CIAO DATE: 06/02

International Affairs:
A Russian Journal

No. 7, 2001

 

New Century, Greater Concerns

V. Lukin _*

The new century, in its foreign policy dimension, begins, I would say, with not lesser but perhaps even greater concerns and problems than the 20th century did with its Anglo-Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the subsequent events. The world has seen a dramatic rise in tensions related to international terrorism. To rout the Taliban and to eradicate terrorism is not necessarily the same thing. Terrorism is a kind of international, an invisible monster, and I think that what is happening now in the financial sphere - an attempt to freeze terrorists' assets and trace their funds and property - is in fact far more important than, even though less dramatic and high-profile, than the events in Afghanistan. If this process moves on successfully, there will be cause to say that a good deal has been achieved. The choice made by terrorists demonstrated not only the weakness of the United States but, in a broader sense, also the vulnerability of modern security and democracy because ever since open society was established with considerable freedom of movement in the world, the security problem has been its natural consequence with the technological revolution making the dilemma even more pronounced. On one hand, there is more freedom, more opportunities to choose a particular way of life and methods of movement, but on the other, there are also more opportunities for terrorists, including the possibility for a group of terrorists to inflict irreparable damage not only on a major world power but also on the whole of mankind. This was dramatically demonstrated, in its entire shock and horror, by the September 11, 2001 events.

Yet we can talk also in terms of national sources of tension. This is above all the Indian-Pakistani conflict. It is a conflict between two nuclear powers. A conflict between Russia and China had been widely predicted throughout the second half of the 20th century. We proved wise enough to avoid nuclear confrontation. Meanwhile, the conflict between India and Pakistan is a very serious matter. Given the insufficient level of legitimacy, there are plenty of problems. The two countries are closely interconnected, and the conflict is very acute, like any family conflict, and of course there is a danger of escalation, although I for one do not think that it will evolve into an exchange of nuclear strikes.

The Middle East will of course remain a serious problem. A settlement cannot be expected any time soon. Furthermore, attempts by the Clinton administration to exert external pressure in order to expedite a settlement in fact led to an escalation of the conflict. The way to act is on a step by step basis, slowly. If the internal situation is not ripe for an agreement, there should not be external pressure. This applies to both the Palestinians and Israelis. Leaders and the vanguard should not be separated from their roots, from their base - this leads to no good. So I believe some new flare-ups here are quite possible.

Meanwhile, the situation on our southern borders has improved considerably. I mean Central Asia since breeding grounds for conflict have been substantially weakened although not eradicated completely. As for the North Caucasus, I hope the situation there will this year be gradually getting back to normal. But that is only provided we follow a correct policy line. Our ill-considered moves in certain areas of our internal policy can lead to the temptation to exert pressure on Western as well as some non-Western countries while we will have to bear the consequences in problem areas that we have: funding of Chechen separatists, etc. So the far-sighted steps that the president has taken since September 11 ought to be followed up. Any consistent policy is better than three policies in one. We need to identify several areas of our interests and act consistently regardless of what the situation in the world is: peace and calm or crisis. This should of course be taken into account, but we should pursue our own agenda.

One important problem that I have often raised, unfortunately, is still there - viz., lack of coordination in our foreign policy. It is unacceptable that there should be one foreign policy on Smolenskaia Square (Foreign Ministry headquarters), another on the Arbat (the Defense Ministry), still another in Yasenevo (the Foreign Intelligence Service) and maybe even one at the Atomic Energy Ministry. Coordination is a major problem. I believe that only two departments should be in charge of foreign policy coordination: the Foreign Ministry (ongoing matters) and the Security Council (long-term matters).

Unfortunately, the Security Council has been taking rather a low profile recently; its performance is still very far from perfect. It should be organized and operate not as a semi- or inter-departmental but as a super-departmental agency. Its leadership should be comprised of strategically minded analysts, not of functionaries. These should be people who have not all their life served in a particular department - not because this department may be bad or its cadres inefficient enough, but because this inevitably results in departmental approaches toward whatever they do. Meanwhile, what is needed here are experts with a broad, nationwide vision. They should collect material and make recommendations to the president, which may not necessarily please certain agencies or departments because state interests are not a sum total of departmental interests, but a line that is to be followed consistently and that sometimes requires a check on departmental interests. If we want to ensure effective coordination of our foreign policy, we should reinforce and review the operation of the Security Council. And of course, in any event, the Security Council is unable to work effectively if the president does not give the due attention that it deserves or if there is not permanent contact between the president and the Security Council leadership. Moreover, if it emerges as a real supra-departmental, not just another departmental, agency, it could be highly instrumental.

