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CIAO DATE: 04/01
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Our last "roundtable" discussion in 2000 was devoted to the main results of the year, closing the millennium — dramatic events, crucial for world politics in the near and more distant future, and rather chaotic, especially in our internal affairs.
What is going to happen along the main lines: Russia-the United States (especially considering the outcome of U.S. presidential elections); Europe: in particular, the prospect of Russia’s emerging from its virtual isolation from military-political, economic, and other unions and alliances in the Atlantic zone; and China, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific region.
What foreign policy and diplomacy will Russia need in the 21st century, which is presumably going to bring about considerable changes in the foreseeable future? To what extent do Russia’s security, foreign policy, military and information doctrines respond to the new environment?
These subjects were discussed at the International Affairs roundtable in which the following participated:
The discussion was moderated by International Affairs chief editor Boris Piadyshev.
We Have Not Made Any Particularly Foolish Mistakes in the Foreign Policy Sphere
B. PIADYSHEV:This past year was bound to differ considerably from earlier periods with their serene monarchic rule and their Byzantine "Family."
Last March, V.V. Putin became the country’s new president. Although a product of the "Family" himself, he left no doubt from the very outset that Russia and its politics were in for a new era.
The first, incomplete, year showed that the country was going to see a drastic change in the power structure and state political geography.
All of a sudden, the State Duma has taken a low profile while the Federation Council has many question marks about its future. A new structure — the State Council — with its general outline still very vague, is in the works. Political parties — both old and new — seem to be lying dormant. The vast country is being divided up into seven districts, which in principle makes sense.
Other processes are also under way. The omnipotent oligarchs and their lap-dog "truth seekers" in electronic and print media outlets — until recently courageous and daring — are increasingly taking a back seat. They have realized that it can be dangerous to mess with the state’s power structures.
And all of that is happening at a hitherto unseen pace. We cannot help sympathizing with most of what has been done, considering that Russia has emerged from the previous decade of reform seriously weakened, disintegrated, powerless, and humiliated. What is disturbing, however, is that along with the obvious "pluses" there are also some tangible "minuses." What could be the implications of that for the state as a whole?
The country has been confronted with some very serious internal difficulties. That is to say nothing about the tragedies, coming one after another: the sinking of the Kursk submarine in the Barents Sea, the bomb attack in downtown Moscow with heavy casualties, and the plight of millions of people that the government is in no position to help.
Foreign policy is part of the problem.
In the outgoing year, it started from a very low point — the OSCE Summit in Istanbul — where, in the expression of Belarusian President A. Lukashenko, they wiped their feet on us, and the suspension of our voting rights in the Council of Europe, which decided that not every country may defend itself against terrorists and bandits.
Nonetheless, our diplomacy is taking the upper hand — with its pro-active, dynamic approach. The pace of the work is highly intense. The president has talks with his vis-à-vis in one country over lunch, has dinner in another, and in the morning he steps off the presidential plane in yet another.
The foreign minister is constantly on the move, maintaining contacts and performing various missions. It’s like in one U.S. movie: "If we are in Brussels, therefore it’s Tuesday." If we are negotiating with the French today, then it’s Wednesday.
It seems that we have not made any particularly foolish mistakes in the foreign policy sphere during this year.
It is only that an end to the war in Chechnya — strange, just like the first war that began under Yeltsin — is nowhere near in sight.
V. NIKONOV:I would like to make a few comments on year-end results. I believe that it has been one of the most successful years (if not the most successful) in Russian diplomacy.
During this year, Russia has succeeded in returning to the international arena that we left in late 1999. Remember the situation as it was a year ago? We were only talked about in connection with the "Family," corruption, Russia’s economic plight, and Chechnya. That was all there was to it. Now the situation has changed drastically. What is important is that the changes did not come about overnight — in fact, they did not come about until after the presidential election. Russia’s economic plight, Chechnya, and so forth took a back seat. After the U.S. presidential elections, the question of who lost Russia is losing all relevance and topicality. We did not have to yield any positions, which is also surprising, considering the pattern that has emerged in the past decade.
The conceptual basis of Russian politics has clearly changed — not only following the adoption of new doctrines (they are, rather, evidence of political continuity), but also from the point of view of policy objectives and priorities. This has been a third change of foreign policy doctrine in the 1990s. The first was the Kozyrev doctrine, which I see as pro-U.S. The second was the Primakov doctrine, which, I believe, was, essentially a multi-vector/alternative doctrine. And finally, today we have to deal with the Putin doctrine, which I am so far feel hard to define, but which could, for convenience, be described as "Russian Gaullism." Just as under de Gaulle, the intention is — while having to act in a far from friendly environment — to preserve independence, pragmatism, and dynamism.
Indeed, in the diplomatic sphere, Putin does within a week what it would have taken Boris Yeltsin a year to do. This is a basically new level of diplomacy, as it were. With priority given to internal politics, Putin, more than his predecessors, is associated with the Russian foreign policy school favoring Russia’s integration into the globalizing world.
Russia’s foreign policy priorities have also changed.
The first priority is, without a doubt, the CIS. That was unacceptable for Kozyrev. It was more acceptable for Primakov — importantly, in two contexts: in the context of building a common market and in the context of building a collective security system. I believe that by far the most important change that we have seen in 2000 has been an effective transition to a "multi-track" concept: a clear multi-level integration within the CIS, the relations with various countries being built depending on the extent to which they are ready to integrate with Russia. On the one hand, there is a consolidating core of the CIS — Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. On the other, relationships with all countries are being built on a general basis, as it were. In this context, there is reason to talk about a consolidation of the core and the shedding of whatever poorly lends itself to integration. There is even some evidence of aggravating relations with countries that do not particularly reckon with Russian interests. I am talking of Georgia.
The second priority, I believe, is Western Europe, which to a large extent is the result of Europe’s importance for us as an economic partner. There is as yet no answer to the question, raised earlier, about the possibility of overcoming the virtual isolation from military-political and other unions and alliances in the Atlantic zone. Moreover, I believe that Russia has already seen for itself that it cannot effectively integrate into European or Euro-Atlantic structures. This is a very sober conclusion, which was not made until recently, showing that there is a kind of a line that cannot be crossed.
Despite objections, especially from the military, we have seen a closer interaction with the European Union. While realizing that there is no way we can join the EU or NATO but nonetheless not giving up cooperation with them, Putin has become our first leader who not only realistically set the task of Russia’s integration into a globalizing economy, but also took some specific steps toward that end. I believe that Russia’s application to join the WTO is a truly revolutionary event for Russian diplomacy and the Russian economy alike. It is most likely that we will be integrating into Western structures through the WTO, but at the same time maintaining relations with the main Euro-Atlantic structures. Unfortunately, the main problems in Europe have not received any long-term solution. I mean, above all, the problem of NATO expansion, which has now just been put on hold, and the problem of EU enlargement, the implications of which have yet to be fully appreciated by the Russian political elite and the Russian government.
