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CIAO DATE: 09/02
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Russian-American Partnership: A Chance to Open a New Page
S. Kortunov *
It is for the third time in the last fifteen years that our relations with the United States are subjected to a serious test. One should admit that there were thaws amid the Cold War: Stalin was “friendly” with Roosevelt, Khrushchev, with Eisenhower and Kennedy, Brezhnev, with Nixon.
A dramatic turn towards the United States was made by Mikhail Gorbachev. He himself and his entourage sincerely believed that the two superpowers could cooperate in building up a new system of international relations and even a world free from nuclear armaments and violence. Euphoric Gorbachev and the USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze squandered the attributes of the Soviet superpower. They agreed on asymmetrical reduction of nuclear medium- and shorter-range missiles and the conventional forces in Europe; they hastily removed, without preliminary preparations, the best Soviet armed forces from Eastern Europe; they did not stipulate unification of Germany and its subsequent membership in NATO with serious conditions, etc. As soon as it had become clear that the Americans had no intention to meet Russia half way disappointment settled.
The leaders of new democratic Russia fell in the same trap of euphoric expectations: there was much talk about “strategic partnership” and even of a “strategic alliance” between the two countries.
Many people believed that the world would be no longer unnaturally divided into two socioeconomic systems once ideological and military confrontation was removed. It was expected that Russia and other post-Soviet states that accepted the Western liberal-democratic values would be immediately integrated into the world’s political and economic expanse. It was at that time that the conception of partnership was formulated on the ruins of the Cold War and the Soviet Union. 1 Both countries equally promoted it yet today it has become clear that they meant different things.
New Russia took partnership as a chance to join immediately the community of industrialized countries. It expected an equal membership in all political and economic institutes of the West. Nobody can reproach Russia of hypocrisy: it was quite sincere in its desire and never applied dual standards to the West. One can even admit that ten years before there was a considerable number of responsible politicians in the United States who sincerely believed that good relations with Russia were possible. Still, the political circles in the United States were absolutely convinced that it was their country, and not democratic Russia and its nation that won the Cold War thus destroying the “empire of evil.” This explains why Americans concentrated on cementing the “victory” with geopolitical acquisitions. The American leaders proved unable to overcome the primitive bipolar “zero game” theory in which there are either “gains” or “losses” and nothing more. This fact alone casts doubt on the philosophy of partnership–indeed, can a victor and a defeated be partners?
The attitude to Russia as a defeated state presupposed its treatment as a junior partner and caused profound suspicions that “the empire of evil” had remained the same. The United States failed to grasp the significance of the changes that had occurred in Russia and the fact that they were part of the global changes. This explains why it never resolved on turning over a new leaf in its relations with Russia. It never resolved on treating it as an absolutely new country and never accepted a very real idea of another Marshall Plan. This buried once and for all the unique historical chances offered by the end of the Cold War.
What was more Russia’s sincere movement towards the United States was met with an aggressive promotion of the idea of NATO’s eastward extension. The US demonstrated its unwillingness to seriously discuss Russia’s approaches to a new system of European security, it unilaterally used force in Yugoslavia, systematically delayed important decisions on bilateral economic cooperation and showed its unwillingness to abolish trade discriminations of Russia, etc. This had little in common with the earlier declarations on partnership. While the US Democratic administration was increasingly often disregarding Russia’s interests the Republican Congress insisted on even harsher policies towards Russia and demanded that Russia “should be shown its place.”
It should be said in all justice that the differences between the two countries did not develop into a confrontation. During the Russian-American summits both presidents preferred not to strain bilateral relations, discussed disputable questions, sometimes agreed on concessions mostly of secondary importance. Still, the crisis of the so-called partner relationships between Russia and the United States was obvious. It became absolutely obvious in 1995-1998.
The change of the political leaders in Russia and the United States in 2000 and 2001 seemed to supply a new chance of better relationships between the two countries. Yet the Bush Administration began its term with a series of statements that belittled Russia’s role and place in the world and cast doubt on the cooperation patterns created in the course of years. Washington doubted the need to act jointly in the field of arms reduction and limitation and announced its intention to set up a national ABM system. The United States did not ratify the earlier signed START-2 and Test Ban treaties. Americans started looking even harder for “Russian spies,” they extradited a large number of Russian diplomats and tightened the visa regime for the Russians. This was accompanied by extremely unpleasant anti-Russian rhetoric. At times, this created an impression that the Cold War or at least the cold peace came back. The majority of the politicians did not succumb to hysterics yet in 2001 the atmosphere for a constructive dialogue was far from favorable.
A new situation in the world took shape in the wake of the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001in New York and altered the context of the Russian-American relations.
