CIAO DATE: 03/02

International Affairs

International Affairs:
A Russian Journal

No. 6, 2001

 

Russians Believe Reforms Irreversible

V. Ryzhkov *

It is still too soon to sum up the changes that have occurred in Russia during the formative 1990s. We have yet to go up a hill offering a view of a stretch of the road leading to a turn beyond which, as we hope, things might clarify.

There are two reasons for this lack of clarity: time and we.

Time always limits change. It does not let something that is bound to happen, happen too quickly. It restrains through inertia and tradition. Especially if this applies to a society that has realized that over its century-long evolution it has come to a dead end and is now trying to get out of it.

As far as we, the elements of this society, are concerned, the outcome hinges on us and nobody else. It is predicated on our conceptions and misconceptions and myths and misperceptions of our past. A specific feature of the path that we are making is that at any given moment it is cleared by those who are making it. Let us not forget that history knows not a few countries and nations that sank into oblivion not because they did not achieve much, but because they did not do what they had to at the moment when they had to. Although time, as a rule, was patient with them.

Where are we headed? Are we blazing a new path? This is the question. This is why the 1990s, and what happened with us during those years, are so important to us.

In the beginning there was Gorbachev and there were popular uprisings.

A deciding factor in the democratic revolution in the east of Europe were the internal changes in the Soviet Union. The historic contribution of the last general secretary and only Soviet president was not that he put forward and carried out a strategic plan to reform a vast and militarily strong Communist power as an open democratic society and full-fledged member of the "civilized world." This is in fact that Mikhail Gorbachev failed to do. The historic meaning of his leadership consisted, quite the contrary, in what he did not do. To be more precise, he did not stand in the way of change. He did not do with respect to the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Lithuanians, and others what, before him, Khrushchev and Brezhnev had done without a second's hesitation. He did not paper over the cracks in the unraveling Iron Curtain. And thus he made a historic contribution to the birth of a new Europe. Standing behind that was his imagination and his peculiar idealism, without which historic changes are not possible.

The year 1989 stands out also in our own national history. Set for the beginning of that year were the first semi-free elections for the Congress of Soviet People's Deputies, providing for some, even if limited, alternative. In February-March, several hundred thousand citizens took to the streets demanding the abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution (enshrining the CPSU's power monopoly in the country) and the transfer of power from party committees to Soviets, or councils. The Congress itself opened on May 25, 1989 and was broadcast live on the air throughout the country. Tens of millions of Soviet citizens became witnesses to and participants in a giant TV rally featuring something hitherto unheard-of: an open, public discussion at the top level of mistakes and crimes committed by the state. Those unforgettable live broadcasts became by far the most popular lessons in democracy and freedom mankind had ever known. It was also at the time that the Interregional Deputies Group - the first organized opposition in the Soviet Union - was formed, Boris Yeltsin becoming one of its leaders. 1

The important thing to remember is that the new Russian and new European democracies arose from a mass movement of "ordinary people." That was a critical factor in the "velvet revolutions" in Central and East European countries, including Russia. In Russia, the people twice took to the streets, defending the ideals of freedom and demanding changes - in the spring of 1989 and in August 1991.

Who knows, perhaps the vague memory of the heady days when the nation itself determined its fate in the streets and squares of Russian cities is today the only solid foundation of our freedom?

Russia has never existed within its present borders. In this sense, it is an entirely new country on the world map. We were for the first time affected by what nearly all European powers had gone through in the 20th century. We lost a part of what we had always considered to be our own and preserved something that had by right been ours for the past several decades. Counting up the balance here is not only a subjective but also an extremely dangerous proposition. The principle of the inviolability of borders after World War II was firmly established in the world and fully accepted by the new Central and East European democracies despite the complex and contradictory nature of the postwar border demarcation. And although the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens still regret the breakup of the Soviet Union 2 , Russia's position is well in line with the generally accepted principles. By now the country has resolved virtually all border issues with its neighbors, ratifying corresponding treaties.

A decade ago, new Russia made a decision of the utmost importance. Russia became successor to the Soviet Union. On all matters. It assembled all nuclear weapons left over from the Soviet Union in its territory. It retained its seat on the UN Security Council. It assumed the entire Soviet debt. It reduced the threat to global and regional security that emerged in FSU territory. It prevented the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It managed to resolve a large number of other problems.