The third priority of Putin’s doctrine is Asia. Again, there are two dimensions: advancement of relations with the "giants" — China, Japan, and India, and on the other hand, the need to deal with instability along the entire Islamic salient. Clearly, the main threats to Russian security are concentrated in the south. Meanwhile, great economic opportunities are concentrated in the east. Still, both the threats and the opportunities are, rather, of a potential character, not manifesting themselves in the short term as yet.
There have been no breakthroughs in the east. In fact, the only important diplomatic achievement this year has been the intensification of efforts in the oil sphere in interaction with China and possibly, also with Japan. The energy sphere will retain its importance in the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, little progress has been made in other spheres.
Things could change in the future, though. Thus far, however, the development of cooperation in the transport sphere, which has received so much publicity, seems to be reaching a deadlock. Our hope of emerging as a transport corridor between East Asia and Europe are unlikely to come true. At any rate, the Japanese were surprised to hear Minister Aksenenko talk about Russia’s plans of carrying Japanese goods to Western Europe while he could not answer one very simple question: What were they actually going to carry by rail? If it was machinery and equipment, the Japanese were already producing them in Europe. If it was shipments of computer chips from Japan to Europe, the Transsiberian Railway line was unnecessary for that: Just one airplane was enough for that.
Our fourth priority this year was, I believe, the United States — unusually low on the list of priorities for the world’s sole superpower. How did that come about?
The objective process — namely, an asymmetry of capabilities — has been in place throughout the 1990s with Russia’s increasingly distancing itself from the United States. In 2000, the United States did not see Russia as an important enough political player to give priority to its concerns. That resulted in an appreciable narrowing of the "agenda" of Russian-U.S. relations with economic relations virtually dropping from the agenda.
Center stage was taken by arms control with no progress being made but, fortunately for us, with no threatening developments either. Even so, the reason for that lay in internal political struggles in the United States. The lame-duck president does not make decisions on key matters of national security. So, no historic decisions can be expected before January 20 of next year — that is, if a new U.S. president is elected by that time. As far as the outcome of U.S. presidential elections is concerned, I believe that the Republicans are better for us: In the past, we somehow came to terms with them, and they also have a more decent foreign policy establishment. There are fewer representatives there of what I would describe as the East European foreign policy school, which is somewhat biased against Russia. Given the great number of problems that we are confronted with, the Democrats are always stepping on our toes. While there are more serious, glaring contradictions with the Republicans, they only exist on a narrow range of problems. Moreover, these problems can be predicted with near absolute certainty: the ABM Treaty, Iran, and our missile and space cooperation with China. And that is all.
Our contradictions with the Democrats are not so acute but they exist on an unlimited number of issues, including the Caspian, Russia’s human rights record, the economic policy of the Russian Central Bank, NATO expansion, freedom of the press, and elections in Kazakhstan. All of that is a subject of our contradictions with the Democratic administration. The Democrats are in no hurry to deploy a national missile defense system, but at the same time they are reluctant to reduce offensive strategic weapons, refusing to go beyond the level of 2,500 warheads.
The Republicans are pushing for a national missile defense system but do not want to hold any arms control negotiations with Russia. At the same time, they are going to cut strategic offensive armaments to 1,500 and even to 1,300 or 1,250 warheads, as some Republicans officially said recently.
Either position leaves us some room to maneuver. Even having taken a tough stance, we can always find a loophole, a gap to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the United States on arms control problems.
"Reform" Is Too Big a Word For Changes in Our Foreign Policy
A. ADAMISHIN: I get the impression that the country’s foreign policy is the most affected by the Soviet legacy. Look at what great changes have occurred in the economic sphere, where we have moved from a planned system to a market economy. It’s a market economy the way we see it, but still the private sector accounts for 70 percent of GDP. These changes have been matched by changes in the political sphere. From a monopoly party with a totalitarian regime to elements of democratic rule. There have also been some impressive changes in the state structure: from a unitary state to a federative state with the regions playing a very important role.
This list could easily be expanded. I am not even talking about the country’s territory, the dwindling population, the declining resources, including transport resources, outlets to the sea, and so forth. Moreover, the backtracking that occurred during this time also points to the country’s basically new condition.
Meanwhile, foreign policy, essentially, continues to follow the Soviet course. It has yet to become Russia-specific. So, for starters, I would like to propose reform of Russia’s foreign policy.
After all, we are talking about reform in the economic, social, and even military sphere. For some reason, however, not much is being said about reform of the foreign policy sphere, even though I believe that this is a highly topical task. It concerns both foreign policy concept in general and basic principles of organization and implementation of this policy.
I would like to close at this point, hoping for an opportunity to spell out my vision of reform in the foreign policy sphere later on.
A. TORKUNOV: Concerning what Anatolii Leonidovich has just said. I think that we will be very interested to hear his ideas about reform of foreign policy concept as a whole and its practical implementation.
I cannot help agreeing with the view that in some spheres we are indeed playing a role that we inherited from the Soviet era. I believe that this is only natural.
It is probably more difficult to reform foreign policy than anything else. It depends not only on the situation within the country or the extent to which the country as a whole is being reformed, but also — and to a very large degree — on obligations that were assumed earlier, including those that have implications in international law. Sure, foreign policy also depends on the country’s geopolitical situation and traditions that somehow or other evolved in the foreign policy sphere — incidentally, not only in the Soviet but also in the pre-Soviet era.
Hence the need for circumspection in reforming the foreign policy sphere today. Although I think it would be wrong to say that it is not changing at all. A new foreign policy concept was adopted, which substantially differs from previous concepts that were adopted in the post-perestroika era. New priorities were defined — something the previous speaker has pointed out. One of these priorities, which is becoming increasingly important, has to do with Russia’s economic development, including a view of particular aspects of our foreign policy through the prism of pure pragmatism — above all, prospects for the country’s economic and social advance and the fulfillment of tasks that were set in the domestic policy sphere.
On the other hand, we are probably not working hard or consistently enough along these lines. This, however, is, above all, due to the fact that we are still in a state of transition, which presupposes a measure of uncertainty, vacillation, and a search for optimal solutions. We should also bear in mind the country’s vast territory. Also, inertia and sluggishness, which, unfortunately, are deeply rooted, not only in the Soviet era. Hence the rather slow pace of reform in the foreign policy sphere. Nonetheless, there has been some progress.
T. BAGIROV: First of all, I would like to thank you for inviting me to take part in this discussion. I understand that I am already a member of the journal’s editorial advisory board; we have an excellent relationship with the journal while some of you attended our presentation of a special issue of International Affairs, devoted to problems of oil and gas strategy and foreign policy.
