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Is There a Security Culture in the Enlarged European Union?

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It would be an exaggeration to claim that questions of whether there is a European security culture in the enlarged EU or what its nature might be have become pressing. There has seemingly been no great support for a European Defence White Paper, for example, as suggested by the EU's Institute of Security Studies in 2004.[1] Nonetheless, the growing number of overseas operations and missions undertaken within the context of the EU's Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the burgeoning number of EU measures to counter terrorism, and the deepening commitments to meeting the demands of conflict prevention and crisis management, suggest a new seriousness about the EU's role in security matters and thus the need for its acceptance and legitimacy.[2] Increased activity has been met by a significant

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[1] *European defence: A proposal for a White Paper*, Report of an Independent Task Force (Paris: EU-ISS, May 2004).

[2] This article tackles issues relating to ESDP and "external" security rather than security as more broadly defined to include "internal" security within a JHA framework or defence as such.

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strengthening of the infrastructure in Brussels, especially but not exclusively within the Council framework and closely associated with and largely attached to the office of the High Representative, Javier Solana. This institutionalisation of security issues has allowed Solana to take the lead in evolving a European discourse that places the EU's responses to global challenges squarely within an evolving European security culture, a discourse that both identifies the threats to Europe and reiterates the principles that should underlie European action. The European Security Strategy paper agreed by the European Council in December 2003 has proved to be a significant reference point.[3]

However, the EU's capacity for action as well as the frequent references to the Security Strategy and other declarations that lay the foundations of an EU security culture need to be set against Europe's continuing underachievement in terms of its defence capabilities. The seeming discrepancy between the continuous commitment to Headline Goals and falling defence expenditure has caused both general concern and – particularly transatlantic – scepticism that Europe is, indeed, serious about ESDP. At the same time, other factors militate against any easy or straightforward creation of a European security culture, not least the competition between discourses at different levels. At the national level, for example, there are competing discourses within member states born of different interpretations of history, geography, the political system, etc, that bear on the question of *a* national culture. Some are very much more telling than others – as in the competing discourses in Germany between Germany as a responsible ally and partner prepared to accept the use of force overseas, and the more pacifistic conception of Germany looking towards UN sanction as a minimal requirement for any action.

While the prevailing national culture may well outlast any particular government, there is every likelihood that it will differ from that of its EU partners. Those of the Big Three have differed markedly from each other in terms of their Atlanticism, and so have those between and among the Dutch, Danes and Portuguese, all NATO members, and those of the neutral and non-aligned member states such as Sweden and Ireland. The strategic defence culture of Greece differs from them all given its particular preoccupation with Turkey. To these national cultures are now added those of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) as well as Cyprus and Malta. Of particular relevance is the question raised by Gniazdowski[4] over the extent to which the collective memories and histories of the CEECs is enough for them to press for common action at the European level.

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[3] "A Secure Europe in a Better World", Brussels, 12 December 2003 <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

[4] M. Gniazdowski, "Possibilities and Constraints of the Visegrád Countries Cooperation within the EU", *Foreign Policy Review*, vol. 3, nos 1-2, 2005.

To complicate matters still further, not least given the strong Atlanticism of most of the new member states, there is an additional security culture in play, that embodied by NATO and strongly influenced by the United States. And the US, itself, has often had both direct and indirect influence on national cultures, since it "shows every intention of remaining, a resolutely 'modern' great power".[5] That intention has involved both a determination to retain huge military superiority and a "belief" in military intervention, if necessary, on its own, as an effective way to "fix" problems.[6] It is an attitude that has resonated strongly with many in Central and Eastern Europe. [7] The European Union, in the sense that it is "post-modern", has therefore to confront the issue of whether, how, and to what extent it wishes to be distinguishable from NATO and the United States.

