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CIAO DATE: 8/00
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Kremlin and NATO: Prospects for Interaction
By V. Kozin
IN EARLY MARCH, shortly before the presidential elections in Russia, there was almost a sensational stir in connection with Russia's position in respect of NATO.
The then acting President, Vladimir Putin was asked in a televised interview: "Is it possible that Russia will one day join NATO?" The Russian head of state replied: "Why not? Why not? I do not rule out such a possibility. I repeat, in the case if Russia's interests are taken into account, if she is a partner with full rights."
At first, the West was not particularly sure how it should react to this statement. Later on, however, it did arrive at a reply, with Secretary-General Lord George Robertson summing it up in this manner: "NATO recognizes the need for partnership between the Alliance and Russia, and will work hard to build on our existing links. That makes for an already challenging task. At present Russian membership of NATO is not on the agenda."
Vladimir Putin in turn adjusted his position as well: "If the military organization adopts decisions similar to those, which were adopted by NATO on Yugoslavia, then it does not suit us and we have no intention to join such an organization." He also added that if Russia was not expected in the Alliance, its zone of responsibility should not be expanded east, coming close to her borders.
Everything was in its proper place again.
Clearly, never and under no pretext will Russia be admitted to NATO. She will not be accepted by definition as is evident from the fifty-year history of this organization. Russia herself ought not to seek membership either. At first, she must deal with her own, more vital internal national problems.
Serious differences still remain between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance on a number of problems. Moreover, a profound rift has developed between them since March 24, 1999, the day when NATO started its bombing attacks on Yugoslavia.
Causes of the Rift
NATO's large-scale strong-arm action against sovereign, non-aligned Yugoslavia has led to a massive loss of human life and considerable material destruction. About 3,000 people died in the course of the operation, children making up 70 percent of the civilian casualties; five million people have been left without electricity and water; two million people have lost means of livelihood; 0.5 million people have lost their jobs; 34 bridges, 17 hospitals, 18 power stations, and 2,000 schools have been destroyed; the overall amount of destruction adds up to one half of that country's national wealth. NATO actively employed munitions with depleted uranium and graphite fillers: overall, Kosovo was attacked with 31,000 uranium-containing shells (equal in bulk to 10 tons of non-enriched uranium), which may lead to leukemia and other dangerous ailments.
Ties between the Kremlin and Evere were also affected by the Alliance's approval at its Washington summit in April of last year of new ambitious strategic goals, which fixed NATO's course for an arbitrary use of force outside of its traditional zone of responsibility, that is, outside of the territory of its 19 member countries. Seeking sanction of the UN Security Council was pronounced unnecessary either. The situation was aggravated by its resolve to continue an expansion on the basis of admission of new members, its failure to abide by the key principles and provisions of the Founding Act, and a gradual transformation of the Permanent Joint Council Russia – NATO – a specialized body intended for holding political consultations on pressing issues of world politics and bilateral relations – into a mere debating club with no decision-making power. The latest addition to this list of grievances is a far from constructive approach on the part of the Alliance to the evaluation of operations, which the federal forces pursue in Chechnya. Its fundamental shortcomings are an incorrect interpretation of events in process there, moral and psychological support for the separatists, as well as an ungrounded criticism of Russia's adapted National Security Concept.
It should be recorded in particular that an impressive arsenal of nuclear and conventional arms was soon placed under NATO's adapted strategic concept. An order was issued to build up dramatically the firepower, and expand the basic infrastructure and logistic support system of the European NATO allies. A decision was also adopted to strengthen the air and the naval components of the European member states, and to improve the system of strategic shipments, transatlantic included. Writing in the Washington Post in December 1999, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen openly called on European NATO allies to create a potential for deploying their armed forces outside of their national territories in a manner "separable but not separate from the Alliance."
Moscow Replies
THE RUSSIAN reaction to the unprovoked NATO aggression against Yugoslavia was immediate and rather sharp, involving a curtailment of practically all ties with the Alliance.
The lid was put on official contacts with the bloc's representatives in its Brussels headquarters and in the Mons-based Partnership Coordination Cell; a freeze was imposed on 20 out of 22 lines of intercourse envisaged by the Bilateral Cooperation Program for 1999 (with the exception of interoperability in the course of international peace-making operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and later in Kosovo); Russian chief military representative to the Alliance was recalled to Moscow; participation was suspended in NATO's Partnership for Peace program and in the Individual Partnership Program; far advanced talks on the opening in Moscow of NATO Military Liaison Office were broken off; the operation of the NATO European Security Documentation Center was discontinued; and the accreditation of NATO information service workers was canceled. Russia also refused to participate in NATO military exercises held with partner states and ceased sending its representatives to various retraining courses and scientific-practical meetings organized by the Alliance. Moscow boycotted the Washington summit of the transatlantic group and waived membership of the Euroatlantic Partnership Council (EPC) and the Permanent Joint Council.
