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International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Main Security Challenges: A Military Response
By Anatolii Kvashnin
Anatolii Kvashnin is Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army.
The concrete and very important goal of the world community and every state at the threshold of the 21st century is to guarantee peaceful development and prosperity of humanity and their own countries.
Unquestionably, it is impossible today to think of security of Russia and any European country without taking account of responsibilities with regard to each other.
Today's geopolitical situation surrounding Russia is being shaped by the changing system of international relations and a new international and regional system. It is characterized by dynamism, instability, tensions and periods of sharp worsening.
The state and the likely development of the international situation is determined by two opposing tendencies. On the one hand, there are attempts to establish a unipolar world based on the domination of a single superpower and to solve key problems of world politics by the use of military force. On the other, there are attempts to shape a multipolar world based on equality of peoples and nations, by taking into account of and maintaining a balance of national interests of states, and abiding by the fundamental principles of international law.
The growing geopolitical weight of regions is having a considerable influence on the development of the international situation which, coupled with the uneven economic development and availability of natural resources in different regional states, objectively gives rise to new economic and military-political groups.
Analysis of the changing situation surrounding the Russian Federation shows that it is not shaping in the most favorable manner. The United States' attempts to revise the key agreements and treaties in the area of strategic offensive weapons and ABM defense are in direct contravention of Russia' s national interests and security. There is concern over the US Senate's refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
We are concerned, especially because of the latest developments in the Balkans, about NATO's eastward expansion and the possibility of the use of military force by NATO within the framework of the new strategic concept and outside the zones of its responsibility without UN Security Council's authorization.
Despite the considerable progress humanity achieved in science, technology and culture, the "might is right" concept has once again been in evidence in international relations. NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia created an extremely dangerous precedent of using force against a sovereign state which does not have a sufficient deterrent potential.
The significance of this precedent goes far beyond the framework of the specific military action. It undermined the prestige of the United Nations and the OSCE, the organizations designed to promote peace and security on behalf of the world community. The use of force against a state which does not have a sufficient deterrent potential may entail the most unfavorable consequences in the field of international security. The inability of the majority of countries to oppose the developed states either economically or militarily makes them look for alternative ways of protecting their security which include the development of mass-destruction weapons and vehicles for their delivery; the use of terrorist methods of struggle against a stronger adversary; disrupting its information facilities, and so on. As for developing mass-destruction weapons and considering the fact that most states have no access to nuclear technology, they may direct their efforts towards developing chemical and biological weapons.
The desire of many states in the western and southern regions of Asia to come into possession of mass-destruction weapons and delivery vehicles may tip the existing balance of forces and, in the long run, upset the geostrategic equilibrium on a vast area outside Russia's southern borders. Among the serious destabilizing factors in the South are the ongoing war in Afghanistan, national-ethnic and religious differences and other differences between states which spark armed conflicts.
The situation shaping up in the East does not give much optimism either. An escalation of the crisis on the Korean peninsula, its deterioration into open war may trigger an international conflict. The still unresolved territorial issues between countries in the Asia-Pacific region are a constant source of tension which can lead to the worsening of the situation in the absence of an effective security system in the Asia-Pacific region.
Thus the geopolitical situation surrounding Russia is undergoing substantial changes. States, the main regions and the world as a whole are moving toward a qualitatively new structure of the world community. Under these conditions, the Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that social progress, stability and international security can be ensured only within the framework of a multipolar world, and it is contributing in every way to shaping it on the basis of equal partnership, mutual advantage, good neighborliness and consolidation of universal peace.
There is a growing body of common interests between Russia and many other countries on such issues as combating the spread of mass-destruction weapons, the settlement and prevention of regional conflicts, the combating of international terrorism and drug trafficking, the resolution of acute global ecological problems, including nuclear and radiation safety, and peaceful exploration of outer space.
The Russian Federation's unique geographical position, its powerful resource potential and vigorous policy in maintaining international security suggest that Russia will play a key role in establishing and maintaining a global balance of forces as an exceptionally important component of world geopolitics.
Military Security Threats to Russia and Europe
At the modern stage the process of world sociopolitical development calls for eliminating both the old and new contradictions. These contradictions may, under certain circumstances, generate threats to national security of both Russia and Europe. These threats may come from different spheres and widely range in quality - from probable to potential to realistic to direct.