Conceiving a security culture

The European discourse has been one that emphasises security rather than defence. In part this has been because, despite the French habit of subsuming the debate under the title of *la défense européenne* , it is not – yet, at least – about the territorial defence of Europe.[8] Moreover, given the changed nature of war in the post-Cold War environment,[9] the emphasis is less on "grand strategy" from nuclear deterrence downwards, than on the various civil and military elements of policies undertaken by multiple actors in the effort to prevent, contain or bring an end to intra-state conflicts and to reconstruct societies formerly at war. One of the bases of the ESDP is, after all, the Western European Union's Petersberg Declaration of 1992 with its emphasis on humanitarian tasks of rescue, peacekeeping and even peacemaking.[10] The tasks may have been revised or enhanced over the years but they remain essentially tied to peacekeeping, the role of combat forces in peacemaking and in post-conflict stabilisation.[11]

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[5] H. Maull, "Europe and the new balance of global order", *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 4, 2005, p. 798.

[6] *Ibid*.

[7] G. Edwards, "The New member states and the Making of EU Foreign Policy", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 11, no. 2, 2006.

[8] And which has clearly influenced the EU-ISS – as in its 2004 publication *European Defence*.

[9] R. Smith, *The Utility of Force: the Art of War in the Modern World* (York: Allen Lane, 2005); M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).

[10] For the Petersberg tasks, see F. Pagani, "A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European Union", *European Journal of International Law*, vol. 9, 1998, pp. 737-49.

Nonetheless, even if the EU's security strategy and the security culture in which it is embedded have both a more modest as well as broader meaning, it is subject to similar conceptual problems as strategic culture in the past. The debate is of long standing: Johnston for example in 1995 analysed it in terms of generations of strategic thought beginning with the US strategists of the 1970s.[12] Among the many differences of approach has been the divide over whether it is better to see strategic culture as necessarily a part of the broad national culture within which security policies are formulated and executed or to treat it as more of an independent variable, as the approach to the use of policy instruments that include military power.

In the European context, it could be argued that the very existence and example of the EU as a means of resolving inter-state conflict has been a critical factor in shaping its attitudes towards the use of force – as the reluctance to envisage the end of the concept of "civilian power" Europe would suggest.[13] But context by itself is not overly helpful in determining the specifics of particular and competing strategic cultures and helping to understand how it was that countries shifted from what Howorth has described as "long held shibboleths (British 'Atlanticism', French 'exceptionalism', German 'pacifism' and 'civilianism')" towards "a common acceptance of integrated European interventionism, based not solely on the classical stakes of national interest, but also on far more idealistic motivations such as humanitarianism and ethics".[14] On the other hand, strategic culture as a variable independent of context appears too restrictive and limited in its explanatory power. One way out of the dilemma has been put forward by Neumann and Heikka,[15] who moved the debate forward by making the concept of strategic culture the dynamic interplay between discourses (understood in the sense of systems for forming statements about threats to security and the possible ways of meeting them, which they and others have termed "grand strategy"), and specific practices, especially those relating to doctrines which set priorities among types of forces and how they might be used.

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[11] See for example, S. Biscop (ed.) *E Pluribus Unum? Military integration in the European Union,* Egmont Paper No 7 (Brussels: IRRI-KIIB, 2005).

[12] See, for example, the various disagreements on how to recognise a security culture if one exists in *Review of International Studies* in 1999 with articles by C. Gray (vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 49-70) and A. I. Johnston (vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 519-23), and 2003 (M. Shaw, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 269-78, C. Gray, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 285-95 and S. Poore, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 285-96).

[13] See among others, K Smith, "The End of Civilian Power Europe: A Welcome Demise or a Cause for Concern",*The International Spectator,* vol. XXXV, no.2, 2000; M. Eilstrup Sangiovanni, "Why a Common Security and Defence Policy is Bad for Europe", *Survival,* vol. 45, no. 4, 2003, pp 193-206.

[14] J. Howorth, "Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy", *West European Politics*, vol. 27, no. 2, 2004, p. 212.

[15] I. B. Neumann and H. Heikka, "Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: the Social Roots of Nordic Practice", *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 40, no. 1, 2005, pp. 5-23.