At the same time Russian policy of the 1990s had an intrinsically dual character. On one hand, it operated on the assumption that the Russian Federation was not at all what the Soviet Union had been. After all, it had proclaimed and realized new principles: democracy, pluralism, federalism, self-government, market economy, and private property ownership. On the other hand, preservation of the status as a nuclear superpower and an exceptional status at the UN, and aspiration for a special role in world politics, inherited from the Soviet Union - all of that naturally placed Russia outside the scope of new democracies. This yet-to-be-overcome dualism brought about sharp turns in Russia's foreign policy of the 1990s.

When in the spring of 1989, millions of Soviet citizens were demanding an end to the CPSU power monopoly in the country, they were moved by profound distrust of the existing Soviet state. It appeared to be ineffectual, incapable of even ensuring basic food and consumer goods supplies. The people were sure that with new leadership, free elections, a multiparty system and democracy, things would be taking a turn for the better.

Apparently the people of Russia got the kind of state that they wanted to see. The existing Constitution guarantees a scope of political rights to citizens that is every bit as good as, say, in the United States or France. Authorities on all levels are elected by the citizens themselves on an alternative basis. There is a great number of parties in the country. Parliament has the power to confirm the prime minister and pass laws. Compliance with the Constitution is overseen by the Constitutional Court while the judicial system is independent of the executive. There is even an office of human rights ombudsman.

Nonetheless, all the indications are that the ordinary citizen still feels alienated from the state. In 1999, 52 percent of respondents said that during the reform years people have become tired and more indifferent with 57 percent believing that they can only rely on themselves. A mere 5 percent saw themselves as full-fledged citizens who had an opportunity to influence the ruling authority through elections, the mass media, etc. 3

One key factor in the electorate's ongoing alienation from the ruling authority could be the failure to put in place influential structures of civil society and an effective, representative multiparty system in Russia.

The large number of registered public organizations calling themselves parties or movements and taking part in all sorts of elections should not obscure the situation. The decade of transition from one-party authoritarianism to democracy has failed to produce a responsible and competent intermediary between society and the state, uniting the most active and socially oriented part of the people, structured depending on the interests and convictions of the various groups of the population. An intermediary that is able to put forward a development strategy. An intermediary that is ready to prepare and nominate competent candidates for elective and appointed offices, subsequently ensuring effective public supervision over their performance.

Instead, what we have are small (except the CPRF), inefficient lobby groups, unable to put forward substantive programs or to nominate suitable candidates - moreover, playing a secondary and not always seemly role in the process of exercising power. In addition, we see representatives of political parties and movements, as a rule, only in the federal Duma and very rarely in regional representative bodies. Their leading figures are underrepresented in the executive, which has real administrative leverage.

Throughout the 1990s, Russia had non-partisan presidents, for the most part non-party governors and heads of city and district administrations. The majority of parliamentarians (on all levels) are also not affiliated with any political parties. As a result, a citizen's ability to influence his representative (deputy) is limited to voting. There are no other options. There is a vacuum in the place that should be taken by activists of a party that has won an election and nominated a particular candidate - activists interested in his faithful and effective performance and so having cause to ensure his responsibility to the party that nominated him as well as to the electorate.

Society itself is to a very large extent to blame for this. It is still dominated by the view that honest professionals, not party intriguers should be in power. A little more than one-quarter of Russian citizens see a multiparty system as an important element of contemporary democracy with half believing it is not important. 4 This may to a certain extent be a hangover from the Soviet era - with a great number of textbook examples of the gross incompetence of party appointees. The price that Russian society pays for this belief, however, is a deepening alienation from the ruling authority - formally elected but infinitely remote and off-limits to civil control.

On the other hand, the Russian political class itself also for the most part believes in the power of competent experts. This approach has always prevailed in, say, the formation of the federal government. (The only short-term exception from this rule was the E. Primakov coalition government.) This approach is fraught with grave danger. Soviet and contemporary Russian history knows plenty of examples when a specialist at the head of a state or government department who is not a public politician responsible to the electorate, perforce begins to uphold primarily departmental interests, which more often than not come into conflict with state and public interests.

