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CIAO DATE: 03/02
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Revolution in Military Matters and Strategic Stability
M. Gareyev, V. Dvorkin, S. Kortunov, Iu. Krokunov, V. Kuznetsov, M. Lysenko, S. Rogov, V. Chkhikvishvili, K. Barskii
Strategic stability, which in recent years grew increasingly predictable and capable of being divined, has become, in the first year of the third millennium, the most discussed problem in the world capitals, at summits and lower-level meetings, among diplomats, generals, and academic analysts. The turmoil-maker is the new U.S. President, George Bush, Jr., who made it plain by his very first steps in office that he was ready to avail himself of the fruits of the rapidly developing revolution in military matters and work for the U.S. soloing in world affairs.
As is logical, this has caused a reaction of varying intensity in the world community. The subject was discussed at the G-8 summit in Genoa in July of this year. The Genoa dialogue between President Vladimir Putin and President George Bush seemed to impart a positive element to strategic security matters in what it concerned Russian-U.S. relations.
These problems were also discussed by the following guests of the International Affairs:
B. Piadyshev
I welcome the authoritative experts, who have assembled at the round table in the editorial offices of the International Affairs to discuss the present-day and prospective strategic stability situation.
As a category of international relations, strategic stability has been changing its outward aspect and essence. The world community has come close to the threshold of "a revolution in military matters." The vigorous technological advances - particularly in the area of electronics, sensors, satellites and telecommunications - are forming a new channel of military operations.
Serving as an encouragement are the wars against Iraq in the Gulf and against Yugoslavia. The course and results of these operations are interpreted as a confirmation of the reality of plans of stand-off wars, of a possibility of suppressing the adversary by remotely operated weapons without committing the mass of friendly troops to direct military operations and thus obviating considerable casualties.
At worst, these changes are fraught with a new global arms race as early as the start of the 21st century, with new temptations to increasingly rely on nuclear missile arsenals and the strategy of terrorism.
At best, it will be possible to hope for a possibility of drawing a distinction between combatants and non-combatants in military conflicts, this long-standing goal of all wars.
It is in our day and age that a movement has come under way - contrary to the moods in the greater part of the world community - towards transferring the world military political system to a different state. The present-day system of international and bilateral treaties, the core of which, as before, is the 1972 ABM Treaty, for better or worse ensured strategic stability in the past decades.
Is it possible and necessary to oppose the revolution in military matters? Is it possible and necessary to oppose the destruction of the existing strategic stability system?
These are difficult questions that are unlikely to have incontrovertible answers.
Incidentally, the United States in particular as well as other Western countries have been elaborating the theory of and practical approaches to the revolution in military matters on a very broad scale and in a deep-going fashion. The UN Secretary General's consultative council on disarmament problems discussed these matters as priorities at its latest sessions. On the UN Internet site, I found a large list containing dozens of book titles and magazine articles on this theme. There are no Russian writers on the list.
And so, strategic stability.
From The Point of View of Professionals, Diplomats and Military Men
V. Chkhikvishvili
I think, it would be wrong to focus on only one challenge to strategic stability, to wit, the U.S. plans of creating a global antimissile defense system, and on consequences of their implementation. There are many other challenges and threats, which already affect and may prospectively affect to an even greater degree the security of Russia and each of us. In the first place, I have in view the invigoration of international terrorism, the extraordinary upsurge in Islamic extremism. Moreover, we are witnessing these phenomena not only in, if I may say so, the traditionally explosive regions, but already in Europe too - Macedonia, Kosovo, etc. The same goes for such a problem as, for example, gene engineering. Why are these matters given so little attention? It seems to me we must consider these problems, too, on a broad plane as a challenge to strategic stability, discuss them, and look for solutions. They are of a real global nature and Russia's security will in many respects depend on how they are dealt with.
As far as the directly stated theme of our discussion is concerned, there has been much talk recently that the United States is edging closer to the creation of global antimissile defenses. As is natural, the problem of strategic stability is one of the leading themes in our dialogue with the U.S.A. since the moment the new Administration assumed office. They are constantly discussed at meetings between the Russian Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State (their July 18 meeting in Rome will be the sixth one) as well as in the course of presidential negotiations (their second meeting will be in Genoa one of these days).*
At the same time, we lack full clarity regarding the U.S. plans of antimissile defenses and strategic offensive weapons. It is clear, of course, where the Americans are steering. But there are few concrete details, whereas, as the saying goes, the devil is in the details. It is for this reason that we are actively in favor of starting, as early as possible, a substantive dialogue. We have an impression, however, that the U.S. side at this stage is not ready for that and pursues mostly a conceptual conversation on the theme of strategic stability in a bid to remove some of the anxiety felt the world over in connection with plans to pull down the ABM Treaty.
All those present here know it well, but I would like to point out again that all is not quite so smooth inside the U.S. itself as regards the Administration's wish to deploy global antimissile defenses. The Democrats in the U.S. Senate, for example, have, for different reasons, serious doubts on this score. Notice that the latest proposals regarding so-called echeloned ABM defense involving land-based, sea-based and air-based systems plus some space-based elements, which Defense Secretary Donald Ramsfeld, among others, enunciated not so long ago, have been accepted with certain skepticism even by a definite portion of U.S. military experts. To make a long story short, there is no cause for panic and for statements to the effect that everything has been decided and it is necessary to take some measures almost right now. The history of creation of anti-ballistic missile defense systems is a long one. All of us remember the Star Wars epic and discussions about ABM defense we had with the administrations of George Bush, Sr., and Bill Clinton. Therefore, the main thing now, as it seems, is to start a concrete dialogue with Washington, and to clarify for certain what the U.S. intentions with regard to ABM defense and further cuts in strategic offensive weapons are. Also, we are conscious of the fact that even if the U.S.A. starts creating an antimissile defense system, it will hardly present a threat to our nuclear potential for years and years to come. The point rather is this: a collapse of the ABM Treaty is likely to strike a blow to all disarmament agreements as it may to the non-proliferation and strategic stability regimes in general. And this is what may represent a serious challenge to security of both Russia and, incidentally, the U.S.A. (something we are telling the U.S. side).