The European Security Strategy

The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, which set out a vision for the EU as a global actor, provides a useful starting point in any discussion of a European security discourse. The ESS pointed to five "key threats" to Europe – terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and consequent regional instability, and organised crime – against which Europe needs "both to think globally and act locally". Crucial is the need to act "before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early." But the ESS also recognised that none of the threats could be met by "purely military means"; military action might be necessary in certain circumstances, but new tools are required, that range from "political, economic and other pressures", through police intelligence, humanitarian action and assistance in the reconstruction of governments, civil society and economic infrastructure. While the EU, it concluded, was "particularly well-equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations", few of them can be dealt with by Europe alone, but require effective multilateral cooperation. The ESS also called for an EU "strategic culture" that would enable the Union to meet security threats with "early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention".

Within the European discourse, the ESS does not, of course, stand alone. In many ways it was the culmination of a number of policy declarations from the one at Petersberg in 1992, through various – though not frequently publicised – Communications from the Commission on conflict prevention, fragile states and development assistance, to declarations by the member states. Other relevant documents include the Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (also 2003),[16] and the European Consensus on Development (2005), the latter reiterating the EU's support for the duty or responsibility to protect.[17] But the ESS itself has been followed up only in periodic Presidency reports on the ESDP rather than anything which might be read by a wider public and so gain some formal recognition for the EU's role in security. It has therefore been left largely to the High Representative and the Council Secretariat to try to build on it, though with some support from the European Commission. Even if some of the subsequent references to the ESS may appear formulaic,[18] it remains, however imperfectly, a useful benchmark for EU action, which allows for a possible deepening of the security culture it called for.

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[16] <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_04/fact/wmd.pdf>

[17] See "The European Consensus" [COM(2005) 311 final] agreed December 2005: joint declaration by the Council, Commission and the European Parliament.

The Security Strategy drew, often more implicitly than explicitly, on a number of principles and norms that had come to characterise the EU even if the EU cannot claim exclusive rights to them. For President Chirac, for example, "a Europe which … places at the heart of everything it does respect for a number of principles" both underpins a (French) "republican code of ethics" and "constitutes a shared code of ethics" for Europe.[19] A somewhat similar if almost post-modern approach was provided by Tony Blair in 1999:

> No longer is our existence as states under threat. Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our national interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer. As John Kennedy put it "Freedom is indivisible and when one man is enslaved who is free?" [20]

Blair's quotation from Kennedy not only reflected the importance of the (US) audience, but it also pointed to the lack of exclusivity of Europe's values and norms, whether shared with the member states or with others in NATO. The EU as a civilian, even normative power[21] had come to be seen as a critical element in distinguishing Europe from the United States – hence the concern over what appeared to be the militarising or "de-civilianising" of the EU.[22]

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[18] See, for example, the Austrian Presidency's Report on ESDP for 2006 <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st15/st15678.en05.pdf >.

[19] Quoted in L. Aggestam, "Europe Puissance: French Influence and European Independence" in Sjursen, H. (ed.) *Redefining Security? The role of the European Union in European Security Structures,* ARENA Report 7 (Oslo: Centre for European Studies, 2000).

[20] T. Blair, 24 April 1999 <http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp>.

[21] I. Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235-58.

[22] S. Stavridis, "'Militarizing' the EU: the Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited", *The*

The institutionalisation of the discourse . . .

The dynamic interaction between the ESS discourse and the institutionalisation of the ESDP has provided further incentives to both member governments and European institutions (not least the High Representative and the Commission) to develop Europe's security role. It has also pointed to location and ownership as vital dimensions of discourse. Indeed, confidence in the European institutions – especially in the Council – and in the processes of managing and deploying "military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments" has been a central element in bringing about, especially among member states, a general recognition of the EU's legitimacy as an international actor with, albeit limited, military capabilities. [23]

Given past failures in the Balkans and the divisions over Iraq, confidence in the EU's institutions and policymaking processes is something that cannot be taken for granted. Multiple veto points remain in Pillar II, especially on the use of force, and unanimity is still required even if not all member states have to contribute to any agreed mission. And yet confidence has increased, reflected in the Constitutional Treaty's proposed EU Minister of Foreign Affairs (EUMFA) supported by an integrated external service. Although the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty meant that Javier Solana could not be elevated to the post of EUMFA, he has been highly successful in winning support for an increasingly public role for the office of EU High Representative, and thereby for the EU itself. The number of speeches given, articles written, visits made and meetings held suggest a dynamism that has gradually permeated national media to create a sense of "voice". The silence that accompanied the divisions over Iraq would be almost deafening in 2006.

