CIAO DATE: 04/05/07

GJIA

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Volume 6, Number 2, Summer/Fall 2005

 

KEDO Adrift
by Yoshinori Takeda

 

When the U.S. government confronted North Korea on its uranium enrichment program in October 2002, a new phase in the North Korean nuclear crisis developed, and the role of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was diminished. In November 2002, the Executive Board of KEDO-composed of the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and the United States-condemned North Korea for its pursuit of nuclear weapons and announced the suspension of heavy fuel oil (HFO) deliveries, starting in December 2002. Although multilateral negotiations on Pyongyang's nuclear program began in August 2003, the six states involved in this process-China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States-did not find a comprehensive solution. In response to the deadlocked situation, KEDO decided to suspend the Light-Water Reactor (LWR) Project in North Korea for a period of one year, beginning on 1 December 2003. KEDO renewed the suspension in November 2004.

Given that KEDO is not, at present, fulfilling two of its basic missions-the delivery of HFO and the LWR project-its critics have good reason for concluding that KEDO's mandated role is coming to an end. It is too early, however, to give up on this unique multilateral organization, which has played such an important role in North Korea's nuclear drama unfolding since the mid 1990s.

In October 1994 the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, the core of which was North Korea's agreement to freeze and dismantle its nuclear program. In return, the United States would provide two LWRs with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW (e) by a target date of 2003. The U.S. government also agreed to organize and lead an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project and to provide alternative energy in the form of HFO for heating at a rate of 500,000 tons annually by completion of the first LWR unit.

KEDO was founded to implement the terms of the Agreed Framework by supplying HFOand constructing the LWR plants to be located in Kumho, South Hamgyong Province, on the east coast of North Korea. Founding members Japan, South Korea, and the United States signed the Agreement on the Establishment of KEDO in March 1995. KEDO then opened its doors to other states and international organizations that accepted the principles of the KEDO charter and offered assistance: New Zealand, Australia, and Canada (1995); Indonesia, Chile, and Argentina (1996); the EU and Poland (1997); Czech Republic (1999); and Uzbekistan (2000). KEDO receives additional material and financial support from nineteen non-member contributing states. Although the participation of these countries in KEDO reflects their deep interest in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, member states, except for the four Executive Board members, are rarely involved in the decisionmaking process.

KEDO's uniqueness as an organization lies in its focus on practical matters requiring diplomatic communication. First, the cooperation envisioned by the Agreed Framework and KEDO focuses on technical issues, analogous to an EU predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community, which has had a crucial impact on major economic and political developments in Europe.3 KEDO's goal has been to utilize the procurement and distribution of non-nuclear forms of energy assistance to North Korea as a means to find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis.4 Second, the implementation of the Agreed Framework and the establishment of KEDO began without diplomatic relations among KEDO's three founding members and North Korea. Technically, the Korean War has never ended; North Korea is still at war with South Korea and the United States. Predictably, the harsh history of northeast Asia has haunted KEDO-North Korean relations considerably.

Yoshinori Takeda is Research Associate at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is on leave from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.