In conclusion, I again would like to repeat my idea about it being expedient to discuss other threats to strategic stability, which are no less difficult in nature and also call for a most attentive attitude.
M. Lysenko
I would like to go on with Mr. Chkhikvishvili's idea and logic from the philosophical and factual perspective. After placing the strategic stability discussion in the focus of world attention, the Americans are laying a special stress on some fatalism. For the Americans, it is, so to speak, a positive fatalism, it is the belief that military technology helps achieve everything and assures strategic dominance for many years to come. In this country, one may observe, so to speak, a negative fatalism in the milieu of separate scientists and observers: allegedly, it is high time we agreed to a certain adaptation or revision of the ABM Treaty.
I would like to quote from a document, which says this: We emphasize that should the ABM Treaty remain in force, it will require an immediate overhaul.
Another quotation: If the ABM Treaty is preserved in its present form, it is quite likely to serve as a source of serious disputes, which are absolutely at odds with relations of cooperation developing between us now.
Sounds familiar, doesn't it? But these are excerpts from the proposals the American side gave us as early as the start of the 1990s. It was almost ten years ago. At that time, the U.S. statesmen proved wise enough not to destroy the ABM Treaty. Hopefully, there will be enough wisdom this time over too. So, my call is this: No need to give way to fatalism.
But what is needed? Above all, it is a scrupulous, firm and constructive dialogue with the American side. Currently it has begun only on the political level. We are expecting a reply from the Americans so that we might start expert discussions. We do and will have what to tell the Americans in defense of the present strategic stability structure.
We are being told that the ABM Treaty is outmoded, that allegedly it is based on an old logic, and that it is necessary to go over to new relations, which would envisage a life without this treaty and at the same time cuts in strategic offensive weapons. One may counter this by saying that whether we want it or not, the logic lying at the base of this treaty - "the sword and the shield" - is to this day the balance in the strategic relationship in the world. The Americans themselves emphasize that they will develop the defense system, but the emphasis will anyway remain on the strategic offensive weapons, if in a reduced form.
The logic remains the same, and therefore creating a defense system, which, let us say, knows no boundary, which will gradually be deployed increasingly on the global plane - it is a thing which undoubtedly should cause concern.
V. Kuznetsov
I also would like to back my colleagues from the Foreign Ministry. I would like to pay attention to the following two issues, which, of course, might be subject to a discussion.
In the first place, it is the thesis Mr. Chkhikvishvili spoke about: There are other threats to strategic stability aside from the main one, which is destroying the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty. Certainly, there are many threats of this kind, but all the same the basis of strategic stability is the document, which was signed in 1972, when a number of clever men came together and said that strategic stability would be based on mutual assured destruction. To avoid this, let us do the following - and wrote the document. In our point of view, it is a document that has lost none of its topicality. What was 30 years ago is now.
What is it that has changed during this time? What has changed is only the reasoning used by the leaders of the United States of America. Now they are saying that the Russian Federation is not an enemy. So what if we are not adversaries? We have heard that since the Clinton Administration. We were not adversaries either, we even called each other partners for some time. The process of reduction of strategic offensive weapons took place during that time.
If earlier we had a huge number of nuclear warheads, both they, and we, then now this number has been reduced to 15-16 thousand with further process of reduction in progress. There is a course for nuclear disarmament, and it is also a positive moment in the activities we are pursuing jointly with the Americans. There are prospects for signing understandings on a further reduction. There is an initiative of ours to lower these levels in each country to one and a half thousand and even lower. There is a statement by the Americans that they are ready to reduce their strategic offensive weapons. There is even the DOD's budget request for 2002, which says that the DOD is ready to cut the heavy bomber fleet by one-third and to decommission the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Certainly, all of this does exist. But in any event, there is a threat to our two states from the nuclear potential, both American and ours. Nothing has changed in this sense. Combat readiness of nuclear forces does exist, if, perhaps, at a somewhat lower level than before, but it exists all the same. The problem we have solved jointly with the Americans is the problem of non-aiming. You people are well aware that it was mostly a purely political statement. The non-aiming may be turned into aiming literally within minutes.
In any case, the threat remains to the Russian Federation from the U.S. nuclear potential and to America from the Russian nuclear potential. And the treaty that was signed has lost none of its topicality. The threat exists both to them and to us. One is unconvinced, therefore, hearing the claims that it is necessary to revise the nuclear deterrence concept based on mutual assured destruction. I think, it will exist as long as there is a big number of nuclear potentials, which make it possible to destroy each other.
Now what concerns the problem connected with vagueness of the situation as regards the antimissile defense the United States of America is going to build. The situation has changed somewhat since recently. The U.S. Defense Department held a briefing on July 10 of this year, outlining what in our view was a more or less pragmatic concept acceptable for the Americans.
The first and main thesis was the use of different weapons ensuring interception of ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight trajectories: the boost phase, the middle phase and the end phase. Unlike what was conceived by the previous Administration, the line-up of those weapons will not be limited to permanent land-based anti-ballistic missile systems alone and will include land-based, mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, and space-based components. In practical terms, the thesis is precisely about implementing the global anti-ballistic missile defense system. It is about creating antimissile defenses capable of using any missile weapons, from smaller missiles to intercontinental-range missiles, in any phases of the trajectories. As for their proposals that the system will include components that are land-based, mobile land-based, sea-based, air-based, and space-based, it is at odds with the treaty we concluded with the Americans in 1972. Perhaps you know Article 5 of this document, which bans development and testing of all mobile land-based ABM systems.