To ensure effective state governance, it is critical to strike a balance between public politicians and narrow specialists. The president, ministers, governors, and mayors should be political figures, nominated by parties and responsible to them and the electorate. Daily routine departmental activities should be conducted by specialists, under strategic oversight of politicians. Only this can ensure the optimal combination of public interests and effective governance.

One specific feature of our political culture, which amply manifested itself in the 1990s, is a decided preference for "strong" authority over all other types and forms thereof (divided, liberal, decentralized, etc.). This is evident from both public opinion polls 5 and the conception of a "normal state" prevailing within the political class. This is the reason the spontaneous developments of the early 1990s naturally brought about the 1993 Constitution, approved by a nationwide referendum, which is still in effect today and which established a regime of a super-presidential republic in Russia. Without taking this circumstance into account it is impossible fully to understand what has happened to Russia over the past decade.

A determining factor in the choice of this power structure was the figure of Boris Yeltsin. It combined several historical types. A typical party functionary, first secretary of one of the largest regional party committees, tough and authoritarian, intolerant of opposition. A person who fell out of favor with the selfsame party, a dissident and critic of the regime. A democratic leader, freedom champion, fighter against totalitarianism, and anti-Communist. An idealist believing in the freedom of expression and democracy. A tired and sick Russian tsar in the magnificent interior of the ancient Kremlin, surrounded by an inner circle of family members and courtiers. He sought a strong executive authority in the name of reform, succeeding in none, however.

His entire presidency consisted of political struggles with the parliamentary and regional opposition, attempts to form a strong and effective team, and strange and baffling decisions and moves. At the same time, long-term, Boris Yeltsin clearly aspired to build a basically new Russia - open, democratic, with a modern economy, and part of the advanced democracies club. To give credit where it's due, he took up where Gorbachev left off, making a historic contribution to advancing his cause. When, on December 31, 1999, the first Russian president announced to the nation that he was stepping down, he set a precedent that probably has yet to be appreciated to the full.

The Russian constitutional structure, arising from the general preference for "strong authority," largely predetermined the following three fundamental factors in the country's political evolution in the 1990s:

The latter requires some explanation. Throughout the decade, we observed one and the same pattern. Weak State Dumas, dominated by opponents of the first Russian president, were for a number of years locked in a destructive struggle with the executive - adopting populist, unrealistic laws and issuing contradictory statements. The government, desperate for a fast-track legislative process to advance reform, throughout the decade had no support in parliament. There was nothing the head of state could do about that. He was only reshuffling ministers and deputy prime ministers, also buying political support from regional leaders at the price of not always reasonable concessions. Yet another prop of the ruling authority came in the form of emerging big capital, which was not slow in trading its services in for acquisition, at rock-bottom prices, of tidbits of the national economy.

Such "strong" ruling authority, over-concerned with amassing power in one set on hands, in fact resulted in a chaotic economic policy, weak government, irresponsible parliament, and systemic corruption, which became Russia's "trademarks" in the 1990s.

Toward the end of the decade, it became clear that there were only two ways out of the situation. First, changing the balance of powers in favor of representative bodies by pooling the efforts of lawmakers and ministers on the basis of political solidarity. That was possible, say, in the form of transition to the French model of "cohabitation" wherein formation of the government was entrusted to a parliamentary majority (if it did not coincide with the majority supporting the president), elected by the people through party lists, with the head of state retaining control over foreign policy, defense and security as well as arbitration in the event of government crisis, including the power to set up a presidential cabinet.

Second, an attempt to politically storm parliament in the next election in a bid to ensure its loyalty by winning a stable majority with the subsequent dismantling of the main stronghold of the omnipotent regional elites: the Federation Council.

Vladimir Putin, who assumed the Russian presidency on top of the wave of public expectations of stability, order and effectiveness, chose the second option, which he has been following consistently. He found a way out of the systemic crisis of strong authority in strengthening it even more, concentrating political and economic controls at one center, weakening the political clout of the parliamentary opposition and regional elites, establishing control over the information policy of mainstream nationwide television and radio channels, and broadly using political and social engineering methods, when natural social processes are replaced or superseded by a targeted imitation or orchestration on the part of the central ruling authority.

