CIAO DATE: 05/02

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000

 

African Mercenaries
Review by Herbert M. Howe

 

Abdel–Fatau Musah and J. ’Kayode Fayemi, eds. Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma. Pluto Press, 1999, 320 pp. $69.95.

The burgeoning private security business troubles many international affairs specialists who fear that the nation–state is losing its control of miliary coercion to private, profit–seeking forces. Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma begins by asking whether “mercenaries [are] becoming the shock forces of corporate recolonisation or, as some contend, a ’necessary evil’ in out–of–area conflict management in the post–Cold War arena.” The book concludes that “mercenaries cannot be an alternative or a supplement to multilateral conflict management.” This work’s generally solid arguments and wealth of new information contribute significantly to the literature on private security.

Mercenaries, usually defined as foreign citizens fighting for a foreign cause primarily for financial gain, have plagued African development ever since they advanced the interests of foreign trading companies in the late 1800s. Africa’s independence, which started in the late 1950s, continued to witness mercenary activity: Katanga and Biafra in the 1960s and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in the 1970s provide major examples.

The end of the Cold War has encouraged fighting in much of Africa, and foreign military specialists have recently displayed their increasingly specialized skills in Angola, the Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and elsewhere. African geopolitics have taken a sad twist, as states increasingly–and often unpredictably–fight each other. Against this background, mercenary companies market themselves as stabilizing forces protecting sovereign states, but are often affiliated with multinational mining companies. Executive Outcomes (EO), which temporarily helped to resolve military conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone, enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with a London–based mineral concern. This combination of foreign military and economic power sparks worries that Africa may be entering a period of recolonization.

Kevin O’Brien offers an overview of private security companies (PSCs) during the decade. Case studies of recent mercenary involvement include that of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone by Abdel–Fatau Musah and the “white legion” in the former Zaire by Khareen Pech. Alex Vines looks scathingly at the lack of respect for human rights and legal behavior displayed by mercenaries. Kofi Oteng Kufuor notes the significant limitations of the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) Convention against mercenaries, while ’Funmi Olonisakin argues for greater regional control of PSCs. The appendices thoughtfully include UN and OAU statements against mercenaries. Eboe Hutchful, in a section that should have come earlier in the book, declares that the “African Security Dilemma, the attempt [by rulers] to strengthen internal security, also increases the power of ’strongmen’ within their security apparatus, and hence the threat to the ruler himself.” One of the book’s few weaknesses is that the contributors only infrequently place mercenaries within this core dilemma.

The book also fires a number of accusations at PSCs. Fayemi, a highly respected security analyst, maintains that “it is in the interest of the new mercenaries that the world remains in a perpetual state of instability.” The implication is that PSCs may wish to start or prolong conflict. Musah contends that the work of PSCs like EO and Sandline International “has pushed the debate about the political recolonisation of Africa from the realm of fantasy to that of real possibility.” Musah also correctly notes “the mutations, mergers and absorption of companies . . . are all part of strenuous ploys and decoys aimed at covering their trails and leading inquisitive eyes into blind alleys.”

Suggested solutions include international campaigns to abolish the mercenary trade and for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the African Peoples and Human Rights Court to treat mercenary misconduct as violations of international law. The OAU will not play a leading role in such a campaign, given the difficulty of obtaining consensus and money from its fifty–three members. Fayemi argues that sub–regional cooperation “offer[s] the best hope for conflict management and preventive diplomacy in Africa . . . .” Olonisakin supports politically accountable regimes and better subregional military cooperation, maintaining that ECOMOG (a West African intervention force) probably prevented the entry of mercenaries into the Liberian civil war.

The authors could have considered some other salient aspects of private security, notably the demand for mercenaries and recent changes within private security. Why does Africa continue to employ the “dogs of war”? Hutchful is right in asserting that insecure personal rulers have prevented the professionalization of their security forces; rulers such as Zaire’s Mobutu deliberately emasculated their own forces and hired mercenaries who might prove more loyal. This understanding suggests a possible solution: More democratic regimes may lessen political unrest and encourage more competent armies–developments that would reduce opportunities for mercenaries. Fayemi, Olonisaken, and others correctly argue for more effective subregional security capability. Yet it is national militaries that will form the building blocks for such forces.