CIAO DATE: 05/02

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000

 

With God on Their Side
by William Martin

 

The United States’ record on religious tolerance, though far from perfect, is a notable achievement in human history and one of the nation’s most admirable accomplishments. This is not to say, however, that religion has not, does not, or should not play a significant role in shaping the nation’s domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, examples of such religious influence abound. In this article, I analyze three significant current efforts: the long–established, highly successful, and still–evolving activities of the Jewish–American community with respect to Israel and the Middle East; the increasing impact of the conservative Christian movement known as the Religious Right; and the nascent efforts of a diverse and growing American Muslim population to speak with a unified voice on matters of vital interest to Islamic peoples.

The Jewish Community. The phenomenal success of the “Jewish Lobby” over the past half–century began with a successful campaign in 1947 to persuade Harry Truman to recognize Israel despite opposition from Secretary of State George Marshall and members of the professional diplomatic corps who felt the status of Palestinian claims in the region needed to be clarified before the United States gave its blessing. Over the years, American Jews have combined tremendous organizational ability, access to wealth and media, and diligent networking with corporate executives and government leaders to create a coalition that has exercised decisive influence over the shape of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. The centerpiece of that policy has been the “special relationship” between the United States and Israel, a relationship that, despite its own stormy spells and the difficulties it poses for relations with Israel’s neighbors, has provided Israel with firm guarantees of security and over $3 billion annually in grants and loans for many years.

Politically active American Jews are involved in a variety of organizations covering the entire range of the ideological spectrum. The American Jewish Congress has long played a key role in apprising Congressional members of Israel’s needs and concerns. Every year, for example, it gathers U.S. politicians in Israel to provide them with firsthand exposure to that country’s security situation and to impress upon them “the critical importance of an undivided Jerusalem.” For some time, however, the leading pro–Israeli lobby has been the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). In a typical example of its unflagging determination to promote and protect Israel’s interests, AIPAC recently launched a “community–wide” effort to lobby for the Congressional authorization of $1.2 billion to help Israel meet the demands of the Wye River Accords, which call for Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territory and the relocation some of its military bases. The “community” AIPAC sought to rally includes the Conference of Presidents, representing more than fifty Jewish organizations and more than one hundred political action committees able to direct their support to members of Congress who demonstrate strong loyalty to Israel. Standing further to the right is the Zionist Organization of America, with strong ties to both Likud and right–wing forces in Congress and strong resistance to the peace process.

Despite the well–documented benefits American Jews have been able to secure for Israel, it has become increasingly clear in recent years that labeling the Jewish community (or “Jewish money” or “the Jewish vote”) as a single, monolithic entity with a unified political agenda is hardly accurate. The division between secular and religious Jews in Israel is deep and serious, and those broad aggregates are themselves divided into hawks and doves; into groups willing to trade land for peace and groups willing to seize land and displace Palestinians regardless of the consequences; into Orthodox Jews committed to actions they feel will pave the way for the Messiah and Orthodox Jews who believe that trying to rush the Messiah’s coming will incur God’s wrath; and into parties on the left and right of both Labor and Likud, some of which are more concerned with domestic issues than with territorial disputes or the internationalization of Jerusalem. It should not surprise us, then, that American Jews differ in their political opinions and interests, and while some feel closely bound to particular factions in Israel, many others lack such ties and regard events in the Middle East with considerable detachment.

It is highly likely that any serious threat to Israel’s survival would immediately cause most American Jews to lay aside their differences. But short of such a situation, no such unanimity exists. Many Reform and Conservative Jews, not to mention non–practicing Jews, are offended when Orthodox Israelis seek to set the criteria for determining who is truly a Jew or to shift the course of Israel–officially a secular democracy–in a theocratic direction. Similarly, growing numbers of Jews in both countries acknowledge that the only formula for a lasting peace in the Middle East must involve cessation of settlements in Palestinian areas and surrender of some land in the West Bank and Gaza. For example, the Democratic National Convention’s 1992 platform included for the first time a plank that, while still strongly influenced by AIPAC positions, nevertheless made a commitment to the peace process “rooted in the tradition of the Camp David Accords.” Also for the first time, the drafting committee included members of Americans for Peace Now, a leader in the American “peace camp.” Such willingness to diverge from unquestioning support of hardline positions is increasingly common. A 1998 poll conducted simultaneously by the Los Angeles Times and the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot revealed that only 40 percent of American Jews felt they had an obligation to support Israel if they disagreed with its policies.