As far as Anatolii Leonidovich’s reform proposal is concerned, I would like to say that in our view — that is to say, the view of the organization that I represent here, which includes major oil and gas companies, above all, in Russia — pragmatism and economic interests have begun to take center stage. The Foreign Ministry and Russia’s entire foreign policy machine have started more fully to take the interests of the real economic sector into account.
There is no need to dwell on this, but I would just like to remind you that Russia’s oil and gas sector accounts for almost 50 percent of the country’s overall budget revenues, and so it would be wrong to disregard its interests.
In this context, I would also like to inform you about the establishment of such a unique organization as the Russian-U.S. Business Cooperation Council. We at the Moscow International Petroleum Club took a direct part in creating it while I was one of the three people who signed a letter to the president. Vladimir Vladimirovich (Putin) backed our initiative. There was plenty of debate, but it is quite clear that the establishment of this public organization in Russia — a counterpart to the American-Russian Business Council in the United States — shows that informal relations in the political sphere are becoming increasingly important with NGOs, to a certain extent, taking on the role as economic diplomacy vehicles.
As I said, there were heated debates. We heard objections to the effect that the state was playing too big a role in creating that organization. But we are following our unique Russian path. Russia is still in a transition stage. So it would be extremely difficult to attain the goals and uphold the interests that have evolved in this strategically important sphere, without coordination with state and government structures.
That brought about the idea of setting up a board of trustees. Incidentally, sitting at this table are two of its respected members: Anatolii Vasil’evich Torkunov and Boris Dmitrievich Piadyshev. Our Board of Trustees defines the organization’s main strategic priorities without interfering in its day to day operation. It is headed by two noted figures — V.S. Chernomyrdin and N.D. Egorov, professor of St. Petersburg University — who, without a doubt, will make an important contribution to Russian-U.S. cooperation despite some running day to day problems. The president of the Board is your colleague, Ambassador Iulii Mikhailovich Vorontsov.
V. NIKOLAENKO: Dear friends, I am happy to see such a stimulating, in-depth discussion. Anatolii Leonidovich, as always, sets what I would say is an offbeat tone for our discussion, and the questions that he has posed certainly deserve consideration.
This, in particular, applies to his comment to the effect that Russia's foreign policy is, as it were, a follow-up on the Soviet policy while Russia has yet to formulate its own foreign policy. There should be continuity, the force of tradition, and the force of inertia. Yet, it ought to be borne in mind that vital interests are always there. Even though the geopolitical situation has changed, Russia's interests are essentially similar to Soviet interests — considering its geographic, economic, and defense capability, and so forth.
It is another matter how these interests were upheld. For example, in the first decade, Russia's security interests — seen in the CIS context — were given a very low priority. Anatolii Leonidovich was the minister and he knows that matters of creating a unified defense area within the CIS framework were addressed when a collective security treaty — a sphere that I represent here — was seen as a second-rate to a mass of other matters brought up for discussion at CIS forums.
Recently, with the general turnaround that we are seeing with the advent of the new president, Russia’s security and its vital interests are being given a much higher priority. The new foreign policy concept formulates a new approach to many matters, including our position in the world, relations with our allies, and relations with other countries and groups of countries. Sure, as far as security matters are concerned, the thrust here is being placed on our close allies. In the past year, contacts along the lines of the Collective Security Treaty were aimed to turn this treaty from an amorphous, non-binding document into one imposing some clear-cut obligations on the member states. While the Treaty remained basically what it was when it was signed in 1992, the main emphasis is now placed on how to relate to it, how to interpret it, and how to use it in practice.
I am not saying that some revolutionary changes have occurred, but at any rate, the sphere of responsibility of each member state has been defined far more clearly than ever before. This new approach is evolving on the basis of a general approach to regional, international, and military problems. This also serves as a good framework for a common security policy, opening new prospects, even though the geopolitical situation of Russia and of all signatories to the Treaty as well as of all CIS states is overall and in the main rather complex. Challenges are emerging from different approaches adopted by different states in upholding their national interests. At the same time, new opportunities for cooperation are opening. In any event, the developments occurring within the framework of our union, our Commonwealth — insofar as concerns the Collective Security Treaty — provide favorable conditions for increasing our weight and influence in the world.
Iu. KAPRALOV: I really like the way our discussion is proceeding. As for the issue of reform, raised by Anatolii Leonidovich, perhaps we can only address the subject after we have heard Anatolii Leonidovich spell out his position in detail.
I believe that on the positive side of this year is the fact that strategic stability has been preserved, given the changes that have occurred in the country, is a very important achievement. We ourselves are not always in a position to appraise the depth and implications of the changes while in the outside world they are seen differently, making some people happy and scaring others. Because our country is so big and has such a big potential and considerable strategic forces, the changes have also been very big. These changes can arouse not only interest but also some apprehension.
What is of principal importance, though, is that, first, the line toward preserving strategic stability was already in place and second, it was successfully pursued throughout the year. Take, for example, the presentation by our minister at the UN General Assembly in New York, which he devoted almost entirely to strategic stability in the broad sense of the word. It is noteworthy that the concept of strategic stability came under attack from many countries at the conference on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. An entirely new aspect came up. The main thing, however, was that we not only managed to maintain strategic stability but also to take an active stance on the matter.
Russia urges other countries to follow the path of nuclear disarmament without any delays and without interrupting the dialogue on matters of vital importance for international security and strategic stability. On November 13, President V. Putin came up with a new initiative on this score.
In stressing Russia's readiness for even deeper cuts of strategic nuclear armaments, we of course proceed from our national interests. It is also important to take into account the fact that the pro-disarmament mood in the world has been growing while strategic stability has been strengthening, which, in our view, will help deal with numerous crisis situations.
The Russian initiative calls for positive cooperation. It is not aimed at confrontation, considering everything that has been done to date in arms control and disarmament, in particular strategic armaments.
We have been encouraged by initial reaction from the United States to our proposals. Russia constantly maintains contacts with the U.S. side both on the political and on the expert level. In the past year, there have been several expert meetings to discuss strategic offensive weapons, the ABM Treaty, and strategic stability as a whole. In the past several months, as of this July, the Russian and the U.S. presidents have made a number of statements while the September 6 joint statement, adopted in New York, maps out a specific program of cooperation in this sphere.
Sure, Russia did not prepare its new initiative on purpose: We did not expect the U.S. presidential elections to drag on for so long. Naturally, it would have been next to impossible to predict that. But this fundamental course toward arms control and cuts, pursued by Russia, reflects the country's fundamental interests on these matters.
The initiative had been prepared long before it was made public. This is a position and a signal for the new U.S. administration — provided it has political will — to advance along with us, without any delays, toward radical cuts in strategic offensive armaments. After all is said and done, it will enable us to continue to deal with — more peacefully, if you will — our internal problems and our domestic reforms which are of vital interest to us, so much hinging on their outcome.
