

A Question of Norms: Transatlantic Divergences in Foreign Policy

Steven Everts

Steven Everts is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform (CER) and Director of its Transatlantic Programme.¹

The first few months of the Bush presidency have had a mixed reception in Europe. While the foundations for close and constructive relations between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) are strong, many European policymakers are worried about the overall neo-conservative bent of the Bush team and its hard-line attitude on many foreign policy issues. The trend that unnerves many leaders and officials across Europe is one of ever-growing "US unilateralism".

Whether the issue is national missile defence (NMD) and the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, or global warming and the Kyoto Protocol, or even an innocuous proposal by the OECD to clamp down on tax havens and money laundering, the Bush team has, so far, displayed a marked indifference, if not outright hostility, towards international agreements that the Europeans consider important. Instead the emphasis is on the need to uphold US freedom of manoeuvre and erode those constraints which the US finds bothersome. Even among America's most loyal supporters there is a concern that under George W. Bush the US is increasingly engaging with the rest of the world on its own terms.

Europe's political class of course understands that it is far too early to make a definite judgement on the impact of the Bush victory on transatlantic cooperation. It always takes a while for a new administration to settle in and find its rhythm. Many Europeans hope that, with the passage of time, some of Bush's plans will be modified so that they become more acceptable. And it is also true that a lot will

¹ This article is based on "Unilateral America, Light weight Europe? Managing divergence in transatlantic foreign policy", published by the CER in February 2001; an Italian version drawn from the same article appeared in the no. 2-3 2001 issue of *Europa Europe*.

depend on the relative influence of people such as Colin Powell (Secretary of State) and Robert Zoellick (US Trade Representative), who are more inclined to pay attention to the views of America's allies than other power brokers such as Dick Cheney (Vice President) and Donald Rumsfeld (Defense Secretary). But on the whole, there is a marked sense of an ease on whether Europeans and Americans will continue to have a shared world outlook and a common approach to "global governance" (that is, the efforts by governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations to manage the international system as such).

While it is clear that Bush will pursue different priorities and strategies than Clinton did, it is quite wrong to argue that US-European divergences started with him as summing of fice. After all, there has been for years a sense of drift in transatlantic cooperation on foreign policy, particularly regarding issues outside the European arena. The start of this gradual divergence can be traced back to the end of the Cold War, but it seems to have accelerated since the mid-1990s.

In recent years, Europeans have been mildly sceptical, and sometimes deeply annoyed, by US policy on "rogue states" (such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea); the propensity of Congress to use economic sanctions especially when they include illegal extra-territorial provisions; or the pro-Israeli bias in its Middle East strategy, to name only a few issues.

US policymakers, meanwhile, have their own set of frustrations. They are concerned, and sometimes dismayed, at some European actions – or, more often, the perceived lack thereof: the EU countries' distinctly underwhelming military capabilities, and their continued reluctance to agree to a more equitable "burden-sharing"; Europe's endemic inability to overcome its diplomatic incoherence and turn the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) into something credible and meaningful; the inexcusable foot-dragging on EU enlargement; a frequent indulgence in provincialism, on display for instance during the Asian financial crisis of 1998 or in the EU's current reluctance to think about security problems in the Persian Gulf or in Northeast Asia; and the sanctimonious grandstanding from Europeans on topics that the US deems unsuitable for transatlantic dialogue, such as the death penalty.

Put together, these divergences amount to quite a list. It is important to view them in the context of the very close and productive relations that Europe and America continue to enjoy across a variety of policy areas. But it is no use denying that these differences have increased in importance.

The point of this article is to look at some important changes in US foreign policy that have taken place during the last decade and assess what they mean for transatlantic cooperation. Equally important are the policy prescriptions on how the divergences can be managed, or at least how their harmful effects can be minimised. It would be misleading to suggest that Europe and America are heading for a political divorce. But if the transatlantic partnership is to endure and thrive, leaders, officials and outsiders will need to tackle these disagreements head on.

A new climate of opinion in Washington

To assess whether some of the trends in US foreign policy that have proved problematic for Europe in recent years will continue, or even worsen under Bush, it is necessary to “deconstruct” the catch-all concept of “US unilateralism”. Upon closer inspection it appears that three factors have shaped a new climate of opinion in Washington: the rise of Congress in US foreign policy making; the weakening US commitment to multilateral regimes; and the trend towards spending more money on defence but less on non-military instruments of diplomacy. It is worth analysing each of these three elements in greater detail.

