CIAO DATE: 03/02

International Affairs

International Affairs:
A Russian Journal

No. 5, 2001

 

New Documents about Winston Churchill during the WWII

Continuing the process of opening up its archives to researchers, the RF Foreign Ministry recently declassified a considerable amount of documents relating to the World War II period. Following is a selection prepared for readers of the International Affairs journal, comprised of telegrams bearing on achievement of mutual understanding in the political and military sphere, subsequently ensuring effective interaction between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, which became the core of the military union of powers great and small that defeated Nazism.

Combined with materials and studies earlier published, these documents help get a better and clearer understanding about the complexity of that process. Obviously, the situation as it evolved after June 22, 1941, was objectively prompting Great Britain and the Soviet Union toward most close coordination and mutual assistance, but in reality the establishment of such relations was a tortuous, halting, and painstaking process. Much credit for the fact that coalition interests eventually prevailed in allied action belongs to people in decision-making positions in their respective countries during the war years. Telegrams that have now been declassified show how difficult that was for them at times, and therefore, all the greater the importance of their efforts.

Most of the materials published below are telegraph messages that were sent by I.M. Maiskii, the Soviet ambassador in Great Britain, to Moscow, and respectively, instructions and directives that he received from V.M. Molotov, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Deputies of the USSR and minister of foreign affairs of the USSR; and J.V. Stalin, the Soviet head of government.

The documents are reproduced in accordance with rules and regulations in force for archival publications of the RF Foreign Ministry, without abridgment or corrections except for spelling corrections, and with brief comments and references, where possible, to other documentary sources

Publication was prepared by Ambassador Anatolii Filev, consultant of the Historical-Documentary Department of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

From I.M. Maiskii to the USSR Peole's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs (NKID)

June 26, 1941
Urgent and most secret

  1. Now, four days after the Nazi attack against the USSR, there is cause to say with satisfaction that we have won the first round in ensuring political support for the war effort, insofar as Great Britain is concerned. Hitler's calculation, which was implicit in, among other things, his proclamation, was perfectly clear: funneling the entire firepower of his army and aviation to strike eastward, once again assuming the role of "savior of civilization from Bolshevik barbarity," thus appealing to the mood of the most conservative circles of the British bourgeoisie, dividing the "national front" here, and achieving peace in the West, or at least considerably weakening Britain's military activity and U.S. assistance to Britain. The purpose behind Hess's "visit" now becomes absolutely clear: It was to lay the ground for a British-German deal shortly before or at the beginning of the Nazi attack against the Soviet Union. Hitler's calculation at this stage has completely misfired. Britain did not allow itself to be deceived and agreed neither to a peace deal nor scaled down its military activity. Quite the contrary, through Churchill, it declared, more firmly than ever, its intention to continue the war until Nazi Germany was routed. Moreover, Britain enlisted the support not only of its empire but also of the United States.
  2. This turn of events is hardly surprising. Recently (in early May), I already set out in detail the circumstances that predetermine the militant stand adopted by the British bourgeoisie (a relatively strong social base and recognition that a "Nazi world order," which is the solely possible scenario at present, means the fall of the British empire within five year at the most). The Soviet Union's entry into the war against Germany had two extremely important consequences for Britain. First of all, it further strengthened the "unified front" (and therefore, the social base, for the time being) as now even the Communists have dropped their opposition to the war. Second, the British government for the first time saw a real prospect for defeating Germany. Both these factors were supposed to strengthen, and actually did strengthen, the country's will (from top to bottom) to continue the war effort.
  3. Against this backdrop, a key role was once again played by Churchill's personality. His fable about an "optimistic frog" 1 (I reported on that earlier) fully justified itself, and without losing a minute, he threw his entire authority and eloquence behind the war. Churchill's move produced a big effect both in Britain itself and in the United States. During these four days, I have heard many people say that had the prime minister not taken such a firm line on the very first day of the Soviet-Nazi war, dawdling for two or three days, taking an wait-and-see position, anti-Soviet elements would have had an opportunity to bring considerable confusion and discord into the public mood in the country. [Vainant] 2 also told me that Churchill's statement had played a key role prompting the United States to take a stand so quickly. In addition to the prime minister, considerable behind-the-scenes efforts along the same lines were also deployed by Eden and Beaverbrook. 3 In particular, Eden told me that after our talk in the morning of the 22nd, he had a conversation with Churchill, the latter taking my comments into account, making the position of the British government on continuation of the war until the full victory over Hitler even more uncompromising than it originally was. So, at this critical moment, the "troika of friends of Russia" in the cabinet that Beaverbrook recently told me about adopted a firm position, favorable for us. Labour ministers were "silent," even (at least some of them) engaging in sabotage.
  4. Nonetheless, the British government not only immediately took a definitive position but also demonstrated in practice its readiness to look for ways of effective cooperation with us. My general impression from the preparations under way for a military and economic mission to Moscow is that the British now indeed mean business. Their mood and behavior is not at all what it was when they sent a military mission in 1939. This is not to say of course that everything will be rosy in Soviet-British attempts to establish military and economic cooperation, but in any event the British government at present is really committed to cooperation. Next, it is very important that the British government is setting itself the task (and working towards it) of supporting our operations in the east by mounting an air offensive in the west. At this stage I am in no position to say whether it is doing all it can to this end. Time will tell. At any rate, a correct line has been taken in this respect, too. It would be very important if you, for your part, could indicate what steps in the west would be desirable in order to divert Nazi (especially air) forces from the east. The atmosphere here at present is conducive to this.
  5. On the whole, summing up the developments in the past four days, I have to admit that the events have exceeded my expectations somewhat. As you know from my preceding communications, I regarded the British will to war as fairly strong and did not anticipate an Anglo-German deal in the foreseeable future. I, therefore, admitted that in the event of a Nazi attack against the Soviet Union, Britain would adopt a position favorable for us. Even so, the expeditiousness and decisiveness with which that position was taken came as a pleasant surprise to me. While noting with satisfaction that the first round in Britain has been won, I am far from thinking that all difficulties in the way of Soviet-British cooperation have been eliminated or that its success is now a foregone conclusion. I will report on the negative aspects of the present situation in a separate message.

