

Politics & Diplomacy

Network Diplomacy

Jamie F. Metzl

As the forces of globalization and the information revolution transform international relations, U.S. foreign policy institutions remain hunkered down in outmoded approaches and insular institutional cultures. Heavily subsidized, protected from competitive pressures, and guaranteed a market regardless of the quality of output, the U.S. foreign policy apparatus at times seems more like a Chinese state-run conglomerate than a player in a global revolution. Yet market realities challenge U.S. foreign policy institutions' non-competitive behavior on a daily basis. U.S. foreign policy institutions must either reform or face increasing irrelevance.

The 1947 National Security Act established the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense, laying the foundations for a national security structure that remains largely intact. This rigid command and control hierarchy, an offshoot of 1940s and 1950s organizational thinking, served the United States well during the Cold War years when issues, and therefore resources, could be prioritized clearly. Although government hierarchies are neither uniform nor monolithic and often compete to advance parochial institutional interests, the overall system was, and remains, insular.

Globalization and the information revolution are empowering decentralized networks that challenge state-centered hierarchies. These networks may be defined loosely as sets of

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interconnected individuals who occupy analogous positions in institutional or social structures and create new community relationships that build upon, democratize, and magnify existing social frameworks. Although networks have always existed, proliferating information and communications technologies are rapidly reducing the economic and physical barriers that once limited network expansion. These decentralized networks are not necessarily always inclusive, but they are ultimately self-optimizing—the more appropriate people they connect, the more useful and attractive the network becomes to others. Metcalf's law, named after Ethernet inventor Robert Metcalf, suggests that a network's value is the square of its members. Small network growth can therefore lead to exponential increases in effectiveness.

Networks distribute influence and power across traditional boundaries, allowing powerful interest groups to form and re-form rapidly. The network is flexible and agile, constantly able to reconfigure itself to address new challenges. It allows ideas to compete and confers a competitive advantage on those most able to share, trade, and receive the most relevant information. Networks lower the cost of collective action, making large and disparate groups better able to organize and influence events than ever before.

Because of these qualities, networks develop much faster than traditional hierarchies and place competitive stresses on traditional forms of organization. In the business world, competitive pressure has led to organizational revolution. In the government sector, it largely has not. Government foreign policy institutions must rethink their conceptual models, institutional cultures, operating proce-

dures, and basic self-understanding in order to respond to this challenge.

Networks Trump Hierarchies.

Although states still have tremendous advantages in the international arena, dynamic networks are complicating and chipping away at hierarchical state power. Networks of civil society organizations and second-tier states banded together to support an international ban on land mines in 1998. The network's vastness allowed these organizations to lobby governments around the world through a more effective, focused, and systematic publicity campaign than that of the United States, which opposed the treaty. Similar groups leveraged their expertise and contacts in support of establishing the International Criminal Court, even representing some smaller states in multilateral consultations.

Dynamic networks have democratized access to power, reducing many of the advantages previously enjoyed only by states, the largest corporations such as IBM, and large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the Catholic Church and the International Red Cross. Although transnational movements like Zionism and the anti-slavery movement have existed for at least two centuries, advances in information technology have made coalition-building much faster and easier. In the new environment, power comes not only from the ability to field armies, but also from the capacity to coordinate diffuse actors. While states and other large actors once had a virtual monopoly on mass communications tools, any individual now has the power to communicate via the Internet with an almost unlimited number of potential collaborators. Spies and embassy officials who

once had advantages in collecting and analysing relevant information about foreign affairs are now often overwhelmed by the information gathered by civil society groups, investment banks, journalists, and corporations. Their reporting can be more timely, accurate, insightful, and useful than that of state actors. In short, the information revolution has reduced the transaction costs of communication and further democratized access to information and knowledge, the key assets of power.

Governments have not yet come to fully appreciate the redistribution of power resulting from the rise of networks. U.S. State Department officials may look gleefully at other foreign ministries and note that the United States is far ahead of its perceived counterparts in responding to globalization and the information revolution. These officials, however, do not recognize that competition is not coming from other states, but from other forms of organisation altogether. As power today is as much about promoting ideas and norms of behavior as it is about projecting military might, the real struggle consists of projecting values, promoting interests, and ultimately setting the global agenda. Governments, corporations, and global constituencies of civil society organisations all demand some level of influence in the international arena. If any one of these entities is less able to project its voice because of institutional limitations, then the values and interests of that entity will suffer. If, for example, governments and civil society organisations are not capable of making the best case for addressing global poverty or mass human rights violations, global corporations are unlikely to address these challenges on their own.