The increased importance of Congress in US foreign policy making

Congress has in the last decade markedly increased its influence over the conduct of American foreign policy. The principal reason is that the end of the Cold War has lessened the imperative to frame a bipartisan approach, with vocal minorities and special interests now often in the lead on many foreign policy issues.

The ideological orientation and broader outlook of Congress have thus become increasingly important. More often than not, Congress has used its growing stature to push US policy in a more confrontational, unilateral direction (see the votes and attitude of Congress on UN contributions, the International Criminal Court or the extra-territorial provisions of the Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts).

Arguably the high point of Congressional unilateralism was the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in late 1999. The cavalier manner in which Congress debated and voted on the CTBT unnerved many in Europe and created a lot of mistrust. Even *The Economist*, hardly the voice of the anti-American left in Europe, wrote a harsh but poignant leader: “If America refuses multilateral engagements, it may be blissfully free; but it will also be alone. It will be a leader with no one to lead, in a world made unstable by its very isolation. This is sovereignty all right. But a superpower should be bigger and wiser than that.”²

While Republicans have fought hard to cut foreign affairs funding and have often resisted the principles of multilateral global governance, many Democrats have frustrated Clinton’s attempts to get fast-track authority for international trade agreements. Therefore Congressmen and women in both parties have foreign policy inclinations that are problematic for Europe.

From a European point of view the problem is two fold. First, it is the unilateral mood in Congress as such. For many Congressmen and women the international ramifications of their actions, or the opinions of US allies, are little more than an afterthought. But second and equally important is the growing divide in foreign policy outlook between the White House and Capitol Hill. Too often in recent years, the administration has failed to engage the difficult members of Congress early on and in a sustained way. Too often it has refused to spend political energy and

² *The Economist*, 22 October 1999.

capital to overcome Congressional unilateralism or obstructionism.

Hopefully Bush will understand the need for a truly bipartisan approach to foreign policymaking. If so, this could reduce the pernicious party-political games that beset US foreign policy under Clinton. But the Europeans, both at the member-state and the EU level, also need to step up their efforts to enhance the representation of their views and interests on Capitol Hill. In concrete terms, this means greater and more concerted attempts to explain European viewpoints to influential Congressmen and women and, particularly, those Senators who focus on foreign affairs.

Finally, the Europeans should stress to their counterparts in the executive branch that they expect them to ensure that commitments entered into will be upheld. Americans who urge Europeans to take on their domestic opinion and parliamentary opposition for the greater good of Atlantic cohesion – for instance over defence spending or genetically-modified organisms – should realise that this type of political engagement is needed on both sides of the Atlantic.

A weakening commitment to multilateral regimes

The second – and closely related – trend in US foreign policy that causes concern in all European capitals is a perceived reduction in the US commitment to pursue its objectives through international organisations and multilateral fora. The careful construction of a rule-based international system is the goal of many European governments and of the EU's CFSP. But America is displaying increasing wariness and resistance – a trend that is being reinforced under Bush.

It is important to underline that European preferences are not merely the product of their own, successful, experience of multilateral governance (the EU is, in essence, all about subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of law). But Europe's support for multilateral regimes is actually the consequence of a deeper conviction that most of the world's problems – ranging from security threats to economic instability to environmental degradation – can almost always be solved only through robust multilateral efforts. Most problems on the global agenda are too complex and too persistent for one country to solve alone.

The "black-list" of American positions and decisions that have caused European disappointment is well known. They include America's broader attitude to the UN and its functional organisations. Many Europeans are also dismayed at the way in which the UN has been politicised, and they too worry about the lack of effectiveness of many of its programmes. But they also know that the UN is only as strong as its members want it to be. Without exception, European governments are convinced of the need for UN involvement to tackle many pressing global problems. As a result, they are deeply committed to UN reform. By contrast, the US attitude to the UN is often close to disdain while the sincerity of its attitude towards UN reform is subject to doubt. Curiously, even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – an organisation in which American influence is exceptionally great – has become unpopular in leading Republican circles.