MAISKII
AVP RF, folio 059, list 1, file 352, d. 2402, pp. 316-320.

From I.M. Maiskii To J.V. Stalin

August 7, 1942
Most secret and urgent

As I am not going to be in Moscow in the course of Churchill's visit, I, therefore, take the liberty to make a few considerations in connection with this visit in writing:

  1. The purpose of Churchill's trip 4 As far as I know the situation in the country, and Churchill personally, in going to the Soviet Union, the prime minister has three main objectives in mind:
    1. Internal political, which is, above all, to consolidate the government's position; pacify the masses, which are increasingly demanding the opening of a second front in 1942; and play for time to maneuver in the country, and in parliament, in the face of this demand. As a matter of fact, the public mood in Great Britain at present is such that Churchill's visit can only enhance the prime minister's standing. At the same time this visit, coming at the time that it does, naturally will compel everyone to reason as follows: "The question about a second front will be decided in Moscow, so we should wait until Stalin and Churchill come to agreement." This mood cannot but weaken pressure on the government over a second front at the grassroots level. Finally, since Churchill's trip to Moscow will, in all, probably take about a month while the public will take another month or so to digest the results of the visit, with the help of the Information Ministry, the British government will for a considerable period emerge from under public pressure over the issue of urgent military assistance for the Soviet Union.

      All of this is expedient while Churchill never passes up what can be expedient in impacting on parliament and the masses. It is indicative in this context that a regular session of the House of Commons on August 4 for several minutes was held in camera. During that time Attlee 5 told MPs that the prime minister was on his way to Moscow. That report produced the effect of oil poured on troubled waters. Prior to that many MPs had been pressing for the parliamentary recess, beginning next week, to be cut from two months to one, insisting that the issue of a second front be discussed before the recess and that the prime minister make a speech in parliament about the current military situation. There was considerable agitation in parliament last week, especially in the wake of my statement, and the British government was expecting big trouble before parliament went into recess. There was even doubt that the house would recess at all. The brief statement about Churchill's upcoming meeting with Comrade Stalin changed that mood as if by magic, and [Cripps], 6 already without any opposition, was able to announce in parliament that the House was taking a one-month recess. Neither will there be debate on a second front before recess. The clouds that had apparently gathered over the government, disappeared, at least for the time being.
    2. It would, however, be wrong to think that Churchill's visit to Moscow was brought about only by internal policy considerations. Churchill is a figure big and intelligent enough to understand the entire seriousness of the present-day military situation for allies as a whole as well as the need for forging a unified, single strategy for all allies. My impression from conversations with the prime minister in recent weeks is that he is, basically, quite prepared to work on plans for a unified strategy, and that without such a strategy he believes it is all but impossible to defeat the enemy. Churchill's approach toward this problem is of course essentially British: He wants to serve as a link between the United States and the Soviet Union in this respect. Churchill has close contacts with Roosevelt on all matters - in particular, military-strategic matters. In parting, Churchill told me that he would like to present in person to Comrade Stalin the plans that the British and Americans had worked out at their latest conference in London (in late July). Now Churchill has set himself the task of establishing a close personal contact with Comrade Stalin, somehow dovetailing Anglo-American strategic plans with Soviet plans. This, I believe, is the second objective that the prime minister pursues in the course of his trip to Moscow.
    3. His third objective is to secure for Britain, within the framework of a single allied strategy, not particularly onerous obligations - in particular, try to convince Comrade Stalin that a second front in Europe in 1942 is impossible and undesirable. My general impression from the numerous conversations with Churchill on the issue of a second front is that he does not really believe in its success. Why? Mainly because he does not believe in the effectiveness of the British army in confrontation with the Nazi army. I recall him telling me last year: [retranslated] I know that our army is a bad army, an amateur army, lacking experience, training, traditions, and leadership. Indeed, where could it possibly have acquired all of that? Now, in five to six years, it will become a good army. This comment shows very well that Churchill sees the war as a protracted, long drawn-out struggle. And this is in fact the case. Churchill has had to live through Singapore and Libya since our conversation last year. That only further strengthened his opinion about the imperfection of the British army. In addition, there is one purely personal aspect that needs to be taken into account. In the previous war, Churchill was the architect of the Dardanelles Operation, which left an indelible mark in his mind. In this war, Churchill has been the mastermind behind the operations in Norway, Greece, and Libya - all of them ending in failure. Moreover, Churchill was strongly affected by Crete and Singapore.