Military Might: Against Whom?
A SESSION of the North Atlantic Council held in December of last year approved decisions aimed at a further build-up of NATO's military might and improvement of its offensive potential, particularly one intended for large-scale operations. It is proposed in the said decisions to strengthen military and military-technical infrastructure, and to improve the planning and conduct of joint combat operations. Washington seeks to bring strong pressure to bear on its West European NATO allies to make them increase their military allocations.
In the debate with the North Atlantic Alliance states one must not omit one more issue concerning the postulates of a hypothetical use of nuclear weapons. It is pertinent to say here that in her strategic guidelines Russia relies on the latter to a much smaller extent than NATO. It was convincingly confirmed by the final communiqué of the December 1999 meeting of NATO Defense Ministers and Nuclear Planning Group, which specified certain "circumstances" capable of serving, in the opinion of NATO strategists, as grounds for a freer employment by the bloc of nuclear weapons. The same is evident from a comparative analysis of NATO's strategic concept and the adapted National Security Concept of Russia made effective as of January of this year.
The recent period has seen NATO nuclear countries come up with proposals about considering problems of introduction of limitations on the tactical nuclear weapons, some types of which are in centralized storage depots, specifically in accordance with unilateral Russian – American declarations. On the whole, this idea merits attention. But it is well to bear in mind that, unlike the Alliance, Russia does not deploy these weapons in territories of non-producing states.
As is common knowledge, Moscow is categorically against the creation by the United States of an anti-missile defense system on the national scale, which will explode international stability and undermine the entire nuclear arms control process. One should simultaneously pay attention to attempts on the part of the North Atlantic Alliance to convince its partners that they support Washington's wish to deploy the national ABM system, something that would eliminate the ABM Treaty.
NATO Expansion is an Anachronism
THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT of the Alliance proclaimed its openness to new members, one "unrestricted by geographical limitations," which caused some profound concern. It also openly named nine potential candidates for membership: Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Estonia, which already cooperate in implementing special schemes called Membership Action Plans, which prepare them for accession.
Some of the said states have announced that they will join NATO in 2002 (the Baltic states), others in 2005 (specifically, Georgia). The heads of the Alliance are actively courting Ukraine. The NATO Secretary-General's official visit to Kiev earlier this year (January), the holding in the Ukrainian capital of an away Ukraine – NATO session and a meeting of the Ukraine – NATO Commission (February – March) as well as the agreements of military and military-technical nature reached in the course of these two events indicate that the Alliance has not given up plans to see Ukraine among its members. Moreover, these pledges find definite response in Kiev. Head of the press service of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, Igor Grushko, went on record as saying on March 7 that based on the principle that a state had the right to create a security system of its own, "Ukraine may under definite circumstances apply for membership of the North Atlantic Alliance." Ukraine intends to take an active part in war games and exercises held by the Alliance and has placed the Yavoriv Training Center at its disposal for these purposes.
An Illogical Step
Expansion would lead to the disruption of the existing balance of forces and a shift in the already impressive conventional asymmetries in favor of NATO, asymmetries, which have developed after the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. For example, in keeping with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE), as adapted by the November OSCE summit in Istanbul, NATO conventional edge on the Russian armed forces will be: 3 times in combat tanks and artillery systems, 2.8 times in combat armored vehicles, 2.7 and 2.74 times in combat planes and helicopters respectively. If, for example, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia alone are admitted to NATO, their joint share of the said weapon categories will be 26 to 52 percent of the Russian maximum levels.
Moreover, it should also be kept in mind that the NATO countries have rejected the Russian proposal to keep in the said adapted treaty the existing group limitations for military-political alliances, which means letting the North Atlantic Alliance have a strictly specified number of weapons. More than that, by redistributing between themselves the earlier national ceilings that figured in the original CAFE text, NATO countries established for a number of their fellow members large-margin territorial (flank) quotas, which gives the bloc additional chances to strengthen its forces in separate parts of Europe. The bloc also managed to obtain inclusion in the treaty of provisions, which fixed its right to carry out an emergency deployment of its armed forces in the Central European zone, while failing to secure the same right for Russia in the North Caucasian region, where Chechen separatists had been working to withdraw Chechnya from the Federation. The Alliance did not agree to extend territorial limitations to the air component of the armed forces nor to the regulation of the naval activities.