Iurii Levada, a prominent Russian sociologist who has for many years been closely watching the evolution of homo Soveticus during the reform era, paints a contradictory picture. Over the past decade, the former Soviet people, now constituting the bulk of the population of new Russia, has gone through three different emotional states. In 1989, dominated by a perestroika euphoria, transition to democracy and prosperity seemed a smooth and quick process. In the mid-1990s, those na?ve hopes gave way to a reappraisal of values and attempts to adapt to new realities. By the end of the decade, however, the majority wants order and calm - in the shadow of a "strong hand." For all the vagueness of the popular conception of the much-coveted order, one thing is clear: It is order enforced from above with the passivity of the majority and the absence of figures and movements that would be able to propose a different, truly democratic model of order 6 .

Despite the drastically changing mood, it seems that the 1990s did not bring about a new type of person (that is to say, one corresponding to a new era, energetic, independent, and taking an active part in democratic self-government and governance) or any tangible departure from homo Soveticus.

This is impartially shown by sociological surveys. In a 1999 poll conducted by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Social and Economic Questions, or VTsIOM, 58 percent of respondents said it would be better to preserve the 1985 status quo with only 27 percent against. Readiness to take a justified risk and extra efforts to achieve a higher financial and social status was demonstrated by a mere 23 percent of respondents whereas 60 percent preferred a small but stable income and a sense of security. Some 67 percent are oriented toward sheer survival or a life as good as other people have. The attitude to the rich is very indicative. These people evoke respect, sympathy, and compassion among 21 percent of respondents; envy, among 8 percent; irritation, anger, and indignation, 53 percent, and fear, 3 percent.

Neither has the attitude to the outside world changed very much. Given that the majority of respondents welcome the country's openness, the possibility to freely travel abroad, 66 percent are still convinced that "Russia has always evoked hostility among other states, and no one wishes us well."

A mere 5 percent of respondents see themselves as full-fledged Russian citizens, able to influence the authorities through elections, the mass media, or otherwise. In 1997, 72 percent of respondents thought that the majority of the population would not be able to live in Russia without constant support and care on the part of the state. About 60 percent think that a citizen does not bear any moral responsibility for his government's actions, or were not sure. Only 36 percent see themselves as free people in our society whereas 51 percent see themselves as not free or rather not free.

The view of democratic institutions and democratic procedure is less than reassuring. Thus, 74.5 percent of respondents agree that democratic procedure - elections, parliament, freedom of expression, etc. - is just a semblance of democracy while we are ruled by those who have the most money and power with 66.4 percent sharing the view that nothing in the country's life depends on ordinary citizens while everything depends on leaders and politicians. Even so, people are not prepared to part with the main democratic gains. Approximately one-half of respondents consider it important to have representative power bodies. More than 60 percent support the freedom of enterprise. Freedom of expression is in principle supported by 85.5 percent of respondents and the possibility of freely traveling abroad, by 67.7 percent. 7

Russian citizens see no other ways of impacting politics except through participation in elections and referendums. The share of those who took part in some form of public activity or other (public rallies or demonstrations, affiliation with a political party or public organization or letters to the media) is between 1 percent and 2 percent. Therefore, the idea of democratic participation per se is gradually losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian public. Society has come to be prevailed by a strong skepticism about most forms and vehicles of democratic participation except elections. 8

Low motivation to ensure financial and social prosperity, readiness to make do, lack of culture and experience in public involvement in running the country, the habitual reliance on state tutelage, and the tendency to attribute difficulties to outside intrigues - these are the hallmarks of contemporary Russian society and the contemporary Russian citizen. This must be the root cause of failures of economic reform and the weakness of contemporary Russian democracy.

By the end of the 1990s, Russian society began increasingly to look for clear-cut guidelines in the unraveling accustomed world. Old Soviet identity was effectively lost while attempts to create a new identity on the basis of universal human values were soon discredited. Throughout the decade, universal institutions and values were losing their importance in the public eye with traditional institutions and values (history, native land and culture, outstanding personalities of the past, glorious victories, etc.) gaining ground.