      This long succession of military defeats impacted the prime minister's psychology, making him unsure about his abilities, especially insofar as concerns offensive operations, particularly against the Nazis. And this is just a step away from skepticism about prospects for a second front. Meanwhile, Churchill's advisers - both military and otherwise - only are strengthening this skepticism in him.
      Is Churchill's position on a second front affected by another factor - the wish to weaken both the Soviet Union and Germany? It certainly is (it has an even greater impact within his military and civilian entourage), but this is a variable factor. Bourgeois Britain is without a doubt interested in seeing both the Soviet Union and Germany weaken simultaneously, but it is certainly not interested in a Nazi victory. So, the more difficult that our situation on the front is getting and the bigger that the specter of Hitler victory is looming on the horizon, the less that bourgeois Britain will be interested to see us weakening. In particular, at the moment local ruling circles consider the situation on the Soviet Front so dangerous, so threatening, in terms of both the general outlook for the war and Britain's positions in the East and in Africa, that they would actually like to strengthen Soviet positions. This especially applies personally to Churchill. Here, however, another factor comes into play - the fear of the Nazi war machine, which paralyzes their will and resolve on the problem of a second front. However, insofar as Churchill and others are aware of a pressing need to give us support, their minds begin to work along various other lines, looking for easier and less daunting forms of assistance to the Soviet Union, such as, for example, intensive air strikes against Germany, redeployment of British air and possibly ground forces to our Southern Front, joint operations in the north of Norway, and so forth. I believe that you will come up against all of these elements of the British mood at the upcoming negotiations in Moscow.

  2. Our position. I believe that at these negotiations [we] should act on the basic premise that if Churchill makes political capital on his visit to Moscow in the internal policy sphere, he should compensate that to us in the military and economic sphere. What could be involved here? As far as I can judge of the mood in London in general, and Churchill's mood in particular, I would say that this could involve the following things:
    1. Single allied strategy.
    2. A second front.
    3. A limited landing force that Churchill was telling Comrade Molotov about.
    4. Assistance for us in the Caucasus with air and possibly also ground forces.
    5. Northern operation.
    6. Intensification of air strikes against Germany.
    7. Increasing the frequency and intensity of raids on the French coast.
    8. Stepping up supplies to the Soviet Union above the provisions under the Second Protocol 7 (including convoys).

What, in our view, is the most important point among the aforementioned - a second front - is also by far the most difficult one. I hope, however, that you will be able to find sufficient argumentation to persuade Churchill to revise his position and take measures to open such a front in 1942. Points c), d), e), f) and g), however, are much more feasible although lately Churchill has apparently stopped talking about a limited landing force. At the same time he has been increasingly responsive to the idea of assistance in the Caucasus. True, a good deal here will hinge on what the prime minister will see in Egypt. As far as the issue of salvation is concerned, I believe that now, citing territorial and other losses that we have sustained this past summer, we should have every reason to demand an upward revision of the Second Protocol, especially considering that the U.S. administration and the British government expressed readiness to review the protocol from time to time. Of course this increase in practical terms could be achieved mainly with respect to U.S. supplies, but it would be important, in Moscow, at least to secure Churchill's pledge to support us on this matter (with exact supplies, arms, and other specific figures included in the official records).

Finally, I would like to address the following question. There is no doubt that even in the best-case scenario we will emerge from the war with heavy material losses. Who will compensate us for them? Sure, above all this must be done by the Germans, but they cannot be expected to cover everything. It would, therefore, be very important already at this stage to open negotiations with Great Britain and especially the United States about a certain level of financial and logistic assistance to make up our military losses, destruction, and so forth. Exactly in what form this should be done is a special matter, requiring separate consideration. But I am only raising it as a matter of principle. Here too, we can mainly count on the United States since Britain will to all appearances emerge from the war very much the worse off. Nonetheless, Britain could still come up with something. It would, however, be far more important on this issue also to secure Churchill's pledge to facilitate our negotiations with the United States.

It would certainly be inexpedient to soften our positions on our main demand - a second front - by making "second-line" demands (supplies, compensation, etc.). Nevertheless, should the course of negotiations show that our positions would not thus be weakened or should it transpire that we cannot really count on our demand for a second front being met, it would make sense to press these "second-line" demands. My experience shows that the British (in particular, Churchill) feel rather embarrassed and even guilty in relation to the Soviet Union over the fact that they have not as yet opened a second front. Under these circumstances, the British would be more prepared to meet us halfway on matters of supplies, compensation, and so forth. All the indications are that a similar mood exists among the Americans. In conclusion, I would like to say that it is paramount to use Churchill's visit to Moscow as a starting point in forging a single allied strategy without which victory would be inconceivable. As I mentioned earlier, Churchill has a good mind to accept this. Such are my considerations. I dared set them out in such detail because I supposed that, arising from my knowledge of the situation on the ground, they might come in handy as you work out a final strategy for the upcoming negotiations.

MAISKII
AVP RF, folio 059, list 1, file 372, d. 2530, pp. 195?-195?.