Today the line between internal and foreign policy is becoming blurry. This is a very important factor, and people engaged in both foreign and domestic affairs need to take this into account. Let us take the issue of Russia's admission to the WTO: Where does internal policy interest begin and where does foreign policy interest end? Or the Chechen crisis: Where does internal interest end and foreign policy interest begin here? It is a conflict on Russian territory but with a clear presence of an international factor. Ditto for problems of Central Asian states. So the interconnection is very broad and inseparable today, including in Russia. Say, we pursue a particular policy line toward the mass media. It would seem that until recently this was a matter of purely internal policy. But should some "advisers" cause us to make many mistakes, this will have far-reaching foreign policy implications for this country. As a result, we could end up squandering the capital - the substantial capital that the president has accumulated since September 11, and squander it much faster some might expect. So internal policy and foreign policy are closely interconnected, and this needs to be taken into account. I believe it is right that there are experts on internal matters today working at the Foreign Ministry and experts on external matters at some of our internal agencies. We need to learn from each other.

The positive trends in our relations with the West today are dominated by tactics that may come into conflict with general strategy. While the logic of life is pushing us toward an alliance, there are various tactical schemes, attempts to outsmart each other. Just how lasting these trends are, is not an easy question. Their consolidation and development are contingent on our foreign and internal policy line. Today I see the main danger lying in that these trends could prove short-lived - not even in the sphere of our foreign policy, but in the internal policy sphere. Some recent moves (I am not saying that it is a deliberate series of moves coming from the center), in particular, the rather dubious court rulings on certain individuals, coupled with negative reaction in the West over the rulings by the same courts on mass media, arouse concern in the West, eroding the capital that has been accumulated by the country and its president. The fact is that Western society is so organized that the executive branch of government cannot long resist pressure from public opinion. So what is happening now stimulates public opinion and parliament, which will in their turn impact on the executive. This is bound to make itself felt in the short term. I am afraid that this danger is seriously underestimated in our higher echelons of power.

The West is pinning high hopes on improvement in partnership relations with Russia. There is a complex relationship between the United States and Europe. Europe is discussing the future of European civilization, and there is a serious discussion about the final borders, and whether or not Russia should be included. Today many are convinced that Europe will be a center of the world civilization in the second half of the 21st century only if Russia, and of course the zone between Russia and Western Europe, is a part of Europe. Others believe that Russia is not a part of Europe and the final European borders should be drawn somewhere in the west or east of Ukraine. The struggle between the two approaches continues to date. I am pro-Europe and I think that Russia should be part of Europe, but not in the sense that Russia should cease being Russia. Neither Italy nor Britain will cease being Italy or Britain, but they are part of Europe. This is also what Russia should become. In fact this has been the case ever since the times of Kievan Rus. In this context we should become a part of Europe, joining European structures when the time is right, emerging as a very important factor. Europe also needs our energy, our vast civilizational expanses, and our culture, which is one of the basic components of European culture. Without us Europe will be but a secondary factor in world politics - there are many other, more powerful, objective factors - and as a European, I would hate to see that happen for I set great store by European values.

The West naturally wants us, while embracing Russian values, also to embrace European values. This applies to human rights, fundamental freedoms, etc. There is nothing wrong about this. After all, Mr. Sanches from Madrid may not be interested more than myself in that I, say, not be arbitrarily detained and beaten by police. Perhaps I am more interested in that than he is. So when I say that I would like to live like Mr. Sanches or like M. Limier, say, in Paris, I am not saying that I will necessarily speak French and eat oysters. There should be a clear-cut understanding of some basic principles that are deeply rooted in European culture and that it would not hurt us Russians to embrace without ceasing to be Russians and losing our Russian identity.