A. STEPANOV: I believe Anatolii Leonidovich has floated an idea that is intriguing inasmuch as it has not been spelled out in detail. This helps promote discussion, encouraging additional considerations one way or the other. I would say that what is needed today is not reform per se but, rather, new approaches, new concepts and new ideas, in harmony with the times. A new era is coming although much from the outgoing century will still be there.
It is above all necessary to strengthen the conceptual basis of our foreign policy. This should be not just one doctrine but a complex of ideas and concepts on specific problems and specific regions. I would like to give you just one example.
I worked for seven years as ambassador in two small countries — Switzerland and, as nonresident ambassador, in Liechtenstein. I could see for myself how difficult it was to improve relations with them. It took a great deal of effort to persuade, say, Kozyrev to finally visit Bern. He would say: "What for?" Everyone was going to Geneva or Davos, but no one was coming here to promote contacts with the country, giving it the attention that it duly deserved. Ditto Liechtenstein.
I believe there is a measure of arrogance here. It has always been there. In the past, during the confrontation era, we gave higher priority to the problem of allies, semi-allies, fellow travelers, and so forth. Unfortunately, there is none of that today.
Meanwhile, the humanitarian action Focus, initiated by Switzerland and with participation of Greece and Russia, came as a kind of political challenge to the United States and its NATO allies, who in 1999 began air strikes against Yugoslavia. Focus participants provided humanitarian assistance to all victims of the aggression — both in the FRY, including Montenegro, and in the province of Kosovo. Russia made available transport facilities and specialists. A representative of the Russian Emergency Situations Ministry took part in the operation of the Bern based headquarters on a permanent basis. The Russian Embassy also took an active part in the action. While NATO carried on all sorts of intrigues, it did not dare thwart Focus. When there did not happen to be a force to stop the aggression, the aforementioned states, including one neutral and another, a member of the selfsame bloc, openly stood up for the fundamental human right: the right to life.
To date, opponents of the policy of neutrality, following the behest of G.F. Dalles, who described it as "amoral," are working hard to see it turn khaki, so to speak. From time to time, voices are heard saying that the neutral status is purportedly an outdated notion. It is highly indicative that neutral states themselves do not think so.
In the 1990s, Russia's developing cooperation and interaction with Europe's two small states — I am referring to Switzerland and Liechtenstein — was accompanied by close bilateral contacts in addressing some important practical matters. The interests and specifics of such states should be treated with respect and understanding while their constructive initiatives should be supported in every possible way. They should feel that their foreign policy orientation is not something that only they themselves need, but that it finds support insofar as it serves generally accepted ideals.
If Russian diplomacy continues to follow a constructive course toward the policy of neutrality and its exponents, that will facilitate an effective application of principles enshrined in the UN Charter, the Helsinki Act, and OSCE documents, in international relations. After all, this directly affects the interests of dozens of sovereign states, including in Eastern Europe and the CIS, putting NATO's "Drang nach Osten" in the right perspective.
K. KOSACHEV: One purely practical question arises: Where could Russia's foreign policy manifest itself at a time when we are just picking up economic strength? Mainly, I believe, in the sphere of international law. As long as Washington is trying on the uniform of the world policeman, we can counterbalance that by standing up for fairness and objectivity, taking on, if you will, oversight, prosecutor’s, functions. Russia should not allow or ignore any instances of arbitrariness or dictate in international affairs. Sure, there is no need to intervene at the drop of a hat but it is critical to react to unlawful actions wherever they might come from, appealing to international forums, above all, to the UN and the OSCE, and revitalizing and consolidating their status, and building a closer relationship with states sharing our positions.
The UN Charter was adopted more than half a century ago. Above all, it laid down the rules of conduct for states in relations with each other. Meanwhile, it virtually lacks any provisions concerning the situation within an individual state: human rights, interethnic conflicts, and so forth. These problems, however, have acquired special relevance and topicality today.
Twenty-five years ago, the Helsinki Act enshrined in international law the principle that human rights violation or the use of force in intercommunal conflicts cannot be just the internal affair of an individual state.
At the same time the format of intervention and, most important, criteria for that intervention have yet to be defined in acts of international law. Hence the arguments used by "interventionists": While we wait for a UN Security Council resolution, pleading with Russia and China, it will be too late to act. So, it is better to grant NATO the right to punish or pardon — moreover, on a selective basis: While Serbs should take punishment for maltreating Albanians, Turks cannot be punished for maltreating Kurds.
Humanitarian crusades should be stopped, and thus far Russia is the only state in a position to do that. The question is, should we orient ourselves towards the established structures — the UN, the OSCE, and others — or should we look for new forms and formulas of interaction? Our Western partners are saying in one voice that the times have changed and so forms of cooperation should also change. Who is right is the subject of a separate discussion, but ignoring your partners' considerations could involve a big risk of ending up in isolation again and missing the train that is fast picking up speed.
The emphasis placed on the economic and international-law components does not of course mean that the military component is neglected. Here, too, diplomatic methods are required to achieve results. First of all, the United States should not be allowed to dismantle the ABM regime. It is critical to continue the disarmament dialogue with Washington with a view to signing the START III Treaty as soon as possible. At the same time thorough defense planning will be required with priority given to modern, state of the art weapon systems.
In any event, in the foreseeable future we will have to meet new challenges mainly in verbal form owing to our limited resources and capabilities. To reiterate: Thus far we are not in a position to turn around the course of international relations. We will need to work hard, step by step, to get a place in the sun. The alternative — self-isolation — is simply ruinous for Russia, above all, owing to its economic weakness. When political good will is not followed up by economic support, good will just fades away.
The West and the United States: Rivals or Allies?
A. ADAMISHIN: Just like many of my colleagues here, I am quite happy with the changes in our foreign policy that have occurred with the advent of President V. Putin. On the other hand, I am afraid that it is a little too much to compare the present situation to what it was in the past decade.
Why did I talk about the need to reform our foreign policy? I would like to see more doctrinal transparency — importantly, not PR or propaganda transparency, but a clear understanding for ourselves. When it is said that we have a "Gaullist" foreign policy, I am ready to go along with that. Very well. Although there is an appreciable gap between the way we envision it and the way it is presented for propaganda purposes.
Above all, it is critical to bridge the gap between our vision of the world and the way it actually is. In this respect, we live in virtual reality world — not least because of our hard 70-year legacy, when we took on obligations that we could not possibly meet, playing the world messiah, and hoping to change the world. There is no need to say how that ended up for us.
Second, we need to overcome the phantom limb pain of a superpower. Phantom limb pain is when a limb — say, a leg — has been cut off but continues to hurt. We still believe that we are just another superpower. This belief is not just held by many but it breaks out into the open for all to see. Here, we are making a big mistake — not only theoretical, because we are not another superpower, given the state that our country is now in — but we are also making a number of practical mistakes, including financial losses. We are spending too much on maintaining our former power — oftentimes needlessly. At the same time, I would like to stress that neither should we indulge in self-abasement.