From A.A. Smirnov, Soviet Ambassador in Iran, to the USSR People's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs

August 11, 1942

Following is a telegram from Novikov, counselor at the embassy in London: "On August 8, the British ambassador in Egypt gave lunch which was attended by Churchill, Brook, 8 , myself, General Isayev, 9 and some other guests. After lunch, Churchill took me aside and for more than an hour expounded on the current military situation and the objectives of his trip to Moscow. The gist of his exposition is as follows:

  1. The United States has failed to meet its obligations to send troops to Britain, forcing Churchill to go to Washington in June. In the course of the visit, Roosevelt gave firm assurances that he would send 1 million troops to Britain by early 1943; by that time, Britain and the United States would have built a large number of small vessels to deploy troops and weapons to the European continent.
  2. The situation on the Egyptian front, according to Churchill, is quite favorable. The British got additional tanks and troops. Churchill expressed confidence that within six to eight weeks there would be not a single enemy soldier left in North Africa. If necessary, British troops would fight in Tunisia. I consider it essential to supplement Churchill's statement with comments by Gen. Smith, deputy chief of the general staff of the British force in the Middle East. On August 10, I had a conversation with him, the gist of which is as follows. The British are getting additional funds to rout Rommel. After Rommel is routed, the Americans will have to loosen their purse strings and instead of spending money on Hollywood actresses, buy up the whole of Tunisia's ruling French bureaucracy so that Tunisia could be occupied without a single shot being fired. The next stage of the British military effort should be a campaign against Germany from the side of Sicily. Italy is a weak adversary while the Balkans are nearby, and so Gen. Smith does not anticipate any serious resistance in this part of the continent. It seems to me that Smith made his comments if not on express directive from Churchill, then at least not without his knowledge.
  3. Churchill said that after Rommel has been routed, Britain will be in a position to redeploy aviation, tanks and troops to assist the operation in the Caucasus, but not before that.
  4. In the course of the talk, Churchill several times revisited the question of whether his trip would entirely meet the expectations of Stalin and the Soviet and the British people. This concern must be weighing very heavily on Churchill's mind. He is equally concerned over the safety of his flight over Soviet territory. He asked me three times about the flight route and the air cover system, to which I of course was unable to respond.
  5. Harriman is coming to Moscow on Churchill's demand.
  6. For the time being British assistance to the Soviet Union will come in the form of concentrated air raids on German centers

"I get the impression that Churchill is coming to us empty handed. The purpose of his visit is to defuse political tension in the public mood in his own country and to play for time in opening a second front. "On a flight to Cairo, I was on the same plane with General de Gaulle. General de Gaulle said that he was strongly in favor of a fixed date being set for the opening of a second front and establishing an allied general staff. That would make it more difficult for the British to evade the question. Novikov."

SMIRNOV
AVP RF, folio 059, list 1, file 378, d. 2576, pp. 201-203.

From I.M. Maiskii to the USSR People's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs

August 20, 1942
Most secret

Today I have seen Eden, who has been away from London for several days. Predictably, Eden talked about the Moscow meeting. Eden read out some excerpts from the prime minister's telegrams, indicating that Churchill was irked after the second meeting, that the third meeting calmed him down considerably, but that the most profound effect was produced by the last, extended meeting at Comrade Stalin's private residence. There, judging from the prime minister's telegrams, they indeed had a "heart to heart conversation," which considerably cleared the air, enabling both parties to "understand each other." Churchill says that in the course of that talk he was able to "see a real Stalin." On the whole, the last meeting left by far the most pleasant memory in Churchill, finally convincing him that his visit to Moscow was useful. Incidentally, in commenting on the last meeting, the prime minister stresses that there was a very good translator there (he does not give a name).

Churchill's telegram shows that his meeting with Comrade Stalin further enhanced the positive opinion he had formed of him; Churchill was especially impressed by Comrade Stalin's deep understanding of all military matters. In particular, he was pleasantly surprised to see the lively and interested way Comrade Stalin reacted to an African plan that Churchill handed him. Eden also reported that Waywell was equally impressed by his meeting and conversation with Comrades Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov. Summing up, Eden believes that Churchill's visit was very useful and that despite the existing differences over a second front and related difficulties, the Moscow meeting should be seen as nothing short of a success that could produce even better results in the future.

MAISKII
AVP RF, folio 059, list 8, file 2, d. 7, pp. 256-257.

From V.M. Molotov to I.M. Maiskii

August 22, 1942

Most secret

The negotiations with Churchill indeed were not entirely smooth. This is quite evident from the text of our memorandum that is known to you. 10 Those negotiations, however, were followed by an extensive conversation in Comrade Stalin's private residence, making for a close personal rapport with the guest. During that meeting, the text of a joint communiqué was finalized, to include, on Churchill's proposal, the decisions that were made. Our draft communiqué made no reference to decisions, only saying that military matters were discussed. The guest was satisfied with the final text of the communique.

As far as the decisions themselves are concerned, I prefer that you secure a briefing to that effect from the British, who told us about some of their plans. We agreed to use in our subsequent correspondence certain pre-arranged terms about which they will of course duly inform you.

Supplies matters were touched upon only briefly. Comrade Stalin particularly stressed the need for 20,000-25,000 Anglo-American trucks to be monthly delivered to the Soviet Union, even ready to accept suspension in the shipping of British tanks to that end.

The subject of postwar compensation was not raised.

Your idea of working out a unified strategy was not discussed. It seems to me that at this stage, when we are the only party at war, this idea is unacceptable to us. You should not put forward this idea to the British. You have not received, and could not have received, such directions from us.

Comrade Stalin had three meetings with Churchill, I had one, and finally, there was lunch at the Kremlin for British and Americans (in a somewhat broader format than with Eden).

Even though Churchill failed to come up with a satisfactory response on the main question, the results can nonetheless be regarded as satisfactory.

MOLOTOV
AVP RF, folio 059, list 1, file 374, d. 2542, pp. 97-101.