The weakening US commitment to global governance has been most vividly demonstrated by its attitude to various international treaties. In recent years the US has not signed, or the US Senate has refused to ratify, several important agreements (in addition to the CTBT):

- The Kyoto Protocol on global warming. Not only has the Senate refused to ratify the Protocol, but the hard-line US negotiating stance during the follow-up conference in the Hague in October 2000 has been widely seen as the main reason for the failure to reach an agreement. Worse yet, in March 2001 Bush stunned his allies when he announced his decision to simply withdraw the US from the Kyoto negotiations without, so far, offering any credible alternative on how to combat global warming.
- The Treaty Establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). In 1998, 180 countries, including the US, supported in principle the creation of such a court. But in the end, and despite major concessions offered by the other negotiating countries to allay US concerns, the US delegation was one of the seven countries not to sign the final treaty. The other countries were Israel, Libya, Iraq, China, Qatar and Sudan. In December 2000, President Clinton at long last signed the treaty. But because the administration prevaricated so long and had not lobbied in its last two years on behalf of the treaty, the chances of ratification are nil.
- The Land Mine Treaty. In 1997, following a groundswell of public concern over the effects of anti-personnel mines in civil wars in Africa, Asia and elsewhere, a treaty was signed that banned their use. Alone among its allies, but together with Russia and China, the US refused to sign.

The ABM Treaty could well be the next victim of the growing US dislike of international treaties. It is highly likely that to proceed with its ambitious missile defence plans, the Bush administration will move beyond the constraints of the ABM Treaty. And while most Europeans recognise that the ABM cannot survive in its present form, they also agree that some internationally agreed limit upon missile defence systems is needed. They also stress that NMD should be developed alongside, and not as a substitute of, other non-proliferation efforts. By contrast, the Bush team seems unconvinced about the merits of such a treaty-based approach.

Ever less money for diplomacy, ever more for defence

The third trend that leaves Europeans scratching their heads is the American willingness to let the sums available for diplomacy and preventive action dwindle year-on-year while spending ever more money on defence. A country's budget, like that of a company or an individual, reflects its priorities. Even America's strongest supporters in Europe are concerned about the growing gap between the financial resources for "soft security" (a wide-ranging category including civil reconstruction, mine-clearing, technical assistance, police and judicial training, and

debt relief) and the money spent on “hard security” (such as military salaries and hardware).

Some figures can illustrate the changes in US funding priorities. The percentage of the US federal budget devoted to international affairs excluding defence spending – the so-called “150 Account” – has been declining for decades. “In the 1960s, the 150 Account made up 4 per cent of the federal budget; in the 1970s, it averaged about 2 per cent; during the first half of the 1990s, it went down to 1 per cent.”³ The development and humanitarian aid budget has been hit particularly hard. The US government spends just \$10.4 billion a year – a meagre 0.11 per cent of GDP – on development aid, compared with an OECD average of 0.3 per cent of GDP.

Other non-military spending has been cut as well. Congress has made severe cuts in the funding for multilateral development banks (around 40 per cent, or \$700 million, since 1995); it has reduced the funding for nuclear non-proliferation efforts including the Safe Guard programme in the former Soviet Union; and it has slashed family planning programmes by attaching anti-abortion clauses. Even funding for the IMF has been difficult to get through Congress.

The last Foreign Operations Bill, passed in July 2000 by the House and Senate, confirmed this trend. The total funds authorised, \$20 billion, were 40 per cent below what America spent on non-military security programmes in 1984, and \$2 billion below what the administration had requested. And while Congress slashed a host of development aid and other soft security programmes, it added \$5 billion extra defence spending, on top of the \$300 billion already allocated, for projects that even the Pentagon had said it did not need.

Meanwhile, the gap in defence spending between the US and all other countries is widening every year. While both Republicans and Democrats stress that America should not be the world’s police man, they vote for ever more sums to be spent on the military, leading to what might be called a “defence overkill”.⁴ Such is the overwhelming nature of US military supremacy that the country spends more than the next nine countries *combined*.

Not only Europeans, but many Americans have signalled their unhappiness with this state of affairs. Ellen Frost of the Institute for International Economics has sharply criticised the fact that “Over time, US foreign aid has shrunk to pitiful proportions.”⁵ Regarding the cuts in the State Department’s budget, she added: “The Department’s troubles reflect widespread Congressional contempt for diplomacy and the so-called ‘pin-striped cookie-pushers’ who practice it. Its budget is grossly

3 R. Gardner, “The One Per cent Solution. Shirk ing the Cost of World Lead er ship”, *Foreign Affairs*, July- August 2000.

