
Conflict & Security

Operation Enduring Freedom and the Future of NATO

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The U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan in response to the attacks of September 11 raised a number of important issues regarding the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the relationship between the United States and its transatlantic allies. On September 12, NATO invoked Article 5—the mutual defense clause of the Washington Treaty—thereby committing NATO to help defend the United States from the perpetrators of the attacks. Shortly thereafter, NATO sent seven of its Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft, crews, and ground support personnel to assist in the air defense of the United States. In addition to demonstrating NATO's military resolve and buttressing the political declaration of Article 5, the deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft also freed up U.S. aircraft for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

NATO also provided blanket air rights for U.S. aircraft, access to bases and ports, and other non-combat support. However, NATO did not lead Operation Enduring Freedom, nor did it develop the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed to Afghanistan in the wake of the American rout of the Taliban. The Europeans expected more of a say in the planning and execution of operations since the alliance

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had stood firm with the United States after the attacks. Since the understanding for fifty years had been that the United States would come to the aid of Europe and lead its defense, it was only natural to assume that Europe would play a large role if the United States was attacked. However, this was not the case; the United States preferred a coalition involving NATO members but not NATO itself.

European members of NATO asked whether this American unilateralism portended the end of the alliance. Americans vigorously denied this, and argued for a broader conception of NATO. Nevertheless, Operation Enduring Freedom was a landmark event because the United States chose to use a loose coalition instead of the NATO alliance, a decision that revealed an emerging U.S.-NATO relationship in which the United States consults with NATO on security issues but acts outside the alliance structure when it is in America's interest.

Why the United States Didn't Turn to NATO. In the aftermath of September 11, the United States wanted the form of a coalition, but not the substance, for several reasons. First, the attacks were on American soil, and consequently the United States had to lead the response. Although citizens from scores of countries were killed in the attacks, it was clear that the United States, its people and its homeland, was the intended victim. Therefore, a response to the terrorist attacks did not automatically involve NATO. Ultimately, there was no direct link to Europe. Consulting NATO would have been unrealistic, and no American administration would have waited for NATO to form a response.

NATO was also not the United States's first choice because there is no clear con-

sensus on how to interpret the Washington Treaty in the post-Cold War world. For example, although the treaty does not place explicit restrictions on NATO operations in a geographical sense or require United Nations approval for its operations, many members have conceptual difficulty expanding NATO's role beyond the alliance's immediate periphery, especially in the absence of UN mandates for such operations. Consequently, rather than get embroiled in discussions regarding the legality of NATO participation in Afghanistan, the United States sidestepped the issue and worked with its allies outside of official NATO channels.

The mutual defense clause is now particularly open to interpretation. Article 5 states:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, *such action as it deems necessary*, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.¹

In the Cold War era, when there was a clear adversary and contingency plans for surprise attacks, the presumption was that NATO would respond as a whole. All national combat units integrated into the NATO military structure in Europe would immediately come under unified NATO command when any member was attacked. NATO, not its individual members, was to lead the operations, and the expectation was that all members would meet their commitments.

Today, there is no obvious adversary, and there are no longer standing NATO defense plans. In the aftermath of Sep-

tember II, there was room for the NATO allies to explore different interpretations of Article 5. For example, the alliance might nominally invoke Article 5, and then deem that no further action was required or provide limited NATO assets like AWACS to the state in need. Alternatively, the alliance could invoke Article 5, then plan and conduct NATO-led, alliance-wide operations.

It is possible for a NATO member to agree to invoke Article 5 and consent to NATO military operations, but not provide its own forces for planning or operations. An ally may also support Article 5 but provide the bulk of its support bilaterally, and not through NATO. This concept, often identified as a "coalition of the willing," is what happened during Operation Enduring Freedom. Eventually NATO must address the issue of how and when to cancel an Article 5 commitment.

The assignment of NATO AWACS to the United States was a novel approach. During Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, NATO members, not NATO itself, participated in the U.S.-led coalition. However, NATO did deploy the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) to southeast Turkey to dissuade Iraq from attacking Turkey, and the AMF remained under NATO command. However, during Operation Enduring Freedom, the NATO AWACS were under U.S. command. In a marked change, NATO provided common assets to a member for its individual defense.