Under modern military-political conditions in Europe and the rest of the world, we generally proceed from the fact that a threat of direct military aggression against the Russian Federation is unlikely at the present time. At the same time, there still remain potential external and internal threats to Russia's military security (they even grow in some regions), and unless appropriate measures are taken our national interests may sustain irreparable damage. Regarding the protection of military security as the most important area of the state's activity, we think it is necessary to spell out the main possible threats so as to be able to neutralize them at the earliest stage possible. We list among such threats:
At the same time we proceed from the fact that the threats to the state's military security, against the background of the ongoing integration processes in Europe and the formation of a single economic area, are interconnected and cannot be considered separately. These threats can be resolved only through joint efforts and a European security policy based on effective mechanisms of its implementation. We have stated more than once, and will continue to insist, that such a policy can be elaborated only within the framework of the OSCE, an organization made up of practically all the states in the region which enjoy equal rights. An inalienable part of the European geopolitical area, Russia will continue to work for preserving the OSCE as the principal international organization whose job is to protect security on the European continent.
European Security and NATO's Expansion
At the threshold of the 21st century, when radical changes are taking place in the military-political situation in Europe, the problems of security on the continent are as relevant and pressing as never before.
What road Europe is going to take? Is it going to create conditions for its integration and construct a model of general and comprehensive security based on equality of rights and duties of all European states? Is Europe going to become a single area with no dividing lines?
The Russian Federation's stance on European security is well-known. We advocate and bet primarily on political, political-legal, economic and other principles of organization of new Europe that do not involve the use of force.
We proceed from the fact that the legal foundation for building a new Europe is provided by the decisions of the OSCE Lisbon summit (Dec. 1996) and the Copenhagen OSCE Foreign Ministers Council (Dec. 1997) on the elaboration of a European Security Charter.
Our approach is based on the idea that security should be equal and comprehensive and its mechanisms should cover all European states. This will make it possible to take account of the interests of individual countries, big and small.
In order to put this idea into effect it is essential to look for a suitable international structure which will encompass all countries of the continent and be able to take into account their interests regardless of whether they are members of military alliances or not.
Therefore the architecture of European security, in our opinion, should be based on the OSCE, the only European international organization that protects the interests of all its member states.
The structure of European security that we suggest should include all European political, economic, international military organizations and alliances operating either independently or in cooperation with the OSCE but always on the basis of the principles of the latter.
No matter how obvious this approach is, it is not the only one. Western countries, first of all the United States, are trying to create a different architecture of European security based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
A security system based on the military-political bloc guarantees protection for its members, but it ignores the interests of other countries and thus is not comprehensive.
The enlargement of NATO on the one hand indicates as it were a grown military threat to it and, on the other, the direction of its enlargement indicates that the threat comes from the East. All this, however, does not tally with the Russian Federation's policy in the West were our group of forces has been cut by 40 percent.
You can argue as long as you please that an expanded NATO has no intentions the would threaten Russia. But you should keep in mind the fact that political intentions are very changeable and a military potential is a sufficiently constant value.
Judge for yourself. NATO's expansion by admitting the first three states of eastern Europe sharply altered the correlation of forces on the continent in favor of the expanded alliance. The depth of NATO's zone of responsibility became increased by 650 to 750 km eastward which substantially reduces the strategic early warning time for the Russian Federation.
Therefore the joining of the alliance by the "first wave" states has already brought about on the European continent a fundamentally new situation which considerably damages the political, military and economic interests of Russia. NATO's further practical eastward expansion and admission of states in Central and eastern Europe will be regarded by us as a challenge to our national security.
However, the Russian Federation is against going back to the Cold War times. Which is why the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization signed the Founding Act on mutual relations, cooperation and security in Paris in May 1997. It was expected to allay some of the Russian fears over NATO's enlargement plans and lay the foundation for partnership and cooperation within the framework of the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council.
During the course of the year we actively participated in putting into effect the European security protection potential contained in the Founding Act. Achievements in this area can be assessed in two ways. On the one hand, a good deal of effort was put in. This includes setting into motion the mechanism of consultations on a wide range of problems of the Russia - NATO relationship. The high-level military meetings within the framework of the Permanent Joint Council and the Permanent Joint Military Committee enabled us to understand and listen to each other. Cooperation was launched in all the areas covered by the Founding Act. The results proved encouraging.