4 J. Lindley- French, *Lead ing Alone or Act ing To gether? The Trans at lan tic Se cu rity Agen da for the next US Presi dency* (Paris: WEU In sti tute for Se cu rity Stud ies, Sep tem ber 2000).

5 E. Frost, “The Trans at lan tic Re la tion ship: A View from Wash ington”, *Dis cus sion Pa per for the Con fer ence on EU- US Re la tions*, Uni ver sity of Geor gia, April 2000.

inadequate; what few increments that have dribbled into it are devoted to enhancing the physical security of embassies.”

Four additional elements make this growing imbalance more problematic from a European perspective. First, there is a broad consensus among Europe’s foreign policy experts that the biggest challenge facing the western world is how to deal with the disorder of “failed states”, whether they are in Europe, the Caucasus, Africa or elsewhere. It is clear that the ensuing political, economic and security problems can only be dealt with by using a variety of tools and a mixture of national and multinational efforts. Few analysts believe that limiting these to hard security tools will suffice to maintain peace and restore order. Having a well-equipped army is useful if one wants to repel an Iraqi-style attack on Kuwait or wage a Kosovo-type air campaign. But without also using other foreign policy means, it will be of little help in dealing with the instability in the Balkans, let alone in Africa.

Secondly, while Europe has in the past overplayed the virtues of being a civil power, it is – at long last – trying to remedy this imbalance through its efforts to construct a real European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). At the Helsinki summit of 1999, EU leaders pledged their commitment to set up a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 troops and to be able to sustain that deployment for one year. Not only are EU countries engaged in a serious exercise to enhance their power-projection capabilities, but eight EU countries have also increased their defence budgets for 2001.⁶ Thus, while the Europeans are trying to ensure that their foreign policies can draw upon a full range of tools, the same can not be said of the US.

Thirdly, there is a risk that this imbalance in financial priorities is exacerbating transatlantic divergences in world outlook. It is no surprise that the American preference for military spending is linked to particular ideas on what are the greatest security threats. Highest on America’s list are problems, such as ballistic missile proliferation, that seem most amenable to military and technological solutions. Quite the opposite for the Europeans. They are most worried about organised crime, migration and environmental devastation, issues that have a greater chance of being solved by political engagement and huge sums of money. The caricature of both sides is reminiscent of the saying “if the only instrument you have is a hammer, all your problems start looking like a nail”.

Finally, the vast increases in defence spending are linked to an ever-greater reluctance to deploy ground forces, particularly for Kosovo-style peacekeeping-plus-reconstruction operations. George Bush, Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell have all argued that the US should be more selective in troop deployments because America is not the world’s “911”. The implication is that the US should focus on “full spectrum war fighting” while “lesser tasks” such as peacekeeping and reconstruction will be left to the Europeans and others. But as Flora Lewis has

⁶ G. Andréani, C. Bertram and C. Grant, “Europe’s Military Revolution (London, CER, March 2001).

pointed out: “There is a peculiar contradiction in the argument that overwhelming strength is essential but that American forces should not be used to pacify trouble spots around the world unless American national interests (which are not defined) are clearly involved. A policy of spend but don’t send may serve some sectional interests, but it doesn’t address the nation’s needs in a troubled world.”⁷

For all these reasons both sides of the Atlantic should ensure that adequate funding exists for the full range of tools that states can draw on to support their foreign policy. Accordingly, it would be helpful both for Atlantic unity *per se* and for the Alliance’s ability to tackle global problems if the US redressed the imbalance in funding priorities. Simply put: more money has to go to soft security in the US (just as Europe has to do more on hard security).

Unfortunately, Bush is unlikely to reverse this trend. It is clear that Bush is deeply suspicious of spending on debt relief, post-conflict reconstruction, the fight against infectious diseases, or other new issues on the global agenda. Instead, he and his advisors emphasise that they would like to see US foreign policy redirected towards defending US “strategic interests”.

Donald Rumsfeld has indicated that he expects a further increase in the Pentagon’s budget. But such a rise in defence spending is not what America needs right now. The best hope, from a European perspective, is the appointment of Colin Powell. Perhaps because of his military background, Powell could use his considerable standing in Washington to reverse the decline in funds for diplomacy, multilateral efforts and soft security tools. Powell has stated his intentions not just to rein vigorate the demoralised State Department and stem the decline in its influence, but also to achieve a significant rise in its budget. EU members and the Union’s officials should strongly support this effort to redress the imbalance between hard and soft security spending.