In addition to concerns about treaty interpretations, the United States did not want to be hindered by NATO's consensus decision-making process. Numerous debates spawned by the NATO-led war in Kosovo clearly indicate that the United States has doubts about the efficacy of NATO-led military operations. The slo-

gan "war by committee" is pejoratively used to describe the battles fought between the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the NATO North Atlantic Council, the NATO Military Committee, and policymakers in Washington over the conduct of the combat operations.

Both retired general Wesley Clark and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson recently defended NATO's leadership of the Kosovo campaign and made the case that NATO should be playing a larger role in the "war against terrorism."² However, American policymakers clearly believe that "the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission." The fear is that otherwise the mission will be reduced to the "lowest common denominator"—a reference to NATO's decision-making process, which relies on consensus.³

The perceived technology gap between the United States and other members of NATO is another argument against NATO involvement in Afghanistan. Without the United States, neither NATO nor most of its individual members has the capability to project meaningful power outside of Europe. Few U.S. allies have substantial air-refueling aircraft or long-range, strategic air transport capability, and none have long-range bombers. To participate in Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO aircraft would have required basing rights in the region and air-refueling support. They would have competed with U.S. aircraft for ramp space without bringing additional combat capabilities. Furthermore, NATO member states are poorly provisioned with precision-guided munitions for their aircraft; and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) has been a problem since

NATO's first combat missions over Bosnia in the mid-1990s. With the exception of the United Kingdom, most NATO allies lacked the capabilities

European states also tend to emphasize solutions to the technology gap within NATO that do not involve large defense budget increases. There is some

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required to operate in the initial air and special-forces campaign in Afghanistan.

Implications for the Future of NATO. The percent of GDP that NATO member states allocate to defense budgets has been gradually declining from 4.5 percent at the end of the Cold War to 2.5 percent now. The European members are at 2.0 percent with many below that figure, while the United States is at 2.9 percent.⁴ In terms of pure dollar outlays, the United States spends roughly twice the defense budgets of all the European members of NATO combined. The proposed \$48 billion increase in U.S. defense spending alone is larger than the largest defense budget in Western Europe.

As a superpower, the United States has historically budgeted a military force capable of worldwide action. Today, only the British and French have retained some capability for force projection outside of Europe. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet threat, NATO has expanded its membership, but its European members are hesitant to expand beyond Europe. It is not clear whether even the United States would want NATO, and indirectly the European Union, to broaden its conceptual area of military action, and it is doubtful that the European members of NATO could take on such a role.

discussion in Europe, for example, of national militaries moving into "niche markets," where smaller countries might give up fielding a rounded military force and instead invest in specific capabilities. NATO, or the European Union, would collectively have all the required capabilities, but individual armies would not. This scheme would reinforce NATO's consensus decision-making process.

Another low-cost solution from the European perspective is for the United States to increase its technology transfer and industrial cooperation.⁵ However, U.S. defense contractors do not relish the idea that they should assist their European competitors by providing them with hard-won technological innovations. Nevertheless, industrial cooperation occasionally produces glimmers of optimism, as with NATO AWACS and European F-16 purchases in the past.

Finally, some Europeans emphasize combining aircraft or ships into European units and using a European procurement system.⁶ The consolidation of Europe-wide military capabilities could produce some short-term efficiencies, but the process will be politically complex, and it does not solve the long-term issue of raising funding for the procurement of new defense technology. For example, Germany has developed a plan for a European Air Transport Command, but

it is expected to take a decade before it can be fully realized. In the meantime, Germany is having difficulty funding its planned purchase of seventy-three yet-to-be-developed Airbus A400 transport aircraft. The problem is the same whether the forces are allocated to NATO, the European Union, or both. As European defense budgets remain relatively flat for the next several years while the U.S. budget increases dramatically, the technology gap will continue to widen.

Of course the technology gap is not the only factor constraining the U.S.-NATO relationship. The United States does not want to deal with the NATO decision-making process when planning or executing combat operations that are vital to U.S. interests, nor does the United States want to get bogged down in peacekeeping and nation-building roles afterwards. For the most part, European members of NATO cannot participate in U.S.-led combat operations, and they do not want to do peacekeeping alone. The mantra in the Balkans is "in together, out together" at least partly because Europeans need American firepower supporting them if a crisis erupts. Additionally, the Europeans do not want to put themselves in a position where the United States can criticize their actions from the outside.

