

Conflict & Security

An Emerging Synthesis for a New Way of War

Combination Warfare and Future Innovation

James Gallard and Peter Faber

In the wake of the precision air attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, many demanded that the United States "change everything" in its approach to national security. While this reaction is understandable enough, we in the United States must be careful to not let it overwhelm us. We must continue to frame the events of September 11 within their proper context, and not the other way around. In particular, the United States needs to think deeply about how it will transform its military and what forms of innovation it will pursue. In the latter case, the United States must be particularly careful to distinguish between true and false innovation.

True innovation not only changes existing balances of power, it also helps construct positive, "user-friendly" strategic environments for those who innovate. In order to avoid the pitfalls of innovating in a vacuum, however, it is important to remember a number of points. First, true innovation is, to some degree, a reciprocal or bilateral process where opponents develop and improve their capabilities in reaction to one another. Second, examining and evaluating an opponent's possible innovations and countermeasures must be an integral part of such a reciprocal innovation process. Third, the time

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needed to develop countermeasures is usually much shorter than the time needed to develop an innovative concept, technology, or approach in the first place.

In contrast to each of these points about true innovation, there are three major forms of false innovation that must be avoided. *Inertial innovation* tends to align itself too closely to the lessons learned from the past. It builds on past successes, and either minimizes or ignores the counter-innovations being developed by real or potential adversaries. *Detached innovation*, in contrast, ordinarily occurs "in the dark." It lacks proper knowledge or perspective of possible opponents and environments, and even "friendly" developments by others. Finally, *vulnerable innovation* is too exposed. It willingly ignores the asymmetric countermeasures being developed by actual or potential adversaries of a country who are well aware of that country's own conceptual, technological, or organizational advances.

The debate over which type of innovation the U.S. military should pursue is critically relevant. One possible option first appeared in early 1999 within a controversial Chinese text entitled *Unrestricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Tactics in the Age of Globalization*.¹ Broadly speaking, the authors of *Unrestricted Warfare*—Colonels Qiao Ling and Wang Xiangrui of the People's Liberation Army—wanted to "emancipate" the minds of military officers from the bondage of traditional thinking, primarily by challenging dated ideologies and strategies. As a result, their text offers a new, upgraded theory of war—Combination Warfare—that aims to reconcile and adapt the "asymmetric" principles first developed by Sun Tzu over 2,000 years ago with the "postmodern" hybrid warfare of today.

By using *Unrestricted Warfare* as a foundation, this article will attempt to illustrate that traditional definitions of military power are not only passé, but are also counterproductive exercises in nostalgia. Innovative thinking about the American Way of War requires adoption of a new strategic approach that goes far beyond mere force of arms and military power. To support this general theme, we will first describe the innovative approach to conflict advocated in *Unrestricted Warfare*. Next, we will use a fictional China-Taiwan scenario to illustrate how this approach might play out. Finally, we will highlight the types of military innovation that the United States should avoid and pursue. In each case, the message should be clear: if the U.S. military is going to pursue true innovation, rather than its false cousins, it must be prepared to cope with combination warfare strategies, as practiced by hostile states and non-state actors.

Combination Warfare in the Twenty-First Century.

In the past, strategists classified war according to three primary characteristics: goals (defend/attack), means (nuclear/conventional), and scale (strategic, operational, or tactical engagements). In the 1990s, however, the U.S. military increasingly emphasized a fourth category: the forms of war. In particular, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) stressed four dominant forms of warfare that it expected to pursue in the future: *information warfare*; *precision warfare* (which features information processing, stealthy, remote, and non-contact attacks, and speed, accuracy, and limited casualties); *joint operations*; and *military operations other than war* (MOOTW). Recognizing the growing importance of different forms of war

worldwide system of power, to which great power politics increasingly will yield. Thus, victory or defeat will not depend exclusively on state-versus-state tests of strength. Some nation-states have already begun to borrow or invoke the power of supra-national, multi-national, and non-state players to redouble and expand their own influence. If this trend continues, supra-national combinations may eventually be a country's most powerful weapon in accomplishing its national-security goals.

Supra-domain combinations, in turn, draw from military, non-military, and above-military forms of warfare. They represent a departure from the past when armies first collided in a two-dimensional geographical space. Eventually, combatants added sea and air operations

fare may be an especially attractive component of this vertical type of Combination Warfare because it can pit itself against civilizations as a whole.

