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CIAO DATE: 8/00
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Russia Has Ratified the START II
By V. Gavrikov *
Until recently, it was widely believed that the arms reduction process, which began in the late 80s, came to a standstill. Moreover, Russia was often blamed for that since it purportedly refused to ratify the START II Treaty, thus hindering the reduction of strategic offensive weapon systems.
This past April, the Treaty was at last ratified. The Russian Federal Assembly passed laws on ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and of a package of 1997 ABM agreements. This is a clear-cut signal to the world of how Russia intends to act in the international situation prevailing at the time.
The START II ratification history was difficult. The issue of ratification was long discussed with the active participation of both houses of the Federal Assembly and in Russian society at large. The Treaty was three times submitted by the president to the State Duma for ratification: in 1995, 1998, and 1999. But each time ratification was delayed for various reasons.
Having signed the Treaty on January 3, 1993, Russia and the United States raised their relations in the military-strategic sphere to a basically new level. The parameters and character of reductions and limitations, as recorded in the Treaty, are in perfect harmony with the countries' aspiration to maintain the strategic balance on a basically lower level of armaments, guaranteeing a predictable evolution of bilateral relations and of the situation in the world at large.
In the preamble to the Treaty, the sides saw it important to stress that they are creating new realities, which have changed political and strategic relations between them. The START II Treaty, which calls for the largest reduction of nuclear arsenals to date – by two-thirds of the existing level – is a crystallization of a new relationship between the erstwhile main strategic opponents in the arms sphere.
True, just like any other state, we have our own national interests that are based on principles of cooperation and partnership with all countries ready for this.
Implementation of the Treaty will help consolidate strategic stability, including as a result of both sides' converting to only single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which, according to specialists, will enhance the survivability and endurance of their strategic nuclear forces. This also reduces the first-strike threat while both sides retain the capability to deliver a retaliatory strike at a considerably lower quantitative level of strategic offensive arms.
The START II provides for the following:
–to reduce the aggregate number of nuclear warheads on ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and heavy bombers to 3,500;
–within the limit of 3,500 nuclear warheads, their number on SLBMs must not exceed 1,750 (this is the first time this limit has been introduced); and
–to abolish all ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). (This important distinguishing feature of the START II Treaty also applies to Russia's heavy ICBMs). These are the RS-18 (SS-19, in NATO classification), six warheads each; the RS-22 (SS-24), 10 warheads each; and RS-20 (SS-18) heavy missiles, 10 warheads each. U.S. ICBMs: the MX (10 warheads) and Minuteman III (three warheads). The sides are allowed to convert multiple-warhead ICBMs (except for heavy missiles) into single-warhead missiles by reducing the number of their warheads.
Reductions under the START II Treaty were to begin on December 5, 1994, the time the START I Treaty went into effect, but since the time frame for reduction under START II was unrealistic due to delayed ratification, Russia raised the question of extending it. On September 26, 1997, the Russian foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state, in New York, signed a protocol to the START II Treaty extending the deadline by five years (until December 31, 2007). At the same time they signed instruments of exchange on early deactivation – by December 31, 2003 – of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which are to be destroyed under the Treaty.
The protocol extending the time frame for arms reduction, which is an integral part of the START II Treaty, was also ratified by the Russian Federal Assembly this part April.
Experts believe that after the provisions of the START II Treaty are fully implemented, Russia's strategic nuclear forces could comprise the following:
–approximately 700 RS-12M ICBMs and more than 100 RS-18 ICBMs;
–four Taifun class nuclear powered missile submarines with 20 RSM-52 SLBMs (each with six warheads); seven Delfin class submarines with 16 FSM-54 SLBMs (each with four warheads), and 12 Kalmar class submarines with 16 RSM-50 SLBMs (each with three warheads);
1
and
–approximately 60 Tu-95MS and Tu-160 heavy bombers (as a result of the bombers-for-gas-debt scheme with Ukraine, the number of the latter will reach 15)
2
, capable of carrying between 600 and 1,000 warheads (air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and nuclear bombs).