What has become clear is that the High Representative has been supported by an infrastructure that has garnered growing influence. The departments officially attached to his private office such as the Military Staff, the Policy Unit, and Situation Centre, as well as the various Special Representatives, together with the Council Secretariat Services, and the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCom), make up an increasingly influential body at the European level able to assess and use the growing exchange of intelligence. But whether by coherent plan or

International Spectator, vol. XXXVI, no. 4, pp. 43-50, 2001; A. Deighton, "The European Security and Defence Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no. 4, 2002, pp. 719-41; R. Whitman, "Road Map for a Route March? (De)-civilianizing through the EU's Security Strategy", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2006, pp. 1-16.

[23] P. Cornish and G. Edwards, "Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture, *International Affairs*, vol. 22, no. 3, 2001, pp. 587-603.

pragmatic response to new challenges, the Council's infrastructure has been developed still further – much to the chagrin of the Commission. It has all the appearances of an "agitation architecture" geared to "mainstreaming" ESS issues. In addition to the Policy Unit and the Special Representatives, there are the coordinator for counter-terrorism activities, and personal representatives for coordinating activities countering proliferation of WMDs and for Human Rights.

A European Defence Agency (EDA) has also been created with Solana at its head with a mission to support member states in their efforts to improve European defence capabilities and strengthen Europe's defence industry base. Its Executive Director, Nick Witney, defined two imperatives: "to spend money on the right stuff. To spend more money together, to pool resources increasingly within Europe." And, while he accepts that EDA cannot produce this by itself since it depends on government action, "We can agitate, we can present awkward truths, we can act as a conscience, a gadfly and a catalyst."[24] Significantly, member governments, (excluding the Danes and, possibly temporarily, the Spanish and Hungarians) signed a code of conduct on 1 July 2006 on opening up arms procurement, at least as regards publishing tenders for planned defence equipment contracts.

Two other ways in which the High Representative and his office have taken up proposals for disseminating ideas have been through the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the concept of battlegroups. The ESDC's aim has been to provide short courses for participants from the EU member states and third countries on both the civilian and military dimensions of the ESDP. Organised from the Council Secretariat, it involves a network of member state institutions and the EU Institute for Security Studies. Given the numbers attending each year (some 50 participants), it may not in itself be of tremendous significance (though it could provide a useful counterpoint to NATO's Defence College) yet the British government worked hard to ensure that it remained a "virtual network" rather than a legal entity.[25] The courses, unsurprisingly, have provided useful platforms from which to drive home the message that, as the High Representative put it, participants should have "a shared understanding of security and defence issues, thus creating a common security culture". [26] The concept of battlegroups grew from an Anglo-French idea of February 2003 to become a more or less concrete rapid reaction capability two years later. The High Representative provided a political framework for the groups in his paper of November 2004, which was then taken forward by the EU Military Staff who developed a "Road Map" outlining the processes and procedures necessary for their development. It is not that everything about the use of battle groups is now clear and predictable or that they provide a full answer to those sceptical about the EU's capabilities, nonetheless, they suggest, again, a seriousness and a greater confidence in moving beyond merely declaratory commitments.

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[24] N. Witney, "European Armaments Cooperation". Speech to the Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, 8 September 2005 <http://www.eda.europa.eu/news/2005-09-8-0.htm>.

[25] <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmeuleg/34-i/3451.htm>

[26] J. Solana, Congratulations to the graduating class in Vilnius, 24 March 2006 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/89011.pd>.

Institutionalisation by itself of course may not be enough. Meyer, for example, suggests that while some issues can be papered over, postponed or simply ignored, "the overloaded agenda and the large number of participants can hamper substantive discussions about longer term strategic choices".[27] Moreover, some member states may not be fully prepared or able to join in the debate and may defect at a later stage. However, the mix of the institutional and practical experience becomes very much more potent, the one being impossible without the other.