The competition between these entities is not zero-sum, but neither is it benign. Those organisations that best respond to new realities will be most able to advance their interests globally. In this competition, government foreign policy institutions face the same competitive pressures as all other entities competing for relevance and voice in the same space.

But while government foreign policy institutions face competitive pressures similar to those confronting business and civil society organisations, government institutions are also fundamentally different from those organisations. The vertical accountability and centralized processes of government institutions make it possible to hold government officials responsible for their decisions and actions. Such accountability is present to a lesser extent in corporations and civil society organisations, since accountability decreases in a distributed network.

Since networks are able to bring together much broader communities to flexibly address problems in ways that hierarchies often cannot, networks will make the non-competitive components of traditional hierarchies seem increasingly inefficient, ineffective, and ultimately irrelevant. As this occurs, rather than abandoning democratic accountability altogether, governments must instead explore which of their functions can and must be transformed. If governments must behave more like networks but cannot fully participate in them at every level, they need to determine what aspects of government foreign policy activity can be better networked.

A state's foreign policy system can be broken into a number of discrete activities ranging from collecting data and processing it as intelligence to formulating, communicating, and implementing

policies. Those functions that require the highest levels of accountability, particularly the decision-making functions, should retain hierarchical structures. There is no reason, however, that the dictates of accountable

requires both conceptual and organizational change.

One preliminary element of this transformation is language. The very term "foreign policy" attempts to differentiate between "domestic" and "for-

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decision-making should equally control intelligence, institutional learning, and communications functions, all of which would benefit enormously from a more networked model. By disaggregating the state foreign policy function into its component parts, it is possible to identify where greater integration into networks is feasible and desirable, and where the hierarchical structures of accountability can and should remain intact.

A Network Model. In many ways, governments have always been networks. Embassies across the globe interact with local leaders and populations and report conditions back to capitals and to other embassies. Yet, while these networks once made government foreign policy officials more informed than their outside counterparts, they now often make them less so. The most effective non-governmental networks are broader, deeper, and more crosscutting than government information networks. Governments must expand their thinking to embrace these external networks. Because the conceptual space of a network is global and does not fully respect traditional boundaries, preparing individuals to engage in this space

eign" in ways that make less sense in a globalized network environment. In this environment, domestic activities have international implications, and participation in a network may be unchanged whether people are ten feet or ten thousand miles apart. U.S. domestic policies on issues such as telecommunications regulation, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, drug enforcement, crime, and taxation have major impacts abroad. Recognizing this, nearly every U.S. domestic specialized agency now maintains an overseas presence. Foreign policy is not foreign. It is global—both domestic and foreign simultaneously.

"Foreign policy" also suggests that the state is in a position to make decisions and then translate those decisions into coherent "policy." While this is the case in some discreet areas, this term does not convey the fact that a state's foreign policy is only one part of a broader "global engagement" between societies. In this context, states, along with sub-state actors, corporations, civil society organizations, business associations, labor unions, religious communities, criminal organizations, and individuals, interact and cooperate on a daily basis.

The popular terms "NGO" and "non-state actor" also miss the point of distributed capabilities. Governments

once defined the space of global interaction, and other entities were defined by being outside of government. Today, however, this negative nomenclature does not recognize that corporations, civil society groups, and even individuals now share the stage and help set the global agenda. Governments and large corporations are more easily recognizable as global actors. Although alliances of civil society organizations and individuals are often temporary and issue-oriented, these entities are just as meaningful, as they, too, represent pooled global constituencies.

A shift in conceptual models must also be accompanied by new relationships among government foreign policy actors, as well as between these actors and global constituencies. Governments need to nurture their own internal networks and link them to broader networks outside of government. The U.S. government, for example, has tremendous capabilities that are hugely underutilized due to bureaucratic isolation. Although committed government officials amass a great deal of useful information in a multitude of areas, the inadequacy of knowledge-sharing and -management systems does not facilitate the exchange of information across agencies and hierarchies.

Building a networked inter-agency communications model requires a comprehensive assessment of government agencies' skills and capabilities, the results of which will be stored in a database shared by all government employees. Best practices for all types of government functions should be catalogued and downloaded electronically. The management consulting firm McKinsey and Company, for example, maintains a Knowledge Resource Directory (KRD) that lists experts around the world by

region and function. All McKinsey employees are expected to provide work-relevant knowledge to the directory and to answer queries from colleagues within twenty-four hours. Similarly, a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) employee dealing with famine in Africa should be able to identify with a few clicks those individuals in all areas of government with relevant expertise on the social, economic, political, historical, and developmental aspects of the issue. A diplomat seeking to have policies explained to Arab populations on an Arabic satellite television network should be able to identify easily all government employees speaking fluent Arabic. Currently, no such system exists.