Under the START II Treaty, the U.S. strategic offensive weapon systems
3
can include the following components:
–500 Minuteman III ICBMs;
–14 Ohio class nuclear powered submarines with 24 Trident I or Trident II SLBMs (each with five warheads); and
–approximately 50 B-52H and 20 B-2 heavy bombers, capable of carrying between 1,200 and 1,350 warheads (air-launched cruise missiles and nuclear bombs).
4
Changes in the structure of strategic offensive arms under the START II Treaty point to a change in the Russian and the U.S. conceptual approaches on nuclear strategy and, in more general terms, on their respective national security strategies. The sides renounce the preemptive strike concept. They are now themselves to define and establish their nuclear potential within the limit of 3,500 nuclear warheads. It is a moot question whether the old nuclear confrontation is still alive but their decisions are increasingly based on recognition of their own interests (and capabilities), not on knee-jerk reactions to action by the opposite side.
It is indicative that ratification of the Treaty was preceded by the adoption of several fundamental documents in the Russian Federation – for example, a program for the development of the national strategic nuclear forces, a draft military doctrine, a national security concept, and so forth. Obviously, in a situation where the parameters of the national armed forces and prospects for their development, as defined by state programs, are clearly defined, it is easier to draft new international agreements in the arms reduction sphere.
Russian experts who worked on START II should be given credit for bringing the scale of strategic offensive arms reductions in line with Russia's economic potential, not just with new international reality.
It is important that implementation of the Treaty will not have a negative impact on the development of our strategic nuclear forces. Considering their operational service life, they will have to be downsized even without START II and money will have to be spent on ensuring the country's security to replace them due to aging. But not a single missile will be dismantled before it is due to be dismantled. Importantly, the Treaty limits corresponding U.S. weapon systems.
It would be appropriate in this context to note that the development of strategic offensive arms on a scale characteristic of the Soviet Union is simply impossible in Russia today. From a purely financial and economic point of view, Russia cannot afford the nuclear potential that the Soviet Union could afford. Was that alone not reason enough to further downsize that potential and to go ahead with implementation of the START II Treaty?
Therefore, under the Treaty, the structure of strategic offensive weapons will also be shaped not only by its provisions but also, to a very large extent, by the country's economic, financial, and technical capabilities. That is to say, cut your coat according to your cloth.
Just like many other international agreements, the START II Treaty is based on compromise, taking into account the interests of both countries, which do not always coincide. In this context, agreement could only be reached on the basis of give and take. In discussing this document, it is important to consider the aim that it sets out to achieve and the price of concessions that were made.
It might be appropriate to recall some factors that compelled the Russian side at the negotiations on the Treaty to make these concessions.
Russia made a major concession by agreeing to dismantle ground based MIRVed missiles, including RS-20 heavy ICBMs. But, as our military experts stress, these missile complexes, as well as RS-22 systems, would have to be removed from alert not later than the year 2005 because by that time they will be past their lifespan. The lifespan of the RS-18 missile complex could at best be extended until the year 2007. (Back in 1995, RS-10, RS-12, and RS-16 missile complexes reached the end of their life-cycle and were taken off alert). 5 Further extension of their lifespan is impermissible due to a sharp increase in maintenance costs as well as for safety considerations. Another factor to be taken into account is that heavy missiles were produced at enterprises that are now based outside Russia (in Ukraine).
Both Russian and U.S. military experts point to the high tactical and technical performance characteristics of Russian heavy missiles, stressing their capability to overcome missile defense systems. Nonetheless, the Americans are also dismantling 50 MX missiles, each with 10 MIRVs (this missile was six times more combat effective than the Minuteman III). 6 The number of warheads on 500 Minuteman III ICBMs will be reduced from 1,500 to 500 – that is to say, from three to one on each missile.