Nevertheless, the United States provided more than 80 percent of the aircraft and flew approximately 80 percent of the strike sorties in Kosovo because few Allied aircraft could deliver precision munitions.⁷ However, Europeans provide 80 to 85 percent of the peacekeepers in the Balkans today, and the European Union is the largest financier of post-war reconstruction and development in the Balkans. If this were to become the norm, it would be a "niche market" scheme on a grandiose scale, and the

United States would have no reason to complain about a capabilities gap since the European allies' primary purpose would be to provide peacekeeping and nation-building forces that would not require compatibility with high-tech weaponry and combat concepts. Such a division of labor bodes ill for NATO since it would limit the voice of European states within NATO. While the United States could still act alone across a range of potential military options, from combat to peacekeeping, the rest of the alliance could not. Consequently, Europe's dependence on the United States and the potential for U.S. unilateralism would increase.

Given that decision-making by consensus is a non-negotiable tenet within NATO, achieving a consensus may become more difficult as NATO enlarges. Consequently, it is also likely that using coalitions of the willing will become more commonplace. Such coalitions may form either within NATO when all allies agree to an operation but not all want to participate, or outside of NATO when there is no NATO-wide consensus for an operation. For example, currently only twelve of nineteen allies participate in NATO AWACS program, and the prospective European Air Transport Command will not include all nineteen NATO members either.

In addition, NATO's future force structure will be based on a series of potentially mobile headquarters with pools of customizable forces instead of fixed units subordinated to one command. Such constructs will allow all NATO to condone an operation without requiring the full participation of all its members. Conversely, it places more of a burden on the participants, but potentially gives them more power

since the operation might not be possible without them.

Conclusion. In the future, NATO will still serve as a source of political support and as a pool from which to draw operational support as well. However, it is clear that NATO's European members are not ready for independent or worldwide operations. For the foreseeable future, the practical division of labor seems set with the United States leading the high-end combat tasks and most of the other NATO allies taking on

peacekeeping and nation-building missions. The United States will continue to consult with its NATO allies, but it will prefer to use coalitions of the willing, firmly under its own command, rather than deal with NATO's cumbersome decision-making process and technological shortcomings.

Author's Note: The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Defense University, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.

NOTES

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China's Bluewater Ambitions

The Continental Realities of Chinese Naval Strategies

Christopher R. Bullock

The People's Republic of China's (PRC's) increasing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific has attracted the attention of other regional powers including the United States and Japan. China's leaders contend that hegemony and power politics still define the international system today.¹ As a result, they believe that China needs a modern defense establishment, high-technology equipment, and a pragmatic strategy to attain its national security interests. This perception is accompanied by the development of a revised national strategy that envisions a shift away from the traditional "people's war" doctrine, toward a belief that future conflict will be local, quick, and politically decisive. The role of the People's Liberation Army–Navy (PLAN) in safeguarding China's security and promoting its interests is much more prominent in this new strategic outlook. Such unprecedented awareness of maritime power has fostered the growth of a new set of Chinese naval theories, a maritime mentality, and above all, an appetite for blue-water power projection. The Chinese navy hopes to deploy a so-called "offshore navy" (*jinhai fangyu*) as soon as it is feasible and a "blue-water navy" (*yuanyang haijun*) to operate in distant oceans by 2050.²

Examination of PLAN's long-term goal of constructing an indigenous blue-water power projection capability has become a recurrent topic in Western academic, military, and policy cir-

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cles. The irredeemable complexity involved in understanding China's true military ambitions results from both PLAN's lack of transparency and its internal intricacies. Consequently, specula-

ferred strategy has been a source of debate for students of military and strategic studies for millennia. By applying elements of both classical and contemporary theory concerning continental powers, this arti-

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tions on Chinese regional intentions are commonly constructed by monitoring the nation's technological development, procurement trends, and fleet deployments. While such analyses can be enormously useful, an overemphasis on technological advancements and procurement policies suppresses disciplined theorizing about China's strategic vision for its maritime frontier. National policy informs strategy, but it is strategy that guides modernization by outlining the configuration and projected use of the naval fleet.