I believe that there is a substantial difference between a superpower, or great power, and a great nation, or a great people. A great nation — no one is going to take that away from us. Meanwhile, geopolitically, now we are not a superpower. We need to decide what we want, making a choice: either reemerge as a superpower, and then whatever resources we will accumulate or create will be spent on that; or become a great nation that does not particularly care whether it is a great power.
All of this calls for a major reappraisal, psychologically speaking, since it is not at all easy to abandon such aspirations. Meanwhile, a person saying that Russia should cut its coat according to its cloth, finding a niche in conformity with its actual status, is immediately seen as unpatriotic.
Third, the character of the external threat. To date it has been assumed — with good cause, too — that the main threat to Russia comes from within. No one can do us as much harm as we can do ourselves. Russia's main external threat, however, is once again seen in the West. Consider Russia's new foreign policy concept: It says that Russia is confronted with new challenges and threats, but then again it is the United States, the West, NATO expansion, and so forth.
Psychologically, this is quite understandable. For decades we had been in a state of war, which — to be blunt — we lost. So, some people are aching for revenge. A state of danger is a source of sustenance to many. Yet I am sure that the West is not the main threat to Russian interests, especially if we clearly formulate Russia's main interests.
I believe that this is, above all, preservation of the country's territorial integrity, and this is not just pure rhetoric, since the country could sustain territorial losses with its "territorial existence" being called into question. Next, economic, social, and other troubles. From this perspective, the West and the United States are not our rivals but, quite the contrary, could in fact become our allies. They irk us by their policy, double standards, and so forth, but I absolutely agree that the main threats come from the south, and, to be quite frank, from the Far East.
A serious threat is lurking there. As a result of a demographic crisis, a mere 5 million Russians live between the Baikal and the Pacific. This is where our positions are the most exposed. Within the Russia-U.S.-China triangle, our place is clearly unbalanced. Using China as a counterweight to the U.S. influence in Central Asia is seen here as an achievement. But it is critical to strike the right balance. Misperceptions inherited from the Soviet era could lead to serious mistakes in the geopolitical sphere. Here is one problem that worries me greatly today.
There is a risk of letting us be dragged into the Afghan conflict again. Granted, we should defend our southern borders. Granted, we cannot leave Central Asian countries without our assistance. But to go in there, to say that we will bomb the Talibs, to provide open assistance to the Northern Alliance or for the Russian defense minister to meet with Mahsood — I believe all of these are ill-advised moves. I remember only too well our past history — the way we were drawn into Afghanistan in the late 1970s. To a very large extent it was the Americans who provoked us into that. Now, too, the Americans have similar aspirations: Let us go in together against the Talibs. Then the Talibs will surrender bin Laden to them and they will reverse the front.
Finally, Russian foreign policy should be made more target oriented. Thus far it is too unfocused. There are too many foreign policy foci and a general lack of direction. This is wrong. To return to the British experience: It would hardly suit us at present. But the British Foreign Office is in charge of foreign policy, intelligence operations, economic cooperation, and cultural activity. Everything is concentrated in one place. And this mechanism has been working effectively for more than just one century.
A. STEPANOV: In 2000, we had to make up lost ground, adjusting particular elements of our foreign policy. Does it need reforming? After all is said and done, I do not think so. At the turn of the 21st century the role of diplomacy as such — of peacekeeping and mediation efforts will be growing. Long-term and short-term analysis of the ongoing processes in all of their aspects presupposes a joining of efforts by scholars and practitioners representing in effect all spheres of human activity.
It is, therefore, expedient to set up a national research center that would deal with the entire spectrum of matters concerning international development and Russia's foreign policy — with a view to working out conceptual guidelines and practical recommendations. It should concentrate the best minds, the best theoreticians and practitioners. This center would also rely in its activity on the scientific potential of the Russian Academy of Sciences and its establishments, leading universities and institutions of higher education.
A. ADAMISHIN: From the practical viewpoint, I support Andrei Ivanovich's idea, to the effect that there should be more scientific research centers that would thoroughly analyze the situation in the world. We can only envy the Americans who have a great number of such centers, where people are not just engaged in research activity but are also preparing a replacement.
A. TORKUNOV: I think that the main national idea that is possible for Russia today is to ensure a normal, decent life for its citizens so that they would understand that their well-being is indeed a top priority for the state — wherever they may live: in a remote village or in Tverskaia Street in downtown Moscow. Indeed, we have a most solid foundation — national culture that incorporates so many brilliant ideas and intellectual and moral values. There is no need for the state to "inventory" ideas, as is being done now, bureaucratic-style. It should not be forgotten that there is no way Russia with its 2 percent of the world GDP can be ranked among the great powers. It is better to give people an opportunity to make a decent living and enjoy, at their leisure, the great Russian culture and literature as well as any other culture and literature created on Russian territory. Yet it must be said, in fairness, that it is unlikely that stereotypes and old memories could be shed any time soon.
That Briefcaseful of Dollars Did Not Belong to Us
V. NIKOLAENKO: We certainly hope that Russia will preserve its integrity, without any separatist trends. This is the foundation of our policy — preservation of a unified Russia and with a unified territory.
Meanwhile, the post-Soviet area is seeing a process of fragmentation with a number of new formations emerging. At the same time multi-level integration should not be mistaken for further fragmentation of this entire area. In this context, the task of our diplomacy is to find a median line, ensuring respect for the right of nations to express their identity in some forms or other, and at the same time preserving a certain measure of unification from the point of view of our common interests — not like in the Collective Security Treaty, but it is important for us to preserve this unified post-Soviet area while working out new approaches to integration.
We should also pursue integration in relations with countries that are unwilling to integrate in a traditional mode — especially given that now Russia is increasingly moving away from its old role as Big Brother. It is important to look for more appropriate forms — say, in relations with Moldova and other countries. It is critical to take the economic factor into account, as was pointed out earlier by Togrul Adilevich Bagirov.
I would not say so categorically that we cannot possibly integrate into Europe. Nor would I say that Russia is not a great power. Today there is no need for us to integrate into Europe. Yet, this could be important for raising our living standards and for embracing universal moral values and economic principles. Even so, integration — or globalization for that matter — should not proceed entirely on terms set by the other side. Europe has yet to define the meaning of European defense identity. Nor do we have a clear understanding of it since this concept has yet to be formulated.
The outgoing year has seen a new threat materialize: terrorism and extremism. Its main breeding base is Afghanistan. What is important is that, among other things, this threat goes beyond our old stereotypes of confrontation with the United States and the West. Just the opposite — it is, rather, a unifying factor. No wonder Trubnikov has been meeting Pickering. This global threat — it is not only ourselves who see it as such — could effectively consolidate us.