The United States agreed to limit the number of warheads on its SLBMs to half the level envisioned under the START I Treaty. Furthermore, the sides agreed that the count of nuclear warheads on heavy bombers will be based on the actual, not attributed number of warheads for which a heavy bomber is equipped (10 warheads per aircraft), as was the case under the START I Treaty. In other words, all nuclear warheads that each aircraft is actually equipped with are counted (long-range – that is, over 600 kilometers – nuclear ALCMs, air-to-ground missiles with a range under 600 kilometers, and nuclear bombs).
This effectively closes a loophole for the United States, which always had an advantage in strategic aviation, to potentially have – due to its heavy bombers – approximately 3,000 nuclear warheads more than the 6,000 aggregate limit provided for under the START I Treaty.
Opponents of the START II Treaty have often argued that as a result of its implementation, Russia, unlike the United States, will lose its nuclear deterrence potential, i.e., its capability to deliver a retaliatory strike, and so forth. Furthermore, they demand that the principle of numerical balance in strategic offensive weapons be maintained on a higher level. Otherwise the West would purportedly treat us like a "minor nuclear state" that the United States – the only remaining superpower – would be able to dictate its will to.
Of course, there are different ways of looking at Russia's participation in the G-8, its role as a permanent member of the Security Council, or the importance of our great Eurasian power for the whole world. But should we really be guided by arguments of the "in-the-past-they-were-afraid-of-us" kind? Moreover, even after Russia fully implements the START II Treaty, the aggregate nuclear potential of Great Britain, France, and China will be inferior to Russia's, but still no one treats these states like "second-rate nuclear countries" that are not reckoned with. If that was really the case, why, then, do opponents of the Treaty so often cite the potential threat coming from the nuclear arsenals of these countries to a "helpless" Russia? After all is said and done, the status of a nuclear power is not predicated on the size of its nuclear arsenals, but on possession of nuclear weapons per se, and effective technology for their production.
The key to Russia's nuclear deterrence policy is maintenance of a sufficient nuclear potential both on the global and the regional level as well as its non-nuclear deterrence potential. Strategic stability is ensured by maintaining Russia's capability to deter nuclear attack or actions detrimental to its vital interests by ensuring the infliction of guaranteed (assured) damage by way of retaliation and maintaining the nuclear balance at the lowest possible level with the aim of preventing a return to the strategic arms race.
Russia's national security concept, approved by presidential edict on January 10, 2000, provides for the use of all means and assets at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, should it become necessary to repel an act of military aggression if all other means of resolving a crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffectual. 7
The question arises: Is Russia is a position to use its nuclear deterrence capability under the START II Treaty? A comparison of the Russian and the U.S. deterrence potentials shows that by the main (but not only) START II indicator, Russia and the United States will have an equal number of nuclear warheads, not more than 3,500. In other words, an approximate balance of such potential will be ensured. The sides will get security as a result of stable structures being put into place.
It has to be said that neither the United States – which was the first to develop and use nuclear weapons, subsequently spending trillions of dollars on their production and upgrading (not to mention "collateral" costs) – nor the other members of the "nuclear five" have, militarily speaking, absolute nuclear security. After all, as long as there are nuclear weapons, the nuclear danger will remain. Yet, having entered into a pragmatic partnership, first Russia and the United States, and then other nuclear powers, are in a position, under new conditions, to strengthen strategic stability and predictability, and ultimately, their own security.
The following political aspect of the problem is also very important: The START II Treaty reaffirms Russia's status as one of the leading world powers and creates prerequisites for the development of normal, all-round relations with the United States and with other states in the world.
There is another important aspect. Opponents of the Treaty also demanded that its ratification be linked to NATO's eastward expansion. 8 More than enough has been said about the negative impact of these plans on the situation in Europe.
Yet, NATO expansion is a new political reality that has evolved and exists regardless of the will of states that are not members of this alliance. Sure, NATO's eastward expansion will create a new geopolitical situation for this country. Obviously, Russia's politico-military leadership will provide for the necessary measures to ensure the country's security in a new environment. But what could be the benefit of refusing to ratify the Treaty as an "adequate" response to NATO enlargement (as proposed by some critics)? The result would be NATO at the borders of Russia which, as a result of such "linkage," would lose the security guarantees that are ensured by the START II Treaty, and a return to open military-technical confrontation. Furthermore, refusal to ratify the Treaty would only stimulate the activity of some countries aspiring to join NATO as soon as possible, without any hindrance or provisos.