In 1989, 30 percent of respondents firmly associated themselves with the concept of homo Soveticus, as compared to a mere 13 percent 10 years later. On the other hand, 43 percent of respondents said they were proud to see themselves as Russian citizens. 9 In 2000, 86 percent of respondents agreed that a Russian person has a special soulfulness that is untypical of a European with 70 percent agreeing that only a Russian person can sacrifice himself for a lofty cause and 71 percent going along with the assertion that Russia features a unique identity, spirituality and culture, superior to all other countries in the world. The proportion of those believing that Russia should follow its own unique path has grown to 60 percent. 10 The majority supports the idea of Russia's unique path, registering consistent aversion with respect to some ethnic groups (especially Caucasians). A shift in the public mood is especially pronounced in society's attitude to the first and the second war in Chechnya - yet another keynote of the 1990s. For all of its deep-rooted inferiority complexes and difficulties of transition from a totalitarian Soviet-era utopia to a democratic going it alone, Russian society in its majority nonetheless believes in the irreversibility of reform and the country's openness. For all the disappointment with democratic institutions and democratic procedure, for all the alienation from the state, Russians appreciate the great importance of basic democratic freedoms. For all the nostalgia for the social stability of mature socialism, the majority supports freedom of enterprise. Tolerance for all sorts of minorities is still high.

So, all the indications are that we should expect a reconciliation and a synthesis of the emerging national feeling and new values. The returning patriotism, the feeling of pride for one's country, its history and culture, even if sometimes in hypertrophied and even disturbing forms, can and should be seen not only as a negative but also as a positive process.

In the future Russia will only be able to exist and advance as a modern nation/state that has adopted a democratic constitutional republic model and at the same time deeply integrated into international political structures and economic relations.

As far as we are in a position to judge today, the processes that have evolved in Russian society over the past decade are to a very large extent similar to the processes of evolution of European civil nations and nation/states in the 19th-20th centuries. In this respect, Russian society can be seen not only as a post-Soviet society but also as a kind of a prototype of a multiethnic and multicultural nation the history of whose evolution as a modern democratic nation and a democratic nation/state is still far from complete.

Perhaps the main outcome of the difficult, tortuous, and conflicting 1990s is the fact that this historical perspective has been preserved.

 

Endnotes

Note *: Vladimir Ryzhkov is deputy of the Russian State Duma.Back

Note 1: Iu.M. Baturin, I.L. Ilyin, V.F. Kadatskii, V.V. Kostikov, M.A. Krasnov, A.Ia. Livshits, K.V. Nikiforov, L.G. Pikhoia, G.A. Satarov. Epokha Eltsina. Ocherki politicheskoi istorii. M., 2001, pp. 63, 67.Back

Note 2: In 1999, they accounted for 74 percent of respondents in a poll conducted by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Social and Economic Questions, or VTsIOM. See: Chelovek i vlast. Sapere Aude. // Vestnik Moskovskoi shkoly politicheskikh issledovanii, vyp. 13, M., 1999, p. 13.Back

Note 3: Chelovek i vlast, pp. 8, 28.Back

Note 4: V. Petukhov, Demokratiia v vostpriiatii rossiiskogo obshchestva. Moskovskii tsentr Karnegi, 2001, p. 2.Back

Note 5: In early 2001, 72 percent of respondents in a VTsIOM survey agreed that a Russian person cannot do without authoritarian leaders and a strong hand that should guide their actions. See: L. Gudkov, B. Dubin. Vse edino. // Itogi, 2001, #3, p. 15. Back

Note 6: Iu.A. Levada. Ot mnenii k ponimaniiu. Sotsiologicheskie ocherki 1993-2000. M., Moskovskaia schola politicheskikh issledovanii, 2000. Back

Note 7: V. Petukhov. Demokratiia v vospriiatii rossiiskogo obshchestva, p. 2.Back

Note 8: Op. cit., pp. 6-7. Back

Note 9: Iu.A. Levada. Op. cit. p. 446. Back

Note 10: L. Gudkov, B. Dubin. Op. cit., pp. 14-15. Back