|
|
|
|
CIAO DATE: 10/00
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Areas of Differences and Agreement
By V. Chkhikvishvili *
RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS have covered a long and difficult road. They had periods of euphoria and serious differences. This is natural also because of what Russia and the United States inherited in the wake of the Cold War and the fact that cooperation and interaction of the two countries were not taking place in a vacuum but were influenced by various internal and external factors.
It is no secret that while Russia is going through a difficult period of political stabilization and a concurrent in-depth economic and political reform, the United States is trying to secure on the basis of its tremendous economic, technological and military potential a definitive influence on the course of world processes in the 21st century.
This single-pole approach in the U.S. policy has thrown into a sharper relief its desire to "force through" its approaches to resolving international and regional problems, the tendency toward unilateral and armed actions bypassing the prerogatives of the United Nations and its Security Council. The United States' actions during the crises in Iraq and Kosovo, the expansion of NATO, the attempts to tip the strategic balance by building a National Missile Defense system (NMD) in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, being critical of the antiterrorist operation in Chechnya (for fairness sake, it is necessary to say that the United States that has been repeatedly hit by international terrorism is on the whole more restrained on the issue than other countries) - all these things, of course, have a negative impact on the state of Russian-American relations.
One more complicating factor is the heating up election campaign in the United States. There is every indication that certain forces, including those in the Congress, are annoyed by the firm and consistent policy of Russia's leadership with regard to protecting our national interests and they would not mind to use Russian-American relations as a bargaining chip in the election tussle.
Still one cannot agree with those who maintain that relations between Russia and the United States are bound to see a growing standoff and what could be the sliding into an acute crisis while the prospects of their cooperation are very slight. We do have many problems and differences, but the most important thing is that we have managed over recent eight years to jointly shape a qualitatively different - pragmatic rather than ideologized - context of our relations, move away from confrontation, sharply reduce the nuclear threat, and create a ramified structure of cooperation. It is of fundamental importance that most of the vital interests of the two countries are similar in the final analysis. Among them are the consolidation of international security and stability, joint search for answers to global challenges (international terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking), and the settlement of regional conflicts. This is mentioned in particular in the joint statement on common security challenges of the turn of the century signed by the presidents of Russia and the United States in September 1998.
Furthermore, unlike in the Cold War era, both countries publicly share the same fundamental values - adherence to democracy and human rights, supremacy of law, respect for political, ideological and religious diversity. Of great importance is also the fact that effective mechanisms of dialogue on the entire range of questions related to the interests of Russia and the United States have been put in place in recent years. There are regular contacts between the presidents of the two countries, the foreign minister and the secretary of state, the heads of federal agencies, representatives of parliaments, regional authorities and business circles.
Thanks precisely to all these factors we can, despite the existing differences, to preserve the positive framework for further expansion of Russian-American relations.
THIS WAS ONCE AGAIN CONFIRMED during the course of the talks of the President of Russia V.V. Putin with the President of the United States B. Clinton in Moscow 3-5 July, 2000. The important thing is, perhaps, that the presidents of Russia and the United States clearly indicated that there is no alternative to a constructive interaction of our countries, that they reiterated the high-priority nature of Russian-American relations, and their commitment to consolidate the positive basis of cooperation and resolve the existing differences through dialogue taking into account each other's interests.
Naturally, the meeting in Moscow did not settle all the problems, and one could hardly have hoped for that. At the same time, understanding was reached on some of them and ways were delineated to solve others through further top-level political contacts later this year - on Okinawa within the framework of the G-8 summit in late July, in New York where the millennium summit will be taking place in early September, and during the Brunei APEC summit in mid-November.
The questions of greater international security and stability and, most importantly, the START/ABM problem occupied a key place in the Moscow talks.
Russia and the United States have made unprecedented efforts over recent years to reduce the nuclear threat and radically cut strategic offensive weapons. Specifically, nearly 40 percent of both countries' strategic nuclear forces are to be cut under the START I Treaty. The 1993 Russian-American START II Treaty calls for further cuts in strategic offensive weapons down to 3,000-3,500 nuclear weapons on each side.