The second basic element of *supra-domain combinations*, non-military forms of warfare, extends our understanding of war to each and every field of human activity. These types of conflict can include financial warfare, trade warfare, resource warfare, economic warfare, legal and moral warfare, and media warfare.

Finally, above-military forms of warfare can include cultural, diplomatic, and psychological warfare, which broadly aim to assimilate those who have different views through the use of "soft power," direct negotiation, or intimidation. Other types of above-military warfare can include technological and

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to this domain, and they now include space and information operations as well. But is operating in these five domains sufficient unto itself?

Some Chinese strategists, for instance, consider ecological warfare an especially powerful military form of war to use in *supra-domain combinations*, especially since so many nations are striving for rapid economic development. Activities in this category could therefore range from burning oil fields to "accidental" chemical spills, to manipulating "natural" meteorological and seismic events (i.e. triggering earthquakes, and altering temperatures and precipitation and sunshine patterns). And as we saw on September 11, new-era terrorist war-

fare, research and development (R&D) warfare, which could involve setting industry standards, creating "user-friendly" monopolies, and investing in multiple R&D streams or leap-ahead technologies that improve one's ability to respond to another's asymmetric strategies. Similarly, smuggling warfare can be used to undermine economic order and stability via the distribution of counterfeit currency, and fictitious or fabrication warfare can be used to counterfeit political or military strength for economic and deterrence purposes.

In addition to *supra-national warfare* and the military, non-military, and above-military forms of *supra-domain warfare*, there are two additional categories of

vertical warfare to consider: *supra-means combinations*, which orchestrate all available means (military, non-military, and above-military) to carry out operations, and *supra-tier combinations*, which dovetail the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict into a single campaign. Again, the desired effect of these vertical combinations is to create a complex set of threats that either deters or overwhelms an opponent. Not only can the practitioners of Combination Warfare horizontally mix and match at least twenty-seven types of war, they can also simultaneously "package" them within as many as four supra-level combinations at the same time. The overall benefit of this approach is to use different forms of national power as "playing cards" that one can deliberately shuffle together to create a "winning hand." This diversity of options also allows players to "stack the deck" by carefully selecting which combinations will most favorably accomplish their objectives.

To realize the above strategy, however, it is necessary to develop new-concept "weapons" that go far beyond the military realm. In Combination Warfare, anything and everything can and should be considered a weapon—from an intentional stock market crash to a debilitating computer virus. Like Osama bin Laden, the authors of *Unrestricted Warfare* believe that new-concept weapons should be closely linked to the lives of common people, and capable of delivering massive, war-like effects aimed not just at combatants, but also at entire populations. This is obviously a controversial element of Combination Warfare. Whether or not the United States wants to travel down this potentially illegal and immoral path, others inevitably will, as the terrorist attacks of September 11 demonstrated so well.

Visualizing Combination Warfare: A China-Taiwan Example.

There are many ways that non-state actors, like Osama bin Laden, might use Combination Warfare, but its potential utility in interstate squabbles should not be forgotten either. Consider the possibility of a future Chinese regime executing a *fait accompli* strategy to co-opt Taiwan politically. In this scenario, the Mainland might initially fabricate a national emergency—via media warfare—over Taiwanese sovereignty. In particular, it might stage either pro- or anti-integration demonstrations in Taipei that deliberately turn violent (diplomatic warfare). A sacred patriotic duty to restore order over "Chinese" territory then becomes imperative (cultural, ideological, and moral warfare). In response, the Chinese initiate submarine exercises around Taiwan and "encourage" commercial shipping to avoid the area, essentially closing shipping lanes and adversely affecting Asian and Western stock markets (economic and financial warfare).

Finally, the Chinese military might direct several dozen Backfire Bombers and perhaps 200 Su-27s against Taiwanese air-defense sites (conventional warfare). At this point, however, the Chinese could stop. Holding back their airborne and amphibious forces, they might use psychological warfare merely to threaten an invasion of Taiwan, thereby creating overwhelming psychological pressure in the diplomatic warfare that would follow. The outcome they desire, after all, might not be a military victory, but a political capitulation.

This largely "horizontal" scenario is more than plausible and is not a particularly complex example of Combination Warfare. We could envision a scenario that used inter-governmental organiza-

tions and non-state actors to apply further pressure on Taiwan. The point is that any number of combinations of horizontal and vertical strategies could be used to achieve the same goal.

Implications of Combination Warfare for the United States.