Developing these electronic capabilities requires enhancing computer systems, making them compatible between agencies, and training individuals to use them. It also requires changing the institutional culture to reward outreach across agency lines, not just up the most immediate, narrow chain of command. Similar to what was dictated for the United States military by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, advancement in any government agency should require a period of service in other agencies.

Although enhancing intra-governmental coordination will take foreign policy institutions part of the way, establishing appropriate networked links outside of government will be truly critical to effectiveness and relevance. The primary impediment to this type of engagement is the culture of insularity and secrecy that pervades U.S. foreign policy institutions. This focus on secrecy developed in response to the competitive pressures of the nuclear arms race and the Cold War, but it has now far exceeded rational bounds. Protecting a widening sphere of

so-called secrets and punishing those who compromise them creates a culture of insularity and fear, in which the risks of venturing outside the safety of existing hierarchies often outweighs the perceived benefits. This isolation creates a system less capable of identifying and coping with ignorance. For instance, although the CIA and the State Department have relatively small numbers of agents and political officers in Africa, the valuable inputs of civil society organizations on the ground are not adequately brought into the policy process. Government employees may once have been able to get by without being connected to these outside networks, but this is no longer the case.

share much of the rest. This type of sharing can lead to innovative partnerships with new actors. Governments, corporations, and civil society groups can come together in creative ways as the need arises. As with interagency coordination, this type of outreach to those outside of government should be highly incentivized.

Participating in such networks will force dramatic change in government culture and organization. The global market punishes inefficient firms, exposing them to more focused competitors that can better perform any part of the larger organization's function. Large firms that once towered over their small-

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While government decision-makers must know the origins of the information upon which they are basing their decisions, accountability should not be purchased at the cost of ignorance. Instead, an appropriate balance must be established between engaging the broad networks that contain enormous amounts of critical information and developing and maintaining information collection and verification capabilities that can assess the accuracy of information received.

Network engagement is a two-way process. Network members must share information in order to receive it. To participate, governments must determine what information is in severe need of classification and liberally

er competitors are today in a permanent state of change, attempting to concentrate on what they do best and seeking to subcontract all else because performing any task less than optimally creates competitive vulnerabilities.

Similarly, a disaggregated view of foreign policy suggests that government institutions must focus on the aspects of global engagement where they provide the most value added, and look for alternate mechanisms to accomplish other tasks. If, for example, the State Department provides the most value added in analysis, planning, and coordination, the Department should focus its energies on these essential functions and rely on others for administration, data collection, and implementation aspects.

While the market punishes entities for sub-optimal behavior, it provides asymmetrical rewards for doing something better than anyone else. Once Silicon Valley established itself as the leading center for electronic network innovation, it attracted those groups that sought benefits from this hub of expertise, making it even more essential to those that would follow. While the State Department might feel that it loses power by giving up control in certain areas, it may be the case that a more focused department could gain power and influence by doing a few things extremely well rather than all things adequately or poorly.

Of course, governments may perceive a need to maintain core competencies in a range of areas to be ready for unseen future contingencies when that particular expertise may be required. By this logic, governments have to maintain the ability to address problems in general, even if all government expertise and capabilities are not brought to bear on each individual problem. In addition, government experts within issue areas often focus on overlapping but distinct aspects of a shared concern. Redundant bureaucracy is, in this model, the government's investment in future stability.

In the field of global engagement, governments do not need to control every aspect of policy development and implementation. They can focus on the areas of highest value added and pool or subcontract much of the rest. For example, government agencies might pool expertise in administration, intelligence, and other functions. (The State Department now maintains separate administrative offices for each of its bureaus.) Government institutions could then establish a "bullpen" of reliable experts both inside and outside the

government who could be called upon to provide services. The small number of Indonesia experts within the government, for example, could be hugely complemented by developing relationships and setting up contracts with hundreds of experts on all aspects of Indonesian society in academic institutions, civil society groups, and other governments. Various configurations of these experts could be called upon as needed. Government employees might work with virtual teams of non-governmental experts to develop thoughtful analyses of long-term global challenges. The government could set standards for the type and quality of information and services provided and create incentives for others to participate. For many such individuals and groups, the promise of working together to achieve shared goals would be a sufficient reward.

Understanding control as the ability to influence values and standards in a decentralized system, not as the need to maintain absolute authority over every component of the policy process, will pose a fundamental challenge to governments. The networked global environment of the information revolution, however, not only distributes control, but also punishes those who attempt to hoard information and rewards those who share it. In the Information Age, you have to give up control in order to get it back, but it returns in a different form. Old control was about hierarchy, monopoly, and aggregation. New control is about flexibility, decentralization, and networked specialization.