If acted upon, this treaty would lower the general level of strategic offensive weapons of Russia and the United States by two thirds over the 1990 level. Moreover, in 1997, the presidents of Russia and the United States signed a joint statement on the basic principles of still deeper cuts in strategic offensive weapons under a START III Treaty down to 2,000-2,500 nuclear weapons. An important step toward stronger strategic stability is the joint political commitment of both countries not to target strategic offensive weapons at each other and the 1997 New York understandings on delimitation of strategic and non-strategic antiballistic missile defense.
Russia is prepared to also move further toward consolidating international security and cutting strategic offensive weapons. Unfortunately, the road to this fundamentally realistic and achievable target is seriously obstructed by the U.S. plans to build a national missile defense system. During the talks in Moscow, Russian President V. Putin made absolutely clear our categorical rejection of these plans that would undermine the 1972 ABM Treaty. We have pointed to the negative consequences of such a step to the disarmament process, the nonproliferation regimes and, in the final analysis, to security of not only Russia but also of the other states including the United States itself, and the strategic stability in the whole world. In other words, "the cure will prove worse than the disease."
Is there an alternative to such an undesirable course of events? We are convinced that there is. We offer a constructive program comprising further cuts in strategic offensive weapons, the consolidation of nonproliferation regimes by creating, among other things, a global system to monitor nonproliferation of missiles and missile technologies, and a number of other initiatives.
While the fundamental differences on the NMD remain, the Moscow summit marked an important step in the Russian-American disarmament dialogues.
First, the fundamental principle - preserving the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability has been confirmed at the top level. This has been written into the presidents' joint statement on the principles of strategic stability.
Second, B. Clinton said he would be trying to get the US Senate ratify the 1997 New York package of understandings on delimiting the strategic and non-strategic ABM defense (which is necessary for putting into effect START II and opening official talks on further cuts in strategic offensive arms). The sides also agreed to step up the ongoing consultations on framing a START III.
Third, the summit in effect started a serious discussion of our positive program in the sphere of security. After long vacillations, Washington voiced readiness to jointly consider the proposals on creating a global system to monitor nonproliferation of missiles and missile technologies open to all states and coupling it with the missile technology regime. The first step toward this objective is the understanding to open in Moscow a center to exchange data on rocket and delivery system launches. It will be set up in order to organize continuous exchange of information received from Russian and American early-warning systems, to rapidly resolve unclear situations and develop conditions for putting in place a multilateral regime of exchanging notifications on missile launches.
Fourth, the sides reached an understanding that it is necessary to resume Russian-American cooperation on non-strategic ABM defense. In our view, we can speak of corresponding regional systems involving all interested countries that observe the principles of nuclear nonproliferation and comprehensive nuclear test ban treaties. Fitting into this context is also our initiative on the creation of non-strategic ABM defense system in Europe. There were several joint command and staff ABM defense exercises after 1996. They were halted following NATO's military operations against Yugoslavia. Moscow has now decided to resume this program. At the same time we would welcome more participants primarily from among European countries.
Another important subject of the Russian-American dialogue is cooperation for the purpose of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. Cooperation in this area is being carried out on a permanent basis within the framework of contacts between Russia's Security Council secretary and the U.S. President's national security adviser, as well as between special representatives of the presidents of the two countries. Useful work is also being done under the auspices of the seven joint groups of experts dealing with specific areas of export control. During the talks in Moscow, the sides agreed to continue cooperation on questions of nonproliferation, which accords with the interests of security of Russia and the United States. Russia once again stated in no uncertain terms that this cooperation is not supposed to abridge the legitimate rights of the two countries to develop many-sided relations with third countries, which do not violate the nonproliferation regimes currently in force, including military-technical cooperation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As for the attempts to use all sorts of sanction legislation to put pressure to bear on Russia, they are obviously counterproductive and do not help greater understanding between our countries in the nonproliferation sphere.