An Alternative to Expansion
OF COURSE, all states ought to respect the right of each member of the world community to the choice of a national security mode. But it must be urged in this particular instance that the decision on the subsequent expansion of NATO be carefully weighed with account taken of all negative consequences of this step.
The greatest degree of compromise seems to be "cooperation through non-admission," where states wishing to accede may develop their relations with the Alliance without formally joining it. This might be done by analogy with the Finnish or Swiss concept of "security through cooperation," in whose context Helsinki and Bern are ready to expand their contacts with the bloc short of becoming its members. The NATO leadership might well suggest to those eager to join that they limit themselves to advanced cooperation within the framework of Partnership for Peace and individual partnership programs, to an exchange of military delegations and military-political talks, to participation in the training process and the holding of joint military exercises. Instead of obtaining membership of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, European states might do a more efficient job by strengthening security in Europe on their own, including through participation in implementing the already approved concept of "European policy in the area of defense and security."
A simple solution may also be the best one: not to rush the NATO expansion, to postpone the process ad infinitum and get down to other, more vital business.
Lessons of Kosovo
COOPERATION between the Russian and the NATO military contingents in Kosovo as well as between their representatives in Brussels has revealed both positive and negative experience in the conduct of this peace-making operation.
July 23 of last year saw the first meeting of the Permanent Joint Council after Russia had frozen its relations with NATO, and September 6, a meeting of the Permanent Joint Council – Military Representatives. Both were devoted solely to the evaluation of the situation in Kosovo as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the upgrading of cooperation between the Russian and the NATO contingents in the said areas and between Russian and NATO representatives in the staff organizations of the Alliance, related to the KFOR operation. PJC ambassadorial-level meetings have been called regularly to discuss practical cooperation in the course of these two peace operations, including an exchange of views on such matters as security measures for the local population and KFOR personnel, common understanding of the operational plan, and other aspects. On the whole, the level of cooperation between the Russian military contingent and the NATO forces in Kosovo is quite satisfactory.
As far as the conduct of the Kosovo peace-making operation is concerned, Russia still has quite a number of questions to ask regarding both the extent of implementation of the agreement on demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the future participation of this organization in efforts to guarantee the civilian life in the area. One cannot but see that the Kosovo terrorist leaders clearly crave power and would like in the long run to seize Kosovo from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It seems quite important to speed up arrangements for bringing back to Kosovo a specified number of Yugoslavian servicemen as it is envisaged by p. 6 of Appendix 2 of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in order to provide for security and stability in this part of Yugoslavia. All kinds of delays in this matter on the part of the NATO countries are unacceptable. The Alliance's contingents also weakly control the Kosovo-Albanian border, which is used as a channel for arms deliveries.
Breaking the Ground
IN THE RECENT PERIOD, the leaders of Russia and of the North Atlantic Alliance have undertaken some concrete actions so as to deal with the backlog of problems and improve step by step their relations.
What caused this turnabout in relations between this country and the Alliance?
First, new forces emerged in the Russian political scene in late 1999 and early 2000, which know well how unproductive "the permafrost situation" is in relations with NATO. Russia and the Alliance are too big players in the field of European and global politics to endlessly continue ignoring or confronting each other. Second, a phased restoration of Russian – NATO contacts is wholly in line with the overall Russian policy of more pragmatic intercourse with both Western countries and former members of the so-called Eastern bloc. Third, an account is taken in Russia of quite constructive statements made by the Alliance leaders to the effect that it cannot exclude Russia from the process of decision-making on problems of European and world security, because both sides have "many joint interests and global problems requiring decisions." Fourth, as held by the Russian military-political leadership, Russia currently has no sharply antagonistic differences with the North Atlantic Alliance, which might lead back to the stormy Cold War times. Fifth, Moscow links hopes for a potential improvement in relations between Russia and NATO with the person of George Robertson, who repeatedly stated, after assuming his present position in October 1999, that NATO was prepared to give stability to NATO – Russian relations. Sixth, this country could not but take into consideration the on the whole positive results of his visit to Moscow in mid-February of this year. Moscow and Brussels share the view that the visit became the first stage on the way to the restoration of their ties.
In the course of their talks, the sides confirmed a mutual readiness to contribute to the building of a stable and undivided Europe for the benefit of all of its peoples. Simultaneously it was noted that this work should be based on the norms and principles of international law, primarily the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the European Security Charter, as well as on the Founding Act signed by Russia and NATO. As the sides declared, they would work to invigorate their dialogue within the Permanent Joint Council and continue an energetic exchange of views on a wide range of security issues to enable them to meet future challenges and make their joint cooperation the cornerstone of European security.