A more networked government foreign policy structure, however, would still need to allow flexible networks to feed inputs into the decision-making process so that accountable officials could make

decisions based on networked information that brings together a wide array of perspectives and expertise. Coordinated planning and budgeting processes could then encourage various government agencies, all connected to their own networks and to each other at every level, to come together to identify future challenges and coordinate responses.

Networked Intelligence? The intelligence community may serve as an example for integrating a network model into an existing command hierarchy. In the current U.S. system, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collects its own information and brings together reporting from other agencies with open source materials to produce intelligence reports distributed to key leaders. The Defense Department and, to a lesser extent, the

ceptual models and boundaries. Although the old priorities no longer make sense, it is not possible for an intelligence agency to have the resources or maintain the expertise to respond to all of these potential problems. The only way to even begin to lay the conceptual groundwork for coordinated responses to these problems is to reach out to a broad range of individuals and institutions both inside and outside of government—to create a network.

A networked approach to intelligence would then seek to identify who within the government might serve as primary nodes in an information-sharing network. These network participants would need not only first-hand knowledge of the given subject area, but also the trust of other members of the network. For information regarding humanitarian

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State Department also maintain highly developed intelligence agencies that collect and analyze their own information. This centralized intelligence function was appropriate during the Cold War years, when the highest priority intelligence requirements, such as accurate information on Soviet troop deployments and nuclear weapons capabilities, were constant and predictable.

In today's world, however, the range of potential threats is limitless—environmental, political, and economic issues take an array of forms in any number of regions, and the issues are often trans-functional and transnational, cutting across traditional con-

ditions in the developing world, for example, USAID could become the lead gatherer of information, leveraging its close work with civil society organizations on the ground to do so. Information, however, would only be made available to USAID if it could establish that it wished to utilize the information exclusively for humanitarian purposes. Moreover, USAID would have to become a full, sharing member of the newly established network by providing relevant U.S. government information such as satellite imagery and political reporting back to other network members. The Treasury Department might play a similar role with regard to eco-

nomic and financial information, and the State Department with respect to political information. The credibility of these organisations, however, would be fatally undermined if their actions were seen as a front for CIA operations. To address this problem, a transparent Civilian Information Coordination Group could be formed to pull together the information from these networks.

Public Diplomats. Public diplomacy, the dialogue between governments and foreign populations, is also ideally suited to a network orientation. Once championed by the now-defunct U.S. Information Agency (USIA), public diplomacy has sought to explain U.S. government activities to foreign populations and to carry out polling and media analysis to educate U.S. decision-makers about foreign attitudes and opinions. USIA also administered critical people-to-people and cultural exchanges. This type of broad engagement between societies is more important now than ever before because it builds the human relationships and cross-cultural understanding that are the key component of networks.

Governments have increasingly recognised the importance of reaching out to foreign populations. The network model, however, takes this one step further. It is no longer sufficient for governments to develop relationships with NGOs. Governments now have an overwhelming interest in facilitating contacts between such groups. Enhanced transnational civil society and issue networks may challenge government authority in some cases, but more often they can serve as invaluable tools for sharing information, developing mutual understanding, and solving problems. Helping to build the infrastructure for these networks should,

therefore, become a much higher government priority.

As the world's leader in developing electronic infrastructure, the United States must recognise the tremendous value of extending network infrastructure beyond the current limits of commercial viability to the world's poorest communities. Helping poor communities find their voices allows them to engage in dialogue about the best ways of solving their problems. This, in turn, helps address the global problems of underdevelopment and environmental degradation that, in today's world, are a much greater threat to U.S. interests than, for instance, Russian troop movements. As perceptions of U.S. hegemony will undermine these networks if they are perceived as tools of even greater U.S. influence, efforts must be made to actively promote global diversity and indigenous Internet content.

Open dialogue and the sharing of ideas should be goals in themselves. The United States must support and facilitate such dialogue, even when it is critical of the United States. Providing a neutral platform even for critics of U.S. policies will be difficult to justify on traditional national security grounds. By giving up that control and countering perceptions of hegemonic aims, however, the United States will benefit from increasingly coordinated, inclusive networked action to address some of its—and the world's—most difficult challenges.

And Miles to Go before We Sleep. Institutional cultures and legacies do not change overnight, and it is important to recognise that making the shift from hierarchical to networked diplomacy is more difficult for government institutions than it was for IBM.

On the one hand, government institutions can attract employees because they offer meaningful work and because lifetime employment guarantees compensate for lower wages. On the other hand, the entitlement system that governs many federal jobs makes finding new people with new types of skills and firing people with skill sets no longer relevant all the more difficult. Conversely, the short tenure of political leadership in all non-military agencies also fails to nurture powerful long-term constituencies for institutional change. The distribution of budgets for global engagement agencies across multiple congressional committees hardly facilitates coordinated budgeting and planning. Finally, the

in global electronic dialogue groups to inform follow-on action. Input from these meetings and follow-on dialogues should contribute to a more transparent policy development process.

