Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000

CIAO DATE: 05/02

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000

The Indispensable Partner
by Joschka Fischer

Last year marked the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall that precipitated the end of the Cold War. The North Atlantic alliance linking the United States and Canada with the democracies of Western Europe was, from its inception, distinctively shaped by the historical constellation of the Cold War. The most succinct and apt definition of the Alliance in those days was provided by Lord Ismay, its first Secretary–General, who described NATO’s mission as: “To keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” Since that time, however, the strategic environment in Europe has changed dramatically. The Russian empire in the form of the Soviet Union and its satellite states no longer exists. Germany, now a successful democracy, has with the consent of all its neighbors and the major powers–especially with the steadfast support of the United States–been reunited in peace and freedom. It is integrated in manifold ways into the Euroatlantic and other international structures. In Lord Ismay’s terms, only the first of the three NATO objectives is left, that of providing an indispensable security link between North America and Europe.

In the Washington Post, Henry Kissinger recently raised the question of whether the Kosovo crisis heralded the end of NATO as we have known it. The background to his concern, and to those of many other American partners, was the commitment made by European Union leaders at last year’s Cologne summit to establish a specific European security and defense identity.

To that concern my immediate response is: It is unfounded. The Alliance is still the guarantor of collective defense and security in the North Atlantic area and will keep this role in the twenty–first century. For Germany in particular, transatlantic partnership and the U.S. political and military presence in Europe remain the key to peace and security on our continent. Four times in this century the United States has intervened militarily in Europe, most recently in Kosovo, because we Europeans believed ourselves incapable of acting on our own. That is a lesson we must heed for the future, too. And given its geopolitical position, even a Europe that is one day united will still need transatlantic safeguards.

The United States is vital to Europe’s security, whether internal or external. In this age of globalization and increasingly shared interests and challenges, however, one thing is also more obvious than ever: Europe is crucial to America’s security. This nexus is reinforced by the new challenges that both the United States and Europe face, ranging from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to terrorism and organized crime, to environmental threats. In a globalized world, there can be no security and prosperity on either side of the Atlantic unless that security and prosperity are shared. After all the blood spilled in what the British historian Eric Hobsbawm has aptly called an “age of extremes,” this is a lesson hopefully both the United States and Europe will never forget. The two components of this transatlantic bridge–Europe’s importance to America’s security and America’s role in European security–together constitute the strong and solid foundation of shared interests on which we have to build a transatlantic security partnership adapted to the new environment.

The crisis in Kosovo confronted NATO with a severe test. It passed the test with flying colors, demonstrating extraordinary cohesion and the capacity to act. The Alliance proved it had successfully realigned itself, as agreed at the Washington summit, to respond to the new strategic environment in Europe and assume an important role in conflict prevention and management. As in Bosnia, NATO placed its military capabilities at the service of the international community, aiding the search for a political solution to restore peace and respect for human rights. NATO’s intervention halted rampant nationalism, violence, and expulsion in Kosovo, paving the way for the long–term stabilization of Southeastern Europe.

Another remarkable outcome of the war in Kosovo was the way the Europeans demonstrated a will to assume unprecedented political and military responsibility within the Alliance–not only in terms of their military contributions, but also through the political initiatives of the German EU Presidency and the final breakthrough achieved by the EU intermediary, Finnish President Ahtisaari, and Russian special envoy Victor Chernomyrdin. The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe also highlights the fact that Europeans are now more willing than ever to shoulder political responsibility and its consequences.

It was at the Washington NATO Summit that the common challenge was first outlined: to enhance the vitality of the transatlantic bond by developing a balanced partnership in the field of security and defense policy. A self–confident, emancipated Europe can no longer assume that the United States is going to become involved in European crises at all times and under any circumstance. We have come to realize that the end of the East–West conflict not only opened up exciting prospects for building a comprehensive order for peace in Europe, but also introduced new risks to security and stability on our continent. Bosnia and Kosovo underscored the need for Europe to improve both its political and its military effectiveness. Precisely because we cannot always call on our North American partners for help, the European Union must develop its own military management capabilities so that it has the ability to act whenever such action is judged necessary.

