

Europe's Gentle Power

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Europa, forza gentile / Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. – Bologna : il Mulino, 2001. – 192 p. (Contemporanea). – ISBN 88-15-08185-2

Institutions exercise “power” both internally, that is, towards their constituents – citizens and intermediate institutions – and externally, that is, towards analogous institutions based on other constituents. The kind of power that Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa refers to in his book *Europa, forza gentile*, which deals with the institution of the European Union, this hybrid between a state and a coalition of states, is mainly internal and is “gentle” – gentle in the sense that it has been and still is exercised in both the ongoing constituent phase and in the operational phase without the violence of military and police instruments, but rather through the rule of law and democracy.

The author combines extraordinary experience in the field of public institutions (at the Bank of Italy, the European Commission in Brussels and now the European Central Bank) with a great sensitivity for the economic, as well as the political, social and cultural components of relations between citizens and institutions. To these he adds a mixture of pride, at times somewhat indulgent, for what has been achieved and apprehension for what remains to be done in the field of European integration. This attitude, rather like that of a teacher towards a promising pupil, is particularly perceptible in this book, the chapters of which (originally essays or lectures) are dedicated to the history of European institutions, the relationship between nation and culture (originally drafted for a Scottish audience), the case of Italy in Europe, the role of institutions in the economy and, finally, the potential validity of the EU model for other areas of the world.

The collection offers a wealth of stimuli. In the “gentle power” dichotomy lies the substance of the author’s pride/apprehension: pride in the historical novelty of a new almost state-like institution which unites without conquering (after so many tragic conquests in European history) and organises without subjugating; apprehension for the fragility of the construction, subjected to the dual pressure of the new competences and the new members to come.

“The European construction is a revolution”, writes the author who considers himself one of its protagonists, together with an elite made up of “employees, officials, bankers, professionals” rather than conspirators. The revolutionary aspect lies in the establishment of “elements typical of an *internal* economic order in what was previously a system of *international* relations”. The process has been gradual; the constitutional order built by modules. “The European macroeconomic constitution appears to be uniquely advanced and enlightened.” And now we have the single currency, the importance of which “transcends the economic and institutional sphere and profoundly touches interpersonal relations, identification with the society to which one belongs, individual and collective psychology”. Other modules lag behind, some even rather far behind. But an initial internal power has been acquired, in a gentle manner.

But what about external power? Actually, the author reminds us, the integration adventure started with the project for a defence community, which derailed in 1954 after it was rejected by the French parliament. With it were derailed the ideas of a federal Europe (in the traditional sense of the term), Europe as a third power and, paradoxically, Europe shaped after the French model. The adventure started again some years later with the single market and continued along the road of economic integration to return to the idea of political integration only years later, basically after the end of the Cold War. In other words, the context in which the gentle power developed was anything but gentle, on the contrary, the “balance of terror” at that time involved the most widespread international tension and highest level of risk the world has ever known. This apparent contradiction is due largely to the effect of the foreign policy of the United States, which played the role of guarantor of European security but at the same time did not hinder the process of European integration, thereby facilitating it while serving its own interests.

The author’s thesis is implicitly very close to that of Europe as a “civil power”, which gained currency during the seventies and eighties, that is, of a Europe which, on the one hand, contributed to the East-West balance with its active, albeit subordinated, participation in the Atlantic Alliance, but on the other brought stability to some European Mediterranean countries by means of enlargement, or encouraged world trade or macroeconomic coordination with civilian – or if you will, gentle – instruments. The “victory” in the Cold War was not only the result of Western, especially US, military superiority, but also of the growing attraction exerted by the affluence and unity of the then European Community – an affluence and unity that the East Germans were the first to see on the other side of the wall and on their television screens at home. This was the beginning of the fall of the Soviet system.

Europe as a pole of attraction, but also as a model, on one condition. Padoa-Schioppa writes: “Europe has taken the new road of limiting sovereign powers. This is the road that the world will also have to take if it doesn’t want to destroy itself. Europe can contribute to pushing the world system of states in this direction only if it learns how to walk that road, internally, down to the very end.” A challenge

that is all the more complex given that the external context could be adverse, though in a different way. In fact, while there are no longer two opposing blocs, the world is still full of conflict and tension and the inclination of the United States to take responsibility for stability and to favour the development and action of international institutions seems to have decreased considerably, especially with the advent of the Bush administration. This calls for a more active role on the part of the European Union, a power that may not continue to be just gentle.

Another political change to take into account is the one that has taken place in Italy, in the light of which we read the interesting chapter on the relations between Italy and Europe during the past half century.

Padoa-Schioppa defends the widespread Italian consensus for integration, of ten scorned both at home and abroad, and explains it by referring back to the Roman-Christian roots of Italian culture and its universalist inspiration, which has been a shared characteristic of “Italian contributions to artistic, scientific and economic activity” in the world, but which has also “mitigated the natural quarrelsomeness of peoples and favoured assimilation and integration”. Nevertheless, “this universalism has also been one of the obstacles to the emergence of a modern unitary state” which only came into being in the nineteenth century – late with respect to the reality of the nation. This delay was to have a lasting negative effect on the “administrative skill in the handling of state affairs, a trained instinct for the perception of the national interest, a capacity to overcome internal divisions and rivalries”. Not long after unification, “having become a nation state, Italy discovered and practised aggressive nationalism. (...) Suffering swift defeat [in World War II], for two years Italy was partially occupied by its former enemies, partially controlled by its German former ally”. And nationalism lost support among Italians for the rest of the century.

On the basis of this legacy and under the thrust of thinkers such as Luigi Einaudi, Altiero Spinelli and Mario Albertini, who influenced a number of political leaders through the years, “Italy’s European strategy consistently followed a few clear guidelines”. Consequently, “Italy played a positive role in all the crucial phases of the (European) construction. In the same way, the European factor had a decisive influence on Italy’s economic, social and political transformation in the last fifty years”. Less and slower was its influence on Italy’s administrative capacity, where “Italy’s bad reputation in implementing European norms”, has only recently improved slightly. To these considerations, I would add that in the same period Italian foreign policy was able to reconcile – or rather integrate – its priority for Europe with its pro-Atlantic inclination, thus avoiding the kind of anti-American Europeanism to be found in France or the pro-American and often anti-European leanings of the UK.

With the advent of the Berlusconi government, numerous Italian and foreign commentators have wondered whether this fruitful relationship between Europe and Italy will continue or whether there will be some resurgence of that recurrent though till now hardly influential contrast between the so-called *partito americano* and *partito europeo*. Italy is also witnessing a return of “national interest” rhetoric, □

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which may be in keeping with the re-emerging *Realpolitik* now in vogue in the US, but tends to overlook the fact that the national interest has never been served as well as it has in the last fifty years. The risk is that the remarkable Italian influence on European affairs, described by Padoa-Schioppa, would decrease; on the other hand, drawing closer to the United States, in British style, would obviously not offer comparable influence. The debate over continuity in Italy's European and foreign policy was already reflected in the new government's choice of foreign minister, clearly nominated by the prime minister to reassure. But the issues pop up again at any important European or international passage. Padoa-Schioppa's reflections shed a very useful light on this debate.