There was another thesis voiced at the briefing: a new testing complex is being created to assist in developing prospective antimissile defenses. It became clear for the first time that there would be a unified system of several new testing ranges located along the western coast, from Alaska to Vandenberg. These are Fort Grill, Shemya and Kodiak islands. It is a new testing structure, which, in accordance with the American plan, should remove the existing geographical limitations on the U.S. testing capability in the anti-ballistic missile defense area.
In keeping with the document we signed in 1972, each country can create any number of test ranges, but at that time we limited the number of ABM launchers to 15. As a result, if today the Americans start building the testing ranges and this takes place within the framework of the existing agreements, there will be no problem. Everything will depend on how many ABM launchers will be deployed in these testing ranges. Currently, as far as I know, they have just a couple of them. It means they can have 13 or 14 of these in the testing ranges within the framework of the antimissile defense agreements.
S. Rogov
Valentin Sergeyevich, let me add something. The next speeches in the Congress after the briefing were about five launchers and yet another five launchers, or 5 + 5 on top of what they already have. But this fits in with the established threshold.
V. Kuznetsov
The 1972 ABM Treaty persists as an obstacle to doing that. What do they need to do concretely? To delete from the document its Article 5, which bans deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems. The rest of the document, I think, is quite all right with the Americans at the present time.
After that, when they hold a series of tests, they will seek to clear for themselves what should be given particular attention. Will it be the sea-based component, or land-based component, or mobile land-based component? If the sea-based variant proves all right, they will develop the sea-based variant, if several variants prove all right, they will develop them. But the most important thing for them now is to remove the obstacles that exist within the framework of the 1972 agreements. With allowance made for that, I think, all negotiations we are soon to hold with the Americans within the framework of the expert groups, which our presidents have coordinated, will have as their goal forcing us to withdraw from Article 5.
Is that in our interests? From the point of view of the Defense Ministry, it is absolutely at variance with the interests of national security of Russia. The agreement written in 1972 must not be pulled down now. If it is the choice the United States of America makes, let it be its personal choice. But from the Russian Federation's point of view, the 1972 Treaty must be preserved unchanged. If we provide a pretext for making a modification in this agreement, there will be a lot of problems. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs knows what these problems are all about. In the first place, these are problems in the area of our political relations with other states. On the military-technical plane too. There will be problems on the financial plane as well.
V. Chkhikvishvili
I think, all of us can see well what problems are facing us now and prospectively. The important thing, however, is that a search for solutions be quiet and without any hullabaloo.
Of course, we know all the latest pronouncements concerning global anti-ballistic missile defenses members of the Administration made. Of course, we are aware of the direction of Washington's drift. At the same time, I want to repeat that we know far from all details of the U.S. plans: what and how they plan to deploy, what concretely they would like, for example, to change in the ABM Treaty, how far and in which way they are ready to advance on the plane of reductions in strategic offensive weapons. There are many other questions too. For comparison, the dialogue on all these problems with the Clinton Administration was more detailed. We were shown all sorts of diagrams, graphs, and maps. They showed what and where would be located, where would fly, etc.
I mean, I am coming back to my idea about the need for a substantive expert dialogue so that we might get to the bottom of the U.S. plans.
From the Point of View of the Academic Elite
S. Rogov
Dear colleagues, I would like to say this: when we are speaking about challenges to strategic stability, we perhaps ought to proceed from the fact that there are different definitions. For the last few decades since the times of the Soviet-American confrontation, we understand by strategic stability primarily relations in the sphere of strategic armaments. Although the concept of strategic stability itself is much wider. In this sense, I support the thesis expressed by Mr. Chkhikvishvili, that everything should not be reduced to this narrow understanding alone.
But further on I will be speaking precisely about the narrow understanding, because we are primarily worried by the developments in the ABM sphere.
Before going over to details, it seems to me it is necessary to state that the system of arms control agreements itself has been struck by a dire crisis. The system of treaties and agreements, which was elaborated during the Cold War years and which regrettably was modernized to a very small extent in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War, is now under pressure from all sides: both from above and from below and laterally. For this, obviously, there are certain objective reasons. It is not just that the United States today is making yet another attempt to overturn the strategic balance - this is something that was before. But there are definite reasons connected with the changes that have taken place in the world. In the first place, the world is no longer bipolar and hence the aspiration felt by certain circles in the United States to pull down the entire regime of agreements, which regulated on the basis of parity the military-strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. and currently regulates the military-strategic relationship between Russia and the U.S.A.
The main argument put forward by the Washington-based supporters of this one-sided approach is that no one is able to create today a symmetrical threat to the United States and that is why limitations on some or other arms systems are allegedly a unilateral limitation for the United States, a self-limitation for the United States. In my view, it is very important to stress this tendency. Today, one has the impression the Americans in the current Administration have no treaty that would satisfy them. Be it the ABM Treaty, be it biological weapons, or chemical weapons. One may think back to the Kyoto treaty. And, of course, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is a first factor, which today is working against the existing arms control regime.
Second. Changes that have taken place at the second level of nuclear stability. The club of official nuclear countries has been expanded, although they have not been recognized as such. I have in view India and Pakistan, which in fact have become club members. And so at this level there are practically no agreements, which regulate relations between nuclear powers. After all, START and ABM are agreements, which were bilateral Soviet-American or Russian-American ones. See how China and France support us on the ABM issue, but there are no limitations today in this sphere in these countries themselves, they have assumed no commitments. We cannot rule out an attempt on the part of the countries of this level to become equal in strategic offensive arms if not to the United States then at least to Russia. At any rate, such possibilities are not ruled out.
And, finally, a third level is an attempt by other states to get hold of mass destruction weapons. Usually there is much talk about this threat. In my view, a no less important thing, and, perhaps, an even more important one, is the negative processes unfolding at the second and the top level of this nuclear stability pyramid, which we have inherited from the Cold War.