The irony is of course that of all countries in the world, the US – because of the powerful attraction that it represents as a political idea and model – is arguably best placed to deploy “soft power”. But because of a warped sense of financial priorities, this potential is heavily under-used.

Evaluation: where does this leave Europe?

It is clear that a new climate of opinion has emerged in Washington and that humility is not its hallmark, despite George W. Bush’s assertions to the contrary. The loudest voices of this school can be found in Congress – although its influence is not restricted to Capitol Hill. “Unilateralist” is the best term to describe this group. When thinking about foreign policy, their emphasis is on maintaining US superiority and sovereignty. They are sceptical of multilateral fora, legal conventions and international norms. They strongly prefer spending on defence to any other type of international spending. They also tend to cast the international

⁷ *International Herald Tribune*, 15 September 2000.

debate in an adversarial way. And they are often scornful of the contributions that other countries, including the European allies, make to the maintenance of global order and stability. The end result is not isolationism but unilateralism. Both Europeans and many Americans are worried.

Two additional points need to be made. First, it is true that quarrelling among European and Americans is nothing new. They have been doing it for decades. None the less, the Alliance has endured and thrived. But this counterargument fails to acknowledge that the current divergences are different in kind, if not in number. Unlike during the Cold War, when the Europeans argued – some times fiercely – with the Americans over nuclear strategy or how tough to be on the Soviet Union, today both sides are quarrelling over the importance of rules and norms when it comes to managing the international system.

Second, Europeans should approach this topic from a positive and constructive angle. Simply complaining about US unilateralism and emphasising European virtuousness may have the short-lived effect of making Europeans feel good about themselves, but it is unlikely to shift American thinking or modify US behaviour. In stead, it is likely to sour EU-US relations, and that in turn will have a negative effect on the ability of Europeans and Americans to tackle global problems together.

The best solution for European Atlanticists is to ensure that Europe's own performance in foreign and security policy improves. Moreover, the Europeans need to support the multilateralists in America – of which there are still a large number. To assure that the multilateralists succeed in their battle with the unilateralists, the Europeans need to devise a careful strategy highlighting both the costs of US detachment and the benefits of acting multilaterally.

Looking at the costs, one of the many arguments that the Europeans should use is that by its self-exclusion, the US has lost the opportunity to shape the nature and functioning of various global regimes. And since the US often does accept and live up to the requirements of certain treaties, it might as well formally accede to them, thus also gaining the benefits of verification. For instance, in the case of the CTBT, the Clinton administration and also President Bush have decided to adhere to a moratorium on nuclear testing. But because of the unilateral nature of this decision, it does not bind others – morally or legally.

The Europeans also need to convey to the Americans the benefits, to Washington, of staying within multilateral frameworks. This not just because the Americans will also value the construction of a rule-based international system when the current "unipolar moment" ends. Rather, the Europeans need to stress that America can look forward to an increase in the effectiveness of its policies if it pursues them with the active support of the European allies. And enlisting that support is in turn dependent on curbing America's unilateralist inclinations.

Suggestions on the way forward

It is clear that below the surface of individual disagreements – over levels of defence spending, the wisdom of proceeding precipitously with NMD and various

trade disputes – lies a deeper, more fundamental divergence over the organising principles of the post- Cold War world. It is essentially a debate about the importance of rules, norms and institutions in the international system. While a convergence of views on global governance is highly desirable, it is unlikely to come about soon. Hence, caution and perseverance should be the watch words. Still, a number of policy recommendations can be identified:

What the Europeans need to do:

- The European Union should explicitly recognise that multilateralising the US is one of its key foreign policy priorities for the coming years. In discussions with their American counterparts, the Europeans must constantly reiterate the benefits to the US of supporting global regimes: staying inside multilateral frameworks is almost always necessary to ensure policy success (multilateralism is a means to success, not a goal in itself); and America will also need strong and effective international regimes once the unipolar moment has passed.
- One of the best ways for Europe to make an impact on US thinking is to move from strategic irrelevance to helpful partner. Europeans who clamour for more equality should realise that this requires Europe to raise its game in foreign policy – in particular by making greater efforts to match words with deeds. For example, when Europeans talk excitedly about European defence, they should ensure that the outcome will not be another false dawn but a meaningful increase in military capabilities and effective decision-making procedures. Only on this basis can a global partnership with the US come about. Conversely, the Europeans can and should stress that this partnership will only work if the Americans agree to genuine and early consultations, and if they pay greater attention to European views on how the international system should be structured.
- To enhance respect and support for multilateral governance, Europeans should be more serious about their own international obligations. For example, to date the EU has not made its import regime for hormone-injected beef compliant with WTO rules. Equally, the negotiations between the EU and South Africa over the bilateral free trade agreement – when obstruction by southern EU members meant that the agreement had to be renegotiated after it had already been signed – showed that the Europeans are not averse to using unilateral measures either. Europe should lead by example and refrain from acting unilaterally.
- Europe should think more globally when it comes to hard security questions. Active European participation in peacekeeping (4587 troops in 15 UN-run peacekeeping operations versus no troops in any for the US) and extensive European foreign aid budgets counter American dismissal of the Europeans

as narrow-minded provincials. But it is true that when it comes to traditional security problems (difficult states, proliferation issues, China/Taiwan), EU governments tend to leave them to the US – and yet reserve the right to criticise Washington about the way it deals with them. While the Europeans do not necessarily and always have to act globally, they should start thinking in a more strategic manner.

- The Europeans must improve the representation of their views and the rationale of their policies to members of Congress. At present, separate national efforts have too often proved disjointed and ineffective. To explain European preferences, the EU High Representative for foreign policy, Javier Solana, should hold informal briefings sessions, perhaps three or four times a year with members of the House and Senate who deal with international issues. These visits should become a regular event on the transatlantic calendar and help to give a “face” to EU foreign policy in Washington.

What the Americans need to do:

- The Americans need to realise that norms and multilateral governance will not go away as a European preoccupation. In fact, they will only increase in importance. Therefore those Americans who want to set up a global partnership with Europe should accept that the promotion of a rule-based international system must be an integral part and an explicit aim of it.
- To maintain Alliance cohesion, both sides need to be prepared – financially and politically – to use the full spectrum of foreign policy tools. Therefore the trend in America to ward spend ever more money on the military and ever less on diplomacy needs to be reversed. Equally, the US must realise that on troop deployments a policy of “spend but don’t send” will strain transatlantic security cooperation.
- The Bush administration will need to make greater efforts to curb the unilateral instincts of members of Congress. Since wariness towards global governance is deep-rooted, especially among Congressional Republicans, the administration will have to make concerted efforts and be willing to spend political capital on this issue.
- Of all the treaties that the US has refused to sign or ratify, those relating to arms control issues involve European interests most directly. To allay growing European concerns, the US should quickly sign and ratify the Land Mine Treaty, ratify the CTBT, and reassure Russia, China and others that it will not withdraw unilaterally from the ABM Treaty to deploy a missile defence system. Furthermore, American policymakers need to consider the damage to US standing in the world of continuing opposition to international conventions such as the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol.

What Europe and America should do together:

- To promote a convergence of views on many individual foreign policy issues, closer and more systematic consultations are needed. For America, this means making greater efforts to consult the Europeans early on in their decision-making process, avoiding *faits accomplis*. For the Europeans, this means trying to avoid the problem of rigidity: once 15 members have agreed a common position, it is subsequently difficult to change it. In practical terms, there should be an EU diplomat stationed in the National Security Council, while the Americans should have one diplomat posted in the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit of the EU's High Representative.
- Most of all, Europe and America need a real debate about global norms and governance. Existing divergences on the importance of norms are creating rising levels of irritation and resentment. They need to be tackled head on. To give greater impetus and direction to this much-needed debate, a High-Level Working Group, composed of senior officials on both sides, should work out a Declaration of Principles. The point of the declaration would be to list the principles – for instance on the importance of global regimes and of reducing unilateral actions to an absolute minimum – that should guide both sides in their foreign policies. After a broader discussion, involving parliamentarians, foreign policy specialists and others, this declaration should then be officially proclaimed at the EU- US summit in June 2002. The declaration would not be legally binding, but it would have a huge political significance. It would set out the basis for a global partnership that has so much to offer – to Europe, to America, and to the rest of the world.