A superficial glance will say that the relations have greatly improved. It is for the first time since World War II that Russia and the US are fighting a common enemy within the same coalition. This means that their national interests, at least, in fighting international terrorism coincide. Cooperation between them looks much closer and deeper than their cooperation with allies (the Collective Security Council and NATO).
The surface, however, cannot conceal the fact that the American Russian policy has not changed and none of the irritating and painful problems has been resolved. 2
It turned out that a long-term anti-terrorist campaign couldn’t be waged without Russia. The crisis showed that in Central Asia none of the states could compete with Russia where political and military-technical possibilities were concerned. The United States found cooperation with Russia and its support invaluable. So far, this cooperation is far from equal: under the anti-terrorist banner the US completed another large-scale geopolitical offensive in Central Asia and the Caucasus, two regions that Russia had described as the zones of its vital interests. This happened with Moscow’s tacit consent. As a result of the anti-terrorist operation Russia lost important instruments of international influence–the Collective Security Treaty and the Shanghai Six–they are crumbling because they are not used.
Once more cooperation with the United States turned out to be a “one-way street”: while Russia takes into account the US interests the latter follows the same political line: it disregards Russia’s interests.
Let’s look at the facts.
In the sphere of strategic relations the United States has already announced their withdrawal from the ABM Treaty thus endangering the international regime of arms control. Their altered military doctrine allows R&D of penetrating mininuclear charges to be used in combination with precision conventional weapons and the use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear states together with planned modernization of the strategic offensive weapons. The military budget was increased by nearly $50 billion.
In the political sphere the plans of NATO extension have not been abandoned. Russia at best can play the role of a junior partner when dealing with the problems of global and even regional security.
In the economic sphere Washington has already clearly demonstrated that it does not intend to make concessions to Moscow: this has been amply demonstrated by the confrontation between the two countries over big trade issues such as steel and oil resources and even minor issues such as poultry exports.
In the coming months our relations will be tested again by the US unilateral strikes against the “axis of evil” countries (if they happen) and possible stalling of talks on strategic offensive weapons, the US military presence in the Caucasus, the second wave of NATO extension, probable pressure of Washington on Minsk, and many other factors. Each of them will confront us with an irritating dilemma: either to agree with the United States further or to insist on our own interests that Russia as a great power undoubtedly has and that may be partly different from those of the United States.
Here is another important circumstance: while enjoying the support of Russia and all other major countries in the anti-terrorist operation the United States turned the national tragedy into a military and political triumph, gained considerable political weight in the world, and strengthened its positions as the only world leader that disregards its own allies, the UN and international laws. In the last six months the political asymmetry between Russia and the United States increased–the fact that will undoubtedly undermine our claims for equal partnership. The Russian politicians should not ignore this.
It looks as if we are not witnessing another confrontational round in the Cold War spirit. The United States treats Russia with disdain amply demonstrated by the recent Olympic Games. The relationships seem to have acquired a different quality of those with an inferior partner unable to respond in kind in the nearest future.
It should be added that the fundamental contradiction between the declared political partnership and far from virtual mutual nuclear deterrence with the help of the still huge nuclear arsenals will remain unresolved for a long time to come.
This means that the prospects of the two countries drawing closer remain limited while the sides are pursuing their tactical and pragmatic aims. This sort of cooperation will hardly develop into a strategic alliance or an equal partnership–this task presupposes simultaneous movement towards each other from both sides. 3
The long-term common threat to Russia and the US has not brought a revision of the relations between Russia and the West, no truly partner relations were established and no new agenda suggested. Their joint opposition to international terrorism failed to become a systemic factor of a new world order in which all other bilateral and international problems would have been pushed aside. So far, there is no firm foundation for a radical and permanent improvement of relations between Russia and the US.
Still, there is a chance for a new dialogue: the two countries have to work hard on the problems that for some period were the main “irritants” in their relations: Chechnya, the mass media, corruption, and NATO. This will require time.
What are Partner Relations?
The present level of relations between the two countries can be best described as limited partnership: this is neither a surprising nor a shocking description.
There is no tradition of equal partnership in the American foreign policy. Its experience is limited to the relationships with much weaker countries: the United States was a partner of Japan and Germany that had been routed in World War II. This can be best described as “partnership from the positions of superiority” that meant redistribution of the financial burden in favor of the allies under an unquestioned leadership of the senior partner. The United States tries to apply this pattern to Russia. When the latter rejects this, American leaders (according to Brzezinski) ask themselves: what is Russia–an ally, a client or a defeated enemy? 4
American interpretation of partnership does not mean equality for Russia in the world politics and its smooth integration into the major international political and economic mechanisms and institutes. In any case, what is understood as partnership in Russia is treated as mere words in the United States. While paying lip service to “partnership” with Russia the US is proceeding along the same road of the “balance of forces.” This dual standard undermines the bilateral relations and triggers crises that follow after another bout of euphoria.