The next moment concerns the revolution in military matters. It is a very fashionable concept in the Pentagon today. In effect, the present U.S. President has identified himself with that concept in a number of his speeches (true enough, he did not use the term "a revolution in military matters," but he expounded the main theses). As seen by the Pentagon chiefs, its essence is the ability of highly accurate, long-range new generation weapons to engage practically the entire spectrum of targets, which previously could be destroyed with the help of nuclear weapons alone. In effect, it is an attempt as it were to overturn certain conclusions, which were made when nuclear weapons made their first appearance and nuclear weapons came to be regarded as a special sphere of military activity. So, as seen by the Americans, let me stress it again, as seen by the Pentagon, the revolution in military matters is an attempt as it were to return the developments to the pre-nuclear period. And this is connected primarily with the fact that in reality the revolution in military matters is being conducted by the United States all by itself, because the United States accounts for 60 percent of all world military expenditures. This means that neither Russia, nor China, nor West European countries, nor still India are capable of spending as much money as the United States does on an attempt to create these new weapons. One special feature of the revolution in military matters is that the main grain in this concept is not so much new weapons, as assets of information warfare. Coming to the fore is the system's brain, not its fist. It is due to the shifts that have occurred in the commercial sphere, the computer and Internet revolution, which has taken place in the last 10 to 15 years and has led to very serious shifts in the economy, it is due to the use of these assets in the military sphere that the Americans count on getting the decisive advantage.
As is natural, I am stating my interpretation of what is declared. The revolution in military matters makes theoretically possible the use of military force by one nuclear state - the United States - against other nuclear states. The case in point is achieving the strategic goals of a war, attaining victory in a war against a nuclear state, bar a transition to nuclear escalation. It seems to me a very important moment. Let me remind you that in anti-ballistic missile defense it is precisely information, not nuclear, component of the combat command and control system that will represent the greatest danger in what the Bush Administration is currently starting to do. The strike components are so far, one may say, in the rudimentary form, but the information systems, the combat command and control systems are the main thing in ABM. In its turn, ABM is a component part of the United States' confrontational attempt to break away from the whole world in the military sphere in a post-nuclear arms race.
What are Russia's interests in the obtaining situation? Clearly, a pull-down of the system of arms control agreements and treaties, which has ensured strategic stability up to the present time, is not in our interests. It seems to me at the same time that we will commit a mistake if we attempt to focus all our efforts on preserving the status quo, because the case in point is not only the plans of the present U.S. Administration or the previous U.S. Administration. The case in point is a fundamental change in the geopolitical structure of the world, as well as changes occurring in the economic sphere. As is natural, these are reflected in the military sphere as well. As is natural, they will be reflected in the arms control sphere too.
Therefore, while retaining what is the main thing in the present arms control system that has been inherited from the Cold War, it is necessary, as I see it, to put before ourselves in capacity of the main goal a different objective - how to direct the developments along a vector that will correspond to both the interests of Russia and the interests of international security to the maximum degree. From this point of view, the sole objective is to preserve, strengthen and modernize the regime of bilateral cooperation between Russia and the U.S.A. (and we may discuss by which concrete means it is to be done and what the concrete details of this regime should be), while at the same time giving a serious thought to the need of creating a new multilateral regime. Clearly, 15, 20, 30 years from now, an arms control regime that does not involve China, India, and other new, young power centers cannot be stable. There is a plethora of theoretical and practical problems cropping up here. As is clear, the parity principle is unacceptable in a multilateral regime. Yet when the issue of quotas arises - the example of Kyoto, a different sphere as it were, ecological security - but how to divide the quotas, who is entitled to how much, in accordance with which objective criterion: population, territory, borders, size of the GDP? Where is the criterion by which to divide arms quotas fairly?
Should we put before ourselves the task of developing an eternal peace or an eternal arms control treaty, or must orient ourselves to a foreseeable period 10 to 15 years long and ponder how to use arms control mechanisms in order to defend Russia's interests? I think, it is a more realistic objective than an attempt to sign some eternal agreement once and for all. Certainly, a world without wars and violence, as was said in the past, is our ideal, but this ideal failed to materialize in the 20th century, nor will it materialize in the 21st century.
Gareyev
I agree with Mr. Pyadyshev that the revolution in military matters should be considered within the general system of major political changes taking place in the world. The changes are quite on a grand scale and we not always have time to estimate their impact for what it is worth. Take the problem of globalization of political and economic life, let alone information processes, etc. On the one hand, particularly in theory, the importance of globalism is stressed, but when it comes to practical life, we tend to look at things in the old way, failing to take into account the changes that have occurred. In the epoch of globalism, all processes, no matter where they take place - in the East, West, or South - are closely interconnected and closely affect other regions, sometimes sensitively.
When we speak about a revolution in military matters, the greatest change that is in progress is the change in the character of threats. After Yugoslavia, people in most countries, such as Indonesia, where I was, say that it is necessary to acquire nuclear weapons. Lacking nuclear weapons, it is impossible to defend independence. Russia is no longer a protector as it was before. One cannot defend oneself without nuclear weapons. The importance of nuclear weapons for Russia has grown sharply; today, it is one of the most important guarantees. Some people would say: As long as there are nuclear weapons, Russia's security is guaranteed. Each time I reply to them calmly: the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons are still there, but the Soviet Union is no more. It ought to be kept in mind that nuclear weapons are not universal weapons and that there are threats where nuclear weapons are of no use - in Chechnya, Tajikistan, or other regions. Therefore, this wider circle of threats requires a wider circle of responses, most different ones.
What arises in this connection is so-called indirect action strategy. Earlier we used to reduce it to the military aspect alone, whereas a strategy should be considered on a broader plane. Intertwined in the indirect action strategy as nowhere else are political, economic, information, and military assets. They are so interconnected and influence each other so greatly that it is no longer possible to single out a purely military strategy. The case in point is to deal with defense security goals and conflict prevention goals by attempting to use to the maximum degree the military, economic, information and other expedients. All this is seemingly common knowledge, but if we take our Russia, we have the Soviet Union's experience and we know by which way of internal blunders and external influence it has turned out that we no longer have the Soviet Union. What lessons have been drawn? We speak a lot on this theme, but we are short of well-conceived measures on the national scale for preventing conflicts and providing for defense security through political, non-military means. Even the Law on Defense contains no requirement that an economic basis for defense be created. But if a mission is not assigned, it will not be pursued. Today, it is necessary to draw up methods, on the scientific plane and by way of practical development, of influencing defense by non-military means.