Since September 11, American assumptions about future warfare have taken a giant step toward mirroring those of our actual and potential foes. For example, we now understand that mingling military and civilian technologies (i.e., near-weapon-grade anthrax and commercial airliners) will occur in unprecedented ways, thereby obscuring the face of war and, by extension, removing its restraints. In this context, while military "hardware"—soldiers, weapons, and battlefields—will remain important for most countries, previously civilian activities increasingly will provide the "software" for future conflicts. In particular, the increased importance of dual-use technologies like micro-processing, real-time satellite communication, and GPS navigation will further blur the separation between battlefield and non-battlefield activities, and will continue to endow whole categories of economic, scientific, and cultural life with a military significance that they previously lacked.

This trend then begs the question, "Is Combination Warfare new?" The answer is yes. Historically, operations structured much like those in Combination Warfare were limited to the mutual efforts of like-minded states, particularly in the military sphere. There were few simultaneous uses of vertical and horizontal forms of warfare, nor of "hard" and "soft" power by interlocked supra-national, national, and non-state actors. As suggested earlier, the United States did bundle above-

military, military, and non-military forms of war together on an ad hoc basis against some of its adversaries in the 1990s. Against Iraq, for example, it combined diplomatic, psychological, intelligence, conventional, sanctions, legal, and media warfare at different times, and prior to September 11, it combined network, intelligence, terrorist, financial, and legal warfare against Osama bin Laden.

Nevertheless, these instances were exceptions to the rule and not necessarily overt strategies. In fact, the United States has yet to codify Combination Warfare in the American Way of War. As David Broder recently observed in *The Washington Post*, no one expected an American president to unleash air attacks against Afghanistan and simultaneously send food and medical supplies to its people.¹ Well, why not? One obvious reason is that we are still encumbered by "old think," and current U.S. war-fighting strategies and doctrine have yet to embrace Combination Warfare. And yet, this is not to say that innovative thinking about warfare has not already occurred. The Asian emphasis on circumlocution, indirection, and Sun Tzu-like methods that create mental dislocations and disruptions, and thereby psychological defeat, have already been explored—and in some cases employed—in the context of American "soft power." Nonetheless, much work remains to be done.

In the case of Combination Warfare, U.S. political and military leaders need to not only recognize that it is a strategy being used against them, but they also need to formally adopt it as the new American Way of War, particularly since no one else in the world can mix and match its "vertical" and "horizontal" elements like the United States can. To

adopt this strategy, however, the United States must take at least three steps:

It needs to create "conductors"—via hybrid professional security education, and not exclusively through academic or military education—who can harness and direct multidisciplinary teams to deal with the global security needs of today and tomorrow.

It needs to realign personnel patterns and organizational structures while maintaining its asymmetric strengths and

Finally, the United States as a country must openly debate and reach some consensus on the purpose of the profession of arms. A host of issues must be addressed: Combination Warfare will dramatically expand the tool kit of options, but who is ultimately responsible for competency in employing this warfare and defending the country against it? Is it now a joint responsibility of U.S. intelligence organizations, law enforcement agencies, and military? If

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competencies. Aerospace power, light and lethal ground forces, and integrated command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C2ISR) capabilities will remain the dominant tools of U.S. military power. However, the relative value of military power itself will decrease in relation to other forms of soft power. As a result, the number of personnel in the military should decrease, while the number of security-related State Department and intelligence community specialists should grow. Additionally, since managing resentment may be America's greatest challenge for the future, DoD needs to restructure its global military commands to project influence at less risk, but with enhanced credibility. For example, regional military commanders (CINCs) could be replaced by regional ambassadors supported by military staffs. The management of peace and war would therefore retain a proper element of civilian control, which is crucial to the success of Combination Warfare.¹

so, how will the United States manage its impulse to convict versus its impulse to destroy? How will the United States recognize the difference between domestic and international problems, deal with "inter-ethnic" issues, and much more?

Conclusion. The United States can no longer limit its definitions of modern warfare to force of arms and military power. Instead, it faces a new strategic challenge: Combination Warfare. Combination Warfare relies on "10,000 methods used as one," on the "civilianization" of war, and on "new-concept" weapons that, in the eyes of some, should target populations rather than militaries.