On the other hand, we have never really been able to channel the operation of the Joint Standing Council along the practical lines of making joint decisions and putting them into effect.
Future contacts with the alliance will depend on the degree of our conviction in the sincerity of the alliance's intentions to restore the relations and readiness to take account of our views of European security, forms and ways of constructing it.
We still believe that there is no alternative but to cooperate with the alliance and we count on the resumption of equal and constructive relationship between Russia and NATO. These relations, however, should not be limited to discussions and exchange of information, a semblance of everything being okay with European security protection. Let me stress that Russia intends, from the word go, to restore relations with the alliance in the practical area of decision-making.
There is yet another important aspect. One of the main elements of the European security system is the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty unparalleled in the history of disarmament processes.
This treaty closed the books on the era of confrontation between the blocs and greatly consolidated stability and security on the European continent through big cuts in the military potentials (50,000 conventional weapons were cut back in Europe).
At the same time the treaty was developed proceeding from a very concrete historical situation in Europe - the standoff between two military blocs. Its security protection philosophy based on the maintenance of balance between the military-political associations - NATO and the Warsaw Pact - no longer corresponded with changed realities.
Today our immediate goal is to modernize the treaty. It is necessary on the one hand to preserve the positive potential of this document, and on the other, to bring it into line with the new military-political conditions in Europe.
The Russian Federation is active in three areas, viz., consolidating the OSCE, developing cooperation with NATO, modernizing the CFE Treaty, and the 1994 Vienna document as the most important elements of the military foundation of European security and it is thereby working to provide real guarantees of security on the continent. We imply by these guarantees first of all a system of legal and contractual commitments, and confidence-building measures which, being transparent in intent and practical action in the sphere of security, would promote stability and good-neighborliness on the continent and facilitate the construction of a Big Europe.
Proliferation of Mass-Destruction Weapons, Delivery Vehicles and Conventional Arms
Russia is situated in the center of the Eurasian continent and it realizes better than any other state the danger of the proliferation of various weapons in the Near and Middle East, South Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region which are in immediate proximity to its borders.
The Russian Federation regards the issue of nonproliferation of mass-destruction weapons, delivery vehicles and conventional armaments as one of the most important and having direct bearing on the protection of Russia's national security and stability both on the regional and global scale.
The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation says that "the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons, the technology for the production of them and delivery vehicles, primarily in countries adjacent to Russia or in the regions close to it" represents "a serious threat" to the interests of Russian security. The prevention of the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons, delivery vehicles and the illegal proliferation of conventional arms is put on the same level with the other threats to national security of Russia.
Our approaches to preventing the spread of weapons, and first and foremost of mass-destruction weapons and delivery vehicles, consist in putting into operation the mechanisms of corresponding accords based on international treaties and international law instruments.
One of the principal ways to combat the spread of nuclear weapons is, we believe, to strengthen the regime based on the provisions of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty one of whose listed depositaries is Russia.
The creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions around the world is of special importance among the package of measures intended to prevent a "horizontal" spread of nuclear weapons.
We consider as a substantial contribution to nuclear nonproliferation the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty which was opened for signature in September 1996 and has been signed to date by 152 states.
Unfortunately, the US Congress decision not to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty did a tremendous damage to the entire system of international measures aimed at containing the spread of nuclear weapons. This decision imperiled the process, set in motion with great difficulty, of preparation for talks on banning the production of fissionable materials. This makes unpredictable the results of the conference on the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It has become even more difficult to talk with India, Pakistan, and Israel about their acceding to this treaty.
As for chemical and biological weapons, their proliferation can be reliably barred if all countries fully honor their commitments under the conventions banning these types of weapons.
The Defense Ministry of Russia made tremendous efforts to have the Chemical Weapons Convention ratified in Russia where it came into force in December 1997. We have now completed the necessary procedures to name the primary facilities. There have been inspections at our chemical weapons production and storage facilities.
As regards the Biological Weapons Convention, we are actively participating in hammering out a mechanism for effective verification of its observance at reasonable costs of its organization, financial and procedural expenses, services of experts, and so on.