. . . and practical experience

The 16 ESDP missions now range from police missions, military missions and rule-of-law missions. The numbers involved in the missions have been small – though Operation Althea has involved 7,000 troops from an astonishing 33 countries, 11 non-EU members, while Operation Artemis involved little more than 1,800 troops from 15 different member states, and EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia involved fewer than a dozen EU lawyers. Most of the military missions have also been of short duration. Operation Concordia in Macedonia as well as Althea in BiH were peace support missions that took over from NATO forces; Artemis has been the only autonomous mission so far and France took the role as Framework Nation. The vast majority of the EU's missions have therefore been civilian operations, with four police missions (in BiH, Macedonia, Congo and Palestine), a security sector reform mission in the Congo, a monitoring mission in Aceh (along with ASEAN) and support for the African Union in Darfur, a border control mission at Rafah between Gaza and Egypt, and two rule-of-law missions in Georgia and Iraq.

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[27] C. Meyer, "European Defence: Why Institutional Socialisation is Not Enough", *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2005, p. 52.

The global range of these missions and the practical experience gained in their planning and management as well as their successful conclusion has engendered growing respect; that, however much the EU tends to talk about processes rather than take action, there has been action, limited though it may have been. On the other hand, their global reach raises some suspicion that the missions, especially those beyond Europe's "neighbourhood", are responses to particular member state concerns; that in an important sense the missions are driving strategy rather than the reverse.

There is also, of course, the danger that overconfidence will lead to the EU taking on a multitude of seemingly small and straightforward tasks – some of which might then escalate to dangerous proportions. That could have unhappy consequences for the missions themselves and also for the willingness of member states to take on subsequent operations.

Size may be a determinant, particular interests too, but there is also the argument that in general the missions are norm-driven rather than simply interest-driven; that the promotion of stability, democracy and human rights are key factors (even if these norms themselves are not always easily reconcilable). For the sceptic, however, that becomes a telling point: it is a good deal easier to agree on small-scale operations in the pursuit of general norms than on operations where sizeable interests are involved.

The combination of operational experience – whether or not they include all member states[28] – together with the institutionalisation of security at the EU level has gone so far as to create alarm among some at the prospect of new transnational pressure groups. Mawdesley, for example, has tracked both governmental and non-governmental networks relating to the armaments sector.[29] She and Manners[30] have also pinpointed a number of what might be described as "advocacy coalitions" (rather than, for example, epistemic communities) comprising bodies such as the New Defence Agenda, the EU-ISS, the joint European Security Forum of CEPS in Brussels and the IISS in London, and the Centre for European Reform pressing for a more effective ESDP. Their concern (along with others, not least Commission personnel[31]) has been particularly with the "down-side" of greater Council involvement or what they term "second pillarisation" of civilian crisis management. Decision-making within the Council framework reduces decision-makers' answerability to the European Parliament. It also entails limited transparency at national levels, given the variable accountability of governments to their parliaments on security issues.

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[28] It is worth recalling that the numbers of European forces deployed overseas by the member states, whether under UN, NATO or other auspices, exceeds the Helsinki Headline Goal of 60,000. See B. Giegerich and W. Wallace, "Not such a soft power: the external deployment of European Forces", *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 2, 2004, pp. 163-82.

[29] J. Mawdesley, "The Arming of the European Union: Explaining the Armaments Dimension of European Security and Defence Policy", *Perspectives Perspectives: The Central European Review of International Affairs*, no. 22, 2004, pp. 7-21.

[30] I. Manners, "Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 13, no. 2, 2006, pp. 182-99.