It is another matter that Russia should not take on the role of sword and shield, as it did during the Tatar-Mongol invasion. Collective forms are paramount here. We should not unilaterally get involved in the internal Afghan conflict but should pool our efforts to collectively meet these new threats. In this context — both in line with the treaty and in line with the general logic — we regard encroachments on our neighbors, including our front line, Tajikistan, as encroachments on Russia itself. And this is right. Otherwise we will end up confronted with a very serious threat indeed.
A. TORKUNOV: South Asia as well as Asia as a whole will require increasing attention in the future. This is a region where there are still some unresolved problems that arose back during World War II: division of the Korean Peninsula; the absence of a formal peace treaty between Russia and Japan; Taiwan, and many territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea. These factors constitute a potential threat of conflict.
Another problem in this context is that it is not entirely clear how the national division/reunification issue is going to be addressed in principle. Furthermore, there are ongoing territorial disputes and disputes over the use of sea areas. Also, the absence of a basic framework for a security system in the region. Add here the increasing gap in economic development among densely populated countries, uncontrolled emigration, ethnic and communal tensions, and you will see that there is an array of negative factors despite recent positive shifts, above all in economic development.
There is still a rather serious potential threat, including for Russia's national interests, especially given Russia’s substantially declining role in the region. Today the balance of forces has changed in favor of China with the United States taking a somewhat lower profile, which also causes concern among countries in the region, creating additional tensions. There is a heated debate in Russia over its policy in the east. This comes through in our agenda, as presented by Boris Dmitrievich (Piadyshev). It will also be recalled that such debate has been going on for the past 100 years, especially at the beginning of the 20th century.
Speaking in the city of Blagoveshchensk, the president, perhaps for the first time ever, outlined some prospects for development of the Far East and Siberia. I would very much like to hope that this is not just another declaration but readiness to go ahead with translating specific ideas into practice. Talking about specific projects in recent years, they have mainly been carried out in the sphere of military-economic cooperation since we basically failed to penetrate eastern markets, in particular losing most tenders, including for some large-scale projects.
It is very important that the president pointed to some large-scale projects that could effectively involve Siberia and the Far East into the process of globalization. These regions could emerge as an energy bridge from Russia to Japan via the Sakhalin, from Tomsk Oblast to Western China with a gas pipeline from Irkutsk to Eastern China, and then on to North and South Korea. Thus, Western and Eastern Siberia and the Far East have a good opportunity to integrate into the system of economic relations in the Asia Pacific region.
At this point, however, the question arises of how all of this will be done — in particular, bearing in mind the factors mentioned earlier by Anatolii Leonidovich. That is to say nothing about the fact that there is no infrastructure — but let us assume that implementation of these projects will help put it in place. What is far worse is the near catastrophic demographic situation there with no hope that it could get better any time soon. Of course, Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians living in CIS countries could be encouraged to migrate there but without large-scale investment this is a non-starter. Meanwhile, there is a strong ongoing demographic pressure from the outside. There is growing illegal Chinese migration to the region. Reportedly, there are millions of illegal aliens there; true, these figures are often contested.
I believe that while pursuing the course toward incorporating our regions of Siberia and the Far East into the globalization process, carrying out large- and small-scale projects and attracting foreign investment, we should also think of how we could conceivably legalize all of those illegal aliens in the Far East, putting in place an appropriate legal framework for their presence on Russian territory. This is of course a very delicate and complex matter, but still, we need to give consideration to it to make sure that the ongoing demographic changes do not result in these areas breaking away from Russia, but quite the contrary, providing conditions for an effective use of the new work force that is emerging in the Far East, mainly as a result of illegal migration.
Iu. KAPRALOV: I do not agree with those who say that our ambassadors do not reckon with economic interests. If only there was something to reckon with. I worked hard to that end in Angola for five years. What can I offer the Angolans? They say: Let us trade in arms — direct shipments without intermediaries. I say: okay. So what? At the time, in the early 1990s, every conceivable firm was engaged in money laundering operations. Our intelligence service still keeps all of that under wraps. Where are the businessmen that I — the ambassador — am supposed to promote? A Dutch man comes for a month with an empty briefcase. A month later, he leaves with his briefcase full of dollars: $250,000. And that, in an poverty stricken Angola that has waged a civil war. And it is still waging it. Where are our businessmen that I am supposed to help?
A. ADAMISHIN: I am rather disappointed by what Iurii Semenovich has just said — namely, that during his five-year stint in Angola he never saw a decent Russian company. There are such companies, of course. Sure, there are also plenty of crooks, I agree, but this is exactly the flaw of our organization because people do not know who is who in Russia. People in Moscow, the Foreign Ministry, should know this; people who issue appropriate directives should know this. When I tried — naively — to push for reform in the Foreign Ministry so that it would, among other things, support domestic business, I was often told at a very high level: "Who are you going to support — the mafia? Berezovskii?" We have a business segment today that is worthy of every support. If we wait until the situation in Russia becomes ideal, we will never get an opportunity to do anything along these lines.
A. PANKIN: Russia's credibility began to decline with the 1996 presidential election campaign that — in the scale of manipulation of the Russian public on the part of the authorities, even in the interests of preventing Communist revenge — crossed the line beyond which, in the Western eyes, the end could no longer justify the means. Then, President Yeltsin's prolonged illness and his not entirely adequate behavior, which made all but a laughingstock of him. Then, the August crisis, which exposed the inefficacy of the economic "reform course" and affected many foreign investors.
Western politicians and journalists alike saw that the policy that so much money, political support, and sympathies had gone into, turned out to be just a bluff. Even now Western media coverage of Russia is dominated by negative developments.
It must be said, in all fairness, that there are plenty of negative things in our life — something that we Russian journalists regularly highlight in our reports ourselves. It is simply that prior to August 1998, Western media gave Russia the benefit of the doubt. The situation now is the exact opposite.
That is not to say that Russia does not need Western public support or that it is doing all it can at least to minimize the damage. The authorities today give a very low priority to public relations. They fail to provide effective damage control, preempt their own actions that are bound to cause a negative reaction in foreign media, public and political circles. The timing for some decisions was extremely bad. Vladimir Gusinskii may be a controversial figure, but from the point of view of political technology, his arrest at a time when the president was away on a trip abroad, in the Stalin era would have qualified as "subversion."
Western journalists that I am regularly in contact with say that it is very difficult to obtain any information from government services such as, e.g., the Russian Information Center — even a response requiring just a simple "yes" or "no" answer. The person in charge of such an important subject as Chechnya has acquired a reputation as probably the worst press secretary in recent history. I only know one reporter who disagreed with that, ceding the dubious honor to Saddam Hussein's press secretary during the Gulf War.
Meanwhile, Western journalists are lazy people, who like nothing better than to copy press releases, including official releases. It is only important that they get press releases on time and that they are well written, taking the journalists' needs into consideration.