On balance, I assess the prospects for Russia's relationship with the West as favorable, but provided that Russia is seen by the West as a natural part of its domain. Then even contradictions will be seen as internal, non-strategic problems. This is only possible with a well-defined, coherent Russian policy, predicated on effective policy coordination on the presidential level by people who have a clear, in-depth understanding of the present-day world, in what direction it is moving, and what Russia can and should do in this world to advance its national interests; people who have a strategic, analytical vision, who are able to translate correct concepts into correct practical moves, who enjoy the president's trust, and act in close interaction with the Foreign Ministry.

Common objectives in combating terrorism could serve as a long-term base for establishment of partnership relations between Russia and the West. This is an important aspect since a common threat always brings people together. Unfortunately -- but maybe there is an element of luck here - the fight against terrorism is a long drawn-out process because it is impossible to eradicate terrorism 100 percent. After all, it is not just social and political problems, but in the final analysis, existential human problems: good versus evil. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center is revenge on the entire world for the gap between the immortal, ambitious soul and reality. To reiterate, terrorists will try to settle scores not only with a handful of people around, but with the entire world. This temptation will be growing. So the fight against terrorism is a long-term basis for partnership. Yet this problem is already taking on a new dimension: Is democracy and open society compatible with security interests? How, without probing a person too much, can it be guaranteed that he will not do something that will destroy human life? The problem seems to be virtually insoluble. How can this be avoided? The temptation is far too strong. Man's craving for freedom is just as strong as his craving for security. Is this not a subject for an extremely serious discussion about cooperation? This calls for profound trust. Incidentally, we have already demonstrated such trust by sharing sensitive information about terrorism, etc. Trust needs to be strengthened step by step, and this is a lengthy process, predicated on a sharing of fundamental values.

In this context it would be sheer stupidity to set our relationship with Washington against our relationship with other Western capitals. It is perfectly clear, for example, that Western capitals do not need Moscow as an obedient, unquestioning U.S. partner. Then there will not be much point in negotiating with it in the first place. Even so, the Europeans will never deal with a Moscow that is in serious conflict with the United States. We are, as it were, within Europe, seeking to integrate into its internal structures, organizations, and economic area. We need an excellent relationship with the United States with no playing on its contradictions with Europe, it will be, rather, an external relationship. With this setup, I believe that our interests, our reforms, in a secure environment, will be best served. There are two main incentives for partnership with the United States. One is a common threat posed by international terrorism and organized crime; the other is the assumption - with good reason - that this partnership is the most conducive to advancing Russian national interests. The question arises: Should we join the WTO on the basis of partnership or non-partnership? Are our security problems in the south better addressed in the environment of partnership or confrontation? It is enough to just look at these questions to see that this is advantageous to us, not to mention the fact that it is only natural from the moral/ethical point of view, especially after September 11.

Judging by what a number of prominent experts were on record as saying, we had no doubts whatsoever that after January, serious negotiations on outstanding problems would open and relations would begin to get better. We pointed out that the Republicans could be dealt with. They are tough negotiators, unwilling to make concessions, but once they have, they honor the agreements that are achieved. I would not say that this was something entirely unexpected. The personal chemistry between the two presidents was certainly a key factor here. This does not of course replace objective trends, but when the latter favor a rapprochement between the sides, personal chemistry greatly facilitates the process. Meanwhile, objective reality was perfectly obvious. Not surprisingly, when our country finally turned the page of its Communist past, its relations with the United States and a number of European countries immediately improved. Yet at the time the force of inertia in both the United States and Russia was too strong, and so the improvement was followed by a rollback. Several years passed, and it became plain that even if we did not want to advance, dragging our feet, thumbing our nose at each other behind our back, and grimacing at each other, the trend was pushing us in the right direction all the same. And then the terrorist attacks showed that there was simply no alternative to pooling our efforts to defend ourselves.

Please note that the reactionary forces today are much weaker than they were in the mid-1990s. The rearguard, the hard-liners, the traditionalists are gradually beginning to accept the inevitable - what is better and more natural for the country at present. Well, they dislike America. But is anyone being forced to like it? It may or may not be liked, but the interests of your own country are paramount, and so a realistic assessment of possible options is a must. All the indications are that the time of ardent philippics and passionate rhetoric is over - it is time to take stock of existing options. Russia has shown that it can be a far more important and influential player on the international arena with the United States than in confrontation with it.