The talks showed that both the Russian and American leadership clearly realize that, in conditions of globalization, new threats to world security call for joint countermeasures from the international community. They held a serious discussion of the new challenges and stressed the need for stepping up combat against international terrorism and extremism that seriously threaten not only Russia and the United States but also international stability. The summit reiterated our countries' interest in resolutely combating international terrorism not only on the bilateral basis but also using multilateral forums, and primarily the United Nations and the G-8. Russia, in particular, voiced its support for stepping up work on international legislation in the areas where it does not exist yet - the combating of chemical, biological and information terrorism.
In practical terms, we agreed to set up a bilateral working group that would hammer out specific proposals on measures to oppose the terrorist threat from Afghanistan, from the Taliban-controlled territory, which has become in effect the main center of international terrorism.
Organized crime is another formidable problem. We are prepared, together with our American partners, to step up work of the bilateral group dealing with law-enforcement.
Combating drug trafficking is a new subject in our dialogue with the United States. We feel it is time to put this combating on a comprehensive basis by signing, perhaps, a full-scale agreement between our governments. We find rather useful the U.S. experience in both combating drug trafficking and the provision of treatment to drug addicts, especially young addicts, and their social adaptation.
We share the realization of the importance of establishing closer contacts between societies and individuals of Russia and the United States. This could reinforce understanding and confidence between our countries. During the talks in Moscow, the Russian side offered in this connection a whole package of ideas. Among them are, in particular, the ideas for expanding links between educational and research institutions, mutual recognition of university or college degrees, more active cultural exchanges, cooperation in emergency situations stressing the use of advanced rescue technologies, and cooperation in the sphere of the so-called emergencies medicine.
The major test of the maturity of our relationship with the United States lies in how we work together in solving international and regional problems. The fact that we have avoided confrontation in such most difficult crises as those in Iraq and Kosovo shows that the cooperation potential created to date rests on a firm foundation. Our approaches to solving a whole number of crises do not coincide on all points. The important thing, however, is that we continue to expand the dialogue aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions in spite of the divergences. We work in coordination where possible and try to take into account the distinctive features in each other's positions. We work rather successfully together as cosponsors in the Middle East peace process and the settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, and we work constructively with regard to the Asia-Pacific region, Afghanistan, Korea, and Angola.
At the same time it should be noted that problems arising in our relationship in connection with regional conflicts do not pass without a trace and they call for additional efforts to minimize the damage. To all appearances, we should look for ways of closer cooperation at the stage where we try to prevent crises. We proceed precisely from the fact that unilateral actions in matters of war and peace, the attempts to replace state sovereignty and territorial integrity with concepts of "humanitarian intervention" and "limited sovereignty" are absolutely unacceptable.
One of the reasons for the certain instability of our relationship with the United States consists in the fact that this relationship does not have a reliable economic basis so far. We should admit of course that there have been certain positive changes in this area in recent years. The important thing is that solid legal contractual and organizational mechanisms have been created to regulate relations in this sphere. I have in mind first of all the intergovernmental Russian-American commission on economic and technological cooperation. From the time it was founded in 1993, the commission has made a good showing as a reliable and effective tool promoting both broader ties between the two countries in the commercial, economic, investment, science and technology areas, and finding solutions to vexed questions existing in these areas. Characteristically, this commission is responsible for enacting nearly 200 various documents. Naturally, not all of them stood the test of time but a substantial number of them still form the legal basis of our ties in the economic and technological spheres.
The United States is Russia's third major trading partner (next after Ukraine and Germany). Bilateral trade in 1999 reached nearly $7.5 billion. Russia's favorable balance amounted to $3.7 billion. Early in 2000, there emerged signs of increased commercial activity: the volume of trade in the first quarter reached $2.9 billion or twice that in the same period a year before.