Second, conscious efforts must be made to shift government institutional culture from a focus on secrecy, information hoarding, and hierarchy to a system of openness, innovation, and information sharing. This can be done by creating incentives and rewards for broader outreach, building technology networks that facilitate information exchanges between agencies and those outside of government, creating programs for government employees to be seconded to corporations and NGOs,

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under-funding of these agencies severely hampers even critical changes like upgrading computer systems to allow personnel to interact with counterparts in other agencies and outside of government. More attention must be given to the funding issue if substantial progress in networking is to be made.

Despite these challenges, however, much can be done to better embrace a networked global environment. First, because network diplomacy is by definition broader-based than traditional diplomacy, efforts must be made to identify and reach out to a broader constituency than ever before. Diplomats must hold public meetings both at home and abroad to share ideas and build support for proposed action. Participants in these meetings should then be connected

and establishing centers of innovation within government. Governments should bring in new people from other sectors at all levels for flexible periods of time and encourage these new employees to maintain and develop their connections with former colleagues.

Third, knowledge management should become a central focus of government operations. Individuals should be required to input project summaries and lessons into shareable databases, and knowledge-management training should be made a priority at all levels. Knowledge-management and institutional learning must become not only a responsibility, but a culture.

Fourth, leaders of government institutions must be recognized and rewarded not only for responding to short-term

crises but also for their contributions to the long-term health and effectiveness of their organizations. Management must be central to any government leader's job description, and private sector managers should be brought in where appropriate. As in all institutions, leaders must put forward a vision of change and then create new behavioral standards and norms that realize this vision.

Certainly, the case for governments is not entirely bleak. There are a number of information-sharing initiatives within the government. Pockets of excellence and superb individuals can be found in many places. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, for example, has used its freedom from USAID's budgetary and bureaucratic controls to do extremely innovative work in post-conflict countries. The CIA has begun building chat sites linking its analysts with pools of private sector experts. These initiatives, while an important first step, exist in spite of the bureaucracy, not because of it. These exceptions must become the norm. Although

networks are not a panacea and there is still an important role for hierarchical accountability, reaching out in new ways to new actors is not a quixotic option, but an urgent need that recognizes that governments can no longer achieve their goals alone.

Governments play a crucial role in addressing some of the planet's most critical issues, from environmental protection to setting human rights standards to allocating resources and nurturing human development and individual security. Although entities other than states are now more central than ever before in most of these areas, governments must fully engage in a global dialogue that allows different groups to work together to fashion the most appropriate responses to short-term crises and long-term challenges. If governments fail to internalize globalization's lessons, their ability to promote broad-based values and engage in this dialogue will diminish relative to other actors. Governments must change the way they do business to make their best voices heard in a networked world.

misión posible

Returning Democracy to Peru

An interview with
Alejandro Toledo,
Presidential Candidate,
Perú Posible.

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Democratization often works in unpredictable ways. When we spoke with Alejandro Toledo last fall, he was in the United States on the first leg of a world tour to organize support against Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori. Months earlier, Fujimori had won re-election to a third term as president in what most observers believed were fraudulent elections. The results were highly contested, and Toledo, who is proud of his indigenous heritage and his up-from-the-bootstraps personal history that includes a Ph. D. from Stanford University, remains convinced that he won the first round of balloting in April 2000. After the first round, in which no candidate officially won more than the required 50 percent of votes, Toledo refused to participate in the second round of balloting and led massive demonstrations against Fujimori. At the time, it appeared that despite the documented irregularities in the election and public questioning by national and international election observers, including the United States government and

the Organization of American States (OAS), Fujimori would retain his grip on power and would somehow manage to survive throughout all or at least a substantial part of his third five-year term. As can be seen from the interview, Toledo was preparing to wage a large, drawn-out national and international campaign. Although confident of his ultimate success, he expected that the campaign would take time. He was clearly prepared to assume the lonely and difficult road of the morally-tall opposition leader fighting the odds.

Yet, only days after our talk, events hurtled past his carefully laid out plans. Following taped evidence of bribery and corruption, Fujimori unexpectedly announced his resignation and scheduled new elections. After fighting tooth and nail to thwart the constitution and secure a third term, Fujimori reversed course and declared that he was prepared to leave office. The change occurred when Fujimori's intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, was caught on tape bribing an opposition congressman. Montesinos had long been viewed as the Rasputin of Peruvian politics. He was the man who knew where the bodies were buried and the treasures stashed. Although Montesinos had been closely allied to the United States and was viewed as a staunch ally in the "war on drugs," Washington turned sour on Montesinos following revelations in August 2000 that he had orchestrated the sale of a large cache of weapons to the largest Colombian guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).