Brakes and constraints

Despite such advocacy of a European discourse from think tanks as well as EU institutions, there are serious constraints on such developments, foremost among them being the strength and legitimacy of national discourses. At a general level there may well be agreement on the objectives of the ESDP and the importance of underpinning EU action with a strong national commitment. Beyond the general, and within national policy establishments, the differences remain marked, the familiar, standard operating procedures persist – especially perhaps in conditions of added uncertainty since 9/11. Responding to new security challenges, disseminating information, and/or stimulating debate has sometimes been difficult. To take a UK example – particularly relevant if, as has often been suggested, the involvement of the UK is of critical importance in the ESDP even if it does not/cannot participate in every mission – the UK's Defence White Paper of 2003 "Delivering Security in a Changing World" managed 28 references to Europe and the EU, but only five to ESDP. Only one of the ESDP references does not include *in the same sentence* a reference to NATO and/or the United States.[32] Whether deliberate policy, or simply a lack of national understanding and ownership of such non-NATO Brussels based-processes, the British Ministry of Defence (MOD) is not far out of line with Meyer's general conclusion that national awareness "remains relatively low given the small number of participating individuals, the fact that top national decision-makers, especially defence ministers, do not meet as frequently within an EU context, and that few national-based news media are actively reporting about and commenting on these activities".[33]

[31] This even if the Commission itself has been assiduous in promoting defence industry interest within the single European market.

[32] <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/051AF365-0A97-4550-99C0-4D87D7C95DED/0/cm6041I_whitepaper2003.pdf>. If one looks for "European Security Strategy" on the UK's MOD website, what one gets (at number 3) is a paper on European Defence from November 2001 (accessed 24 March 2006).

[33] Meyer, "European Defence", p. 52-3.

Ingrained and slow-to-change national cultures that relate to national territorial defence thus remain dominant. White Papers may be produced that speak of less existential threats and the need for flexible responses but the emphasis continues to be placed on national defence – not least in order to justify defence spending at existing levels. It is difficult – if not impossible – for governments to call successfully for increased expenditure on armaments for specifically European purposes, even if Eurobarometer and other polls, continuously suggest that public opinion is in favour of "more Europe" in foreign and security policies.[34] National discourses retain a legitimacy that European multilateralism has difficulty in challenging.

Significantly, the pattern has been different in terms of NATO and cooperation with the United States. The MOD is far from exceptional in adding the formula about reliance on NATO and cooperation with the United States in references to the ESDP (as can be seen in the reactions of the new EU member states, below). But, even here, especially since the invasion of Iraq, there have been signs of change and old certainties have been questioned. Popular anti-Americanism, for example, seems to have increased to the point of being difficult though not impossible to ignore by governments whether in Western or Central and Eastern Europe.[35] The United States has not, of course, been an idle bystander, though its policies towards NATO's transformation and its measures to counter terrorism have not won universal acceptance, and its continuing scepticism, official and unofficial about ESDP, as well as its tendency to treat member states bilaterally have sometimes proved counterproductive.[36]

Of a somewhat different order but, nonetheless, complicating attitudes towards European security have been differences over the nature of the EU and who runs it. The institutionalisation of ESDP and the security discourse has not gone unchallenged. To the more Eurosceptic, there is always antipathy and the suspicion that policy is run by Brussels rather than through decisions taken there. And there have been confusion and a good deal of turf-fighting between the Council and Commission. But issues of competence and responsibility for the EU's "core strength" in the security field, the mix of civilian and military instruments to meet the needs of preventive diplomacy and state and society reconstruction remain important. They have sometimes been compounded by the difficulties experienced at all levels in coordinating specific policies whether in Brussels or on the ground. There is sometimes the appearance of atomised policy areas that inter-relate only with difficulty and sometimes seem almost to counter each other – as in the confusion of roles between EU bodies in BiH.[37]

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[34] See for example *Eurobarometer* 64 2005, pp, 103-4 <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_en.pdf>.

[35] See Pew Surveys <http://pewglobal.org/reports/>.

[36] See R. Kagan, *Paradise and Power* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003) for an especially provocative example that led to numerous rejoinders.

The security culture and the new member states

An essential part of the enlargement process was to bring stability to Europe as a whole. For most of the CEECs it was a double enlargement process, of joining NATO as well as the EU. Neither the CFSP nor ESDP were held in any great respect by the new member states even if there was generalised support. As Polish Prime Minister, Marek Belka, declared:

> Europe should increase its share of responsibility for the world, especially in these turbulent times, times of terrorism, the privatization of war, so to speak, and in times where modernism is being questioned, challenged, attacked, bombed, killed by dark forces …[38]

And, indeed, many of the new member states have been particularly strongly in favour of giving substance to the Neighbourhood Policy and extending it to the Caucasus in the interests of greater stability.

