

The Charter of Fundamental Rights: an ID Card for the European Union

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The Charter as an aspect of the progressive constitutionalisation of the EU

The building of the European Union is an unprecedented process of progressive sharing of sovereignty by an increasing number of nation states. It implies setting up a dual supra-national structure (the Community and the Union) with its own institutions and stipulating international treaties that have to be modified and updated over time. From it derives, among other things, what may legitimately be defined as a process of progressive constitutionalisation.²

The decision of the July 1999 Cologne European Council to gather "the fundamental rights applicable at Union level ... in a Charter and thereby [make them] more manifest"³ may be considered part of this process. The wording is correct because fundamental rights have already been in force at the European level for some time. This was reiterated by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as early as 1969,⁴ when it observed that "the protection of fundamental rights constitutes an integral part of the general legal principles of which the Court ensures respect"; and was definitively sanctioned by the Treaty of Maastricht in Article 6.2: "The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common

1 MEP Paciotti was the EP delegate for the Group of the Party of European Socialists to the Convention for the Drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Italian version of this article appeared in the no. 1, 2001 issue of *Europa-Europe*. Translated from the Italian by *Gabriele Tonne*.

2 A. Barbera, "Esiste una 'costituzione europea'?", *Quaderni costituzionali*, vol. 20, no. 1, 2000, p. 59.

3 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Title IV, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999.

4 Judgment of 12 November 1969, case 29-69, p. 419.

to the Member States, as general principles of Community law." In order to list those rights more systematically, however, they had to be set down in a Charter, as requested by the European Parliament.

The link between drafting a Charter of Fundamental Rights and writing a real constitution is obvious. But the fact that the two have not been worked out contemporaneously in the European Union is one of the original characteristics of the construction of European supranationality. The national constitutions introduced in European countries in the second half of the twentieth century were the result of the fall of authoritarian regimes and the establishment of liberal democratic systems based on the principles of the constitutional state and the rule of law. But the current situation in the European Union is quite different, as its requirements are increasing to deal with greater competencies, especially in view of enlargement to the countries of Eastern Europe.

An innovation: the Convention

Particularly original was the body to which the European Council gave the mandate for drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights: a body whose composition was established by the European Council held in Tampere on 14-15 October 1999. Delegates included fifteen representatives of heads of state and government of the member states; one representative of the European Commission; six representatives designated by and from the European Parliament; and thirty members designated by and from national parliaments (two for each national parliament, one for each chamber).

Since the Charter was to be proclaimed jointly by the three European institutions -- the Council, the Commission and the Parliament -- it was only right that it should be drafted by their representatives and that, in particular, the two EU organs which represent, respectively, the legitimacy of the states (the European Council, whose meetings are also attended by the president of the Commission) and the legitimacy of the people (the Parliament) should be present on an equal footing.

Unprecedented was the presence of representatives of national parliaments -- and in greater number than the other components. Moreover, while the other components could consider themselves real representatives of the institutions that had delegated them (in the sense that the representatives of the heads of state and government were directly responsible to their leaders, the representative of the president of the Commission was responsible to the president and each MEP designated by the European Parliament using this organ's proportional method had a mandate from the EP), the delegates from the national parliaments represented a pluralist assembly without a common position. Nevertheless, their presence turned out to be invaluable as an essential liaison with national public opinion, political spheres and legal traditions.

Also totally new was the working method of the body thus designated, which decided to call itself Convention. Transparency was total: the meetings were open

to the public and all documents were published on the internet. In deed, a considerable number of documents and suggestions were produced not only by members of the Convention (which presented more than a thousand amendments) but also by private associations, lobbies, scholars. Hearings were organised with the countries that are candidates for entry into the Union and with a large number of non-governmental organisations that had requested them. Work was based on documents prepared by the presidency, that is the president and vice-presidents elected by the Convention, the Commission representative and the representative of the Council's presidency, which formed the editorial committee. The texts were discussed by the Convention, re-elaborated on the basis of the orientations that emerged during discussion and the amendments presented, and then re-submitted to the Convention. There was no voting at this stage, just a search for the widest possible consensus for further progressive adjustments.

An other singular fact was that the Convention did not know whether the text it was preparing would remain a political declaration or whether it would turn into a legally binding document as part of the Treaty on European Union. The matter was solved by the wise suggestion put forward by the Convention's president, Roman Herzog, and taken up by the Convention: the document would be drafted "as if" it were a legal text, resembling those that form the first part of most continental constitutions, formulated therefore in brief articles using the clearest possible language.