Given the likelihood that the United States will face different forms of Combination Warfare in the future, a number of questions remain. Is the United States sufficiently organized and prepared to use this form of warfare—not in the de facto way we used it in the 1990s, but in a systematic, formalized, doctrinally-accepted way for the future? At the same time, is

the United States prepared to parry its use by others? Indeed, just how able are the United States and its allies to deal with various combination warfare scenarios? Finally, is the United States producing the leaders, both civilian and military, that have the necessary "vocabulary" to properly apply this form of warfare and defend the country against it? The

answers may be hard to come by, but the national security of the United States depends on them.

Author's Note: The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.

10 Colonel Gao Ling and Wang Xiangyu, *Unrestricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Peace in the Age of Globalization* (FLA Lit Service and Arts Publishing House, February 1999).

11 David S. Broder, 'Wonder of a New World,' *The Washington Post*, 14 Oct 2001, B7.

12 See Eliot Cohen, 'The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory and the Reality of Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force,' in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians—The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 2002) 429-468.

Russia and Northeast Asia: Facing a Rising China

Leszek Buszynski

Russia is a country struggling to claim its inheritance from Soviet and Tsarist times as a "great power," but the economic and political basis for that claim has largely disintegrated over the past ten years. While Russia retains a nuclear weapons capability, and a significant arms industry, it is sadly lacking in the economic and financial capacity indicative of national strength in today's world. Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin have attempted to restore Russia's pride and self-esteem as a global actor, and to reclaim a position of influence that has been historically Russian. In Northeast Asia, Russia has sought confirmation of its global status and a political balance against unilateral U.S. action, particularly in terms of ballistic missile defense (BMD). This policy objective brings Russia closer to China. Russia has also sought broader relations with the Asia-Pacific region by improving ties with Japan, developing greater influence in the Korean peninsula, and seeking closer economic ties with other East Asian states as well as markets for the products of its defense industries.¹

Reality, however, is another matter. Russia faces the looming specter of a rising China, a continued impasse in relation to Japan, and constrained relations with other Asian actors which may portend the gradual but inevitable erosion of its regional position.

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China in Russian Policy. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, various domestic actors in Russia have stressed the inescapable importance of China for a weakened Russia. For the leadership and the presidential apparatus, China is a source of balance against the overwhelming influence of the United States, and a state whose cooperation is essential for Russia's security. China is a natural ally against the West for Communist-leaning members of the Duma and the Eurasian ideologues. For the military, a stable relationship with China ensures border security in the east and a much needed market for the defense industries.

Border security alone would ensure China a prominent place in Moscow's scale of priorities. A border agreement with China was concluded in May 1997, and President Jiang Zemin of China signed a border demarcation agreement

with Yeltsin when they met in Moscow in April 1997. The agreement left the disputed status of three river islands for subsequent negotiations.¹ The two states' propensity to cooperate on security issues is reinforced by mutual support for each other's territorial integrity in Taiwan and Chechnya.

Moreover, Russia and China share a concern over U.S. global hegemony, which prompted Yeltsin and Jiang to declare a "strategic partnership" in April 1996. Putin authorized a revision of Russian foreign policy doctrine, announced by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on July 10, 2000, in which Rus-

sia opposed "the tendency towards unipolarity through the power and economic domination of [the] U.S., and the weakening role of the UN."² During Putin's visit to Beijing in July 2000, China and Russia's mutual concern over U.S. BMD plans was placed at the top of the agenda. Putin vaguely linked U.S. BMD plans to Russian defense collaboration with China, and agreed with Jiang to begin negotiations on a treaty of good neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation.³ That treaty, signed when Jiang visited Moscow in July 2001, was, according to the Russians, intended to ensure predictable and balanced relations between the two powers.⁴ The Russians noted that Jiang was the initiator and surmised that the Chinese leader wanted to cement ties with Russia before a new generation of leaders unfamiliar with Russia emerged in Beijing. The

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treaty may offer some protection against changing attitudes in Beijing, and to this extent, Russia benefitted.⁵ Nonetheless, the treaty may also allow China to use its relationship with Russia as leverage in its own dispute with the United States.