The United States's first instinct was to try to isolate Montesinos and protect Fujimori. However, when Montesinos stimulated an eventually-aborted coup

after secretly returning to Peru from exile in Panama, it became clear that Fujimori could not stay in power without the network of authority that Montesinos commanded.

When Fujimori announced his planned resignation just days after our interview with Toledo, the Peruvian opposition leader had already left Washington and was in France. Fujimori's initial proposal was to oversee new elections and stay in power until July 2001. However, events snowballed from there. His support eroded quickly and he soon faxed in his resignation while traveling in Asia. He then sought exile in Japan, the homeland of his parents. The president of Congress, Valentín Paniagua, was installed as interim president and the presidential race was underway.

The current moment is a critical one. Peru has a historic opportunity to rebuild the institutions of democracy after a decade of strong-man rule by Fujimori. When Fujimori first came to power in 1990, the country was mired in a brutal guerrilla insurgency and a severe economic recession. Fujimori won plaudits when he successfully confronted both challenges. He effectively defeated the Shining Path guerrillas and reduced the country's hyperinflation. In April 1992, the citizenry approved when he assumed dictatorial powers and shut down the Congress in what became known as the *auto-golpe* (self-coup). By the mid-1990s, Peru was enjoying growth rates of 11 to 13 percent. Fujimori easily won re-election in 1995. But as the 2000 election approached, Fujimori began to turn his accumulated presidential powers against opposition candidates, particularly through the use of the intelligence service controlled by Montesinos. The abuses provided an

opening, and Alejandro Toledo skillfully and quickly mounted a credible electoral challenge to the regime in the last weeks of the campaign.

Today, just two months before the special election scheduled for April 2001, Toledo is leading in the polls. Peru's two-round election system encourages many candidacies, some of them frivolous. It also provides opportunities for dark horses to suddenly and unexpectedly emerge, as was the case for both Fujimori in 1990 and Toledo in 2000. Running second in the polls in the upcoming election is former president Alan Garcia who preceded Fujimori and left the country in a political and economically ruinous state. He is also dogged by charges of corruption. But political comebacks are not unknown in Peru, and Garcia represents a political party, APRA, that dominated the political landscape from the 1930s to the 1980s. Yet Toledo has an undeniable strength. More than any other leader or movement, he directly challenged Fujimori during the 2000 election and then dedicated himself to building a national and international opposition movement in the name of restoring democracy.

If he wins, the challenges he will face are straightforward: Peru needs to rebuild the institutions of democracy, including the justice system, the Supreme Court, the media, the electoral system, and the institutions of democratic governance at the regional and local levels. Ten years of highly personalized rule under Fujimori have weakened democratic institutions and created a barrier to further economic development and democratic consolidation. At the beginning of the new century, Peru has been given another chance.

***** The recent Peruvian presidential election was characterized by fraud and criticized by the international community. Do you think that the international community's punitive actions and measures have been sufficient?

***** I think that there is consensus in Peru and in the international community that Peru has an illegitimate government that can potentially cause instability in the region. In light of this, my personal opinion is that the international community has not reacted with sufficient force, and routing its condemnation through the OAS probably dilutes its impact and justifies the presence of an illegitimate government for five more years. Nonetheless, from the point of view of Perú Posible and the democratic forces that I am now leading, I believe that it would be a mistake not to continue the dialogue with the OAS. There are twenty-nine democratization points suggested by the high-level mission presided over by Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and OAS Secretary General César Gaviria. There is an enormous risk if time passes. The dictatorship will consolidate itself, and this sends the message to other Latin American countries that lack strong democratic traditions that it is possible to change the constitution as many times as necessary to remain in power by force against the will of the people in a new-styled dictatorship. This is no longer the classic dictatorship like Pinochet's, where two or three generals lead. Today we see a democratic face but a strongly dictatorial heart, and this is engendering some temptations in Venezuela, Ecuador, and probably Bolivia.

***** Why has the reaction of the international community been so weak? Why haven't the OAS, the United States, and particularly other Latin American countries defended democracy more strongly in this case?

***** I think we must separate each reaction. There is a non-interventionist argument in Latin America with which I do not agree. I think that the non-interventionist concept does not hold up to a critical analysis because it contends that nobody should intervene in a country's internal affairs. This was [Ernesto] Zedillo's argument in Mexico, based on

co-traffickers. And the United States left in the hands of Fujimori's government, particularly in the hands of Vladimiro Montesinos, the fight against narco-trafficking, although there are significant signs that they are involved in it. It is weak to assume that this government was the only one capable of succeeding, but I believe that the United States is starting to realize the nature of this regime.