But speaking about what is new in the military matters as a whole - the indirect action strategy - we see how it all is carried out. Military operations do not follow immediately: an embargo, an economic blockade and other measures, subversive special operations, information operations. One must learn how to reply to these questions. It is the most important element in providing for this country's security.
The emergence of highly accurate and non-nuclear weapons makes it possible to deal effectively with a number of matters and tasks related to neutralization of the adversary. These are long-range weapons that enable so-called standoff operations and defeat of the adversary. The nature of combat operations will change, and it is primarily these long-range weapons rather than the direct clash that will decide everything.
I would like to draw your attention to yet another aspect. The standoff defeat, say, of Yugoslavia. The U.S. army and its NATO allies do not fight the adversary. They deliver strikes against power stations, bridges, hospitals, and other civilian facilities. By delivering fire for effect against civilian facilities, they put the victim of an aggression before the inevitability of a capitulation. And that is called the strategy for the 21st century as the most technological, advanced one, etc. The result is this: during World War I, civilian casualties made up 5 percent of the overall death toll, in Vietnam already 95 percent, and now in Yugoslavia almost 100 percent. There are almost no military losses.
All this strategy is state-sponsored terrorism. It is state-sponsored terrorism via strikes at civilian facilities, something that makes some or other country capitulate. In what way is this strategy different from what Bin Laden or Basayev do? They also seize hospitals, take hostages, and dictate some or other conditions to a state or a government. For this reason, it is necessary to draw the corresponding conclusion from the point of view of international law, from the moral point of view. This must be given a corresponding evaluation.
S. Rogov
I would like to reply to the remarks by the esteemed President of the Academy of Military Sciences. The role of nuclear weapons in providing for Russia's security must not be turned into an absolute. More than that, if we make this conclusion, we will be unable to provide for our security. As regards military conflicts and wars, in which this country was involved in the last decades - Afghanistan or Chechnya - certainly, nuclear weapons did not play any serious role in that kind of armed confrontation. But in the present-day situation, where Russia is in an unsatisfactory state in a number of essential indicators determining a nation's might, primarily economic, not military, where the state of our conventional armed forces is unsatisfactory either, reliable nuclear deterrence enables us to implement the necessary economic, political, and military reforms within a sufficiently limited timeframe so as to lead this country out of its crisis and to become a really great power in a number, not one, key power parameters.
From this point of view, the next 10 to 15 years is a period of key importance. If we manage to use the period with maximum efficiency, we will be able to rely on a number of factors, not just one whale. If we fail, we will not preserve a reliable nuclear deterrent either. This circumstance must be taken into account when we think both about the ABM Treaty and other agreements related to arms control, which may yet be signed in the near future.
V. Dvorkin
In the first place, lacking a clear-cut definition of the concept of strategic stability, one may speak such patently correct things about everything under the sun. It is not strategic stability that determines the state of the economy, the demographic situation, drugs, or terrorism. If we interpret strategic stability in this manner, it will probably be a rather superficial conversation and one is unlikely to make concrete recommendations here.
For this reason, I would like to speak about strategic stability the way it was defined sufficiently long ago. The essence of strategic stability is in a stable equilibrium, in a stable balance of strategic forces, primarily the strategic nuclear forces. It is also common knowledge for long what the destabilizing factors leading to a disruption of this balance are all about. These are both antimissile defenses and concrete types of weapons. For example, it is a fact that fixed multiple rocket launchers are a relatively destabilizing factor, although in definite situations they play a stabilizing role. That the naval components both in this country and the U.S.A. play a stabilizing role is also obvious as is the role of any element of a weapon type and its characteristics. For this reason, I would like to speak about problems of strategic stability understood as nuclear equilibrium.
I wanted to reply to Mr. Gareyev in the sense that when he says that nuclear weapons are not absolute from the point of view of guaranteeing security, I agree. But when he says that nuclear weapons helped us neither in Afghanistan nor in Chechnya, I would like to say this. One should not understand the role of nuclear weapons in the sense that they will be able to deter, say, the war in Chechnya. It is the indirect influence of nuclear weapons, because had we had no nuclear weapons, we would have been treated, in principle and theoretically, the way Yugoslavia was. Here is for you the influence and role of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts and even in internal conflicts. One possibly will do well not to disown nuclear weapons here.
One more thing I would like to point out, Mr. Gareyev, what you said about the doctrine. Is it necessary - I am asking both you and myself - to insist that the doctrine advance the economy? I think, the mission of the doctrine is to construct the defense policy from the point of view of the use of force in conformity with the economic conditions, both obtaining and forecasted. Should we in addition put before the doctrine the mission of advancing the economy, we may drown it in this matter completely, failing to define the nature of military operations, which one has to and should be oriented to, given the existing and forecasted state of the economy.
As for the role of highly accurate weapons, which Mr. Rogov referred to… You see, unlike him, I do not think that the Americans are seeking to substitute development of highly accurate weapons for the role of nuclear weapons, if I got him right. These types of arms cannot be compared. No amount of highly accurate weapons is capable of destroying a city as one middle megaton class charge is. True enough, one may put it differently: highly accurate weapons will hit a nuclear power station or a chemical factory. But this nuclear power station and this chemical factory may as successfully be hit by conventional, non-accurate weapons. Because it is not difficult at all to blast a nuclear power station or a chemical plant without using highly accurate weapons.