We also firmly believe that international nonproliferation regimes and export control have a special and extremely important role to play in solving the problem of nonproliferation of mass-destruction weapons, delivery vehicles, and conventional arms.
Russia is a party to a number of such international regimes the foremost of which are the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the regime for the monitoring of missiles and missile technology proliferation, and the Wassenaar accords.
We proceed from the need to strictly abide by the rules and accords reached by these "clubs".
At the same time we call upon the parties to the above regimes to show the same approach; we are against double standards and the "blacklisting of culprit states".
We believe that, in discussing the issue of proliferation of weapons in particular in the Middle East, attention ought to be paid not only to Iran and Iraq but also to Israel which, in our opinion, is the initiator of the arms race in that region.
We are also seriously concerned about the military-political situation in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region because India, Pakistan, and North Korea aspire to build up their nuclear missile potential.
We believe that it is necessary to view the weapons proliferation problem in conjunction with the military-political situation taking shape in this or that region and taking into account the factors that prompt the region's states to build their own military potentials. In our opinion, collective pressure against these countries would be counterproductive. We think that we should conduct a reasoned dialogue with them, preferably on a bilateral basis.
Furthermore, no allowances should be made for individual parties in the implementation of international accords.
Monitoring the proliferation of conventional arms and in particular illegal transfers of light fire-arms, is important in building trust and security between states and stability in the world.
More than 500 million pieces of light firearms change hands around the world. Some 70 countries produce arms on the industrial basis, and many countries by primitive methods. Such arms belong in the category of standard weapons with which the armed forces and internal security forces are armed in every country.
Russia is completely behind the initiatives of states in the regions and within the UN and OSCE framework aimed at the prevention of illegal transfer of light firearms.
Much has been done in this respect in recent years especially in terms of tighter national control on the production, storage and transfer of such arms. The situation is, however, alarming in many cases.
This applies first of all to Central Europe - Kosovo and Albania where big quantities of light firearms have accumulated and further aggravate the military-political crisis in the Balkans. In this connection, we fully appreciate the United Nations' worry caused by the information it is getting that the current process of rearming the new NATO members in accordance with the alliance's standards makes them to increasingly export Soviet-made weapons. These weapons get as a rule to the zones of regional conflicts or to international terrorist groups.
It is important in this connection to focus the world community's efforts on combating the illegal trade in and accumulation of light firearms. In our opinion, there should be concerted efforts aimed at preventing regional and internal conflicts, timely reaction to incidents of illegal spread of light firearms, stepping up aid to the countries which request it for combating the illegal proliferation of such weapons.
The 1972 ABM Treaty
The signing of the ABM Treaty banning land-based antiballistic missile systems denied either party the hope to rationally use nuclear arms against each other.
Recent events indicate that the deployment in the United States of a missile system to protect its territory banned under the ABM Treaty is virtually a decided matter. The signing by President Clinton of the corresponding bill into law elevated this goal to the rank of US government policy. Although the final decision to go ahead with the deployment is to be made sometime in 2000, there is no solid reason to expect that the United States should give up the idea to build a national ABM defense system. In other words, the process of deployment in the United States of an AMB defense system, as far as we can judge today, has become practically irreversible.
I would like to stress that the United States justifies the creation of a national ABM defense system by the alleged need to protect itself against the rogue states which, according to the United States, are North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.
Russia shares the United States' concern about the spread around the world of missiles and missile technology, something mentioned recently in the joint statement of the presidents of the two countries in Cologne. However, it is necessary to look for a solution to this problem not in the deployment of an ABM system, which would only accelerate the spread of missile technology in the world, but in the initiative put forward during the Cologne summit by President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin on establishing a global system to monitor compliance with nonproliferation of missiles and missile technology.
As for the real threat to the United States from intercontinental ballistic missiles of the "third world" countries, I would like to make the following observations. First, speaking about the technical side of the matter, these countries are unlikely to gain access in the foreseeable future to technology necessary to build ICBMs (multiple stages, powerful engines, special thermal insulation, structural and other materials for the warhead sections). Second, it is far from being a fact that these countries generally need intercontinental ballistic missiles. These countries, most probably, can become involved in regional conflicts and thus they need no ICBMs. And third, even if one is to suppose that some "third world" country should gain possession of ICBMs, it is not obvious at all that it would risk to deliver a strike at the United States clearly realizing that a retaliatory strike would simply wipe it off the map.