The contents of the Charter

The contents of the Charter basically correspond to the Cologne mandate: civil and political rights, fundamental rights of the citizens of the Union, economic and social rights. In this context, the work of the Convention involved compilation more than innovation. But it is obvious that a body composed of members legitimated not so much by their legal competence – although there were undoubtedly some extremely qualified members – as by their institutional and political representativeness, would produce a document characterised by strong creative elements. But they are not in contradiction with the Cologne mandate. The Charter is essentially a kind of codification inspired by various sources. The first was the indications set down in the Cologne mandate; the second a number of international conventions signed by the fifteen member states in the Council of Europe, the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation (underwritten by all fifteen member countries, these texts indicate a general consensus on the principles they contain). Then, there was EC treaty law and secondary legislation, and the case law of the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights. Recourse to this multiplicity of sources made it possible to find adequate foundations for and sufficient consensus on some new rights which, although in force, have not yet been explicitly established as fundamental rights. They pertain above all to the protection of personal data, principles relating to bioethics, the right to good governance (one of the rights of European citizens), as well as the already well known new generation of fundamental rights

of consumers and rights relating to the environment.

A text resulting from cooperation among subjects so different in national background, political opinion and legal tradition, could not but be a compromise. Even in its formal expression, the document does not provide a unitary and inspired vision of Europe as some might have wished and as is still demanded by Catholic integralists, the extreme left and American-style liberalists. But these demands go against the very idea of a European Union, which is by nature a union of states, of peoples and of nations which are and want to remain different; a Union that respects diversity by enhancing the rights of the individual and does not require standardisation; a Union that is not founded on a single identity, based on bloodlines, territory or ethnicity, but on shared values, principles and rules, ensured by a constitutional system of law, and guaranteed by institutions which allow for the coexistence of diversities.

Thus opposition to the Charter can be justified only in those who are against the European Union itself. In fact, in addition to the British Conservatives, there are a number of minority, localist, nationalist and separatist groups within the European Parliament which are against a deepening of the European Union. They all expressed their objections to the Charter, not because of its content, but because of its very existence, which *per se* provides proof of the political and not merely market nature of the Union. More difficult to understand is the opposition of those who claim that the Charter's substance is not advanced enough or seriously lacking in parts: among them are some Convention members belonging to the Party of European Socialists who contributed quite intensely to its drafting, but whose proposals were not all or not entirely accepted. This should not justify opposition to a document that is, on the whole, dignified and definitely to be valued for its significance and historical importance.

The structure of the Charter: the indivisibility of fundamental rights

One of the most innovative characteristics of the Charter is its structure. In addition to the preamble (the proposal for the first draft was put forward by Italian representatives), the Charter includes fifty articles which are no longer divided according to the traditional distinction between civil and political rights, and social and economic rights. Instead, they are grouped together around six fundamental rights: dignity (Articles 1 to 5), freedom (Articles 6 to 19), equality (Articles 20 to 26), solidarity (Articles 27 to 38), citizenship (Article 39 to 46) and justice (Articles 47 to 50), plus four articles (Articles 51 to 54) containing general provisions.

This structure puts all the fundamental rights on the same plane, thereby emphasising their indivisibility. The concept of indivisibility, insisted upon by a number of delegates and eventually accepted by the entire Convention, made it possible to overcome recurrent objections to the introduction of certain principles or rights on the grounds that the Charter need not protect fundamental rights for the respect of which the Community or Union is not responsible. These observations were always very contradictory in that they were never made with reference

to classic rights contained, for example, in the European Convention on Human Rights, which often deal with matters that are still the sole competency of the states (regulations for criminal trials, the prohibition of capital punishment), but were raised with respect to economic and social rights, far more directly implicated in activities of community competence than those included in the European Convention.

The criterion of indivisibility does not respond only to the obvious principle of coexistence and interrelation among the various rights, making it possible to adequately interpret the scope of each in the context of all the others. Among other things, it constitutes a permanent framework for the developments currently underway and for a possible redefinition of the competencies of the Union's institutions and organs. If the treaties are modified to expand the competencies of European institutions and greater national sovereignty is shared at the Union level, the Charter will not have to be changed to embrace a new fundamental law.

This initiative does away with the much criticized prevalence of the values of economic efficiency over those of justice and social equity enshrined in the Treaties: for the first time, an attempt has been made in a non-national forum to draft a complete statute for the fundamental prerogatives guaranteed each individual, in addition to those ensured the citizens of Europe. Above and beyond this or that shortcoming, the Charter is, as Giuseppe Bronzini so rightly commented, "the most comprehensive, complete and persuasive list of fundamental prerogatives available to day in a non-national context",⁵ in which the protection of all the rights and principles taken as the fundamental values of the Union defines a European social model that is quite different from the merely mercantile and economic one generally attributed to the European Union. Even in the consolidated field of the rights deriving from the liberal bourgeois tradition, there is a European specificity, for example, in the prohibition of capital punishment, which is not common to the entire democratic West.