Now what concerns our painful problems regarding ABM and START. Despite discrepancies and even contradictions in statements by the current U.S. leaders, one may draw the conclusion that since the money is, in effect, if not allocated, then certainly planned, the process of development and testing involving subsequent deployment of ABM is becoming irreversible. Any steps on our part may influence to a definite degree only the timeframe and the tactics of legal formalization of this process. Vagueness of the architecture of the strategic ABM exists only in the sequence of echelons they will deploy: the middle, interception in the ascending phase of the trajectory or in the final phase of the trajectory. There are no great riddles here, because we know the technological state of the weapons and their testing stages. There is, for example, a practically tested system, which has much strategic potential. For that potential to be used, it is necessary just to hold tests with operational-tactical and strategic missiles as targets. No problem. It is the first thing.
Second. That the strategic land-based ABM with interceptor missiles is not at the best of stages is common knowledge. I think, the latest test was made especially for Genoa and especially in order to support the line for allocations. I know well the main firm, I know there are many people there, who have close links with the world of politics. That they can simplify the terms of a test to the utmost and make the test successful - I am practically certain of that. They do just that.
The system for intercepting missiles in active phases of the trajectory is in the initial state. There are many problems here, information ones in the first place. These are more likely naval weapons, air weapons.
I think, the Americans will speak about a space-based ABM at the very last stages, about the completion of development and the holding of life-size tests with Brilliant Pebbles interceptors. It will be too much all at once and hard economically even for them. But what they will be obliged to do is to create information systems, primarily low-altitude and high-orbit. This is what is outside of the ABM Treaty.
In order not to destroy the entire system of strategic stability in the military security sphere, it is necessary not just to conduct a dialogue. What is a dialogue? One may repeat time and again: no amendments, no changes in the ABM Treaty - this is also a dialogue. But there may be a different kind of dialogue too. There might be a dialogue, which possibly consists in the coordination of minimum amendments to this treaty. Some amendments, as far as I understand, may be discussed, for example, in regard to matters related to the location of testing ranges. A testing range in Alaska - it is what they are going to do and what they are planning allocations for. Do we have to be firm here as well and dig our heels in? A constructive dialogue, I believe, is needed primarily in order to put within a definite framework in a new format reductions in strategic offensive armaments, because for Russia the strategic nuclear balance is a status factor underpinning our special position in the world. The dialogue, therefore, must be constructive and leading to the preservation of the balance.
Reasonable Balance Between Foreign Policy Objectives and Means of Reaching Them
S. Kortunov
Dear colleagues, I would like to make a few comments. First, strategic stability, as I see it, is a phenomenon of the bipolar world, which is a thing of the past. It is common knowledge that such categories as crisis stability were first developed by the well-known assemblage of American scholars back in the late 50s which then passed into operational plans of the US Department of Defense thanks, in particular, to the efforts of Robert S. McNamara and other well-known 20th-century military figures. It has been quite rightly noted here that under conditions of what is now a multi-polar world, or to be more accurate, a "postbipolar" world, it is clear that, applied to this new emerging world, the strategic stability category and the entire apparatus that used to accompany it do not work. Vladimir Iraklievich (Chkhikvishvili), Sergei Mikhailovich (Rogov) and Mikhail Nikolaevich (Lysenko) are quite right in saying that the notion of strategic stability has now much broader implications that include the newest and new challenges that should be reckoned with. Therefore, under these conditions, for instance, the claim that the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability rings to my ears as an incantation that to all intents and purposes does not reflect the actual state of affairs.
The next thesis that flows from the first one consists in the following. The ABM Treaty is certainly a constituent part of strategic relations between the USSR and the USA that took shape in the Cold War years. Furthermore, this was a kind of tool to control the nuclear arms race during the period of confrontation between the two nuclear powers. What is after all the meaning of the ABM Treaty stripped of all manner of emotive and rhetorical considerations? The ABM Treaty restricted the ABM system to purely symbolic numbers and left either side exposed to a retaliatory strike by the other side. This is precisely the crux of it: security under the ABM Treaty rests precisely on assurance of destroying the potential adversary, the objective consisted as it were in destroying rather than in avoiding one's own destruction.
This was the tough logic of Cold War and confrontation. We can hardly believe that the nuclear world will last forever and even less that it accords with the new character of the world that is in the making and not least with the new character of the emerging - let's hope for it - Russian-American partnership. It was in fact the ABM Treaty that legitimized the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence through mutual assured destruction. Therefore we should perhaps discuss now in the broad context of Russian-American relations and the emerging world, instead of the ABM Treaty, the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence and ways out of this situation which, I stress, cannot last forever in the 21st century. And in this sense the ABM Treaty, as a symbol of a confrontation model, has become obsolete. Unfortunately, mutual nuclear deterrence remains to be a phenomenon of Russian-American relations despite all the announcements about not targeting each other, being friends rather than enemies, and so on . In practice the situation continues and it will continue even after putting into effect the START I, START II and even START III treaties.
There is a fundamental contradiction in the Russian-American relations: a contradiction between the avowed political partnership and the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence that does not mesh with partnership. Therefore, passing over to real partnership would, strictly speaking, mean for both countries moving beyond deterrence. Our attempts to preserve the ABM Treaty at all costs in this sense signal that we have not reached yet a new level of confidence that would measure up to partnership between Russia and the United States.
It is clear that the United States' objective is different. This is simply a claim to world leadership in the 21st century. It has made a political decision to depreciate nuclear potential of other countries including Russia first and foremost, perhaps. This shows that the United States confirms its intention to create in the 21st century one political pole of force.
From my point of view, it is time to go over from discussing strategic stability to discussing the moving beyond mutual nuclear deterrent, which would precisely correspond with the avowed partnership character of Russian-American relations. We should in this connection to soberly take stock of our resources. I would like at this point to cite an extremely important provision from the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept: "Successful foreign policy of the Russian Federation should be based on the observance of a reasonable balance between its objectives and resources for reaching them. The concentration of politico-diplomatic, military, economic, financial and other means on solving foreign-policy tasks should be commensurate with their actual importance for Russia's national interests, and the scale of participation in international affairs should be equal to the de facto contribution to strengthening the country's positions."