On the other hand, the American tradition treats partnership as something bigger than cooperation. Cooperation is based on common pragmatic interests: during the Cold War the US and the USSR actively cooperated in preventing a nuclear war, establishing arms control and the regime of non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons. Partnership requires a different basis: homogeneous social order or, at least, shared fundamental principles of foreign and domestic policies; identical or close strategic geopolitical or economic interests; the closest possible cooperation of the strategic allies that coordinate and pursue common policies in relation to third countries; a very high level of mutual understanding. One can see that Russia and the US have just entered the road leading to this sort of cooperation. Practical cooperation between them that has been already reached is a far cry from real partnership. Beside the conditions enumerated above it requires a high degree of trust and mutual assistance when needed. The documents issued in the United States and its practical steps do not indicate that Americans look at their relations with Russia as a partnership. In fact, the importance of the Russian factor in their foreign policy is being devalued.
As distinct from the Soviet Union, Russia is not a superpower with global interests that contradict the interests of the United States. It is a new country in search of a new identity. We have no long-term development strategy and no clear regional interests; Russia lost nearly all Soviet allies; it has no idea who are its allies today.
This vagueness will not last for ever: sooner or later the interests and the limits of possible concessions and compromises will be outlined and potential opponents, allies, friends and partners identified. This will probably create qualitatively different conditions for cooperation with the US.
It seems that we should better abandon the term “partnership” and substitute it with a more adequate term “constructive, or positive, cooperation.” This is hard to do now, though: the term has already struck root in political parlance. In any case, both sides should exercise a more balanced perception of each other based on reason and a sober assessment of realities. They should switch to a more pragmatic and balanced policy.
It is very important to get rid of excessive declarations in our relations and try to avoid obviously unrealizable tasks–the failures to resolve them will further cripple Russia’s interests. In our dealings with the Americans we should concentrate on equal and mutually advantageous cooperation, on a just balance of interests and the mutuality principle. Unequal cooperation has few chances to survive. One should say in this connection that in his time Andrei Kozyrev seriously undermined the prospects of an equal cooperation by agreeing on a subordinate role for his country. Let us hope that the present leaders will not fall into the same trap.
Common Interests
A stable partnership requires a clear idea of the degree to which our national interests coincide. All lofty words apart, one can say that the United States wants a politically and economically stable Russia with an investment climate favorable for American business. Washington knows that if disintegrated Russia will create a threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies. (In fact, the situation will be much more dangerous than that produced by the Soviet Union’s falling apart.) For the same reason, the US wants stability across the entire former Soviet Union. Here the interests of the two countries coincide though the US does not want Russia, as the legal heir to the Soviet Union, to become a serious rival. On the other hand, it is in the interests of Russia to curb the US imperial ambitions and its efforts to remain the only superpower. A multi-polar world much better answers Russia’s interests: the major centers of power will contain one another thus creating a wider range of possibilities for our country to realize its interests.
Long-term constructive cooperation is spurred on by new threats to international security coming from the states eager to boost up their international status. In an absence of a finally shaped world order and of a direct conflict between their interests Russia and the US both need to contain other centers of power to prevent new superpowers from emerging. The United States and the Soviet Union first cooperated when rebuffing Iraq that had invaded Kuwait. Today, both countries are guided by common interests in fighting international terrorism.
Finally, partner relations between Russia and the United States can firmly rest on their shared need in a stable and secure system of international relations and, consequently, in power management of processes going on in the world, in preventing and settling regional conflicts.
So far, America has failed to organize the world according to its tastes–as the only alternative this order has no prospects. All other attempts to impose it on the world will meet with even greater opposition of other subjects of international relations.
Eurasia remains the key to global security. Russia, as a Eurasian country from which an active contribution to anti-terrorist struggle in the region is expected should not be looked at as a partner of no consequence. This is fundamentally important.
It is also important today to shift the Russian-American relations from the area of “negative mutual dependence” to the area of a joint positive program. This can be done if we concentrate on the spheres where real cooperation in strategic issues of long-term and mutual interest is possible. They are, besides the anti-terrorist struggle: strategic stability, peaceful activities in space, non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons and means of their delivery, control over proliferation of conventional weapons and “critical” technologies, joint efforts to involve other countries in the process of arms reduction and limitation (nuclear arms, in the first place), maintenance of regional stability, prevention and settlement of conflicts, military-technical and military-technological cooperation, disarmaments and arms control, cooperation in the field of ecology, reform of the UN, joint activity in the struggle against international criminal structures, including drug mafia.