Christian Conservatives. A newer–but increasingly potent and more distinct–religious influence on American foreign policy has emerged from the ranks of politically active Christian conservatives (mostly Caucasian Protestants), commonly identified as the Religious Right. Researchers who track this movement estimate that it comprises approximately one–sixth of eligible voters–a substantial aggregate, but nevertheless a minority.

Like Jewish activists, Christian conservatives compensate for their size by mastery of technology and organization. The United States has more than 1,600 Christian radio stations and nearly 250 Christian television stations, almost all of which carry programs produced by Religious Right leaders or supporters, as well as direct mailings, telemarketing campaigns, and Internet sites. They also use a multi–layered network of churches and “parachurch” organizations to identify supporters, fundraise, and provide programs and candidates around which to rally. When their candidates are elected, they supply them with a steady flow of research and position papers and, when the need arises, inundate their offices with a barrage of faxes, e–mails, letters, and telephone calls. The result is impressive. As some members of Congress have noted, many groups have a great Washington presence and some have great grassroots, but few combine them both.

The Religious Right first began to flex its muscles during the Reagan years, when, with encouragement from the State Department, adherents offered both ideological and financial support to anti–Communist forces in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. More recently, with experience and enhanced organization, Christian conservatives have widened the scope of their agenda. Some of their causes echo the interests of their allies and mentors among the New Right or “movement conservatives” who in recent decades have nudged U.S. foreign policy to the right. Others are driven by the same values that underlie their domestic agenda. They have, for example, consistently opposed any foreign policy initiative that might facilitate abortion, expand the rights of homosexuals, or devalue the role of the conventional homemaker and mother.

Religious conservatives have also vigorously lobbied for legislation that would impose sanctions on countries that persecute or limit the freedom of Christians to worship and evangelize. In this context, they have paid particular attention to China, and were instrumental in pressuring Congress to pass the International Religious Freedom Act in late 1998. This act creates a White House office for reporting religious persecution worldwide and allows the president to choose from a variety of measures, ranging from diplomatic protest to economic sanctions, in order to punish offending countries. Though less stringent than the Religious Right wanted, this legislation could impact dozens of countries with less than exemplary records on religious freedom. These include close American trading partners such as Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

In 1998, religious and social conservatives in the House of Representatives nearly blocked $18 billion in appropriations for the International Monetary Fund, in part because the fund channels money to countries and organizations that regard abortion as an acceptable form of family planning or population control. The United Nations is another favorite whipping boy. In large measure because of opposition from the Religious Right, the United States did not contribute to the UN Population Fund in 1998, jeopardizing a program that provides contraceptives to nearly 1.4 million women in 150 countries. More tellingly, the billion or so dollars in UN arrears (the United States and the UN disagree on the amount) was held hostage at the insistence of House Republicans aligned with the Religious Right that funding be tied to legislative language barring aid to organizations that seek to legalize or fund abortions.

Religious Right activists have also been critical of the International Criminal Court and other multinational or broad–scope organizations such as the European Union, the Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Council of Churches, and, in some quarters, the Roman Catholic Church. This propensity stems from several sources, including standard–issue isolationism, a fear of losing national sovereignty to a liberal international order, and a conviction that the UN and other efforts at global governance are controlled by Marxists, secular humanists, and radical (often homosexual) feminists bent on eradicating traditional Christian values– perhaps with a standing UN military force to back their goals. Another important source of these concerns is a theological doctrine widely shared in fundamentalist and Pentecostal circles known as “Dispensationalist Premillennialism.” This doctrine holds that highly figurative apocalyptic passages in such biblical sources as Ezekiel, Daniel, and the book of Revelation furnish a blueprint for the “Last Days,” which are likely to come upon us at any moment. Dispensationalists believe that the imminent appearance and reign of the Antichrist will feature a unified political and economic dictatorship so complete that buying or selling will be impossible without his authorization. A mighty False Prophet will lead a global religion to bolster this regime. In such an atmosphere, terms such as “global governance” and “new world order” resonate with ominous overtones and any organization aspiring to multinational or global influence is sure to be viewed with suspicion.