One substantial consideration in favor of the START II Treaty is that it is subject to effective verification. This verification provides for the use national technical means, exchange of telemetric data, various on-site inspections, exchange of data on the number, location and technical characteristics of systems subject to verification. Detailed procedures for the dismantling and destruction of weapons have been worked out. Implementation of the START II Treaty and the effective operation of its verification mechanism will ensure predictability in the military-strategic sphere in our relations with the United States.
Yet another important aspect of the problem has to do with the costs of START II implementation which are often seen as "excessive and unjustified" for Russia. The cost problem is extremely sensitive, considering the country's economic and financial plight. Moreover, oftentimes not even experts in the field can assess the extent to which implementation cost projections cited in various domestic publications actually correspond to reality. The disparity of estimates cited in various sources is really distressing. Suffice it to mention that unlike U.S. estimates of direct costs of implementing the Treaty ($602.6 million), some Russian sources give estimates many times, and even tens of times, higher than U.S. estimates. How does this come about given that the numbers of the sides' weapon systems subject to reduction are if not equal, then definitely comparable, as are the verification and inspection costs (and as is the saving of resources as a result of strategic offensive arms reductions)? It is difficult to get rid of the impression that such estimates are oftentimes based on partisanship which has nothing to do with the essence of the problem.
"Profitability" of the agreement should not be judged in purely economic terms. Yes, this will require a certain level of spending (the government has already calculated and budgeted it), but then the projected reductions will cost us considerably less than would the maintenance of strategic offensive systems at their present level. A saving effect will also be achieved from the cancellation of some big-ticket strategic arms modernization programs.
The Treaty, to a large degree, reflects the sides' readiness to reckon with each other's mutual economic interests, providing for treaty-based obligations that minimize the level of outlays. In the course of negotiations, Russian representatives managed to secure a provision whereby 90 heavy ICBM silo launchers will not be destroyed but will be converted for single warhead missiles. Instead of destroying 105 RS-18 ICBMs, they will have the number of warheads reduced to one per missile.
In the context of strategic offensive arms reductions, implementation of conversion projects is very important for our national economy. The Treaty allows the use of ICBMs and SLBMs as space booster rockets. According to V.N. Iakovlev, commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, more than 360 ICBMs can be converted into booster rockets, including approximately 100 heavy RS-20 missiles (Dnepr booster rockets), up to 200 RS-18 (Rokot and Strela) missiles, and also a certain part of Topol ICBMs. 9 Moreover, this is the most effective known method of re-utilizing missiles decommissioned at the end of their lifespan or due to aging. Of course, this problem needs in-depth study and coordination (which, incidentally, is already being done with the participation of RF agencies and departments concerned), but could eventually become economically beneficial for Russia. These plans, naturally, need state support in securing a foothold on the world space services market.
The costs of eliminating strategic offensive systems will be reduced as a result of cooperation with the United States and with some other countries in developing and using applicable technology. The United States provides facilities for the destruction of ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and solid fuel missiles as well as for transportation and reprocessing of liquid missile fuel from 154 RS-20 and 65 RS-18 ICBMs.
The United States undertook to render Russia direct financial assistance in the safe dismantling and elimination of nuclear weapons. Under the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) Program, in the 1994-1999 period, more than $300 million was provided to Russia for the destruction of its strategic offensive systems under several bilateral cooperation programs. In the years 2000 and 2001, it is planned to provide another $260 million for these purposes. In the absence of a treaty, all costs involved in the dismantling and destruction of strategic weapon systems would have been borne by Russia itself.
The Americans also assumed the costs of all on-site inspections involved in conversion of RS-20 ICBM silo launchers and the destruction of these missiles as well as in some annual inspections of converted RS-20 silos (under the START I Treaty, the costs of inspections conducted on its territory are to be borne by the Russian side).
