other state claiming world leadership) there was an element without which leadership could not appear. I have in mind a widely shared conviction that Rome’s worldwide might was worth of numerous sacrifices, both material and human, and that proliferation of Roman ideas and institutions was an absolute benefit comparable to the Roman roads and aqueducts that were worth of battles against the barbarians.
It takes not much knowledge of the US politics, ideology, and morals to say with conviction that today there is no widely accepted comparable ideology–the only one that will afford to apply the vast American resources to the cause of domination of American values and ideas on five continents and in 189 countries. (A similar urge was present when the American empire was just being formed in 1898 and when it spread to the Philippines; it was clearly felt in two world wars and in the Korean War. It was badly bruised in Vietnam and later and to a lesser extent in the Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993.)
Much should be changed in the country’s domestic arrangement if it wants to shoulder imperial omnipotence that calls for cruel and harsh self-assertion. The mission that those who insist that the country “should not let the chance slip away” calls for a recognition that human life is not the supreme value. Imperial efficiency and the universal use of the norms created in these unique United States should triumph over wide civil rights. Rome won supporters in numerous wars and Roman citizenship spread far and wide to the conquered territories. Any sober-minded observer should admit that the American national consciousness can hardly accept imperial sacrifice, if it can accept it at all. The faith in the military technology and in a possibility of wars that require no money, in which bombers while dropping bombs remain out of the hitting range while the missiles are guided from space can, for a while, create an illusion that victories require no victims.
Will the American nation be willing to follow the example of Rome where the young men were brought up to be ready to die for the triumph of the empire and its values, where Senate consciously encouraged combats of gladiators to prevent softening of hearts, where it was sacrilegious to think that “all men are created equal, they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” having in mind the hard earned Roman privileges? So far we cannot detect any sign of such changes in the life of the great trans-Atlantic republic and they will hardly take place. A withdrawal of communism described as a deadly enemy from the world arena, participation of many countries in the America-led antiterrorist coalition, Russia’s new loyalty, China’s secretive nature, and lack of unity in the Islamic world offer no myths that would mobilize to a degree needed for an empire.
Endnotes
Note *: Anatolii Utkin, head, Foreign Policy Department, Institute of US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; Doctor of Historical Sciences. Back.
Note 1: See The Washington Post, March 19 2002. Back.
Note 2: See M. Sorrel, “Branding the New Era,” Foreign Policy, Summer 2000, pp. 60-61. Back.
Note 3: See The New Yorker, April 1, 2002, p. 12. Back.
Note 4: See S. Mallaby, “The Reluctant Imperialism, Terrorism, Failed States and the Case for American Empire,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002, pp. 2-7. Back.
Note 5: See R. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, New York, 2002, p. 46. Back.
Note 6: See Atlantic Monthly Magazine, March 2002, p. 46. Back.
Note 7: See E. Eakin, “All Roads Lead to D.C.” The New York Times, March 31 2002. Back.
Note 8: See M. Boot, “The Case for American Empire,” The Wall Street Journal, November 17 2001. Back.
Note 9: See The Times, February 18 2002. Back.
Note 10: See Observer, April 7 2002. Back.
Note 11: See G. Soros, “The Age of Open Society,” Foreign Policy, Summer 2000, p. 53. Back.
Note 12: See D. Smith, M. Corbin, Ch. Hellman, Reforging the Sword. Forces for the 21st Century Security Strategy, Washington, 2001, p. 26. Back.
Note 13: See ibid., p. 30. Back.
Note 14: See The Financial Times, May 21, 2002. Back.
Note 15: See W. Perry, “Preparing for the Next Attack,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2001, p. 33. Back.
Note 16: See S. Blank, “Drift and Mastery,” European Security, Autumn 1997, p. 2. Back.
Note 17: See The Financial Times, September 19 1997. Back.
Note 18: See J. Haslam, “Russia’s Seat at the Table: A Place Denied or a Place Delayed?” International Affairs, 1998, No. 1, p. 129. Back.
Note 19: See S. Talbott, “The Battle for Russia’s Future,” The Wall Street Journal, September 29 1997. Back.
Note 20: See J. Haslam, op. cit., p. 130. Back.
Note 21: See S. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995, p. 35. Back.
Note 22: See W. Pfaff, “The Coming Clash of Europe with America,” World Policy Journal, Winter 1998/99, p. 8. Back.
Note 23: See R. Tucker, “The Future of a Contradiction,” National Interest, Spring 1996, p. 20. Back.
Note 24: See N. Renwick, America’s World Identity. The Politics of Exclusion, New York, 2000, p. 210. Back.