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CIAO DATE: 04/05/07
Facing Double Jeopardy: Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism
by Jon B Wolfsthal
As the world’s only superpower, the United States has a major interest in reducing the spread and use of nuclear weapons. Only nuclear weapons can strategically constrain U.S. action overseas, and only nuclear weapons can realistically threaten the fabric of American society. Alarmingly, given the conse quences, the risk of a nuclear attack against the United States is increasing. In the near term, this concern focuses mainly on the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by terror groups, particularly al-Qaeda. Traditional tools that have kept the nuclear peace, such as deterrence, are of little or no value against these terrorists. Therefore, the only hope for the United States is to prevent such groups from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the long term, the primary nuclear danger is a possible new wave of state proliferation that engulfs the Middle East and East Asia. As today’s international security is predicated on the existence of few nuclear states, the spread of nuclear weapons in these regions fundamentally challenges U.S. security.
As disturbing as these realities are, the spread of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, and more can—and must—be done to prevent it from taking place. Throughout the nuclear age, the United States has kept proliferation in check with aggressive, comprehensive, and focused policies. In the past thirty years alone, U.S. efforts have prevented and even rolled back proliferation in at least eight states. These successes have required the use of incentives, alliances, diplomacy, and, at times, sanctions.1 While not perfect, such nonproliferation efforts have enjoyed a positive track record.
But state proliferation is no longer the international community’s primary con cern, as the possibility of nuclear terror ism has become its central focus. Fortunately, nuclear terror is preventable. Terror groups do not have the capacity to produce their own nuclear materials. They must therefore rely on state nuclear stockpiles. The effective prevention of nuclear terror requires the cooperation of over fifty countries at a cost of billions of dollars. Compared to the economic, security, and political consequences—to say nothing of the loss of human lives—that would accompany the first terrorist use of a nuclear weapon, these efforts are vital.
Overall, international efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism to date have been slow, uncoordinated, and piecemeal compared to what is required to win the race against time, as described by both International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohammed El Baradei and former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn. A combination of concerted effort and luck has left the international community fortunate, but few believe that such fortune will hold out as time progresses. Most believe more hard work will be essential.
Double Jeopardy. The full extent of the terrorist threat to the international community is unknown. Yet enough evidence exists of terrorist interest in nuclear weapons to cause alarm. The good news is that terrorists do not yet possess the means to produce their own enriched uranium or separated plutonium— activities that require time and large, complex facilities.2 Thus, groups intent on acquiring nuclear weapons must steal or buy such materials from existing national stockpiles. The bad news is that many hundreds of tons of direct-use nuclear materials exist all over the world and hundreds of tons—enough for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons—are vulnerable to theft or diversion. Moreover, there is strong evidence that terrorists affiliated with al- Qaeda and others are actively seeking these materials in Russia, Pakistan, and elsewhere.3 Russian security officials have reported that Chechen groups linked to al-Qaeda have conducted surveillance of Russian nuclear facilities. Russian offi cials were sufficiently concerned in the wake of the 2004 Beslan school attack and dual airline bombings to order additional Interior Ministry troops to protect nuclear sites. Pakistani nuclear experts are also believed to have met with top al- Qaeda officials in 2001, possibly even with Osama bin Laden himself.4 Moreover, there is continued concern about the reliability of the security and personnel associated with Pakistan’s nuclear complex.