V. Chkhikvishvili
Sergei Vadimovich (Kortunov), apropos the United State's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. When do you think this can happen?
S. Kortunov
You cannot set a definite time limit on this process. Many think it has already happened de facto.
V. Kuznetsov
No. If we speak about what has happened in Norway, this is a totally different story. It has nothing to do with violating the ABM Treaty and the letter of the ABM Treaty.
Iu. Krokunov
I stick to a position, dear colleagues, that strategic stability has more to do with strategic armaments and has a military orientation. In broad terms, it certainly touches upon many aspects: ecology, medicine, HIV infection, terrorism, drugs, etc.
Turning to strategic stability in a narrow sense, I would like to cite some facts. They have to do with appraisals of threats to national interests of international security and strategic stability made by Americans themselves. The Defense Intelligence Agency chief says: It is a terrorist act rather than a missile strike that constitutes the most likely form of possible attack on the United States and its citizens in the future. CIS Director George Tenet notes that an enemy nuclear, chemical or biological attack on America can be carried out by other means than missiles. For instance, terrorists can smuggle a bomb on board ship or truck.
Speaking about ballistic missile defense, we should note that it is designed first of all to hit warheads, that is to say, warhead-carrying reentry vehicles. There is a very big problem there: during the operation of a ballistic missile defense system, especially if it is sea-based, or when a missile is in the early stage of its trajectory, hitting it may result in fragments of the warhead falling down on a territory that was not targeted originally. Thus, creating a ballistic missile defense system the side can endanger security of territories of other countries. Can this ballistic missile defense system amount to an "impregnable umbrella?" Many specialists both here and in other countries think it cannot.
For sure, this can be confirmed. However reliable is the resulting system, there are certain technical and even financial limits. Let's suppose that maximum reliability has been achieved in test-range conditions. Conditions of actual warfare are much worse. We have the example of the Caribbean crisis where the United States had a tremendous advantage both in terms of megatons and the number of warheads, but still the United States could not bring itself to employ nuclear weapons. That brought the realization that it did not make sense during the Cold War period to accumulate very big arsenals of nuclear weapons, the realization of uselessness of their employment for overkill. Thus, the only remaining road to achieve strategic stability and prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles is cutting them on a contractual basis.
It seems to me that we advocate parity - we should have the same numbers as they have. This is, perhaps, not quite right. We should use a different principle here: What number is required to guarantee nuclear deterrence? Officially we know that it is now being proposed to bring down the number of warheads to 1,500, and this is not the limit, we can go even lower.
Now let us talk about ballistic missile defense and its effect on the entire system of agreements. It seems to me that since there is a deterrence system based on an agreement, it took many decades to form and, as we have said officially, this is the cornerstone, then both nuclear weapons and this treaty have a political complexion or aspect. What can we link this to? For example, nuclear weapons have never been used after Hiroshima. That is to say, these are not battlefield weapons, weapons for achieving objectives in military operations. As a political tool to achieve deterrence, nuclear weapons will be performing this role for a long time to come. I cannot guess at the future too far ahead, but there will be no alternative to it in the 21st century.
I would like to consider the dangers and new challenges that can bring about the deployment of a new NMD. Many experts, especially in the West, think that Russia's position with regard to NMD is attributed to the fact that the potentialities of the system would have a negative impact on the Russian nuclear potential. This is not so, it seems to me. The main threat to Russia and the world community is that the creation of NMD would compel the so-called "rogue states" and terrorists look for some other more ingenuous ways to carry out their designs. The means for bypassing this missile defense system will be more efficient and cost less than the development and building up the potentials of the NMD system itself.
Furthermore, the only place where there are still no combat weapons is the outer space. The building of NMD may and would for sure lead to a situation where space becomes an arms race arena. To prevent weapons from getting into space is one of the lines of action for the international community.
The objective of the Americans was different in connection with the creation of NMD and cutting further nuclear potential. There was a presidential campaign and certain promises were made, and money was earmarked. Now it's time to pay debts, as they say. The Americans will not pull out of the ABM Treaty any time soon because there are no objective conditions for that. All talk about deploying new systems and claims that they will not affect the Russian nuclear potential and strategic stability and that they will mark a new step in harmonizing the strategic and offensive weapons issue and protecting international security and stability in the 21st century looks more like bluffing.
Why? President Bush said clearly that all these things were needed to assure the United States' domination in all spheres, including the military sphere, in the 21st century. This is the agenda they have set. There is a need for a spurt and taking the technological lead. This is to cite him again. Taking the technological lead is possible only by dumping a certain sum of money if it is available in excess. This is a situation we can now observe. Who can process, who can digest this money? Most certainly, this is the military-industrial complex and especially that part of it which keeled over once the Star Wars adventure was over. If this is true, then most certainly taking the technological lead and all activities of the Americans including the hasty tests in advance of the Genoa meeting were aimed - how shall I put it - at winning the world community's positive appraisal of these American initiatives. Whether NMD will be built or the Americans will abandon the treaty, I don't know. I think there are big doubts there.
S. Rogov
Let's then see what is the most dangerous in Bush administration policy. The administration has been in power six months now. It has begun to allocate money for additional missile defense and we are hearing now very vague and multitier statements. No concrete statements. Where's the problem? Now the Americans, at least the part of the Bush administration represented first of all by the Pentagon, are feverishly looking for ways to dismantle the ABM Treaty and everything else to be involved here, to find any reason, any pretext.
This is as obvious as the fact that if they should spend now $20 billion instead of $8 billion (a year) on testing, they would be able to deploy something serious, but not too soon. The objective is to provoke us as soon as possible into dismantling this (treaty) regime. This raises the question, how should we react to such tactics. I wish them come and say: "Let's hold talks on these questions." They say nothing trying in fact to create such a situation.