Dispensationalism also underlies the unwavering support which virtually all segments of the Christian Right give to Israel. The key to understanding this phenomenon is the belief that a complete restoration of the nation of Israel, including the rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem, is a prerequisite to the end of the present age (or “dispensation”), which will usher in the Second Coming of Christ and the establishment of his millennial reign. Consequently, Christians must support Israel. While overlooking this ironic scenario which envisions a mass conversion of Jews, Jewish leaders have welcomed the efforts of America’s evangelical Christians to bolster Israel’s defense against hostile neighbors. The Israeli government has assiduously wooed prominent evangelical leaders–such as television evangelists and presidents and deans of evangelical seminaries–by bringing them to Israel at little or no cost and favoring the tour groups they lead with briefings by cabinet officers. And when an Israeli Prime Minister visits America, he is sure to meet with leaders of the Christian Right, both in public and private. In April 1998, when Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a Washington audience of 3,000 people attending a Voices United for Israel conference–at least two–thirds of whom were evangelical Christians–he observed that “we have no greater friends and allies than the people sitting in this room.”

In return for such attention, conservative notables such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson arrange meetings between evangelical leaders and Israeli officials, deliver passionately pro–Israel messages on their radio and television programs, and invite their followers to urge their members of Congress to support Israel. At one 1998 meeting, Falwell pledged to resist the Clinton administration’s efforts to pressure Israel into ceding more land back to the Palestinians. “There are about 200,000 evangelical pastors in America,” he observed, “and we’re asking them all through e–mail, faxes, letters, and telephone to go into their pulpits and use their influence in support of the state of Israel and the prime minister.” In an extensive October 1998 article in Christianity Today, evangelical historian Timothy Weber noted that, in addition to such high–level efforts, “scores of small, grassroots, pro–Israel organizations that rarely get into the headlines exist to educate and mobilize their local communities to support Israel.” Weber also called attention to “an enormous network of pro–Israel and Christian Zionist organizations” and noted that “Most of them have their own Web pages on the Internet, and they usually have links to one another.”

The Muslim Community. Until quite recently, Muslims in the United States have shown little interest in organizing themselves to wield political influence. This appears to be changing as thoughtful leaders recognize that strategic mobilization of approximately six million co–religionists could enable them to speak with a louder voice. Most major cities have a few prominent Muslim activists and organizations. In 1997 a group of national Islamic organizations formed a Coordination Committee designed to provide consistent advice to Muslims about political issues and candidates. In addition, the Committee attempts to “bring Muslims off the political sidelines and onto the political playing field.”

This trend is spreading through the American Muslim population. Richard Curtiss, the executive editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, favors a plan to devise a questionnaire to be sent to all candidates for U.S. federal office, with the results to be discussed “in every mosque in America.” If candidates are aware of such a process, Curtiss contends, “they will start paying attention to the issues which concern the Islamic community,” issues that would include “an even–handed U.S. foreign policy in support of human rights, self–determination, and fair play abroad.” Such an initiative could be expected to have an impact on U.S. foreign policy. The point, he stresses, “is to become known as a community that votes, and can vote as a bloc when one candidate is judged better suited on the basis of Islamic standards.”

Some of these standards–particularly those supporting conservative family values–would mesh smoothly with those of the Religious Right. Others relate directly to distinct Muslim concerns, such as greater religious tolerance toward the Islamic community, accommodation of religious observances and practices of Islamic workers, and securing chaplains for Muslims in the military. Regarding foreign policy, key concerns include self–determination for Kashmir, support for the Muslim–led government of Bosnia, opposition to Serbian repression of Kosovar Albanians, cessation of Russian attacks on Muslim civilians in Chechnya, Palestinian self–determination, and opposition to the establishment of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Several Muslim leaders have imitated the tactics of the Religious Right and implored their co–religionists to become more politically active. They have encouraged the Islamic community to influence the political process by conducting voter registration drives, attending precinct caucuses of the political party of their choice, establishing personal contacts with congressmen, and seeking elective and public office. Noting that Christians have risen to power in some predominantly Muslim countries, SUNY–Binghamton Professor Ali Mazrui asks: “Why shouldn’t Muslim minorities in non–Muslim countries seek participation and increasing empowerment for themselves?” While conceding that “American Muslims may never equal the power of the Jews in the U.S. system,” Mazrui thinks it reasonable to hope that “Muslims may one day help provide some counterbalance in policy formation.” For the Islamic community not to take advantage of the resources and opportunities for full participation in the American political system “is an exercise in political castration.”

The size of the Muslim population in America is roughly equal to that of the Jewish community and is growing rapidly as a result of immigration. That is a long way from a majority, to be sure. Richard Curtiss notes, however, that it is difficult for a candidate to become president without winning California, and that the 700,000 or so Muslims in California, working together, could make it difficult for a candidate to win California without their vote. As both Jews and Christian Conservatives have shown, well–organized minority constituencies can wield power out of proportion to their numbers.