That, however, means the Europeans must first learn to speak with one voice. In that respect Europe has made considerable headway with the appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Clearly, a true common foreign and security policy is still a long way off, but it is essential that we stay the course and develop political and military instruments that will give us the capacity to act on our own in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management.

Galvanized by the war in Kosovo, Europe has already made significant progress in this area. In their Joint Declaration in St. Malo, France and Great Britain laid the groundwork for the creation of a European security and defense union. During its dual EU (Western European Union) and WEU Presidency, Germany made the most of this new dynamism, paving the way for groundbreaking decisions at the 1999 Cologne European Council on the establishment of permanent political–military structures. In concrete terms, it is envisaged that the European Union should be able to plan, politically endorse, and carry out international crisis response operations, with the necessary institutional framework in place by the end of the year 2000.

EU member states have committed themselves to further developing their military assets and capabilities for deployment in European–led operations. That includes transport and reconnaissance capabilities as well as improved command and information systems. The Eurocorps is to become a European crisis response force available for deployment in NATO and EU operations. Another important aspect is enhanced cooperation within the European defense industry and closer coordination in planning and procurement of defense equipment.

At the same time, however, one thing is certain: In relations with United States, “hegemony” in the field of foreign or security policy or a duplication of efforts is not our goal. Quite the contrary, we remain committed to the closest possible cooperation within NATO, and particularly with the United States. A self–confident Europe is not a denial of the transatlantic partnership. Obviously, a new form of burden–sharing within the Alliance, with the Europeans making a bigger contribution, is also in the American interest, for even the United States as the sole remaining superpower is neither willing nor able to take care of all crises in all parts of the world–especially not when they happen on Europe’s doorstep.

A Europe that is able to act effectively can, together with the United States, make a notable contribution to global stability. The world of the twenty–first century needs multilateral institutions and shared rules. The UN was a magnificent and historic idea of one of America’s greatest presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt. We need a global platform for common action in order to be able to meet effectively the challenges of the future. Moreover, history shows that unilateral action by major powers invites the imitation or even the formation of opposing powers, and thus ultimately has a destabilizing effect. There is a lesson here for both sides: Europe must develop in order to be a valuable partner and to remain credible, while the United States must be wise enough–as it has been so often before–to choose the arduous process of transatlantic coordination over the tempting but dangerous option “go it alone.”

Combatting the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be an area of particular concern. Here, an important task awaits both Americans and Europeans in the years ahead. In this light, the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.S. Senate was perceived as a major setback for worldwide efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is an important cornerstone of global efforts in this field, and without it the whole system of cooperative disarmament and arms control could be jeopardized. This matter depends particularly on the stance of the United States, the world’s largest nuclear power. If we embark upon the course in the wrong way, a new, highly dangerous nuclear arms race could begin in crisis regions. Even the U.S. could not control such a development, the result of which could instead be nuclear anarchy. It is vital, therefore, that the Senate’s rejection of the treaty last November not be the last word on the subject. We must not place at risk all of the painstaking progress accomplished made in recent decades in the field of disarmament and arms control. The same goes for the ABM Treaty, a crucial pillar of the arms control regime.

A strong Europe will also make for stronger transatlantic relations across the board–in the political, economic, and military domains. In a globalized world, only a European Union that can act effectively–not just on economic and financial issues, but also in the area of foreign and security policy–will be able to safeguard peace in Europe and rise to the global challenges on today’s agenda. It is clearly true that the United States is the “indispensable nation” in that its contribution is essential to resolving international issues. It is up to Europe to develop and become the “indispensable partner” to the United States, while it is up to the United States to accept and support this process. This is the challenge–but also the transatlantic opportunity–of a European security and defense policy.