V. Kuznetsov
Sergei Mikhailovich (Rogov), I say it once again that coming to the negotiating table one should have a clear understanding of the subject. They are building their national or missile defense system for the sole purpose - to depreciate the nuclear-missile potential of Russia and China. We should not look in absolutely different spheres for altering the 1972 ABM Treaty or think up something unfounded. There is no need for words "rogue countries," Korea, Iraq. I did see how they work with Iraq. As soon as the missile program of any problem state or a "rogue state" begins to really get moving, they would not permit it. This missile program or a program of weapons of mass destruction have no chance to continue. They would bomb it out. This is where the problem lies. So we should think of how to protect ourselves, how to see to it that strategic stability is not undermined, not least by the US activities with regard to building its NMD.
B. Piadyshev
We should expect that the discussions between the presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush at the G-8 meeting in Genoa 22 July will play their role both in creating a new atmosphere between the leaders of the two great powers and in the so desirable clearing the intentions of the parties, first of all the United States, in matters of strategic stability. The situation has been changing after the deliberate coolness of the new US administration. Bush was hugging the Russian as if they were old friends: He is someone I can have an honest dialogue with… I'm optimist in that we can achieve something with him.
Well, this is nice to hear. European leaders, too, have taken this change of mind well. US allies in Europe are in no way convinced there is much need for building a powerful shield against nuclear threat from the rogue states; they doubt it is possible to create appropriate sophisticated technology in a hurry, as the Americans hope.
European leaders say the Genoa impetus is in for a difficult future. In principle, the two presidents agreed in a brief statement that the problems of missile defense and reduction of strategic arms would be interrelated and thus is to be discussed as a package. But later statements from the Americans call for reflection.
The Americans began to speak about three variants of their actions.
First: Moscow and Washington should agree to jointly withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty. Otherwise, the United States would try to replace this treaty with a strategic declaration with regard to potentialities of ballistic missile defense. People surrounding Bush explain that this document will not serve as a substantive arms control treaty. Finally, if Russia, the same people go on to say, should not agree with both joint withdrawal from the Treaty and the declaration, the administration would be forced to announce unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty. In a word, serious discussions are only beginning.
K. Barskii
It is interesting to take a look at how these problems are being perceived in Asia. On the whole there prevails a negative attitude toward Washington's intention. However, there are important nuances connected with the policy of states in the region in the nuclear missile field, and the nature of their relations with the United States and each other.
One of the bitterest critics of the American designs is China. And it has rather weighty reasons to be. China vigorously opposes monopolization of international relations. The establishment of US world hegemony in the military field does not accord with national interests of the PRC. It is easy to see that the shared views of Russia and China on pivotal problems of strategic stability flows from the coinciding national interests of both countries, something that was confirmed in a joint statement by President of Russia Vladimir Putin and PRC President Jiang Zemin in Moscow 16 July 2001.
True enough, there is also one more aspect. Even without knowing the details of the US program and assuming that the US NMD is being designed not as a shield against Chinese missiles, it is clear that creating in the United States a domestic "missile shield" is going to affect precisely China. Being a nuclear power with a limited number of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, China, of course, is least of all interested in eroding and even less in dismantling the ABM Treaty, which would lead to a depreciation of the PRC's nuclear missile potential. The cooling of US-China relations after the administration of George W. Bush came to power makes the NMD subject even more sensitive.
Japan finds itself between a rock and a hard place as it were - between its fundamental line in matters of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament and its alliance with the United States. In the joint statement on cooperation between Russia and Japan in international affairs (September 2000), the Japanese side spoke in no uncertain terms for preserving and bolstering the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. At the same time, the Japanese leaders "show understanding with regard to Washington's studying a missile defense program," but they at the same time stress that the implementation of the US plans should not harm international security and strategic stability.
In a similar position is another US ally - South Korea. Seoul refrains from comments with regard to Washington's strategic plans, it, however, declares support for a position in favor of preserving the ABM Treaty. It is noticeable that the South Koreans cannot but forecast a negative impact of realization of the NMD plans on the state of dialogue between two Koreas the lack of progress in which is of growing concern to Seoul.
North Korea appraises Washington's designs in strictly negative terms. The White House openly says that it sees NMD primarily as a protection against a possible missile strike from the so-called "rogue states" in whose number Washington includes also the DPRK. It is not surprising therefore that North Korea, which is consistently speaking for preserving the ABM Treaty, rejects Washington's strategic plans openly aimed against Pyongyang. Frankly speaking, all this does not add to hopes for greater confidence on the Korean peninsula. South Asia has a special view of the existing arms and nonproliferation control regimes. India nonetheless in all likelihood has no illusions about possible repercussions of dismantling the existing system of global strategic balance in terms of building a multipolar world. Delhi calls upon Washington to hold consultations on questions of strategic stability with all interested sides including Russia and the PRC. The Pakistanis also advocate preservation and observance of the ABM Treaty. Let us, however, imagine an Asian state setting as its goal the finding of its own answer to American technological innovations. We cannot expect anything but a chain reaction of mutual mistrust and escalation of the arms race.
The Asian angle provides a good view of the fact that the US antidote to new challenges and threats in the nuclear missile area raises more questions than it gives answers. Therefore, the first thing that should be done is to, jointly with the Americans, make sure whether these challenges and threats really exist and if they do exist, to appraise their scope and nature.
M. Lysenko
There is a sphere of permitted ABM activities under the 1977 understandings. This is a sphere where further work is welcome. We can dispute and update things, agree to some forms of cooperation, and this is incidentally what we suggested in the proposals regarding a European ballistic missile defense.
B. Piadyshev
I suggest we round off at this point. I think the discussion, which was extremely interesting, is useful not only for our readers, but also for the roundtable discussion participants themselves. Representatives of the various departments and research centers have voiced their opinions and this is good for getting an overall understanding of the situation.