As a major market for Russian weapons, China has supported Russia's defense industries in a time of collapsed domestic demand. Some industries such as the Sukhoi aircraft design bureau are now dependent on the Chinese market. Russian arms exports to China have included the following sales: the 1992 sale of twenty-six SU-27s and another twenty-five later as part of a currency/barter deal;

a licensing agreement, concluded in 1996, for the manufacture of 200 SU-27s over five years; the sale of two Soyremenny destroyers with 3M80 Moskit anti-ship cruise missiles (otherwise known as SS-N-22 Sunburn), the first of which was delivered to China in December 1999, the second of which was delivered in January 2001; and the 1997 sale of four Kilo class submarines. In addition, a contract was signed in 2000 for the purchase of twenty SU-30MK multipurpose fighters. Prime Minister Zhu Rongji of China also recently expressed interest in four to six A-50E Beriev advanced radar aircraft to replace Israel's planned sale of the Phalon AWACS system, which was blocked by the United States in July 2000. Other possible purchases include two additional Soyremenny destroyers and six more Kilo class submarines.

Russia's arms sales to China, particularly the Sukhoi advanced aircraft, the submarines, and the destroyers with their Sunburn cruise missiles, will strengthen China's ability to act against Taiwan and U.S. carrier groups. In the past, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued assurances that the Asian balance of power would not be disturbed by Russia's arms sales, but commercial interests have apparently taken priority. Moreover, Russia's strategic interests are affected as China is equipped with Russian weapons that the Russian military itself cannot afford. Within the Russian security establishment there is concern about the possibility that Russian weapons may be used against Russia itself in the future. Moscow takes comfort in the fact that Russian weapons have thus far been deployed in theaters far removed from the Russian border near Taiwan or the South China Sea. There is concern for the future, however, as revealed by the

prolonged debate in the Russian Defense Ministry over the decision to sell the multi-functional SU-30 to China. Within the ministry, there is a demand that arms sales to China be linked to the modernization of Russian forces along the Chinese border.¹

Deadlock in Japan. To avoid excessive dependence on China, Russia has attempted to develop a relationship with Japan, but these attempts have stagnated over the Northern Territories/southern Kurile islands dispute. Russian presidents have been constrained by domestic politics from offering concessions to Japan in a way that would break the logjam, particularly as Russians fear that doing so would set a dangerous precedent for other claimants to Russian territory.

During an August 1997 meeting with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan, Yeltsin impulsively declared a commitment to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. The Japanese were opposed to the conclusion of a peace treaty without a corresponding resolution of the territorial dispute as a precondition. As a result, Yeltsin created a "nightmare" for officials of both countries since it was mutually understood that the Russians simply could not deliver on their promise.² Putin backtracked on Yeltsin's rash promise in July 2000 by proposing that the two sides conclude an "interim pact" instead of a peace treaty, and that they should aim at "long term goals" for a resolution of the dispute.³ The Japanese were disappointed by Putin's behavior and lamented the passing of Yeltsin, whose personal relationship with Hashimoto and characteristic unpredictability held out the hope of progress over this issue. Putin's cold calculation made progress less likely in the Japanese view.⁴

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Putin has returned to the 1956 declaration according to which Moscow was prepared to return two out of four islands to Japan. Tokyo believes that this declaration is a first step toward the return of all four islands, but Putin regards it as a final solution.¹¹ During his visit to Tokyo in September 2000, Putin affirmed that Russia would abide by all past agreements, including the 1956 agreement, which was the first time that the Russians acknowledged the agreement in recent territorial negotiations. He also proposed that both sides sign an interim treaty of peace and amity, while the Japanese called for a territorial demarcation north of the islands. Such a move would be tantamount to Russian acknowledgement of Japanese sovereignty.

Putin's resort to the 1956 agreement changed little and simply extended negotiations within familiar parameters.¹² When Putin and Japanese prime minister Yoshiro Mori met in Irkutsk in March 2001, they could agree at least that the 1956 agreement was "a basic legal document" serving as the "starting point" for the peace process, which was the first time that the validity of the 1956 agreement was confirmed in writing. There was no target date for concluding a peace treaty, and the negotiations were inconclusive.¹³

To deal with the impasse, Russia has demonstrated an inclination to use the relationship with China to induce Japan to postpone a resolution of the territorial dispute or accept a compromise. For their part, the Chinese have been con-

cerned that Japan may develop a security role under the 1997 revised defense guidelines with the United States, and may cooperate in U.S. theater missile defense (TMD). Although Russia and China have different objectives in Japan, if they were to cooperate, Moscow's dependence on China would increase.