On the other hand, there were significant doubts about EU relations with Russia and with the United States that reinforced doubts about the ESDP. Most of the new member states were very much more preoccupied with territorial defence and a collective memory of Soviet domination. The paucity of references to Russia in the European Security Strategy paper was a cause for concern since:

> Russia has always been the litmus test for Polish public opinion and politicians of European foreign policy…. It will be hard to convey to the Polish public that "the resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a

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[37] G. Edwards and M. Tosic, "Persuasion and Norm Promotion: International Institutions in the Western Balkans" in Bourantos, D. *et al* (eds) *Multilaterlaism and Security Institutions in the Era of Globalization* (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming 2007). Even the "double-hatting" of the Council's Special Representative and Commission delegate in Macedonia, while welcomed by most as an efficient step forward, worried others, including the UK, which declared that it will take decisions only on the merits of each case.

[38] Marek Belka at the Trilateral Commission meeting in Warsaw, 7-10 May 2004 <http://www.trilateral.org/AnnMtgs/PROGRAMS/warsawpdf_folder/belka_poland_europe.pdf>.

> strategic priority for Europe", but Russia's policy on the Caucasus is beyond the main scope of the ESS.[39]

As a result, there was a sense of impotence about EU policy deriving from the competition among member states to curry favour with Russia.[40] While Polish leaders have been particularly vociferous on the importance of maintaining and even improving Atlantic links, the Baltic states, too, were alarmed at Western European attitudes to further NATO enlargement which seemed to give greater weight to Russian sensibilities than to the Balts' sense of security. Few question the supremacy of NATO under US leadership. As one Latvian official put it: "I think that due to our bitter lessons of history, we, Latvians, will be good Atlanticists..." for, he concluded, "[r]ealism means military capabilities and no paper exercises or paper tigers... ".[41]

And yet, even while relations with the United States, especially through NATO, remain key, some factors have been problematic for the relationship – even to the extent of creating a more positive view of CFSP and ESDP. There was alarm that NATO was ignored and marginalised in US responses after 9/11. CEEC governments responded to the Bush administration's call for a coalition of the willing in relation to Afghanistan and Iraq, but this was despite increasing disquiet among public and elites. Nor did they appreciate Donald Rumsfeld's efforts to exploit the divisions between "old" and "new" Europe, even if they found President Chirac's undiplomatic wigging unwelcome and unhelpful. Moreover, they have been wary and sometimes unhappy that, since 9/11, the US has looked to the transformation of NATO from a collective defence organisation to a more global security body. Then NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, did little to allay their concerns by raising and answering the question of whether territorial defence is "really relevant in the middle of 21st century Europe? Surely security is better ensured by dealing with threats at their source rather than on our doorsteps?"[42] It was not geared to settling any nervousness on the part of new NATO members, when, as one Pole put it:

> Joining NATO in Polish eyes meant that when the Russians appeared

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[39] O. Osica, "A secure Poland in a better Union? The ESS as seen from Warsaw's Perspective", *German Foreign Policy in Dialogue Newsletter*, vol. 5, no. 14, 2004, pp. 12-3.

[40] R. Trzaskowski and O. Osica, CFSP Watch 2004 <http://www.fornet.info/CFSPwatch annualreports2004.html>.

[41] Ilgvars Klava, Director, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, October 2003 <http://www.lai.lv/Kopaa_ANG.html>.

[42] Lord Robertson, October 2003 <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031013a.htm>.

> on the country's eastern frontier at Bialystok, the armoured might of the western alliance would stop them in their tracks. Instead "new" and "old" NATO members are being told to prepare for "out-of-area" operations.[43]

This move away from traditional defence concerns has contributed to a greater appreciation of the potential of ESDP, even if as very much a second best. There has been significant interest, for example, in the battle group proposals with a number of new member states signing up such as the Czechs (joining the Austrians and Germans in one group), Slovenia and Hungary in another (with Italy) and Estonia in yet another (together with Sweden, Finland and Norway). There has also been greater interest in developing especially the civilian side of ESDP, the Lithuanians, for example, being instrumental in launching the EU rule-of-law mission in Georgia, regarded as a successful example of the potential benefits the EU could provide for the region.[44]

Conclusions

The institutionalisation of the ESDP has been a highly significant development in creating the conditions in which a European security culture can evolve. Deepening cooperation has been undertaken despite, or rather because of the divisions between the member states over Iraq. In large measure this has been possible because of shared perspectives of the threats confronting the EU, and a growing confidence that the EU is an appropriate and capable vehicle for delivering security. But there remain important issues that can fall in different ways, either encouraging member states towards a more coherent and consistent security discourse or perpetuating inconsistency.

