The International Spectator
Volume XL, No. 4
October - December 2005
Editorial
Note
The articles contained in this issue
revolve around the widely debated question of reform of international institutions. The
core subject is UN reform, with Jeff Laurenti providing a critical American perspective,
complemented by Giancarlo Chevallard, Chris Hill and Antonio Missiroli, who address the
multi-faceted European dimension of the problem.
Laurenti sets the context, discussing the run-up to current activity, and most notably the
widely felt need for change generated by the acrimonious divisions over the Iraqi crisis.
The crisis induced an intense period of soul-searching, culminating in a near but rather
superficial consensus on the need for UN reform. Yet, according to Laurenti, the role
played by a crucially important actor, the US government, has been far from constructive.
The Bush administration has criticised the corruption (that is, regarding the Iraqi
Oil-for-Food programme) and ineffectiveness of the UN but, rather than strive to promote
change, it has denounced UN shortcomings to justify its own unilateralism. In fact,
according to some in Washington, a reformed and more effective UN would be seen as an
unwelcome counter-weight to US power and policy, whereas the existing system has served US
interests in cases such as Lebanon (over the Hariri affair), Syria (regarding withdrawal
from Lebanon), Sudan (approving a UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur) and post-war Iraq.
According to the author, it is in this context, spiced by the obstructionism of US
representative John Bolton, that the failure of the UN summit in September 2005 should be
read.
Chevallard views the Millennium Summit differently, arguing that the widespread
disappointment it generated is due to excessively high expec-tations and the result-
rather than process-oriented lenses through which it has been assessed. Chevallard
recognises the failure to move forward on key areas such as UNSC reform, the fight against
WMD proliferation, and the marginal progress made in areas such as terrorism, development
and UN Secretariat reform. But the author concentrates on what he describes as the
"glass half full", namely the successes in establishing the UN Peace-building
Commission and Fund, the Human Rights Council, and the entrenchment of the principle of
the "responsibility to protect". And it is precisely in these areas that
Chevallard flags the importance of the EU's leadership and its bridging role, without
which, he argues, these important steps forward would not have been taken.
Hill and Missiroli instead focus on the "glass half empty", and in particular on
the critical issue of UNSC reform. While there is substantial EU unity in the areas
mentioned above, EU divisions (most notably between France, Germany and the UK, on the one
hand, and Italy and Spain, on the other) have been partly responsible for the failure over
the UNSC. Hill analyses how the resulting stalemate has had negative and inter-connected
effects on the UN as well as on European foreign policy. He argues that UNSC reform should
reconcile the principles of regional/continental representation and of revolving
membership. To escape the deadlock, he proposes a weighted European rotation of one
non-veto wielding seat between Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland, with more time allocated
to the former. An alternative solution is put forward by Missiroli, who claims that
Europeans know only too well that an increase in size is no recipe for greater
effectiveness. He proposes that the three non-permanent members currently elected every
other year from two "European" caucuses would be replaced by only two
non-permanent seats (in addition to the permanent British and French ones) drawn from a
single new caucus encompassing all EU countries, candidates and neighbours, called
"EU and others". The extra seat thus made available by "Europe" could
be assigned to the "Asia and Africa" grouping to achieve a fairer geographical
distribution of Council seats.
From the reform of the UN, the issue shifts to reform in the EU, with articles by Alberto
Majocchi, Cesare Merlini and Steven Szabo. The authors approach the question from
different perspectives, yet interestingly converge on similar solutions.
Majocchi tackles the thorny question of Europe's ailing economy, lagging behind that of
the US in terms of growth and productivity. The Lisbon Agenda provides an agreement in
principle to resolve Europe's economic dilemma, but the ambition to upgrade the EU's
status as a top-class knowledge-based economy has not translated into practice. The
constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact, on the one hand, and the limited
size of the EU budget, on the other, have prevented allocation of the public funds needed
to realise the Lisbon project. As a way out, Majocchi proposes to implement the Lisbon
Agenda at EU level, funding it through the issue of EU bonds by the member states and a
European Lisbon Agency. Such a development would federalise the Union in the fiscal domain
and (at least initially) in the Euro group, in line with the vision of a two-speed Europe
with a federal core. The same conclusions are reached by Merlini, coming from a different
perspective. He contrasts the lack of an EU identity with the re-awakening in the United
States of national pride and the growing centralisation of powers in Washington (shifting
the federal balance towards the centre). He notes that, quite the opposite of what is
happening in the US, the current challenge for the EU is to develop a new identity on the
basis of the decline of the old nations, and in spite of the absence of a constitution and
of defined borders. One solution would be to freeze new enlargements and devote attention
to the internal state of the Union. An alternative, mirroring the bottom line in
Majocchi's argument, would be to proceed at multiple speeds, with integrationist (but not
necessarily perfectly overlapping) cores in different policy areas.
Szabo tackles another key problem bedevilling the West in general and Europe in
particular, that is the absence of strong leadership in these testing times marked by the
EU's constitutional crisis, the budget impasse, the stalemate in agricultural reform and
the wider challenges of terrorism. Szabo points out the structural constraints under which
European leaders operate, ranging from the EU's multi-level governance to the proportional
nature of electoral systems. Yet the need for leadership remains as pressing as ever, in a
European context marked by generational change, a return of ideology, the erosion of
values, the challenges of globalisation, European reunification and the loosening of
transatlantic ties. Szabo is sceptical about the emergence of leadership at EU level and
focuses instead on the desirability of a Merkel-style collaborative leadership within key
member states.
The issue of leadership is discussed in a different international context - that of the
World Bank - in articles by Marco Zupi and Antonio Tricarico. Both speculate on whether or
not the changing of the guard from James Wolfensohn to Paul Wolfowitz at the head of the
institution will result in continuity. Zupi highlights the difficulty in steering a large
and complex organisation like the Bank in new directions and refers to the World Bank's
changes under the previous leadership. He develops his argument by tackling two key
dilemmas facing the Bank, first the balance between "security" and
"development" and second that between "poverty-reduction" and
"efficiency" in determining the Bank's policy choices. Yet the new leadership is
also likely to be motivated by the aim to mark a change from Wolfensohn's presidency.
While unlikely to materialise in a radical shift in policy substance, Zupi argues that
greater attention devoted to monitoring and impact assessment could mark a welcome new
imprimatur of the new leadership. In the last article in the issue, Tricarico reaches a
similar conclusion regarding the degree of continuity under Wolfowitz. He argues that,
from a civil society perspective, little change can be detected so far with respect to the
conservative trend in the World Bank's approach that seems to have been regaining ground
in recent years. This claim is substantiated by an assessment of three controversial
policy issues. First, the Bank has not adequately introduced analysis of the impact on
poverty and society of the implementation of its Poverty Reduction Strategies. Second,
unheeding of the negative findings of the World Commission on Dams Report, the Bank has
continued to finance controversial dam projects, the latest in Laos and Pakistan in 2005.
Third, notwithstanding the emphasis put on renewable energy in the Extractive Industry
Review, the Bank has persisted in financing fossil fuel industries in developing and
middle-income countries. Taking the lead from the reform of other international
organi-sations, Tricarico, like Zupi, suggests that the introduction of measures to assess
results could reassure those waiting for the Wolf to bite.
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