The Korean Peninsula. Russia has also tried to expand its role in East Asia by attempting to influence the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula. This policy of using Korea against Japan has roots in Tsarist times, when Russian penetration of Korea triggered the 1904-6 war with Japan. Under Yeltsin, Russia attempted to discard North Korea as an abominable remnant of Russia's Stalinist past, and moved to strengthen relations with South Korea. But Russia quickly discovered that its attraction to the South was its clout with the North and that the voluntary surrender of influence with the North entailed a loss of influence in the South as well. Russians bitterly lamented their exclusion from the U.S.-North Korean framework of October 1994, which terminated the North's nuclear defiance of the international community and passed the initiative over Korean affairs to the United States.¹⁴ The United States and China became the major actors in the Korean peninsula, and Russia was excluded from the negotiations over its future in the four-party talks—which included the United States, China, North Korea, and South Korea—that began in New York in March 1997.

Putin has since announced that Russia would play a more active role in the Korean peninsula, with the intention of expanding the number of countries participating in the dialogue process from the current four states to six, or to a region-wide dialogue.¹¹

To qualify for entry into the dialogue process, Russia had to demonstrate influence over North Korea without allowing itself to be manipulated into an unwarranted defense of Pyongyang because of the 1961 treaty between the two countries. Since 1992, the Russian Foreign Ministry has sought a replacement or revision of this treaty, and negotiations were accelerated after North Korea's launch of the Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998. A new treaty of friendship was ready by March 1999, but signature was delayed until Igor Ivanov's visit to Pyongyang in January 2000.¹² The delay was caused by disagreement between North Korea and Russia over whether and how to modify the 1961 treaty.¹³ While Russia sought a new treaty altogether, North Korea saw no need for a revision. Meanwhile, the two countries were also deadlocked over nuclear issues. Russia insisted that North Korea observe the moratorium on missile launches that it had promised to the United States in September 1999, while Pyongyang demanded a nuclear guarantee from Russia in exchange. The 2000 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation was finally negotiated because of mutual concerns over U.S. TMD.

The new treaty included no reference to mutual defense and only obliges both states "not to conclude any treaty or agreement with a third country nor join in its action or step if they stand against the sovereignty, independence and terri-

torial integrity of any of the parties."¹⁴ After the signature of the treaty, North Korean defense minister Kim Il Chol visited Moscow in April 2000, revealing renewed interest in Russian weapons on the part of Pyongyang. A framework agreement on cooperation in the defense industry and military equipment was signed during this visit, according to which Russia would resupply the North with weapons and parts.¹⁵ Reports indicate that Russian weapons deliveries to the North have resumed with the transfer of 3,000 Igla portable missile systems.¹⁶ Putin has succeeded in reviving Russia's relationship with North Korea, and in July 2000, he became the first Russian leader to visit Pyongyang. Kim Jong Il reciprocated by traveling to Russia in July to August 2001. Kim used the occasion to express his resentment against the Japanese, who refused to accept his conditions for normalized relations, indicating a mutual dissatisfaction with Japan.¹⁷

Moscow has similarly attempted to develop influence in South Korea by expanding military sales. In 1996, Seoul accepted the idea of taking delivery of Russian weapons as partial payment of a \$1.7 billion loan extended by South Korea when diplomatic relations were established with the Soviet Union in 1990.¹⁸ The Russian deputy defense minister, Nikolai Mikhailov, visited Seoul in May 1998 to promote Russian weapons in this connection, specifically by offering three Kilo class submarines and S-300 surface-to-air missiles.¹⁹ The South Korean navy rejected the plan to purchase the Kilo submarines because of logistics and telecommunications compatibility problems; however, Seoul has accepted delivery of other Russian weapons including T-80U battle tanks, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, Metis

anti-tank missiles, and Igla portable missile systems.³² Russian weapons are not popular within the South Korean defense establishment, but Seoul has no other choice than to accept a wider variety of weapons systems in payment of the loan. Other weapons under consideration for transfer to South Korea include transportation aircraft, hovercraft, and refueling aircraft.³³

Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy" of engaging North Korea, declared in 1998, promised Russia greater influence in the peninsula. Kim's engagement policy required the endorsement of both China and Russia, thereby holding out the prospect of restoring Russia's role in the

by his Korean counterpart that the South's participation in the U.S.-sponsored TMD, against which Sergeyev had spoken, was not on the agenda.³⁴ When Putin visited Seoul in February 2001, he obtained President Kim's support for the 1972 ABM treaty, which the Bush administration has attempted to revise. A joint statement issued at the end of Putin's visit stated that, "The Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea agreed that the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability and an important foundation of international efforts on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation."³⁵ The South Korean Foreign Ministry subse-