From J.V. Stalin to I.M Maiskii

October 28, 1942

For Maiskii. 11

I have received your considerations. 12 I found them interesting and instructive. A number of your proposals coincide with moves that we are planning to make.

Still, I think that being a proponent of an easy war, Churchill is easily influenced by those interested in the Soviet Union's defeat since our country's defeat and a compromise with Germany at the expense of the Soviet Union is the easiest possible form of war between Britain and Germany.

To be sure, the British will subsequently understand that without a Russian front on the European continent with France out of the game, they - i.e., the British - are doomed. But when will they understand that? We'll see what happens.

I doubt that the British would support an operation in the north. They are only paying lip service to it. Churchill told us in Moscow that by the spring of 1943, about 1 million Anglo-American troops would open a second front in Europe. But Churchill apparently belongs among those political figures who easily make a promise - only to forget it or break it just as easily.

In Moscow, he also pledged to intensively bomb Berlin throughout September and October. Nonetheless, he failed to honor his pledge and did not even try to inform Moscow why it was not being honored.

Well, now we will know what kind of allies we have to deal with.

I have little faith in Operation Torch. 13 Even if, contrary to expectations, this operation is a success, we could put up with the fact that our aircraft were taken away for the sake of this operation.

I told Willkie, 14 and informed Roosevelt, that within the next 12 months we must get 2 million tonnes of wheat from the United States. Willkie said that the United States had a surplus of grain and that our requisition was quite feasible. Roosevelt made a positive response but did not offer anything specific. You are absolutely right in suggesting that in this context we should turn to Canada which also has more grain than it knows what to do with.

STALIN
AVP RF, folio 059, list 1, file 374, d. 2543 pp. 38-43.

From I.M. Masikii to the USSR People's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs

February 9, 1943
Urgent

In addition, I should note the following from a conversation with Churchill in the evening of February 8: 15

  1. Churchill touched on Comrade Stalin's message to Roosevelt in response to the president's plans to send 100 bombers to our Far East region and have our bases inspected by U.S. generals. 16 Roosevelt was furious, Churchill said, and was going to react strongly, but I talked him out of it. I asked the president, who is really fighting now? Only Stalin is fighting, and how… 17 If so, we cannot pin the blame on him for everything that goes wrong. Roosevelt agreed with me and decided not to confront Stalin on the issue. The president asked me, Churchill went on, why Stalin had refused to attend the conference. 18 At that point I interrupted Churchill, saying: "Surely you know from Comrade Stalin's message why he could not come." Churchill laughed and said, of course I know, but that was not all. There was also another reason. I told the President: Stalin is a realist. You cannot get at him with mere words. Had he come, the first question he would have asked you and me would have been: Well, how many Nazis did you kill in 1942? And how many are you going to kill in 1943? What would we have replied to that? We don't know it ourselves. That was clear to Stalin from the start, so what use was it going to the conference? Especially given that he had to attend to some very serious business at home.
  2. Churchill is greatly concerned by the discord between Comrade Stalin and Roosevelt. This is bad, Churchill said, not even so much for the war period as for the post-war period. When peace comes, the situation will become extremely difficult. This is of relatively little consequence to me personally. After all, I am already an old man; I am almost 70 and do not have much time left (at this point Churchill's eyes suddenly became moist), but the country will not die, the people will still be there. They will have to live somehow. I do not see any other salvation for mankind other than through close cooperation between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain. This may not be easy: America is conservative, increasingly tilting to the right, while the Soviet Union is socialist: How will their relationship work out after the war? I don't know. Britain should become a bridge between them… Russia and Britain are inseparably linked in Europe and Asia. We need each other. We cannot do without each other. So we will always be able to come to terms in the end. What about America? It is separated from you and us by oceans. It believes that it does not need either you or us… It's a big mistake. But after all, Americans are so inexperienced and naive in many respects… Be that as it may, I am greatly upset by the misunderstanding between Stalin and the president. It is critical to clear it up. I have always been thinking about how to arrange a meeting between them. Then, making a terribly sly face, Churchill added, almost boyishly: Do you know why on my return trip from Turkey I stopped over in Cyprus? I shrugged my shoulders. Churchill went on, with an even more cunning air: Of course my old regiment is stationed there, but this is irrelevant. I flew in to Cyprus to see whether it could be used as a venue for a future meeting between the three of us - Stalin, Roosevelt, and myself. I came to the conclusion that it could, very well. A marvelous island. It could be sealed off completely. No one will know anything. It takes not more than five hours to fly from Tbilisi to Cyprus. The president will come; now he has come to like flying very much. In a word, it is difficult to think of a better place. It's not Iceland, which we talked about earlier...