The deployment by the United States of an AMB system on its territory is creating a fundamentally new situation also in its relations with Russia in the area of strategic armaments. The choice of sites for such a national ABM system (Alaska and the Grand Forks airbase, North Dakota) signals its intent - to intercept ballistic missiles launched primarily from Russia and China. Under these conditions we will be forced to respond with enhancing the efficiency of our strategic nuclear forces. One can say with certainty that the process of further cuts in strategic offensive weapons will be suspended or stopped altogether.
It is difficult for me to predict anything but a number of countries, including those which do not have nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles are voicing serious concern about the situation surrounding the treaty. It cannot be ruled out that scuttling the ABM Treaty would cause the demise of another important multilateral accord - the 1963 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and a number of countries would get down to work on their own nuclear weapons. It is hard to predict under this situation the future of the missile technology monitoring regime.
Use of Military Force Without UN Authorization (Conclusions from the Balkan Crisis for Russia and Europe)
Assessing the rejection of legal principles by NATO states in the key issues of international security, one ought to state that the world law and order were destroyed through the efforts of NATO member countries on March 24, 1999. Henceforth, in the opinion of a majority of rational politicians, all documents, conventions, charters, and declarations are worthless. Committing its aggression against Yugoslavia, NATO flouted the letter and spirit of the documents concerned with the problems of peace and security, including the UN Charter, Declaration on the Right of Nations to Peace, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
The General Staff makes a detailed analysis of the Balkan crisis and draws appropriate lessons both for Russia and Europe. Let me dwell on the military-political conclusions alone leaving out the strategic, economic and ideological aspects.
First, NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia has fundamentally changed the situation in Europe by demonstrating its readiness to continue to act in the spirit of the alliance's new strategy - to impose upon sovereign nations, at its own discretion and by force of arms, its own ideas of ending crisis situations.
Russia and other countries, which are not NATO members, are in for a difficult work to create a multipolar world based on strict observance of the UN Charter and international law. At the same time, there are no guarantees that NATO would not use the Yugoslav scenario against any other country including Russia.
Second, the alliance brought its troops into Yugoslavia under the guise of a peacekeeping operation thus taking up a strategic base of operations in the heart of Europe.
Third. In our opinion, NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia was the moment of truth as far as protection of Russia's national security is concerned. The new political thinking and the equal security principle once advocated by the West have vanished without a trace. The United States used the colossal surplus of force to consolidate its domination on the European continent.
Fourth. The aggression came as a continuation of the NATO leadership's policy aimed at consolidating its leading role in the newly constructed system of European and world security. A "small victorious war" of the most powerful military-political bloc against an independent and sovereign state was supposed to show to the world community NATO's efficiency, its readiness to meet security challenges. It is no accident that the alliance's anniversary summit went to the accompaniment of air strikes at Kosovo rather than to the sounds of triumphal marches.
Fifth. The United States is trying to take advantage of the inevitable differences between its European NATO partners (such differences are already in evidence) over the "peacekeeping" mission of the alliance in Yugoslavia to weaken the unity of the Council of Europe to prevent or to at least delay the formation of united Europe as a realistic rival of the United States in the financial-economic and political regard. It is no accident that the aggression followed precisely in the wake of the introduction of the euro, Europe's single currency.
In conclusion I would like to say that the military policy of the Russian Federation is being implemented within the fairway of the general policy of our state aimed at the construction of a multipolar world, secure Europe, equal partnership and good-neighborliness with all countries and peoples.
The essential condition for the protection of international security ought to be the creation of a model projected into the 21st century for the protection of global and regional security based on the principle of equality and equal guarantees for all.
The key objective today is to fully use the potential and the open nature of the OSCE to create a single economic area and a world based on the comprehensive security concept. Inside this area free of dividing lines, all the states will have the possibility to cooperate in a constructive manner complementing each other and developing relations of genuine partnership. I am convinced that united in our efforts to achieve peace and accord we will attain this objective in the 21st century.