Over the past decade, China's military leaders and strategists have become increasingly vocal in describing PLAN's overall strategic direction. Under this vision, naval forces will contribute independently to strategic and operational objectives by projecting power far from the continent. By adopting an evolutionary naval strategy, military planners hope that the Chinese navy will develop a globally deployable, combat-effective maritime force more quickly.

Reference to the dominating influence of geography in China's national strategy development is regrettably absent or given only token acknowledgment in Western literature. Chinese naval strategy is inextricably conditioned by the nation's geopolitical position. How geography theoretically contributes to a nation's pre-

ferred strategy has been a source of debate for students of military and strategic studies for millennia. By applying elements of both classical and contemporary theory concerning continental powers, this article will show that geographical considerations matter to China and influence its maritime aspirations. China's ambitious naval modernization program will ultimately reflect the realities of a predominantly continental focus. Geostrategic concerns characteristic of a traditional continental power will constrain China's reliance on maritime power and the operational range of the Chinese navy.

Geopolitics and Continental Power.

Geography occupies a paramount position in international relations and has a pervasive, though often subtle, influence on strategy development. In terms of military planning, geography is most commonly understood as territory to be protected and acquired, or as a theater of operations. It is at a higher level of analysis, or geopolitics, however, that geography has its greatest influence. Geopolitics involves the study of geography's influence on international relations and on the foreign and military policies of states. According to geopolitical analysis, size and location of a state are crucial determinants of national strategy and security planning. Commenting on the dominant position of geography in strategic formulation, Colin Gray frankly states, "all politics is geopolitics, and all strategy is geostrategy."³ Not all strategists

and practitioners agree with such a bold statement, but it illustrates the pervasiveness of geography in how a state determines its national strategy.

Central to the debate, and most relevant to this analysis, is the theoretical division between continental and maritime powers. The particular characteristics of each environmental concentration were first discussed in Halford J. MacKinder's monumental essay, *The Geographical Pivot of History*.⁴ While MacKinder's prediction that technological advances in land-based transportation would lead to the unassailable dominance of continental power failed to materialize, the observation that continental and maritime states have distinct strategic focuses consistent with their geographic situations remains valid. Position, resources, land-mass, and population are key indicators in prescribing the environment most important to a state's security strategy. U.S. naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan acknowledged that dependence on a particular environment is not a pure factor; rather, states will strive to obtain security in their preferred environment and attempt to acquire a defensive capability in the other.⁵ Financial and geographical factors make acquiring simultaneous dominance in both environments extremely unlikely, if not impossible.

Above all, maritime power and the possession of a national fleet are products of strategic geography. An essential prerequisite for a maritime-oriented strategy is that the country be insulated against the threat of overland invasion.⁶ At the same time, freedom from domestic instability is equally important for a maritime focus since naval forces are poorly structured to address domestic instability. Not surprisingly, island states are likely candidates to pursue a maritime-focused strat-

egy. Technologically advanced states with tranquil borders and internal stability also often adopt maritime strategies. Clearly, the freedom of movement associated with seaborne maneuvering grants maritime nations the luxury of meeting challenges to national security at the source, rather than waiting for it to reach its own shores.

States that lack such characteristics have little choice but to become continental powers, emphasizing land-based military forces. Spatial proximity to hostile or unstable countries demands that the bulk of security initiatives focus on securing the periphery. Geographical vulnerability absorbs limited defense resources and restrains the strategic flexibility common to maritime forces. For example, many pre-1945 German navalists were frustrated by the physical reality that Germany was positioned between France and the Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, domestic instability also compels many national governments to adopt continental or land-oriented strategies. Some states that seem to be prime maritime candidates, like Indonesia or the Philippines, fail to move beyond coastal defense since a large standing army is necessary to maintain state unity. A state threatened at home does not have the luxury of engaging in armed conflict abroad.