It has to be admitted that the costs could have been less, but at the time strategic arms were produced few were concerned about how they would be eventually dismantled and destroyed.
Critics of the Treaty often refer to the country's ongoing economic plight. But then it is all the more illogical to object to nuclear arms reduction since that would mean a tangible economy of funds and resources that are crucial for implementing some vital socio-economic programs in Russia. At the same time it should be borne in mind that the START II Treaty does not limit our ability to modernize the allowed types of strategic weapon systems. This also requires funding.
Another serious concern about START II implementation is the environmental issue. Russia's national security concept lists as the state's high priorities (among others) the environmentally safe storage and disposal of dismantled weapon systems, above all, nuclear powered submarines, nuclear warheads, liquid rocket fuel, and so forth.
In the process of dismantling, transportation, and disposal of nuclear warheads and rocket fuel components, the hypothetical possibility of accidents increases. At the same time agencies and departments engaged in this work have gained considerable experience in the field. It is enough to recall that by mid-1992, all tactical nuclear weapons from the FSU were safely brought to and concentrated on Russian territory. In 1996, the evacuation of nuclear warheads dismantled from strategic weapon systems temporarily deployed in Ukraine for their subsequent destruction was successfully completed. Under the existing agreements, two large formations of Strategic Missile Forces (16 missile regiments) were withdrawn from Kazakhstan. Ninety-six RS-20 ICBMs, about 900 nuclear warheads, and 18,000 tonnes of missile fuel components (6,000 of this being heptyl, as especially toxic substance) were evacuated to Russia. In Kazakhstan, all the 104 heavy ICBM launchers were dismantled. 10 More than 80 Topol mobile missile complexes were withdrawn from Belarus. This entire operation was completed within a relatively short time without any particular problem. Sure, the volume of work involved in the dismantling and destruction of strategic offensive systems under the START II Treaty is much larger, but given the established time frame, this is quite feasible.
For all the importance of the Treaty's ratification by Russia, it should be borne in mind that, contrary to the widespread belief, the United States is yet to ratify it.
In early 1996, the U.S. Senate "advised" the president to ratify the Treaty but this does not at all mean that the process of START II ratification is complete. The Senate is also yet to ratify a New York protocol extending the deadline for arms reductions, which is an integral part of the Treaty. The U.S. Administration is yet to submit the protocol as well as the entire package of START and ABM agreements, adopted on September 26, 1997 in New York, to the Senate for consideration. It is also well known that the U.S. Congress objects to one of the documents in this package: the Memorandum of Understanding on Succession. To complete the ratification process, the U.S. president must sign an appropriate ratification instrument.
Even so, ratification of the START II Treaty gives Russia an opportunity to begin official negotiations on further reductions of Russian and U.S. strategic arsenals – that is to say, within a START III framework. Importantly, the Russian leadership has repeatedly stated its readiness to reduce our strategic offensive arms – of course, on a reciprocal basis with the United States – to a lower level than provided for by the 1997 Russian-U.S. Helsinki Agreement, to 1,500 warheads rather than 2,000 to 2,500.
Thus Russia is showing readiness to go further down the path of reducing its strategic arsenal on the basis of bilateral agreements with the United States as well as in a multilateral format with the participation of other nuclear powers provided that strategic stability in the nuclear sphere is maintained.
The latter is very important since, having ratified the START II Treaty, we cannot ignore the status of the ABM Treaty due to the objective interrelation that exists between preserving this treaty and the possibility of strategic offensive arms reductions. Deployment of a national missile defense system by one of the sides would automatically impair the strategic offensive potential of the other side, in effect destroying the balance. This interrelation is well known and it is reflected both in the ABM Treaty itself and in the START I and START II Treaties. Introduction of the concept of a limited national missile defense system makes no difference in this regard. Russian representatives on various levels have repeatedly stated that Russia will only implement the START II Treaty and conduct negotiations on START III if the ABM Treaty with its categorical ban on the deployment of a national missile defense system is in force. If, however, the United States torpedoes the ABM Treaty, we will not implement START II and might subsequently pull out of START II as well as START I and the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The Federal Law on Ratification of the START II Treaty expressly provides for this.