In the preamble, mention is made of a peaceful future which refers to the value of peace enshrined in the premises of the Treaties. The attempt to introduce a subjective right to be activated to prevent the use of force failed, but then again, no such right exists in any European Constitution. Also unsuccessful was the author's attempt to formulate a specific right to peace for European citizens as a reward for having built institutions common to nations that have gone to war with one another for centuries. The establishment of Union institutions founded on the rule of law and the respect for diversity by means of treaties of indeterminate duration that cannot be denounced makes not only for a state of peace among the peoples that are united by those treaties, but also for a real guarantee for maintaining it.

With the exception of these attempts and others even more justified but

5 "La Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione europea (ovvero l'Europa dopo la guerra in Kosovo e la crisi austriaca", *Questione Giustizia*, no. 5, 2000, p. 937 ff.

equally unsuccessful (such as the right to be able to benefit, on equal conditions, from the results of free scientific research, at least in the biomedical field), the Charter manages innovatively to embrace the main socio-economic rights and some third generation rights. This outcome was uncertain for a time because of the representatives of some countries like Great Britain who tried to limit the Charter to a strictly liberal horizon, and the Scandinavian countries which did not want social rights included in the Charter for fear they might cause competencies for these matters to be assigned at the community level.

In the end, the document guarantees protection against unjustified dismissal and a worker's right to information and consultation, items that can not be found even in the Italian Constitution. In deed, the objections of some associations are unfounded in that they claim that the Charter does not define certain rights with sufficient detail and would like to see the Union adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights, yet the latter has been totally absorbed into the Charter and the Charter actually goes beyond it to include new rights and more extensive protection of the rights found in the Convention.

Conclusion

Unexpectedly, both the Court of Justice in Luxembourg and the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg were against the Charter, at least at the beginning of the drafting process, unnecessarily concerned that they might lose their prerogatives. But the Charter furthers the interests of the law. In deed, the Dehaene Report on the institutional implications of enlargement delivered on 18 October 1999⁶ states that reform of the community legal order is essential for making management of European affairs more flexible, transparent and responsible, on the one hand, and for offering European citizens a catalogue of their basic rights, on the other.

While institutional reform, carried out by means of secret diplomatic negotiations at the intergovernmental conference, has made little headway and achieved unsatisfactory results, the special Convention conducted with total transparency and maximum openness has set the Union on the road to "democratization" based on the codification of basic rights. The Charter, explicitly approved by the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, was proclaimed by the presidents of the three institutions on 7 December 2000 at Nice.

The Charter already has value not only as a political document and as an ID card for the Union with respect to its citizens, third countries and the countries seeking entry into it, but also legally. In fact, the ECJ in Luxembourg can not but take it into account in its practice. Then again, the Charter has been quoted in the "Three Wise Men's Report on Austria" and the document of the Union's bioethical

⁶ R. Von Weizsäcker, J.-L. Dehaene, D. Simon, "The Institutional Implications of Enlargement", Report to the European Commission, Brussels, 18 October 1999.

group,⁷ and will be the basis for the report that the European Parliament's Commission on the freedoms and rights of the citizens draws up each year. The president of the European Parliament and the president of the Commission have officially declared that they intend to apply it integrally.⁸

Bringing the Charter into the Treaties is not a superfluous pursuit, both because it could thereby become the first part of a European "constitution" and because it would change the meaning of the Treaties themselves. Up to now the ECJ has recognised the fundamental rights only in as much as they do not compromise the objectives of the Treaties. By inserting the Charter into the Treaties, the objective of the Union would become respect for the dignity of the individual and the entire European construction would have to be measured by this yardstick.

7 Re spec tively, M. Ahtii sari, J. Frow hein, M. Oreja, "Re port on Aus tria by the 'Wise Men'", Stras bourg, 8 Sep tem ber 2000, pp. 4-6; and Groupe Eu ropéen d'Ethique des Sci ences et des Nou velles Tech no logies au près de la Com mis sion Eu ropéenne, "Les As pets Ethiques de la Richer che sur les Cel lules de Souche Hu maines et leur Utili sa tion", Brus sels, 14 No vem ber 2000.

8 See S. Ro dotà, "Ma l'Eu ropa già ap plica la nuova Carta dei dir itti", *La Repubblica*, 3 Janu ary 2000.