The Asia-Pacific region is perhaps the most natural maritime environment in the world. However, the countries in this area are actually not maritime in character.⁷ This is especially true with China. Despite its large coastline and island claims, historically, the Chinese have had little concern for maritime power. From a geopolitical perspective, China has retained a distinctive continental tradition, and has lacked a true maritime mentality. China's size and

location have been crucial determinants in the way its political and military leaders think about strategy.⁸ Drawing its strength from its large population and landmass, China has historically relied upon continental power.⁹

China's monolithic dominance of the Asian continent strongly influences its entire military strategy. It is the only country to border east, south, central, and southeast Asia. Its central location and long, vulnerable borders have been the central concern of Chinese leaders for roughly 3,000 years. The harsh geographic reality is that the very size and location that gives China strength also imposes its strategic weakness. The pre-eminent exogenous concern of Chinese military leaders was to defend the Chinese heartland from semi-nomadic "barbarians" from the Northern Steppe and the Turkic empires to the west.¹⁰ Armored columns of soldiers crossing the northern border from the Soviet Union eventually became the PRC's principle strategic concern until the mid-1980s.

The PRC continues to retain a continental focus. Its leadership is concerned with the relative weakness of some neighboring countries, and non-traditional security threats associated with drugs, organized crime, legal immigration, and internationally sponsored insurgency lie at the crux of Beijing's regional security concerns. More recently, the American presence in Central Asia and the potential for increased instability have fed concerns among the Chinese leadership over the accessibility of regional oil supplies. Domestic stability also remains a crucial problem for Beijing. Internal instability stemming from nationalist separatist movements among many minority groups and growing popular dissatisfaction have made domestic security the rul-

ing Chinese Communist Party's principal concern—a task that a maritime strategy is ill-suited to accomplish.

China's New Maritime Mentality.

Prior to the 1990s, when restrictions that had hampered strategic debate in China were loosened, Chinese naval strategy had been dominated by the concept of coastal defense. For over three decades, naval strategy was rooted in the judgement of Xiao Jingguang, an old-line infantryman and navy commander in the early 1950s. "The navy should be a light navy, capable of inshore defense. Its key mission is to accompany the ground forces in war actions."¹¹ Xiao's directive concluded, "a combination of coastal sea guerrilla warfare and coastal anti-landing warfare will be the major combat form for a future sea war."¹² The Cultural Revolution and the 1974 PLAN victory over a superior Vietnamese fleet reinforced the legitimacy of the tenets of this "people's war" doctrine in the maritime sphere. From a geopolitical perspective, early PLAN strategy reflected a rational continentalist approach to preventing its maritime frontier from becoming an access route for foreign invasion.

A combination of factors in the mid-1980s facilitated the PRC's reevaluation of its maritime forces. Changing perceptions about the character of modern warfare and new threats to its national security were chief among these factors. The leadership in Beijing concluded that the likelihood of invasion or involvement in a major war with a superpower in the near future was remote. As a result, the PLA has embarked on a program of peacetime defense construction to prepare for engagement in limited and local wars (*jubu zhanzheng*) on the periphery of China. In addition to the emphasis on

limited war, the PLA appreciates that China's periphery extends beyond its borders to what it terms the "strategic frontier."¹³ In contrast to a territorial frontier, the strategic frontier "defines the living space of a state and a nation, and contracts with the ebb and flow of the comprehensive national strength."

Consequently, the PLA realizes that it must secure a sphere outside its national borders. With the conclusion of bilateral treaties and the resolution of many land-based disputes with formerly hostile borderstates, the remaining regional disputes are maritime in nature. According to two senior PLAN officers, "The seas have become the new high ground of strategic competition... [and] remain of crucial strategic value."¹⁴ As the coastal area has become the most likely region for interstate conflict, it has also become the focus of China's strategic defense plans.

There has been an unprecedented degree of strategic debate within the Chinese defense establishment about the use of naval forces. Steering the early debate and frequently acknowledged as China's preeminent naval theorist, Liu Huaqing is the father of PLAN's current naval strategy. Understanding what the concept of a strategic frontier meant for the maritime environment, Liu advanced an offshore defense strategy that moved beyond coastal defense.¹⁵ He recognized that the widespread deployment of cruise missiles, aircraft carriers, and over-the-horizon weapon systems necessitated a defense that engaged potential adversaries outside the area of dispute and away from economically vital coastal zones.¹⁶ Geographically, Liu argued for asserting a defensive barrier out to the "first island chain" of Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Philippines, and the Greater Sundas, and for shifting this barrier outward to

the "second island chain" (the Bonins, the Marianas, Guam, and the Carolines) and beyond as the technology to do so became available.¹⁷

The most probable catalyst for both local wars and a major confrontation with the United States is the remaining regional maritime challenges. Bernard Cole lists China as a party to six of East Asia's more than two dozen maritime disputes.¹⁸ Taiwanese reunification with the mainland and a claim of exclusive ownership over the Paracel and Spratly Islands are currently China's most volatile territorial challenges. Both cases strengthen the role of the PLAN by calling for greater Chinese control of the seas.