What do I, a person who takes more interest in domestic rather than international affairs, expect from our diplomacy in the future? Boris Dmitrievich Piadyshev, head of the Soviet delegation at the London Information Forum, held in the summer of 1989 within the framework of the Helsinki process, could have told you a great deal about the way the Soviet Foreign Ministry imposed democracy in the country. Just to grant Russian citizens access to fax or photo-copying machines, international obligations had to be assumed — to be used as a bargaining chip to pressure the Communications Ministry or the KGB.
In a sense, we are now going through a similar period. After 15 years of destruction (justified under Gorbachev and unjustified under Yeltsin), we have seen a new administration come to power that I believe is committed to the cause of creation. It will have to clear up a lot of mess, resorting to some tough action. It has been a historical pattern in Russia that tough action can easily pick up pace, turning into repression just for the sake of repression.
The Russian Foreign Ministry is an organization responsible for the way this country meets its international obligations, including in the sphere of human rights and democratic freedoms. Thus, it has a very important task to fulfill — namely, to prevent possible dangerous tendencies. On the other hand, reaction from the international community to our reality is far from always rational. Oftentimes they react just to a semblance or appearance without seeing the essence. So, I would also like Russian diplomacy to work on international partners to persuade them to act according to the "do not harm" principle.
Forecasts for 2001 and the More Distant Future
V. NIKONOV: I believe that the 21st century will be characterized by two main processes that are already underway now: globalization and the gradual transition of mankind to what is known as the "third wave" — that is to say, post-industrial, IT civilization.
In this context, the task of Russia's foreign policy is to ensure it the role as a center of the globalizing world, taking an active part in the globalization process, ensuring that it does not fall by the wayside. Either we take part in these processes, trying to maximize our role in matters of globalization, or we fall by the wayside, thus lagging behind — probably forever. There is no way we can get away from globalization, just as we could not escape the "second wave," known as industrialization. Those who did get out of it now live mostly in Africa and are not doing very well.
Now I would like to identify a number of what I see as important trends and specifics that will emerge in the 21st century.
First of all, it is the growing interweaving of internal and foreign policy. Even now it is rather difficult to separate internal policy out from foreign policy. This trend will continue in the future. There is a growing number of internal problems that are taking on a global character: financial problems, the environment, crime, and migration. All of this is absolutely inseparable from both internal and foreign policy.
Second, there will be a growing number of players in the world — that is to say, subjects playing on the diplomatic field. I am talking not just about an increase in the number of states, which is happening very rapidly. In the second half of the 20th century the number of states in the world had increased fivefold — from about 50 to 250, of which 189 are UN member states. Experts predict that by the mid-21st century there will be 500 states on our planet. And we once again have a chance to make a contribution to this cause, given that even in international law, the right of nations to self-determination is beginning to take precedence over state territorial integrity while this trend is fast gaining ground.
As well as an increase in the number of states the number of large non-state foreign policy subjects will be growing. Even now it is clear that Microsoft is playing no less important a role in the world that the governments of most states. In addition, there will be non-governmental global organizations that will also impact on foreign policy — from Greenpeace to various international financial and other institutions.
Regional integration will intensify. Global integration will not as yet be on the agenda of the 21st century, but regional integration will be a key trend in the 21st century. I believe that the number of NAFTA member states will grow to 30 or more within the next decade. The European Union will probably incorporate all states to the west of Russia, except Kaliningrad. Naturally, a single currency will be used in this area. The issue of global regulation will be taking on increasing urgency. Sure, there will not as yet be a global government in the 21st century. The question is what course the process of creating a global regulation system will take: either via UN channels, which is preferable for us, or via "G-7" channels (it is not as yet clear to what extent it will enlarge, but obviously there will be more than 10 members), or it will be exercised by a superpower, such as the United States.
I believe that we will see attempts at unilateral domination with a de-facto multi-polar world. Serious changes will occur within the factors-of-force system. Clearly, military components are receding, especially for developed states, with the financial power, the banking system, and consolidating information infrastructure taking center stage.
The military component and military factors will be manifesting themselves, rather, in the developing world, where a real arms race, including weapons of mass destruction, should be expected to begin in the foreseeable future. The 21st century will be a century of proliferation, rather than non-proliferation, of weapons of mass destruction. India and Pakistan will be followed by many other states, and it will be very difficult to stop them in that respect. This will cause mounting problems for the world at large.
Concerning the correlation of "high" and "low" diplomacy, the former will see its importance declining with the importance of the latter growing. When I talk of "high" diplomacy, I mean security matters, wars, peace treaties, and summit meetings. "Low" diplomacy involves financial policy, customs policy, and so forth. These matters will be increasingly taking center stage.
Finally, the number of foreign policy players within each state will be growing — in fact, it is already growing. We could see that especially in the 1990s, when there was an unlimited number of foreign policy players within the country. The Foreign Ministry was just one of them — moreover, I believe, not the key one. Anatolii Leonidovich made a good point there. If we look at the foreign policy problems that we have ended up with this year, we will see that they occurred not so much because of the Foreign Ministry — maybe they had nothing to do with the Foreign Ministry in the first place — as through insufficient interagency coordination — as a rule, on matters that require top-level intervention. I will mention just a few problems: Gusinskii, sinking of the Kursk submarine, and Yugoslavia are not purely Foreign Ministry problems nor is the Middle East a purely Foreign Ministry problem. Also, the debt problem, debt restructuring, above all, the debt to the Paris Club, and the failure of negotiations with the IMF. The Talibs are not a problem as yet, but they could well emerge as one even though this is also not quite a Foreign Ministry problem.
What is the bottom line? People now engaged in foreign policy need to sharply improve their competence and qualifications. This applies not only to the Foreign Ministry. These are people who engage in foreign policy — from LUKoil to the State Duma to the Defense Ministry to environmentalists to the Atomic Energy Ministry, etc. Oftentimes they are ill prepared to operate on the international arena. "Elimination of illiteracy" problems are just vital here or nothing will work out. Indeed, we to a very large extent inherited our understanding of foreign policy problems from the past era. There are far more experts on geopolitics, as it was understood in the previous century, than there are on, say, the WTO. Therefore, many of those engaged in the foreign policy sphere are qualified for the past century but not for the future.
Finally, coordination of foreign political activity as well as foreign economic activity, on the Foreign Ministry level, is absolutely essential. The Foreign Ministry is simply not in a position to cope with this single-handedly. Such coordination should be provided by the head of state and an appropriate agency that has yet to be put in place.
K. KOSACHEV: There is no cause to create panic and talk about a catastrophic worsening of Russia's positions. Thank God, no one is yet in a position to threaten us with external aggression or the use of military force or political pressure. The negative trends for the most part can still be reversed, but only provided that we adequately assess the new world in which Russia is to live in the next century.