As far as the Chinese factor is concerned, it is extremely important to us. We should advance relations with China to the extent to which this will be acceptable to the Chinese. The signing and ratification of the Russian-Chinese treaty of friendship is extremely important, as has often been stressed in, among others, International Affairs, above all because it effectively resolved - at least for the foreseeable future - one of the most acute geopolitical problems that we were confronted with: an overpopulated China overhanging our virtually non-demarcated border. Now this border has been de jure recognized by both sides, which opens good prospects for peaceful coexistence in this potentially exposed area. We should give the Chinese credit for their wisdom and understanding that Russia is such an important strategic partner that it is necessary to disregard some of its weaknesses and exert no pressure on it, but quite the contrary, work to lay a groundwork for the future. We need to respond in kind, and in this context we have only ourselves to blame for whatever illegal migration there is: It is our corrupt officials who are ready to sell anything to just anyone. This must be dealt with. In this connection I recall an apt comment by Saltykov-Shchedrin: Everyone is stealing but at the same time saying, tongue in cheek, Isn't this outrageous! If we continue to act according to this principle - accept money from all sorts of dubious Chinese businessmen from the semi-criminal world, allowing them to settle down in this country and then raise a hue and cry before the electorate: "How horrible! What an outrage! What does Moscow think it is doing?" -- nothing good will come of it, but we will have only ourselves to blame for the deplorable outcome. Meanwhile, the Russian-Chinese treaty, the finalization of the demarcation process and the legal recognition of the border is one of the greatest achievements of our foreign policy and diplomacy over the past 10 to 15 years, which, it must be stated bluntly, have not seen too many such success stories.

Now a brief comment on possible new attempts to implement the so-called humanitarian intervention doctrine. I can see two aspects in this doctrine. One is high-minded and praiseworthy. Remember the events in Afghanistan. The fact is that they began not with U.S. air strikes - not even with the September 11 attacks. It is a long story. One of the most horrifying pages in this story was the destruction of Buddhist cultural landmarks by the Taliban in Afghan mountains. I never saw them myself but I saw similar creations in China. These wonderful things are the property of human civilization. Already then, when the Taliban were doing that, I was writing and saying that humanitarian intervention was necessary in order to stop that. There was no other option. If, say, some cretins come to power in Egypt, saying that the pyramids were built before our era and so they must be demolished, how is mankind supposed to react to that? Quite obviously, the pyramids are the property of the whole mankind.

The other aspect is an attempt to use humanitarian intervention as a pretext to score geopolitical points and address tasks strongly resembling those that were addressed by many states engaging in brinkmanship, balance of force politics, ever since the days of the Ochakovo conquest of the Crimea. Our task is to separate one out from the other. There is only one way of doing that: Only the internationally recognized community, namely the UN, may decide whether or not to carry out such operations, and direct them. Russia should adopt a clear-cut position on the issue. Yes, we are for humanitarian intervention in certain situations; we are for humanitarian operations designed to save human civilization. What if genocide is perpetrated against a certain tribe, as was the case in one African country? We must intervene in this conflict on the UN level, under a UN mandate or on authority from some regional organization. But we should not do this on orders from Washington or Paris or Wellington or Moscow. No individual country may issue such a mandate. This is why we must deal with this matter. Incidentally, we are in fact dealing with it. On the instructions of the UN and on the initiative of the Canadian foreign minister, a report, titled Humanitarian Intervention and National Sovereignty, was prepared and recently presented to the UN Secretary General. I was there, as Russia's representative.

Concerning countries that are a problem to the West, we need to agree with the West which of them are really a problem. I have a feeling that this category could include countries that are a problem to both the West and Russia, pursuing a coordinated line toward them. As for countries fingered by Washington only because they for some reason or other are irked by someone, we have to be extremely careful, calm, not teasing our partner but at the same not neglecting our own interests. Say, as far as Iran is concerned, it is perfectly clear that there are elements of competition in our disagreements with the United States. We need to conduct an open, calm dialogue, just as France is doing. Insofar as concerns competition, we need to be tough and persistent, while in political negotiations we need to be flexible, ready to reckon with our partner's opinion to the extent to which it makes sense.

 

Endnotes

Note *: Vladimir Lukin is deputy speaker of the Russian State DumaBack