Equal partnership also implies a mechanism of consultations and structures of permanent cooperation on the working level. A ramified infrastructure of cooperation can be used if the United States’ interest in the questions enumerated above is tapped. I have in mind a system of all sorts of reconciliatory commissions and sub-commissions, committees, and regular working meetings at all levels. Life has shown that it can be a powerful regulator of partnership inside the industrialized world and a shock-absorber that guarantees stability of such partnership and its irreversible nature. The present agenda of the relationships between Russia and the US includes the task of setting up a similar mechanism. This will require a lot of careful efforts the results of which will never dazzle like, for example, disarmament treaties.
The summits should set the pace, aims and content of this partnership. For several years now the Commission for Economic and Technological Cooperation under the prime minister of Russia and vice president of the United States has served the major coordinating mechanism. It was efficient enough despite criticism coming from the both sides of the Atlantic. It seems that we should restore this practice.
The commission can supply a pattern for a commission (commissions) of the foreign and defense ministers as a cornerstone for a working mechanism to coordinate cooperation in the military-political sphere.
At the same time it would be wise to establish contacts between heads of other federal departments; the current conditions make efficient cooperation among the heads of special services of both countries designed to oppose international terrorism especially important.
Finally, it is advisable to set up a network of work groups on the problems of bilateral cooperation, including nuclear nonproliferation, control over transfer of arms and dual-purpose technologies, cooperation in the sphere of military technology and peacekeeping operations.
Different Interests
The United States declares that it wants to help Russia integrate into the world community. In actual fact one can discern a trend towards political isolation of sorts, attempts to limit spheres of Russia’s interests and its possibility to influence developments in the former Soviet Union, Europe, the Middle East, and the world in general. There is an obvious desire to perpetuate Russia’s economic dependence on the United States that refuses to grant Russia the status of an equal partner in the world trade and the international division of labor. There are frequent attempts to make Russia accountable for its peacekeeping activities in the zone of its vitally important interests, arms exports, production of fissionable materials, and in other security-related spheres. Americans are afraid in earnest that in future Russia may try to bring together former Soviet republics in the sphere of economy and restore the old federative state. This is the main American apprehension. Washington would like to deal with a fairly weak Russia, not a world power and an equal rival in all corners of the world. The American leaders are working, and will continue to work, towards a “geopolitical pluralism” in post-Soviet expanse so that to prevent a rebirth of a superpower of worldwide importance with a military-political potential comparable with that of the Soviet Union.
Russia, in its turn, cannot accept the American steps that undermine the mechanisms of collective international security. Obviously, Russia joined the anti-terrorist coalition not because it wanted to please the United States and not in exchange for political or material gains. This is the main difference between its behavior and that of certain Central Asian states. The decision was prompted by Russia’s national interests that coincided with the American interests. In the course of the anti-terrorist operation, however, the United States clearly demonstrated that it needed neither the UN Security Council, nor OSCE, nor other international organizations that could supply the legal foundations from what America was doing (even if its actions were justified). As a result, the entire world, and the Arab East, has learned once more that mankind entered a new age in which reason and humanism do not count, in which the norms of international law are ignored and in which force reigns supreme like it did many years ago. The world has become even more fragile and vulnerable.
The world order based on international law was destroyed back in 1999 by the US and NATO aggression against Yugoslavia therefore the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against the United States occurred when the world order had been lying in ruins and when there were no laws to violate. In other words, the terrorists relied on the precedence of 1999 accepted and approved of by the civilized world community. In their turn, the US-headed anti-terrorist operation is proceeding in the world no longer ruled by law.
The United States did not investigate; it did not conduct adequate court procedures even inside the country. The guilt of bin Laden has not been legally proved. It is unclear why the United States attacked Afghanistan; what is more it announced that it would move against other countries. All this is a legal absurdity. Instead of conducting a domestic and then international juridical investigation the US indiscriminately accused certain countries of terrorism and announced that there was an Islamic trace in the terrorist acts. In fact, America accused Islam of terrorism and announced a “crusade” against it (to borrow expression from a statement made by the president of the United States in September 2001). The American media started a nation-wide hysterics that triggered an upsurge of Islamophobia. There are Arabic victims of it, both emigrants and American citizens. By threatening to force all regimes to pay dearly for giving shelter to terrorists 5 the United States usurped the right to mete out punishment outside the UN. This is a flagrant violation of international law. Those countries that failed to agree with the United States were classed among the terrorist supporters with corresponding consequences: in fall 2001 US secretary of commerce openly threatened to use trade sanctions against the countries that would prefer not to side with Washington in the anti-terrorist operation.
