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CIAO DATE: 04/05/07
Losing Hearts and Minds: Understanding America's Failure in Iraq
by Samer Shehata
Although the future of Iraq remains uncertain, the United States has already lost the war for Iraqi hearts and minds. The war of diplomacy was lost not because of biased reporting in the Arab media or the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, but primarily because of a series of policy mistakes, broken promises, and the failure to meet basic obligations. Nearly two years after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, significant parts of Iraq remain entrenched in a Hobbesian nightmare. In addition to the absence of law and order, basic services have only recently reached prewar levels in much of the country. In Tikrit, Fallujah, and Baghdad, cities favored under the previous regime, residents have less electricity and clean water than they did before the war.
No amount of refurbished schools, democracy programs, or good intentions can compensate for these conditions, which many blame—rightly or wrongly—on the United States and the now defunct Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA). By faulting the old regime, the condition of the country’s infrastructure before the war, or the continuing violence, the United States is unlikely to win the sympathy of ordinary Iraqis. Even if elections in January 2005 are “successful,” it is unlikely that this will be sufficient to convince Iraqis that America is trustworthy and deserving of their support.
The future will likely bring intensified counterinsurgency operations, increased urban fighting, corresponding resistance, and inevitable civilian casualties, that will further embitter Iraqis. From the perspective of most citizens, the United States and the CPA received failing grades long ago.
What mistakes did the United States and the CPA make that resulted in the present state of affairs? What do Iraqis think of the current situation, the coalition forces, and the continued American presence? And how will the continuing violence likely impact Iraqi opinion of the interim government and the United States? Answering these questions is essential for assessing the prospects for Iraq’s future.
“Kites and Boom Boxes.” Those who spoke before the war about Iraqis welcoming American troops with “kites and boom boxes,” such as Fouad Ajami, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, mischaracterized the situation. Kanan Makiya, an Iraqi Professor at Brandeis University, told President Bush during a visit to the Oval Office that invading American troops would be greeted with “sweets and flowers.”1 This kind of polit ically motivated misinformation coming from experts was employed by adminis tration officials to sell the war to the American public.2
One of the many problems with such naively optimistic predictions is that they failed to recognize the possibility that Iraqis, while welcoming the end of Saddam’s regime, simultaneously disdained the idea of for eign troops in their country. The course of the occupation has only made matters worse.
An Army War College report, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, presciently stated , “Long-term gratitude is unlikely and suspicion of U.S. motives will increase as the occupation continues. A force initially viewed as liberators can rapidly be relegated to the status of invaders should an unwelcome occupation continue for a prolonged time. Occupation problems may be especially acute if the United States must implement the bulk of the occupation itself rather than turn these duties over to a postwar international force.”3
Samer Shehata teaches Middle East and Arab politics at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He traveled to Iraq both before and after the war.