Russia has become more dependent on China to support its global and regional role.

reconciliation process between North and South. Kim visited Moscow in May 1999 to obtain Russian endorsement of the engagement policy, at which time the South Koreans stressed the importance of Russia's role in the Korean peninsula.³⁶

Kim's rapprochement with North Korea, China, and Russia also created strains in Seoul's alliance relationship with the United States. South Korea could not succeed in engaging North Korea while it was identified with Washington's TMD, to which China and Russia were openly hostile. South Korea will continue to face this dilemma of harmonizing the various interests of the major actors on the Korean peninsula as long it pursues the Sunshine Policy.

Consequently, the South has attempted to distance itself from U.S. TMD. When Russian defense minister Sergeyev visited Seoul in May 2000, he was told

quently explained that approval of the ABM treaty did not entail opposition to TMD, that the United States had been consulted over the joint statement, and that it was reviewing its position toward TMD but had not opposed it.³⁷

In any case, the revival of Russian influence over the South is largely dependent on the progress of Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy, which may not be sustained. The Sunshine Policy has been subjected to much criticism from conservatives in the South, who have accused Kim of making excessive concessions to the North. The issue compelled the resignation of Unification Minister Lim Dong Won and five Cabinet members on September 4, 2001. Moreover, China, not Russia, has emerged as the major beneficiary of the engagement policy and has positioned itself to have closer relations with both North and South Korea.

For North Korea, China offers a model of reform and development, while Russia is regarded as a negative example. Kim Jong Il visited Shanghai in January 2001 to examine China's market reforms first-hand—a similar version of which may be introduced in North Korea with Chinese encouragement. China holds a similar position in relation to the South and was South Korea's first export market in 2000. China's expanding economy offers South Korea a promising alternative stimulus to a receding American economy. Russia has been a secondary beneficiary of the Sunshine Policy, and its role in the Korean peninsula has been subordinated to that of China.

Conclusions. Russia has become more dependent on China to support its global and regional role. As China increases in economic and military strength, that dependency will become more obvious. For a seriously debilitated Russia, China has become more important as a stabilizing influence for the security of its eastern and southern border regions, as a market for its defense industries, and as political support against the United States. Although Russia has attempted to balance its relationship with China by expanding relations with Northeast Asia, it has made little headway. Efforts to improve relations with Japan have stagnated over the territorial dispute. Although Russia has revived ties with North Korea, and now has also established relations with South

Korea, its role on the Korean peninsula is secondary to that of China. Russia has attempted to establish a significant position of influence in Northeast Asia that would confirm its self-image as a "great power," but finds itself behind China in regional affairs. Some within Russia now believe that European or U.S. support will be needed to mitigate the consequences of Russian dependence upon China.

China's surprising rise and Russia's decline may transform the way we view Northeast Asia. In recent history, Russia was strong, and China weak; now there is the prospect of a role-reversal. Within Russia, concerns have been raised about the future of its far-eastern territories, the habitable parts of which were acquired when China was weak. Russia's far east has a population of 7 million, and its Soviet-era industries were established for strategic rather than economic reasons and are unlikely to survive marketization. The region cannot support itself economically, and would become more dependent upon Chinese business and Chinese labor for survival. The fear expressed in Moscow is that within ten or fifteen years the region could be absorbed by China and lost to Russia.¹² If this came to pass, Russia would disappear as an East Asian regional power, let alone a global one, and the world would face a much-expanded Chinese power commanding vast industrial, financial, and natural resources. Some in Russia do not consider this scenario a far-fetched one.



1 Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klishin reported on 4 September 2001 that Russia would surpass the UK and France in 2001 to become the world's 2nd largest arms seller after the US and predicted that sales may reach \$6 billion annually. Sales of aircraft would constitute some 65-70% of the total. See *Kodi, Five Days/Kodi Liberty* [Inverloch, RRF/RF] No. 258, 6

Sept 2001 [online at www.rff.org.au/kylin2.htm]

2 It was agreed that the 24,444 sq km islands in the Uluru, Anwar and Argun rivers would be split 50/50, both sides according to the Thakuy principle by which the main channel was considered as the border. These islands were still in dispute, two around Khabarovsk and one in the Argun river.