Obviously, Russia cannot support this. Participation of all western and eastern countries in a broad anti-terrorist opposition under the UN aegis and according to the UN Security Council’s decisions rather than subordination to Washington would have met Russia’s national interests. It would have been appropriate to formulate strict demands in the name of the UN to those of the countries that have terrorist bases and recruiting centers of international terrorists on their territories. If they proved unable to close down these objects they could have received assistance from special services of other countries. If they refused to obey then economic and military UN sanctions would have been appropriate.
In Europe, by encouraging NATO extension the United States is acting against Russia’s national interests. The very fact that its opinion is ignored cannot be described in any other way than a desire to isolate Russia and prevent its integration into Europe. To save the partnership it will be wise to stop, for a while, the second wave of NATO extension until it becomes clear how the strategic dialogue between the alliance and Russia is developing and until the relations between them transform into a real interaction on a wide range of problems of international security in the format of twenty members. 6
It is natural for the partners not to infringe on the vitally important interests of each other yet this is not an alternative to genuinely partner relations. They are based on each of the partners’ ability to understand the interests of another and to protect its own in a non-confrontational manner.
Russia looks at the CIS as the zone of its vitally important interests where the United States is trying, directly and indirectly, to weaken Russia’s influence. This cannot be called partnership. When acting in the post-Soviet states the US sometimes abandons the principle of priority of democracy and human rights it declared itself for the sake of geopolitical aims. (This was demonstrated in cooperation with Uzbekistan.) America’s approach to the problem of the rights of the Russian speakers in the CIS and the Baltic states also demonstrates dual standards. This lessens the efficiency of cooperation between the two countries in settling regional conflicts in the CIS.
Russia’s new neighbors hardly threaten it yet for strategic, financial, and other reasons Moscow would prefer to sign new bilateral or multilateral military agreements with them. The final outcome notwithstanding Moscow will resolutely object to participation of any of the new states in any military alliance of which Russia is not part and to the permanent use of the military objects on their territory by third countries.
Today, it has become clear that the United States has come to stay in Central Asia. 7 So far this meets Russia’s interests because the United States remains involved in the anti-terrorist operation in the region with no end in view. America’s presence in Central Asia stabilizes the situation, which Russia is too weak to control alone. At the same time, Russia does not want to be left alone to face the disturbed Islamic world and the Taleban when the US having bombed several countries it does not like withdraws from the area. In this case events might follow the worst of the possible scenarios: the Islamic world, including part of Russia’s regions and the northwest of China might follow the road of Afghanistan. This would make Russia a sort of an outpost of NATO designed to protect the West against the “Islamic threat.”
We should not forget that if the US entrenches in Central Asia Russia will be gradually losing its military, political, and economic positions. It will have to accept the fact that the US will move its forward bases to the former Soviet territory, that is, the territory of “Greater Russia.” Too close relations with the United States may worsen Russia’s relations with its southern and eastern partners and the former allies in the Middle East especially if the United States continues its drive for world domination under the banner of anti-terrorist struggle.
Permanent American presence in the zone of Russia’s vitally important interests will put on the agenda political monitoring of what the Pentagon is doing. So far, this task belonged to military alliances, NATO in particular. This explains why the question of Russia’s involvement in NATO or even its formal membership (something that is impossible today) remains topical.
No partnership with the US is possible if it interferes in Russia’s constructive cooperation with other countries. Any attempts to put pressure on Russia (this happened in case of the project of an atomic power station in Iran) are impermissible. In this case Russia demonstrated its resolution to follow the principles of international law and its own national interests rather than to succumb to the American political and ideological preferences.
There is another question: Would Russia’s national interests be better served if Russia followed pro-American orientation? It was asked once more when Russia supported America’s anti-terrorist efforts. Some experts believe that Russia’s choice was of a tactical, not strategic, nature. The tactical line was quite successful: Russia has lost nothing and gained some points. Its ties with the West strengthened and its international political weight increased. In fact, this choice had no alternatives. Let’s hope that tactics will develop into a strategy–so far there is no strategy in sight.
Other experts believe that Russia in the person of its president has already opted for a strategy. Some call it historic, others, civilizational. They say that Russia has chosen the West, Europe, the Christian world as a whole and Christian civilization. This interpretation is extremely dangerous and, as such, does not meet Russia’s national domestic and foreign interests. Russia is the West and the East at one and the same time, it is Europe and Asia, the Christian and the Muslim world. Russia is one of the largest Muslim countries. It should be made absolutely clear that its civilizational choice was not aimed against the East, Asia and the Muslim world. We have opted for democratic values and international law. This is our civilizational choice. Any other opinion will undermine the Russian Federation.
If realized such script would allow the US to move its troops in the Russian territory and open a possibility of direct contacts between the RF regions and the United States fraught with Russia’s division into more or less independent regions and later disintegration. The use by the United States of air corridors of the post-Soviet expanse and former Soviet bases in the course of the anti-terrorist operation created an absolutely new situation.