    I have even issued orders to start building several light but convenient structures in Cyprus should the three delegations come there. To all appearances, Churchill greatly enjoyed that entire air of mystery and romanticism. Only please, he exclaimed, putting a finger to his lips, don't say a word to anyone. I swore that I would keep mum.
  3. Churchill has a grudge against de Gaulle. He cannot forgive the general the trip to Morocco, on which I earlier reported in detail. I've had enough of this Joan of Arc in pants, Churchill roared. Eden tried to soothe Churchill somewhat, but without much success. On the other hand, judging by some of Churchill's comments, he sympathized with Giraud - with his conduct, self-control, and "tact." I do not rule out that this personal element could in the foreseeable future play a certain political role.
  4. Churchill spoke at length about the precautions that he took during his trip. It looked in a way like a vaudeville with elements of disguise. But Churchill spoke about all of that with passion and excitement, only occasionally throwing in bits of humor. Once again, there was something boyish about him. Incidentally, I asked him whether there was any truth to the rumor that in the course of his trip Churchill had met with Franco in Gibraltar. That made Churchill irate - not because the idea of his meeting with Franco had provoked any strong political feelings in him but because such a meeting could only have been arranged in Gibraltar… but then his entire intricate system of camouflage and deception would have gone down the drain. No, Churchill did not see Franco - he did not even stop over in Gibraltar, flying directly from Algeria to Britain.
  5. Churchill is absolutely delighted and even moved by the Red Army. When he talks about it, tears come to his eyes. Comparing Russia in the past war and Russia (i.e., the Soviet Union) in this war, Churchill said: Factoring everything in, I think that new Russia is five times as strong as the old one. Teasing Churchill slightly, I asked him, half in jest: How do you account for this? Churchill replied in the same spirit: If your system gives happiness to the people, I am for your system. True, I am little interested in what will happen when the war is over… Socialism, Communism, cataclysm… As long as the Huns are routed.

MAISKII
AVP RF, folio 059, list 10, file 8, d. 64, pp. 23-26.

From V.M. Molotov to I.M. Maiskii

February 26, 1943
Most secret

On February 20, I received Kerr. 19 In the course of the meeting, he said that he intended to discuss with me matters of Anglo-Soviet cooperation after the war and that he would need to have several meetings with me to that end. Eden had asked Kerr to tell me that both he (Eden) and Walles 20 had been on record as saying last November-December that both governments attached the most importance to that the basic principles of a peace agreement be harmonized between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States well before it was signed. Although Stalin did not declare that in public, Eden supposes that this is implicit in Comrade Stalin's November 6, 1942 statement.

I said that the basic provisions to that effect were made both in Comrade Stalin's speech and in the Anglo-Soviet treaty of May 26, 1942. Kerr said then that he wanted to tell me about the successes that Britain had already achieved in discussing a future peace agreement. He said a number of committees had been set up in London to work on political and economic matters for a future setup, also that the British government in the foreseeable future was going to open negotiations with the United States on matters arising from Article 7 of the Anglo-American agreement on mutual assistance. Kerr said that the British government intended to consult Soviet and U.S. governments on all matters of a post-war settlement once it had formed a clear idea about them itself. Moving over to the question of future financial arrangements in Britain, Kerr handed me a British government memorandum concerning plans to create a clearing union after the war, and on behalf of the British government, asked the Soviet government to study the document. Kerr said that the U.S. administration had worked out its own draft on the matter, presenting it to allied nations for consideration. The British government proposed that the U.S., British, and Soviet governments use those two drafts to work out a single one. The British government asked two or three Soviet experts to be sent to London for the purpose. Kerr asked me whether the Soviet government had come to any definitive conclusions on a post-war setup and at what stage, and how, it thought negotiations with the U.S. and British government on those matters should begin.

I said that matters of a post-war setup were at a stage of preliminary study as we were more preoccupied with the war effort, but questions raised by the British government were certainly worthy of serious consideration.

Next, Kerr said that on behalf of the British government he would like to ask me to clarify a statement made by Comrade Stalin in his speech on November 6, 1942, to the effect that the Soviet Union did not pursue the objective of annihilating the German state in the first place. The British government saw that statement not only as good propaganda but also as a very wise statement per se. On the other hand, in light of that statement by Comrade Stalin, it was not entirely clear to the British government whether Comrade Stalin had not changed his views that he had presented to Eden on December 16, 1941 concerning a division of Germany - that is to say, the separation of Austria and East Prussia, formation of an independent Bavaria, and transfer of the Sudeten region to Czechoslovakia, which Eden took to mean as an intention to annihilate Germany.

I said that I did not quite understand exactly what was not clear about that statement by Comrade Stalin. After all, the British government itself saw it not only as good propaganda but also as a very wise statement. Of course the best possible answer to that question could be provided by Comrade Stalin himself, but I should say that Germany is one thing and Austria, quite another; that separation of East Prussia or another region from Germany is one thing and preserving Germany as a single state, quite another. If the British government saw a discrepancy between two statements by Stalin, in December 1941 and on November 6, 1942, does it also not see a difference between Stalin's statements in December 1941 and in February 1942 as Stalin's order of February 23, 1942 also stated that we were not pursuing the objective of annihilating the German state. Nonetheless, the British government had never raised that question in connection with Stalin's February 23, 1942 order.

Kerr said that he could not answer that question and would pass it on to London.

I also asked whether the British government itself considered it necessary to annihilate Germany since it was asking us about that. Kerr evaded the question, promising to send a query to that effect to London. Next, Kerr said that the British government was asking to clarify also a statement made by Comrade Stalin in his November 6, 1942 speech to the effect that it was not the Soviet Union's intention to eliminate any organized military force in Germany. Those words by Stalin puzzled the British government as they did not square with the provisions under Article 6 of the Atlantic Charter. Kerr said that Stalin had presumably said that for propaganda purposes in Germany and in the German army and that it should be taken to mean that Stalin did not support the idea of preserving any military force in German apart from the police and forces necessary to maintain public order.

I said that I did not see anything ambiguous about those comments by Comrade Stalin. Nonetheless, I would prefer not to interpret Comrade Stalin's speech and would pass the question from the British government on to him.