The maritime frontier is also economically important for China. This has led to Beijing's realization that maritime forces are essential for the "defense not only of its territory but also of its foreign trade routes, and for the exploration of offshore marine resources."¹⁹ Conservative figures estimate that China has offshore petroleum reserves of roughly 30 to 40 billion barrels, whose extraction and protection is pivotal to China's national economic development.²⁰ A huge population also makes China highly dependent on fishing, so much so that it was party to fourteen noteworthy fishing disputes with neighboring states between 1994 and 1997.²¹ Therefore, the PRC's outstanding maritime territorial disputes and economic considerations are important motives for the PLAN modernization effort.

The Maritime Strategy of a Continental Power. Consciously or subconsciously, contemporary literature has tended to foster an unfortunate segregation between Chinese military studies and the strategic theories of geopoliti-

Beijing's actions have given little indication that China has shifted away from a continental focus in its maritime strategy.

tics. Recognizing that China is and acts as a continental power contributes to our understanding of its naval modernization. Despite the lofty goal of blue-water power projection, Beijing's actions have given little indication that China has shifted away from a continental focus in its maritime strategy. On the contrary, Chinese actions reflect the strategy of a continental power with coastal interests.

Several Western and Chinese scholars claim that recent naval deployments illustrate PLAN's gradual progression toward blue-water capability. However, other evidence demonstrates that the focus of Chinese naval strategy is much less ambitious. As one senior PLAN officer put it, "In a future war, the combat areas are most likely to be over the continental shelf and at the peripheries of the ocean economic zones."²² PLAN is developing the capability to seize and control offshore areas, maintain command over important sea channels adjacent to China, and conduct combat operations in areas bordering Chinese territorial waters.²³ These are classic strategic objectives pursued by continental powers hoping to expand coastal defense. Norman Friedman believes that the very idea that an island chain is somehow a barrier to invasion suggests the dominance of "a land-orientated mentality that bodes ill for Chinese naval development."²⁴ It is debatable whether Beijing, as heir to an ancient continental tradition, is familiar with the type of abstract thinking required to understand the ambiguity and global perspective of a

strategy focused on maritime power.

Nevertheless, it is evident that China's new fondness for the maritime environment has shaped the impressive modernization efforts of PLAN. United States and Japanese naval operations are unlikely to be threatened by this modernization program for the foreseeable future. However, the Asia-Pacific region may be destabilized as smaller countries in the region become increasingly fearful of an assertive Chinese navy. As PLAN becomes more capable of exercising Chinese claims over its maritime periphery, the U.S. navy's freedom of action will become increasingly threatened. Defined in naval jargon as the "fleet-in-being," the very presence of a capable PLAN in the region will threaten American deployments and hinder U.S. strategic and operational options by making naval actions more hazardous in East Asia.

Reviewing China's maritime blue-water ambitions through a geopolitical lens reveals that China has not changed its historical dependence on continental power. A number of Western navalists have said that Alfred Mahan's theory of maritime strategy—once equated with imperialism by Mao Zedong—is alive and well in Asia. Mahan has not found a home in the People's Republic of China, though. The theories of Halford J. MacKinder and other land power strategists are a better foundation from which to analyze China's current naval strategy. China's maritime renaissance has made it nothing more than a stronger continental power.

NOTES

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- 4 Halford J. MacKinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *Geographical Journal* 23, no. 4 (1904); Alfred T. Mahan, *The Problems of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1905), 62-3.
- 5 Norman Friedman, *Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 230.
- 6 Bernard Cole, "Asia at Sea," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (1997): 36.
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- 9 There have been a variety of 'barbarian' peoples along China's northern frontier that threatened China with invasion. On several occasions these tribes of nomadic steppe people were able to unite to threaten China with conquest. Most notable were the conquest dynasties of Jin (Jurchens), Yuan (Mongols), and Qing (Manchurians).
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