Excessive pro-American bias may bring negative results for Russia. First, moral damage: Russia does not object to the American military actions and the use of force outside international laws.
Second, economic damage. Discontinued cooperation with the countries the US suspects of supporting international terrorism will deprive Russia of billions of dollars it now earns by selling arms and high technologies.
Third, political damage. Continued unconditional support of the United States and Moscow’s readiness to follow Washington’s global strategies will amount to recognition that the last decade of a painful search for Russia’s national identity in world politics and a role and place in the world community and world history was wasted.
Inside the country solidarity with the Americans has already produced a wide range of opinions among the heads of the key regions. The south, on the whole, approves of solidarity while the leaders of the largest and influential Muslim republics remain silent. The Muslim clergy is split over the war waged on Islamic territories.
Outside the country the prospects of pro-American orientation are not clear either. The Taleban was Russia’s enemy yet the United States is lengthening the list of enemies of the so-called civilized community. Today it includes not only enemies of Russia but also such countries as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea described by the US president as an “axis of evil.” 8 There is no clearness against whom the anti-terrorist operation is waged while international terrorism is becoming obviously a political factor thus giving the United States freedom of action. According to some well-informed sources this fall the United States will start hostilities in the Middle East. A strike at Iraq is planned for September. Syria. Somalia, Libya, Algeria, Sudan, and certain others may also become targets of American attacks. If this happens Russia will face an unpleasant choice: either to withdraw from the US-led anti-terrorist coalition and forget about partnership with the United States or to abandon its traditional partners. Terrorist organizations threaten to retaliate with weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and nuclear). Today it is hard to say which new threats to Russia will appear if the United States delivers its strikes at Iraq and other “axis of evil” countries. 9
Open or even tacit agreement with the planned Washington actions may cause a radical revision of Moscow’s relations with Delhi and Beijing that may start looking at Moscow as an unreliable partner.
Today, the future of the CIS and the 1992 Collective Security Treaty are two most sensitive points for Russia. The American use of airfields, air space and bases in Central Asia with a complete support and approval of the local countries and Russia’s tacit agreement may weaken or even destroy these international mechanisms.
Today, military leadership in Central Asia belongs to the United States therefore one can expect that the Collective Security Treaty and the Shanghai Six may be replaced with something like CENTO that will include Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan and, probably, other countries. The sudden change in the Constitution of Japan that permits it to participate in military alliances requires a careful analysis. At worst, SEATO might be revived under the pretext of anti-terrorist struggle.
Finally, one wants to ask: To which extent can Russia oppose negative, and anti-Russian, trends in American policy? Obviously, it cannot use force: this would be a counterproductive and expensive step. Today, Russia can use political and diplomatic means to rebuff the attempts to weaken its influence in the world, keep it away from the world markets, and slow down its integration into the world community and to avoid confrontation over problems of marginal importance. To successfully deal with urgent international and bilateral issues the United States should establish a straightforward and respectful partnership with Russia that would take account of its interests.
Cooperation on Key Issues
Today, anti-terrorist struggle is inevitably the central point of cooperation between the two countries. International terrorism is practically immune to the latest methods of warfare; unilateral efforts of any country, even as strong as the United States, will never resolve the problem. The world needs a collective structure able to promptly destroy terrorist seats across the world without loss of civilian lives. Joint efforts are the only possible and the most efficient answer to the evil of terrorism. Recent experience has testified, however, that the existing international organizations, NATO included, are too bureaucratic and too slow to promptly and efficiently respond to unexpected terrorist challenges.
The routing of the world terrorist center (Afghanistan under the Taleban regime) is a necessary yet the first stage of the global anti-terrorist struggle. It seems that we have to switch to the second phase: to bring all constructive forces in the Islamic world into an alliance and to cooperate with them in order to destroy the entire infrastructure (military and financial in the first place) of the “Islamic international” (that has nothing to do with Islam), to prevent further radicalization of the Muslims by cooperating with them on an equal basis. In this sphere Russia has unique experience that it can share with the United States and other members of the anti-terrorist alliance. This may require a bilateral and, later, multilateral structure.
In the coming years bilateral cooperation will concentrate on the military-political sphere. It is important to remove the discrepancy between the proclaimed strategic partnership and still surviving mutual nuclear deterrence. It is desirable to establish in future limited mutual influence of the military potentials, that is, a possibility of mutually influencing the defense efforts of both sides at the early stages of political decision-making on key issues.
According to some of the Russian experts the changes in Washington’s military policy do not directly threaten Russia’s national security at least in the next 10 to 15 years until Americans finally deploy the strategic AMB system. Yet these changes, America’s unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in particular, endanger international arms control, may cause another bout of arms race and encourage proliferation of mass destruction weapons and means of their delivery.