3 "Koréjska strana vzhledně politikou rozvolně federaci," *Mezinárodní zprávy*, 11 July 2000.
4 Dmitrii Gornostay, "Prezident opravdive v Asiiu," *Mezinárodní zprávy*, 19 July 2000.

5 According to the terms of the treaty both sides are obligated not to enter into any agreement which would jeopardize "the national security and territorial integrity of the other" and in the event of the threat of aggression against either the two will immediately consult. Svetlana Babayeva, Ekaterina Grigor'yeva, "Drugaya stranitsa," *Ispravka*, 17 July 2000.

6 Sergei Lamyarin, "Kak eto Russkiye podpishat novyy dogovor," *Mezinárodní zprávy*, 14 July 2000.

7 Dmitrii Koptev, "Tutornye oshibki," *Ispravka*, 8 December 2000.

8 Vadim Tsygalkov, "Ordet iz Putin Ostrova Yaponii? Nye otvet, tak to dazhe Mityaj. A on yet Mochit," *Mezinárodní zprávy*, 4 September 2000.

9 *Japan Times*, 18 July 2000, 4 August 2000.

10 *Ispravka*, 19 August 2000.

11 Vadim Golovnin, "Vozmushchaya k podzhaty Khushchaya," *Ispravka*, 15 October 2000.

12 *Japan Times*, 20 February 2001. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Logunov claimed that the 1993 Yelcin-Hosokawa declaration which identifies all four islands as subject to negotiations would have to be scrapped. Logunov repeated that Russia accepted the 1995 agreement on the understanding that the return of two islands would be the final resolution of the issue. *Japan Times*, 1 December 2000.

13 Putin said at Izrael that the 1995 agreement was "one of the agreements that forms the basis of our bilateral relationship." The Japanese side wanted to set a date for a continuation of negotiations but the Russians were reluctant, perhaps because it was understood that Mori would soon step down as Prime Minister. *Japan Times*, 27 March 2001.

14 *Ispravka*, 29 October 1999.

15 See Putin's interview with Japanese news organizations in Moscow, *Japan Times*, 18 July 2000.

16 The Russians had expected to conclude the new treaty in March 1999 when Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karagin visited Pyongyang. The treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation was approved during the visit. *Japan Times*, 19 March 1999.

17 *Ispravka*, 20 July 2000.

18 *Japan Times*, 11 February 2000, Yuri Golovnin "Koréjskim zhitelstvom pozvany na slovo," *Ispravka*, 11 February 2000.

19 *Japan Times*, 30 April 2000.

20 "Russia Selling Man-Portable Missiles to North Korea," *Wall Street Journal*, 20 March 2000, www.walstreetjournal.com/article.htm?art=2000.

21 In an interview, Kim Il Jong accused the Bush administration of fabricating a so-called missile threat from North Korea and emphasized the North's sovereign right to develop a missile program. Kim accused Japan of crimes against the Korean people and stated that if Japan moved away from the hostile politics of the past then a revival of the relationship would be possible. "My dear old friend, Kim Il-sung's last wish" *Russia Today*, 27 July 2000.

22 "Za yet nado platit," *Ispravka*, 18 May 2000.

23 *Korea Times*, 29 May 1998, www.kk.co.kr. See also Shim Dae Hoon, "Russia Returns," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 January 2000.

24 See "Most Russian Arms to Arrive in Wapora-for-Dog Payment," *Korea Herald*, 10 March 1999, www.koreaherald.co.kr.

25 *Ibid.*, 6 February 2001.

26 See Joint Statement from Kim Dae Jung's meeting with Boris Yelcin in Moscow 28 May 1999, in "Korea, Russia agree to strengthen mutually complementary relations," *Korea Herald*, 29 May 1999.

27 "Za yet nado platit," *Ispravka*, 18 May 2000.

28 Patrick Tyler, "Moscow finds Unlikely Ally in Seoul," *International Herald Tribune*, 28 February 2001.

29 *Ibid.*, see also John Burton, "South Korea criticizes U.S. National Missile Defense," *Financial Times*, 28 February 2001. During the visit Putin offered financial support for a railway that would link the Seoul and Pyongyang then would go to the Chinese border where it would link up with the Trans-Siberian railway. It would cut freight delays from South Korea to Europe by half to twenty-five days. Viktoriya Solodova, "Drugaya polovina Korei," *Ispravka*, 28 February 2001.

30 Andrei Piontkovskii, "Kak zavorozhit," *Mezinárodní zprávy*, 14 August 2001.