Our main asset is that most countries in the world are really interested in Russia as an alternative center of power. No matter how these countries might relate to the United States or to Russia, they cannot put up with the U.S. emerging monopoly in world affairs.
Considering Russia's geopolitical situation, its foreign policy can only be multi-vector. Even if we want to, we will not be in a position to limit ourselves to just one country or a group of countries. When I hear our politicians talk to the effect that Russia, if necessary, could establish some "Eastern alliance" as a counterbalance to the United States, this makes me rather skeptical. Say, China is a great power, which will apparently retain its status in the future, and is hardly interested in an anti-U.S. alliance with Russia. Beijing is playing its own intricate game, taking into account its strengthening economic with the United States, its tortuous relations with Japan and India, and many other factors. Chinese leaders may talk about a multi-polar world, the threat of U.S. hegemony, and so forth, but these are just moves in their overall game, and so there should be no illusions.
Neither does India need any anti-U.S. front. Otherwise a more specific document would have been signed in the course of V. Putin's recent visit to that country than a general declaration on strategic partnership. That is to say, at this stage, permanent coalitions or unions are hardly useful, if possible at all. This of course does not rule out joint actions with particular states around specific international problems.
Therefore, from the tactical point of view, we need active, dynamic action on all lines while preserving room to maneuver. As for Russia's top foreign policy priority, it could be formulated as follows: promoting a favorable environment to ensure the growth of Russia's economic, political, military, intellectual, and information capability, better living standards, successful democratic reform, and human rights and freedoms.
When money talks, the world listens up. Let us look at India and China. Having exploded nuclear charges two years ago, the Indians nonetheless staged a rapprochement with the Americans, so to speak, free of charge. Is that a diplomatic victory by Delhi? Yes, it certainly is — but above all, it is the victory of money that the Americans are making in that country. Incidentally, in that respect India merely repeated the experience of China. Washington does not like it either, but it is possible, and beneficial, to deal with it in the economic sphere, and so Beijing, step by step, has been scoring victories in the foreign policy sphere.
The economic component should also play the key role in Russia’s foreign policy. The pragmatic approach adopted by the president on foreign policy is reassuring. We are opening up our internal markets to foreign investment. An important factor in our relations with the Baltic states is the building of ports and oil terminals in the Leningrad region. Ukraine is clearly nervous of our idea of building a gas pipeline bypassing it, to Europe via Poland. Turkey is involved in the Blue Stream project while Iran, despite U.S. sanctions, could reemerge among the recipients of Russian conventional weapons.
This should be so in future: Economic interests should come first and only then, development of political relations. The main thing that Russian diplomacy should do is learn to count. I have to admit that, strange as that may be, as a former aide to three Russian heads of government for international matters, I had never seen any coherent calculations or economic background papers to back up particular decisions made by the Russian political leadership. At times the impression was that economic departments were operating on their own turf while the Foreign Ministry was acting on its own turf, which were parallel, never intersecting or overlapping. Moreover, whatever economic analysis is made, Russian private business interests are never taken into account.
Without going into economic details, on the tactical level, two main lines could be proposed — on the assumption that the problems that have affected the national economy in the past several decades, set a number of objective limitations.
The first line is consistent integration into Eastern and Western economic unions — of course, in conformity with our own interests. Second, a course toward ensuring the most favored nation treatment for Russian export of goods and services and helping Russian exporters gain a foothold on foreign markets. One important step in this direction is the president’s recent decision to step up Russia’s efforts to join the World Trade Organization. Russia’s line in the EU, APEC, and other influential international trade and economic associations also requires a pro-active approach.
T. BAGIROV: Indeed, the year 2000 is a year of political stability, but above all it is a year of economic stability — mainly thanks to high oil and gas prices. So we should all thank our oil and gas complex. I would not like to be seen as a lobbyist, but nonetheless high prices and the stable operation of the oil and gas complex can help resolve all other problems, conduct the antiterrorist war in Chechnya, and address other priorities. I absolutely agree with those who say that the economic priority should become the top priority.
I would like to point to the great potential — the huge potential — including the peacemaking potential, of major energy projects. In particular, pipeline projects, which link not only Russian territories, including the rebellious Chechnya, but also the territories of some important countries in the former Soviet Union. So the problems that were inherited from the Soviet era — say, Karabakh and Abkhazia — can be addressed, among other things, through large-scale energy projects with Russia playing the leading role in their implementation.
Yet, putting in place conditions for economic leadership is just what the Foreign Ministry has been doing, especially in the past one to one and a half years. Let us be frank: To the U.S. ambassador or to the British ambassador or to other ambassadors, the interests of U.S., British, and other companies indeed come first. As far as our embassies are concerned, this has yet to become a priority.
And one final point. How should we describe the plan that Anatolii Leonidovich talked about earlier — reforms or conceptual changes or something else? I would describe it as modernization because we have entered a new century and, within just a few days, we will enter a new millennium — a new era. Many things are already happening and will continue to happen despite our will. We should not be afraid of this. We should only lead a normal life, putting economic interests above everything else. That of course includes the oil and gas sector.
B. PIADYSHEV: This final comment from Togrul Adilevich brings to mind the immortal: "We provide the ideas and you provide the gas." That did not work out, however. Those who have the gas, also have plenty of ideas of their own.
Exactly a year ago, several days before the end of 1999, we met at the same table to sum up year-end results and talk about prospects for the future. Because it was the end of the 20th century, we sought to review the whole of the past century. International Affairs had just conducted a poll, asking its participants to do the following:
Name three figures from the 20th century who had the most impact on the course of world politics and identify three events that had the most impact on the world at large in the 20th century.
The questions were sent to nearly 500 Russian politicians, diplomats, scholars, businessmen, and journalists. That produced lists including more than 100 positions each. The first three figures were named by a considerable majority regardless of whether it was in the positive or negative sense: V. Lenin, J. Stalin, and A. Hitler. It was left for the reader himself to decide who had ruled the 20th century: tyrants, men of genius, or pragmatic politicians.
The most important landmarks of the 20th century, as identified by the absolute majority, were as follows: the 1917 October Revolution in Russia; the victory of the anti-Nazi coalition in World War II (1941-1945); and the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the disintegration of the world Communist system (1989-1991). The 20th century has seen the birth and fall of ideologies, world wars with nuclear bombs dropped on cities, and dramatic breakthroughs in science and technology.
Soon a new year, 2001, will begin, and with it the 21st century and the third millennium.
We can look as far ahead as we like, but only up to a point where reality turns into fantasy. It is not at all difficult to make forecasts for the year 2001 and the next few years. This is in fact what has just been done by participants in the roundtable meeting at the International Affairs editorial office.
I would like to thank all our colleagues who have once again shown their high competence and good judgment.
In conclusion, I would like to express hope that we will see more light, reason, and happiness both in personalities and in events of the 21st century, compared to the past era. Why not?