It seems that Russia’s tactics in relation to the United States was a correct one: there was no panic, no threatening rhetoric and no statements about a desire to compete with America in the field of offensive and defensive weapons. At the same time, America has made strategic moves–we should give a strategic response related to our nuclear policies.
When thinking about the future Russia should keep in mind that nuclear armaments and plans to use them against each other are a permanent reality no matter how political relations between Moscow and Washington develop. So far, the question of new legally binding and controllable agreements with Russia on irreversible reduction of strategic offensive weapons remains unresolved. Meanwhile, the technological advances made in the US and the test results of ABM components say that the country is able to deploy a working limited anti-missile system in the medium-term perspective the density of which will lend itself to improvement.
This means that in the foreseeable future Russia should remain a strong nuclear power. The nuclear balance (not parity) with the United States within a fairly wide range of the total number of warheads and fighting capabilities should continue ensuring special strategic relations with the United States and maintaining Russia’s political weight in the world. This will keep the US interest in the dialogue on the offensive and defensive weapons and the entire complex of relevant political and economic relations.
Diplomats should do their best to keep the arms control talks going yet we should not rush into a new START treaty with the United States at all costs. If it becomes clear that America is not ready to sign in May a legally binding and controllable agreement related to strategic offensive and defensive weapons it would be wiser to continue working on it after the summit rather than to sign another declaration that may undermine the regime completely.
At the same time, it is advisable to formulate well-substantiated and thoroughly argumented suggestions on our cooperation with the US in the field of ABM that would not undermine strategic stability. Such cooperation may include joint work on global information systems and on a new generation of confidence-building measures in the field of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Russia’s political gains are obvious.
When talking to the United States Russia could offer radical measures: a level of “minimal” nuclear deterrence, a new partnership philosophy, a model of strategic relationships between them that would go beyond the limits of nuclear deterrence. Obviously, if Russia and the United States did not possess tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of missiles they would have never made them now. This paradox cannot be removed, at least in the nearest decade, by destroying nuclear weapons yet it is possible to radically reorient and reorganize the remaining nuclear forces. This is a realistic and important aim of the Russian-American partnership. The relations between the UK and France in the nuclear sphere may serve a graphic example of how two nuclear powers with approximately equal potentials and a technical possibility of mutual destruction are living peacefully without fears of sudden attacks and threat of confrontation.
If Americans do not display an interest in a mutually acceptable agreement that will take account of Russia’s interests we shall be probably left with only one choice: independent nuclear policies. In this new situation Russia will independently determine the quality and quantity of its nuclear forces with the traditional emphasis on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, MIRV in the first place. This will ensure guaranteed potential of nuclear deterrence of the US in all possible military-political developments.
In the coming years Russia and United States are doomed to deepen their cooperation in preventing and settling local crises, to pool their efforts in order to strengthen international and regional stability. Naturally enough, Russia will continue insisting that it should be consulted on all relevant issues and that the UN Security Council should adopt relevant decisions. These consultations should become an element and a mechanism of political decision-making within OSCE and, in future, of political cooperation between Russia and NATO.
Conflict settlement across the former Soviet Union is another relevant subject. Russia needs stability along its borders and inside its frontiers–this calls for its active involvement in settling conflicts. Moscow cannot ignore the fact that hostilities claim lives of its citizens and violate the rights of Russian speakers outside it that causes a veritable flood of refugees who need adequate accommodation. This strains the budget, and aggravates the social and crime situation. When trying to preserve peace and stability in Eurasia by stemming waves of religious fundamentalism, nationalism, and political extremism coming from the Caucasus, Central Asia and other formerly Soviet areas Russia is obviously acting in the interests of the civilized world as well as in its own.
We have to admit that the United States and other Western leaders do not display adequate understanding and a desire to help Russia. On many occasions the Russian Federation asked for a status of UN peacekeeping forces for its troops in certain CIS countries (stationed there mainly on their own request) and for corresponding funding. These requests remained unheard. Typically enough, Russia’s role of an intermediary in the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia that does not infringe on the US direct economic and strategic interests met with opposition. It would have been much more in the spirit of partnership if Washington recognized Russia’s leadership in conflict settlement in the former Soviet Union as well as the international legal status of its peacekeepers acting in the CIS. Moscow will always react with irritation to the US attempts to arbitrate between Russia and the former Soviet republics and to use the conflicts in the former Soviet territory to boost its influence and decrease that of Russia.
Nonproliferation is one of the issues on which both countries agree. It is in the interests of Russia to make additional efforts, coordinated with the United States to fulfill the decision of the 1995 conference on permanent and unconditional extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty. It is also in Russia’s interests to establish efficient cooperation in monitoring the nonproliferation regime of the weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery and to set up measures preventing such proliferation.