In conclusion, Kerr said that he would present the question raised by the British government in his letter.

I said that the ambassador was free to do as he saw fit.

On February 24, Comrade Stalin received Kerr at his request, giving Kerr in the course of their conversation the following answer to his letter, addressed to me, in which Kerr had presented the aforementioned questions from the British government:

Reply of Premier J.V. Stalin to the Letter from British Ambassador H. Kerr

"I have received a letter from Ambassador Kerr, dated February 21 of this year, presenting questions that require my answer with clarification of some points in my speech of November 6, 1942, concerning Germany.

"I do not think that sending in written queries requiring written replies concerning particular statements in speeches made by representatives of our governments is an entirely effective procedure. I also have a number of questions calling for clarification concerning some points in speeches by British statesmen, but I do not require explanation, knowing from experience that this path can only result in long drawn-out and fruitless correspondence.

"The same applies to references to conversations in private that did lead to any agreement, which, in addition, were not put on record.

"I believe that there is one solely correct way of clearing up matters concerning the disarmament of Germany and methods of keeping it in check as well as of reaching a consensus in this sphere (just as in other spheres): a meeting of official representatives of both states and the signing of an agreement binding on both sides. This procedure in fact was proposed to the British government in the course of Mr. Eden's visit to Moscow in December 1941, but the British government at the time refused to go along, reluctant to bind itself by some agreement. If, however, the British government now considers it necessary to arrange such a meeting and reach agreement with the Soviet government on the future of Germany or other states, the Soviet government will be ready to cooperate.

February 24, 1943.
Please advise receipt.

MOLOTOV
AVP RF, folio 059, list 10, file 22, d. 174, pp. 53-56.

From I.M. Maiskii to J.V. Stalin

July 3, 1943
Urgent

  1. Yesterday Churchill invited me to his residence for a talk that lasted more than an hour. He began it in a rather irritated and sullen mood. Churchill offered me his reply to Comrade Stalin's message of June 24 21 to read, after that telling me that he was considering terminating direct exchange of messages with Comrade Stalin. I asked him, why. Churchill said that when the exchange began, he hoped to establish a direct contact with Comrade Stalin, gradually building a friendly rapport between Comrade Stalin and himself, like the one that existed between himself and Roosevelt. At times it seemed to Churchill that it was working out. But now, after Comrade Stalin's June 24 message, he was beginning to doubt its success as direct exchange of messages only led to friction and mutual irritation. Would it not be better in that case to stop it and use routine "diplomatic channels" instead?
  2. I raised objections, providing a number of arguments to show to Churchill why the character of Comrade Stalin's June 24 message was what it was. In particular, I especially stressed that our people and our army were sustaining extremely heavy losses and also that 40 million to 50 million Soviet citizens were under the heel of the Nazi oppressors. Every Soviet family had in one way or other suffered at German hands. Hence the extreme impatience of the Soviet people to see the war end as soon as possible and Germany and its allies routed as soon as possible. Hence also the extreme incomprehension and concern among our people and our army over the constant delays in opening a second front in the west: What are the allies' real intentions? Can they be trusted completely? All of this is effectively conveyed in Comrade Stalin's message, and Churchill should treat everything that is said there with the full seriousness that it deserves.
  3. As my discourse progressed, Churchill began to soften up. I realize very well, he exclaimed, just how great the suffering of the Soviet people is; I probably understand it better than most people around me. But I am getting all the lumps. To that, I observed with a half-smile, that it was an inevitable outcome of the high position that Churchill occupied. After all, he was in charge of Britain's entire policy (moving ahead) (?) 22 of the British empire.

    Next, Churchill said that although Comrade Stalin's message was a highly ingenious polemical document, it did not quite take into account the actual state of things. In what respect? In that when Churchill was giving his promises to Comrade Stalin, he honestly believed that they would be fulfilled. There was no attempt to trick anyone. But we are not gods, Churchill went on. We make mistakes. War is full of most unexpected developments. What appears feasible today, based on the most accurate calculations possible, tomorrow proves impossible in practice.

    We have to adapt and revise our plans as we move along. Moreover, my experience in this war shows that everyone is always late. This is how things are. It is sad but there is no getting away from it.
  4. Then Churchill went over to the military situation. He said that "Husky" 23 could begin any day now - possibly, even before I had reached Moscow. General Alexander 24 is optimistic about Husky, but Churchill prefers to err on the side of caution. Time will tell. Churchill, however, is inclined to think that despite the fact that there have been no operations across the Channel, 25 Anglo-American strategy has yielded some advantages for us. In particular, aerial bombing of Germany plus operations in the Mediterranean considerably held up the Nazi offensive on the Soviet Front. Churchill is even beginning to think that this offensive will not come to pass in the first place since the Germans have begun redeploying a part of their air force from the Soviet Front. Should this expectation of Churchill's be met, allied strategy will be fully justified. We'll see what history tells, Churchill exclaimed. In addition, Churchill said that judging by information that the British had, the Italians and Japanese were pressuring Germany not to mount a large-scale offensive on the Soviet Union this summer. Why? It is simple. Italy is afraid that should the Germans mount a major offensive on the Soviet Front, they would not be in a position to provide it assistance against the Anglo-Americans. Japan would also like to see German assistance in its struggle against Great Britain and the United States, with which it is at war, not against the United States, with which it is not at war, believing that should the Germans strike in the east, they would not be able to help it. Moreover, the Japanese believe that Germany would not be able to do anything decisive in the Soviet Union while they would only use up their last reserves. That would make their defeat inevitable. That prospect scares the Japanese since their entire strategy rests on the idea of peace through compromise.
  5. In conclusion, Churchill said: Tell Stalin that if he thinks Eden's visit to Moscow is desirable, Eden will be ready to come. Then Churchill suggested a tentative time frame for that visit: the end of July. We should meet more often, Churchill added, so that we understand each other better, on the personal level, discussing various matters together. Churchill did not expand on the purpose of Eden's visit. I promised to honor Churchill's request. Then Churchill said: It would also be a very good idea for the three of us to come together - Stalin, Roosevelt, and myself. But should this plan prove difficult to carry out geographically, he would have nothing against Stalin and Roosevelt having a two-way meeting. He has complete mutual understanding with Roosevelt. He would be happy if the same mutual understanding was established between Roosevelt and Stalin.