Thirdly, with respect to the OAS, it is an organization constituted by governments, and consequently it is quite politicized. The OAS needs to deliver results to send a message that its existence is justified. It is diluted and bureaucratic. More

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the Estrada doctrine.¹ I think it was Brazil's point as well. I disagree for the following reason. It is incongruent to argue that we must globalize the economy, trade and finance, and cyberspace and telecommunications, but when it comes down to the concept of democracy to say that these are domestic issues in which other countries should not interfere. I absolutely disagree because if there is one element that requires globalization, it is democracy. Democracy does not have a nationality. It does not have borders, just as human rights do not have colors. What happens is that some Latin American countries want to reserve their right to change.

With respect to the United States, I think that it has bought into the story that Fujimori would repay Peru's external debt and that he was the only one who could succeed in the war against the nar-

than ninety days have passed since the Windsor Resolution in Canada and no results have come about. This creates impatience. In Peru we are in dialogue with the OAS, and I believe we should continue, but it is time to see results. We should send a strong message that if we do not see results, there will be frustration throughout the country, which could produce more instability.

***** Returning to the role of the United States, what else could the United States do to promote democracy and stop the consolidation of a dictatorship in Peru?

***** I lived in the United States for seventeen years and I know the strength of its democracy, but sometimes I find that the United States has developed a sophisticated strategy of incongruencies

in government. In other words, there may be one position in the State Department and the White House that does not necessarily coincide with that of the Department of Defense. There are certain measures of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that do not coincide with the point of view of the CIA. Then, there are different voices within single organizations. I would like to see a more consolidated position. I would like to see the United States—Congress, as well as the executive branch—exert pressure on the OAS to engender democratic changes. Otherwise, the United States could potentially become a silent accomplice to new-styled dictatorships. I know that this is not the philosophy of the United States, but a timid reaction could tempt other countries to do the same, as in Venezuela. In my opinion, the United States would benefit if it emphasizes to its neighbors in Latin America its strong support for democracy. And in the effort to democratize, we hope that at the Summit of Americas in Quebec, Canada, in April 2001, we will be able to evaluate the advances in democracy, and that these dialogues lead to new elections in Peru.

Today we lead the democratic forces in Peru jointly with civil society, and we will not make concessions in our plea for new general elections. However, I believe that Peru cannot have elections now, because it is first necessary to improve conditions by implementing democratic measures. For that reason, we have agreed to wait approximately a year, the time it would take to implement these measures. These measures will inevitably result in new elections for the presidency as well as for Congress.

***** Have you been able to establish contact with officials in the U.S.

embassy, in the Department of State, or in the White House to communicate your position that Peru must hold new elections, and do you think the United States would support your position?

***** Perú Posible does have contact with them. In the next few days, we will talk to some senators and members of Congress. They know that we stand together in our efforts to democratize. I do not know if they are open to supporting new elections, but that is a right of the Peruvian people. The United States has questioned the elections. The OAS removed itself as an electoral observer, alleging that there was no guarantee of a free and transparent election. Fujimori has maintained power by force. Consequently, I refuse to think that the United States would resign itself to coexist with a dictatorship in Peru, because that would make it an accomplice.

Although we communicate with the White House and the U.S. Congress, we are working not only with the United States, but also with the European Union. I am traveling to France, Italy, and Israel. It is part of our effort to reach out to the international community outside of the OAS. I hope that the United States will be responsible in defending democracy and will act in defense of Peru.

In the case of the election of the president of the Dominican Republic, there was fraud. In the Peruvian case, the corruption was much more obvious because the OAS, in charge of observing the elections, withdrew from the process. The National Democratic Institute, the Carter Center, Transparency International, the Defender of the People (*El Defensor del Pueblo*), and the Council for Peace (*Consejo por la Paz*) also withdrew from observing the elections,

and consequently, we could not participate. If they said that the conditions for free and transparent elections were absent and we participated in the second round of elections, we would have legitimized an electoral process that *a priori* was fraudulent.

***** Your movement is new in Peru. Have you been able to consolidate it? What views do you have about the next year in a country where the freedom of speech and organization are limited? Will you be able to challenge the government to demand new elections?

***** We are operating under very restrictive conditions. As you know, the media, television particularly, is basically hostage to the government. There are nine television channels, and eight of those are government-operated. Therefore, there are continuous attacks on the credibility of the leaders of the democratic forces, and we have no way of defending ourselves. Secondly, we cannot travel freely because the intelligence service follows us. We receive threats, among which telephone threats are the most common.