The role of the bigger member states has so far been crucial, whether in terms of Anglo-French initiatives as at St Malo or Le Touquet, or their consolidation and development by Germany. But the willingness of the other member states to be "led" by a *directoire* of the Big Three is always contingent on, not least, reasonably full information and consultation. The opportunities for "up-loading" their own concerns and having their voices heard remains critical – the initiatives of the Swedes and Finns in promoting the civilian side of crisis management being a case in point. But the dangers of "going global" even in terms of preventive diplomacy rather than focusing on Europe's neighbours, can be serious, especially when many of the new member states are still adapting themselves to being a part of the EU as a global actor and, rather more prosaically, when there are significant budgetary implications. And budgetary issues remain unresolved both in terms of the limited funding for Council activities but, more significantly, in terms of the EU's capabilities actually to undertake the tasks it has allotted itself.

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[43] K. Bobinski, "European Enlargement and the Barcelona Process", in Jacobs, A. (ed.) *Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation: Enlarging and Widening the Perspective*, Discussion Paper C131 (Bonn: Zentrum fur Europaische Integrationforschung, 2004).

[44] <http://www.urm.lt/index.php?-209134013> accessed 19 October 2005.

Balancing the civilian and military dimensions remains important, too, for the wider acceptance of a European Security Culture. To the extent that they are aware of it, the broader public has welcomed a more strategic role for the EU, especially in its civilian power guise. But, as some within the academic community have suggested, the sound of army boots in the Council building, *Justus Lipsius*, may challenge the normative nature of the EU and its distinctiveness as an international actor. There is a risk that with the "militarisation" of the EU, it becomes more like a state which, since it has the capabilities, finds use for them, thereby undermining its civilian, civilising strength.[45]

It is less the somewhat melodramatic idea of the militarisation of the EU than the more insidious process of securitisation of both policy and discourse that also causes concern. The securitisation of immigration policy with its consequent shift from immigration as an economic phenomenon to be welcomed to a security issue to be feared has already taken place.[46] That process, largely also a function of 9/11, is now being carried over into other policy areas such as development assistance with less concern for good governance in the interests of democratisation and respect for human rights, than for security sector reform, stability and international security.[47] In that process, the weight of the second pillar and the member states becomes greater and accountability more problematic.

Easing his way through these tensions has been the High Representative supported by an ever more sophisticated and capable infrastructure. In some instances, as in the EU3's negotiations with Iran, he has become an increasingly important intermediary between governments, the Iranian and the EU25. In other instances, he has used the growing resources attached to the office not simply to offer advice but to shape policy – sometimes seemingly in competition with the Commission – and to implement it. His role in determining Europe's Security Strategy was critical; his efforts in seeking to give substance to it, consistent.

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[45] Manners, "Normative power Europe reconsidered".

[46] See, among others, A. Buonfino, "Securitizing Migration" <http://www.opendemocracy.net/people-migrationeurope/article_1734.jsp>.

[47] N. Woods, "The shifting politics of foreign aid", *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 2, 2005, pp. 393-410.

In winning the confidence of member governments, the High Representative and Council Secretariat have been instrumental in taking up common threads within national security cultures and extending and developing them in a manner that has allowed a distinctive European security culture to take root. The growing number of EU operations, limited though they may be, feeds the discourse, creating a sense of legitimacy and even pressure for further operations. The discourse is not, however, uncontested: national discourses remain strong as do political and budgetary constraints on ambitious operations. NATO, transformed or not, persists; and the United States looks on warily and with suspicion.