    In the course of our conversation, Churchill on several occasions returned to the phrase in Comrade Stalin's message about "trust in the allies" (at the every end of the message). Clearly, that phrase heavily weighed on Churchill's mind, embarrassing him considerably.

MAISKII
AVP RF, folio 059, list 10, file 8, d. 64 pp. 165-170.

From F.T. Gusev, Soviet Ambassador in Great Britain, To the People's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs of the USSR

May 1945
Urgent and most secret

On May 9, at 17:15, Churchill and his daughter, Mary, visited our Embassy, offering congratulations on the victory. Before coming to us, Churchill had visited the U.S. Embassy. Churchill's visit to the U.S. and Soviet Embassies turned into a public event: He drove in an open vehicle accompanied by a cavalry escort with crowds of people lining up the streets to welcome him enthusiastically. Churchill rode from the U.S. Embassy to the Soviet Embassy for about 40 minutes instead of the usual 10 minutes. At the Embassy, Churchill was met by the ambassador, counselors, and Soviet generals (military attaches and deputy chief of the military mission). There were mutual congratulations on the victory.

Churchill made a brief speech about the great contribution by Soviet Russia to the war and the outstanding role of the great Marshal Stalin. Toasts were proposed to Churchill, to Comrade Stalin, and to close cooperation between the USSR and Great Britain after the war.

Churchill stayed at the Embassy for about 15 minutes and after a photo session at the Embassy and out in the street, welcomed by a large crowd of people outside the embassy building, departed with his escort.

GUSEV
AVP RF, folio 059, list 15, file 54, d. 316, p. 8.

Endnotes

Note 1: For details, see: I.M. Maiskii. Vospominaniya sovetskogo posla. Voina 1939-1943. M., 1965, pp. 132-133. Back

Note 2: The U.S. ambassador in Great Britain.Back

Note 3: The British foreign secretary and the secretary of supply, respectively. Back

Note 4: As underlined in the original Back

Note 5: British deputy prime minister. Back

Note 6: Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the British House of Commons. Back

Note 7: The reference is to an agreement reached with the U.S. administration and the British government in the course of V.M. Molotov's visit to the United States and Britain in May 1942 (signed in Washington, on October 6, 1942). See: O.A. Rzheshevskii. Voina i diplomatiia. Documents and commentaries (1941-1942). M., 1997, dok. 105. Back

Note 8: Chief of the General Staff of the British Armed Forces. Back

Note 9: Deputy chief of the Red Army General Staff Operations Directorate, who accompanied V.M. Molotov during his visit to Great Britain in May 1942, where he had to stay on until August of the same year due to an illness. Back

Note 10: Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945, vol. 1. M., 1983, doc. 132. Back

Note 11: The telegram was written by J.V. Stalin in longhand; there is no indication of any security classification. Back

Note 12: The reference is to two long telegrams, dated October 22 and 24, 1942, that I.M. Maiskii sent to J.V. Stalin in response to questions raised by him on October 19, 1942 (see: See: Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia… vol. 1, doc. 147). In these telegrams, the ambassador made a thorough analysis of W. Churchill's strategy and short-term military-political objectives, including on the issue of a second front, making a number of considerations about the line that the Soviet side should take in that situation. Back

Note 13: Code-name for the landing of U.S.-British forces in North Africa. Back

Note 14: A U.S. political figure who visited the Soviet Union in 1942 as U.S. President Roosevelt's personal representative. Back

Note 15: At the February 8, 1943 meeting, I.M. Maiskii handed W. Churchill a message from J.V. Stalin of February 6, 1943 (See: Perepiska… vol. 1. M., 1986, doc. 111). In the course of the meeting, they also discussed the allies' military plans for 1943 and further steps with respect to Turkey in light of W. Churchill's visit to that country. Back

Note 16: See: Perepiska… vol. 2, doc. 64, 66, 67, and 69. Back

Note 17: Dots as in the original. Back

Note 18: The reference is to a meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill with participation of chiefs of general staffs on January 14 through 24, 1943, in Casablanca. Back

Note 19: The British ambassador in the USSR Back

Note 20: U.S. undersecretary of state Back

Note 21: See: Perepiska… vol., 1, doc. 165. Back

Note 22: Parentheses and the question market were apparently placed when I.M. Maiskii's message was processed in Moscow. Back

Note 23: 3 Code Back

Note 24: Commander of the British force in the Middle East and North Africa. Back

Note 25: The reference is to the English Channel. Back