The challenge for Muslims will be to achieve a sufficient level of organization. James Zogby, director of the Arab–American Institute, which represents both Muslim and Christian Arabs, notes that to speak of “the Muslim community” as a homogeneous entity is to engage in “mythic construction.” Zogby reckons that American Muslims of Pakistani origin are the most active and best–organized component, but their primary motive has been to support self–determination for Kashmir. The Arab component, more concerned about the Middle East, is fairly well organized but comprises only about 10 to 15 percent of American Muslims. A large Iranian community shares a widespread displeasure with the current regime in Iran, but is itself sharply divided over what kind of government they would like to see in their homeland. The Turks have shown limited political activism and would likely refrain from uniting with the Islamic community at large because of their secular orientation. And African–American Muslims–one of the largest constituencies in the American Muslim community –have little historical reason to be concerned about any of the aforementioned issues. Thus, Muslims could well become significant players on the American political scene, but that time may not be as close as some would like to believe.

The Future of Faith and Politics. What are the implications of the fervent and growing efforts of religious activists to affect American foreign policy? How should legislators and other government officials respond to them? How seriously should diplomats and political analysts view their behavior and concerns? Will their participation in politics inevitably lead to increased hostility and conflict with lamentable results both at home and abroad? Given the faith–flavored potions that have poisoned so many regions, no realistic assessment can ignore the possibilities for harm. Still, careful attention to “the religious factor” is not only analytically indispensable, but can offer at least modest grounds for an optimistic reading of the role religion can play in international relations.

Because religion is often tightly interwoven with particular cultures and ethnic groups, it can be impossible to disentangle discrete components and label them correctly as secular or religious, sincere or manipulative, beneficial or dangerous. It is also true, however, that religion can be a powerful force in its own right since religious structures often exhibit enormous strength and resilience. This important fact may be overlooked by political scientists, economists, sociologists, mainstream media, and policymakers, whose milieu is likely to be in an advanced stage of secularization. Too often, if religion is not taken seriously in one’s own circle, it is easy to conclude that it is not to be taken seriously at all.

A second point worth considering is that, while greater political involvement by religious groups can obviously increase tensions and lead to open conflict, the diversity within and among the three traditions discussed in this article–Judaism, Christianity, and Islam–can serve to check and moderate extreme claims and initiatives. When legislators recognize that no group can claim to speak for the Jewish, Christian, or Muslim community as if there were no dissenting voices, they will be in a better position to weigh competing claims with greater care.

People of faith have a right to be politically active, and they cannot be expected to abandon their religious convictions when they enter the political arena. They have a right to organize themselves to work effectively for the good of their country as they understand it and to attempt to shape public policy, domestic and foreign, within the limits of a Constitutional framework that promotes religious toleration and pluralism. It is not acceptable to shape U.S. policy in the Middle East on the basis of a belief that Jews should be allowed to inhabit “all the land,” including “Judea and Samaria,” because God promised it to the descendants of Abraham; or a belief that the Dome of the Rock and the Al Aksa Mosque must be removed from the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, one of the holiest sites in Islam, so that the Messiah can come (whether for the first or second time); or a belief that efforts to achieve peace are futile, even perverse, since that goal will only be achieved by the Mahdi (the expected one), a messianic figure who will one day return to usher in a perfect Islamic society. Such beliefs, dependent as they are upon revelation thought to be divine, are simply not a viable basis for the foreign policy of a secular, multicultural democracy in a pluralistic world. Many members of the religious communities previously discussed understand and accept that. Others do not. Our government should pay closest attention to those who do, and who assert their opinions on the basis of justice, fairness, and collective welfare of the involved parties and the global community.

Finally, we should recognize that religion can be a powerful force for peace and amity. The world’s many religions cannot be fully harmonized so as to remove all barriers among them. They are not all the same even after we get beneath the superficial veneer. And yet, common to most is a preference for peace over war and for non–violence over violence; a tradition of compassion, however unequally directed; an admiration for ethical integrity and the keeping of promises; and a consistent reminder of the imperfections of human nature. Religious leaders may be able to draw upon the best of their respective traditions to create something positive that might have been missed had matters been left entirely to political or military leaders.

Congress, the president, and other key policymakers cannot answer all of the prayers of equally devout but diverse religious communities. Neither can they fashion a “one–size–fits–all” approach to groups with strong religious orientations. And sometimes the differences may be so great and intense that religion would best be omitted from the discussion. But those who would shape U.S. policy must be aware of the resources for compassion, reconciliation, justice, and peace that exist within religious traditions and should not hesitate to explore their possibilities when the opportunity arises.