Things are not bad in the sphere of investment cooperation. The United States leads in the volume of direct investments in the Russian economy with $4.5 billion (35.6 percent of all foreign investments) as of 1 January 2000. Taking into account portfolio investments, American investments in Russia amount to $6.4 billion, or nearly 22 percent of all the foreign investments. Most of the money is invested in Russia's fuel and energy sector where large-scale joint projects are being realized, primarily on Sakhalin. Work is in progress on major projects in such fields as machine building, telecommunications, food industry, hotel and financial services.
The Russian-American cooperation in the field of technology is proceeding rather actively. This is true first of all in regard to the space sphere. Our countries are the leading participants in the International Space Station project. Together with Norway and Ukraine, they work on the commercial "Sea Launch" program. Very active is a Russian-American company that carries out commercial launches using Russian booster rockets.
It should be noted at the same time that Russian-American ties in the areas of commerce, economy, science and technology are obviously below our countries' potentials. One possible example is that the share of the United States in Russian external trade is as little as 7 percent whereas the Russian share in American foreign trade is slightly above 0.5 percent. It is hard to compare the value of our trade ($7.5 billion in 1999) with, for example, the daily volume of trade between the United States and Canada, which runs into $1 billion. Or is it possible to compare the amount of American investments in Russia with tens of billions of dollars the United States invests in China?
There are, of course, objective reasons for the current state of affairs. Among them are the "pains" of Russia's rapid transition to a market economy, which resulted, in particular, to certain delays in passing new laws, in particular those that should create favorable conditions for the operation of foreign companies and foreign investments. The 1998 crisis also had a negative impact.
But there are also what seem to be reasons of a subjective nature. We speak first of all of attempts to use commercial, economic, investment and technological ties with Russia as a political leverage in dealing with us, we speak of sanctions and what are sometimes "contract" antidumping procedures instituted against Russian exporters, the still existing discriminatory restrictions in the United States including the notorious Jackson-Vanik Amendment surviving from the Cold War era, and the attempts to use unscrupulous methods of competition on the markets of third countries (the United States' active opposition to the Russian-Turkish "Blue Stream" project is one graphic example).
The state of affairs in the economic sphere occupied a noticeable place at the Russian-American summit in Moscow. Naturally, V. Putin did not pass over in silence all the problems that stand in the way of our relations in this area. As a result, it proved possible to reach a number of understandings of great practical importance not only for our cooperation with the United States but also for the Russian economy. In particular, the countries reached an understanding on starting in the very near future substantial talks on American legislation to grant Russia the status of a market-economy country. They also agreed to step up dialogue on Russia's entry into the WTO. The realization of corresponding understandings will help to substantially ease access to the U.S. market for Russian export.
Of practical importance is also the decision made at the talks to abolish the quotas on commercial launches with Russian rockets, considering the fact that the commercial space-rocket sector will become in the next few years one of the biggest and highly lucrative segments of the world hi-tech market closely linked with the market of applied information systems based on space communications.
Of great importance for expanding our commercial, economic and investment ties with the United States and the other countries were the clear statements made by V. Putin about a serious intention of the Russian leadership to adopt the necessary measures to improve the investment climate in the country, including the creation of the necessary conditions to substantially augment the inflow of foreign investments, the consolidation of the legislative base, the continuation of restructuring of the banking systems, and the combating of corruption and economic crime.
We have now entered a rather important stage in Russian-American relationship connected, among other things, with the impending coming to power of a new administration in the United States. It is therefore of fundamental importance to make use of the present positive experience in our future relationship. We had and will have differences, which is normal in relations between so dissimilar and mighty powers. It is, however, important that the existing problems should not stand in the way of expanding the constructive dialogue. The principle where victory for someone signifies defeat for someone else should be consigned to the past. Defeat for someone in our interdependent world may signify defeat for everyone.
Addressing the joint news conference wrapping up the Russian-American summit, V. Putin stressed that the approach to resolving the existing differences should be one: "It should not result in the destruction of all the positive that has been achieved in recent times, it should project into the future. The leadership of Russia, and as far as we know, the Administration and the U.S. President have such an intention. We will adhere to precisely these principles."
Endnotes:
*: Vladimir Chkhikvishvili is Director of the Department of North America at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Back.