Russia is interested in a cooperation program in the field of nuclear safety that would use the United States’ technical assistance, establish a stricter control over, physical protection and safety of nuclear materials, and closer cooperation in preventing illegal trade in such materials. At the same time Russia will oppose the United States’ intention to limit such control to the Russian industry of nuclear materials and to impose on it its own unilateral decision crippling Russia’s economic interests.
Finally, Russia should talk to the United States about a possible intergovernmental umbrella agreement on a full-scale military-technological state-controlled bilateral cooperation. At the same time this agreement should put such cooperation within certain limits so that to prevent simple borrowing of Russian latest technologies. In fact, cooperation in the sphere of control over conventional weapons and the “critical” technologies proliferation looks doubtful: this area is a scene of a bitter rivalry between the two countries and of the US’s efforts to remove Russia from the world markets of armaments and military hardware. What is possible is an agreement on certain basic rules and lists of non-exportable weapons and countries that should not receive certain categories of military hardware.
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Today it is very important while not interrupting the Russian-American relations to analyze what happened in Russia and the world in the last ten years. The United States should admit that its foreign policy based on the desire to get unilateral concessions from Russia as payment for its political support of the reforms has not justified itself. The US should abandon an illusion that Russia will accept a partnership of the paternalist type and a role of a junior partner. Americans should treat with understanding Russia’s desire to be equal to the United States on the world arena not because of its past but because of its possible future role. In its turn Russia should stop thinking about its relations with the US as an aim in itself. Moscow should look at them as a powerful instrument of settling domestic and foreign policy problems and of ensuring national and international security. Vladimir Putin has said: “America will never become Russia and Russia will never turn into America. We can complement each other. Our cooperation is one of the most important stability factors in the world. We should never forget this. This responsibility should be part of our policy.” 10
Endnotes
Note *: Sergei Kortunov, Vice President, Foreign Policy Association, Candidate of Sciences Back.
Note 1: As applied to the relations between Russia and America the term “partnership” first appeared in the Partnership and Friendship Charter of 1992. Later, Russian diplomats started applying it to nearly all countries: China, Germany, Ukraine, etc. This practice devalued the term. Back.
Note 2: There is an opinion that Russia should have sold its contribution to the antiterrorist operation to the United States. Some experts even go as far as quoting the price: closer relationships with NATO (or even full membership), discharge of its foreign debts, immediate admission in the WTO on acceptable conditions. Such haggling would have developed into a political and moral loss. On the other hand, the moral loss notwithstanding, one should bear in mind that in diplomacy unilateral concessions are never rewarded. They are pocketed and forgotten. All those who have ever dealt with America at bilateral talks know this. Back.
Note 3: Condoleezza Rice, presidential national security advisor, believes that it is for Russia to meet the United States halfway. She described the trend of cooperation between the two countries as on the whole correct and added that Russia would have to go further on. This means that America does not think of “drawing closer” to Russia as a mutual process. Back.
Note 4: See Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993. Back.
Note 5: According to Rice the United States is not prepared in principle to distinguish between the terrorists and those who support them and supply them inside the country. Back.
Note 6: President Putin has pointed out: “Everything depends on the quality of relations between Russia and NATO. Productive and confidential relations and mechanisms of joint decision-making on the key issues will probably convince us to change our attitude to extension. This is too early to say: the nature of the relations between us has not changed. As we all know we are negotiating actively and expect certain positive results.” Back.
Note 7: At the early stage of the anti-terrorist operation Washington explained that it needed airfields and bases in the former Soviet Central Asian republics exclusively for the needs of the operation in progress: it was explained that the Pentagon needed intermediate airfields and bases of logistical support. From this it followed that the bases would disappear as soon as the operation was over. Early this year the situation changed: the anti-Taleban military operation had been completed yet there was no talk about folding up the military structures. Official delegations of the Congress, the State Department and the Pentagon are frequenting the region. Back.
Note 8: According to Igor Ivanov Moscow can describe the following areas as seats of terror: the Middle East, the Balkans, Somalia, and certain Asian and Caucasian countries. Russia has no information that North Korea, Iran and Iraq support international terrorists. A CIA report made public last January listed Russia among suppliers of dual-purpose technologies to the countries that are part of the “axis of evil.” The United States has formally accused Byelorussia, member of a formal state alliance with Russia, of selling arms to terrorists. Back.
Note 9: Aleksei Arbatov is convinced that the Taleban was an exception–it was a genuine rogue regime. Deprived of support of two American allies (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) it found itself in total isolation. It will be much harder to deal with Iraq, North Korea and Iran. Back.
Note 10: See Wall Street Journal, 11 February 2001. Back.