It is difficult, but I can tell you that Perú Possible has decided to institutionalize itself as a political party. It is newly born, but fortunately the international community supports its consolidation. We have 483 departmental, provincial, and municipal committees. We have an ideology, a statute, and a code of political ethics. Although it is difficult to carry out institutionalization because of the restrictions imposed by the dictatorship, we have resolved to continue until we can return democracy, the rule of law, and freedom to Peru.

The void of political parties in Peru is symptomatic of the country's institutional void. Fujimori's government has

attained a monopoly of all the democratic institutions. It controls the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, the constitutional tribunal, the national election tribunal, the media, and the armed forces. It controls everything and the United States knows it. That is what surprises me. The United States knows and is complacent. I am speaking in general terms because there are congressmen who are really putting it all on the line, but I think that the United States has decided to side with the OAS. As Peruvians, we must institutionalize new political parties, which are conscious of the new challenges that a competitive world offers, but are also rooted in Peru's history. In the short term, we need a coalition, a united front for democracy—on which we are working.

We have an agenda with seven main points. First, the creation of a united front for democracy. Second, we have announced a parallel government with a shadow cabinet that will analyze, evaluate, criticize, and propose policies in the economic and social arenas regarding decentralization and the institutionalization of democracy. Third, we said we would walk the path of the OAS, but it would be a mistake to place all our eggs in that basket. Fourth, we are working with the international community outside of the OAS. Our future tour is part of this effort. Fifth, we will continue to mobilize the interior of the country, particularly the provinces. This is especially difficult because the National Intelligence Service persecutes us, plants people to sow violence and later blames us, but we will continue peacefully in our cause. Sixth, the washing of the flag is a deeply symbolic and peaceful act. Every Friday at 1 PM, every city in Peru joins in the act of washing the flag, which is soiled by the dictatorship. Finally, we also have a minute of silence in the name of resistance and the wall of shame. In effect, this is our agenda of

work to be done. I know it is difficult because of the adverse conditions, but there is a firm determination not to surrender to a dictatorship.

***** Do you think that other opposition forces are willing to follow your party in a coalition under your leadership?

***** I am an advocate for joint leadership. I have the job of institutionalizing Perú Posible and now it is my turn to lead the democratic forces. I am not promoting a presidential candidacy. I am not, for the moment, a candidate. I am committed to returning democracy, rule of law, and liberty. Countries can have deep differences, but worldwide events suggest that dictatorships do not leave by their own free will. No lone party has managed to remove a dictatorship. In Chile's case, as you might remember, there was the *Concertación* for democracy; in Suharto's Indonesia and in Marcos's Philippines, democratic forces had to unite. Political parties can have differences, but there are commonalities: democracy and liberty. We now have differences but we manage to cooperate for the greater objective. I feel

PM, when the elections concluded, Perú Posible had 48.7 percent of the vote and Fujimori 42 percent. It was the armed forces and the National Intelligence Service that ordered the nullification of the results and robbed us of an election. That is a fact. I have the firm conviction that we can return democracy to Peru. Peru will be neither healthy nor viable as long as it is under an illegitimate government. As long as the government lacks legitimacy, it will engender division and instability. This instability drives away foreign and domestic investment. And when there is no investment, there is no economic growth. When there is no economic growth, there is no employment. When there is no employment, there is no income and no consumption. When there is no consumption, there is no demand. Poverty is worsened.

I have the firm conviction that soon we will return democracy to Peru. Fujimori is a wounded Asian kitten. If we had participated in the second round elections, it would have been seen as a regular election. Today, Fujimori is being severely questioned by more than 50 percent of Peruvians and, as you

No dictatorship has been easily removed. It has always been complex.

that Peru is mature enough to follow a path of unity in the name of democracy.

***** Are you optimistic that you can return democracy to your country and that all the new initiatives will produce results in the next five years?

***** On April 9th, Fujimori's government robbed us of an election. At 4

know, criticized by the international community and media. But the Fujimori of the year 2000 does not have the same power to delude as the Fujimori of 1992, when he led the *castro-gays*. I ask the international community to remain firm because the Peruvian case is not Peruvian *per se*. It runs a dangerous risk of being contagious to the region. We might be witnessing a new style of dicta-

torship that might undermine thirty years of hard work toward democracy.

I am optimistic. I know it is a difficult route, but we will continue our peaceful struggle. No dictatorship has been easily removed. It has always been complex. Other countries' experiences suggest this. I hope that the United States and

the international community will show more consistency between their discourse and their actions.

Notes: 1 The Estrada Document is the classic Mexican doctrine of non-intervention, which declares that states should recognize other states, irrespective of regime type or the policies of specific governments.