The world is increasingly concerned about the negative consequences that the collapse of the ABM Treaty would have for international security and strategic stability. That would also mean the collapse of the existing system of basic disarmament agreements.
The conclusive vote at a recent UN General Assembly session in support of a resolution – sponsored by Russia, Belarus, and China – on the need to preserve and comply with the ABM Treaty, which was not opposed even by U.S. NATO allies, showed that the world community is critical of U.S. plans to deploy a national missile defense system, effectively scrapping the ABM Treaty.
The ABM agreements, which were signed on September 26, 1997 in New York, and approved by the Federal Assembly, are designed to ensure the implementation of the ABM Treaty in the context of the CIS, to enhance its viability, to prevent circumvention of the Treaty through deployment of anti-missile systems, and to strengthen its role as the cornerstone of strategic stability and one of the key prerequisites for strategic offensive arms reductions.
Ratification of these agreements demonstrated to the world community Russia's commitment to uphold the ABM Treaty, encouraging its supporters to take further active steps in its defense.
The Russian position on the United States' destructive ABM line consists not only of that we reject U.S. plans to thwart the ABM Treaty. Russia offers a constructive alternative:
–opening, as soon as possible, official negotiations on START III;
–cooperation in the sphere of tactical missile defense systems based on 1997 agreements; and
–promotion of cooperation in preventing proliferation of missile technology.
The latter calls for implementation of our initiative to set up a global missile and missile technology nonproliferation control system. This, in its turn, effectively destroys Washington's main argument in favor of deploying a national missile defense system: the purported military threat on the part of some "rogue" states.
START II's entry into force will help consolidate the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The conference on the implementation of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which took place in April and May of this year, appraised Russia's efforts in ratifying the aforementioned disarmament agreements as evidence of its bona fide obligations and adherence to the Treaty.
This country has consolidated its positions in opposing nuclear proliferation in the world, including on the periphery of its southern borders.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that Russia ratified bans all nuclear weapon tests or all nuclear explosions. This ban in effect puts a barrier to further modernization of nuclear weapons and means a comprehensive freezing of the nuclear arms race. It is also necessary to stress the role of this treaty as a major instrument of ensuring nuclear nonproliferation in the world. With a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, provided that all nuclear capable states accede to it, this will erect an effective barrier to any proliferation attempts.
It is indicative that here too the United States is in strong opposition: Last year, the Senate failed to ratify the CTBT. By contrast, Russia, as a result of its efforts in the sphere of disarmament, strengthened its credibility in the world.
Our country pursues a pro-active, assertive foreign policy line designed to ensure a stable and predictable situation in the world where it by right should occupy a worthy place.
*: Vladimir Gavrikov is counselor at the Security and Disarmament Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.Back.
Endnotes
Note 1: See: Dogovor SNV-2. Fakty i argumenty (Belaia kniga), 1993, p. 197. Back.
Note 2: Nezavisimoie voennoe obozrenie, 21-27 January, 2000. Back.
Note 3: See: Sokrashchenie iadernogo oruzhiia. Protsess i problemy, MFTI, 1997, p. 12. Back.
Note 4: Under the Treaty, both sides are entitled to 100 heavy bombers for non-nuclear missions. The United States intends to exercise this right (the reference is to the B-1B heavy bomber). Back.
Note 5: Voennaia mysl (Military Thought), 1995, No. 6, p. 19. Back.
Note 6: Voennaia mysl (Military Thought), 1994, No. 9, p. 74. Back.
Note 7: See: Nezavisimoie voennoe obozrenie, 14-20 January, 2000, No. 1. Back.
Note 8: See: Sbornik Ratifikatsia Dogovora SNV-2. Resheniia, problemy, perspektivy, pp. 61-63. Back.
Note 9: Nezavisimoie voennoe obozrenie, 17-23 December, 1999, No. 49. Back.
Note 10: Obshchaia gazeta, 5-11 September, 1996. Back.