At the same time, Russia did not receive from the North Atlantic Alliance's leadership, in the course of their five-hour-long discussions, a clear assurances that NATO would never repeat the sad Yugoslavian experience of an indiscriminate and disproportional use of force mostly against the civilian population of Yugoslavia, with civilian-to-military casualties standing in relation as 4 to 1. True enough, the Russian side gave positive evaluation to the bloc leader's statement that it was necessary to hold preliminary consultations with Moscow before any decision was taken on the use of force with a view to finding political solutions and averting dire humanitarian cataclysms, something that the Russian side had repeatedly called attention to. But Moscow failed to hear firm assurances that the Alliance would never again use arms outside of its responsibility zone without a UN Security Council sanction.
The first meeting of the Russia – NATO Permanent Joint Council at the ambassadorial level was held at the NATO headquarters on March 15 of this year, which covered an extended agenda related, apart from the situation in Yugoslavia, to NATO's strategic concept and Russia's National Security Concept. An exchange of views and information took place simultaneously on a broad range of arms control issues, including non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons, preparation of a conference to review the NPT, as well as CAFE problems.
At the same time, the sides thus far set neither the timetable for nor forms of resumption of Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace program, nor still the date for or format of Russian participation in the Euroatlantic Partnership Council, nor the procedure for reopening all channels in Russian – NATO intercourse. Neither was an agreement reached on the opening of a NATO diplomatic and information mission in Moscow, something that the Alliance leaders insisted on in keeping with the relevant Founding Act clause.
Matters of possible development of Russian – NATO relations were considered at the March 17 Moscow meeting of Russia's Interdepartmental Commission for Intercourse with NATO, which focused on things involved in stage-by-stage resumption of relations with the North Atlantic Alliance. These were discussed in the context of the overall goal of building a new Europe without divides, without regions with different levels of security, and without strong-arm approaches to the solution of emerging problems.
Subsequent Prospects
AS MAY BE SEEN, the Moscow discussions with the head of the Alliance have so far led only to insignificant shifts in bilateral relations.
More likely than not, they have become only a first step on the way to a potentially fuller correction of Russian – NATO ties. Moscow is certain that this process must proceed in stages. Simultaneously it must be of a verification nature, which means that the transition to each subsequent stage should take place only after an evaluation is made of the results of the preceding one.
In prospect, it seems important to install a direct governmental hotline between the Kremlin and the NATO headquarters by analogy with the operating channels existing between Moscow and Washington, Moscow and London, and other capitals. This would make it possible for the Russian leaders and the NATO Secretary-General to deal with important problems as they arise and to head off misunderstanding.
It is worth considering a prospect for a Russian – NATO summit at which to analyze both the key issues of Russian – NATO intercourse and the situation in Kosovo. It is also important to resume contacts between the military leadership of Russia and NATO.
The agenda of the Russian – NATO dialogue should be gradually expanded within the framework of the PJC and the Permanent Joint Council – Military Representatives as should at some stage intercourse be restored with the Euroatlantic Partnership Council.
Contacts ought to be resumed, without waiting for any special achievements in the Russian – NATO dialogue, between the Federal Assembly of Russia, specifically the State Duma, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, something that would enable the Duma deputies to influence the strengthening of regional and international security to a greater extent than before.
As far as one can judge, there are certain prospects for the widening of the Russia – NATO dialogue. At the same time, one cannot fail to see that a lot of outstanding problems, occasionally quite acute, have accumulated in Russian – NATO relations at the start of the new century. There are still profound differences on very important world political issues, pressing arms control problems, separate aspects of strategic principles, and matters related to the role and place of Russia and NATO in the international arena. A potential key to unfreezing ties between Russia and NATO is an unbiased attitude to the Russian state and its policies on the part of the North Atlantic Alliance, as well as a change in the bloc's general line in the international arena, one that causes some serious concern.
GEORGE ROBERTSON repeatedly spoke in public about his wish to give our contacts "a new, long-term and stable character." He also claimed in his late-1999 interview with the Nezavisimaya gazeta that at the start of the next century relations between NATO and Russia should be transformed into a true strategic partnership. The partnership theme sounded again during his visit to Moscow.
As they enter the 21st century, Russia and NATO really must cooperate constructively with each other, if on a fundamentally new basis. Otherwise both sides will invariably run into difficult problems in their relations.