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CIAO DATE: 04/05/07
Blind Spot: The United States and Post-Conflict Intervention
by Robert M. Perito
Iraq was not the first time the United States was unprepared for post-intervention violence. Similar outbreaks of civilian violence occurred during the initial stage of U.S. interventions in Panama, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Given the importance of properly managing post-conflict interventions, it is critical that the United States find a solution to this problem. As one U.S. Army colonel put it, "The U.S. cannot be unprepared for missions it does not want, as if the lack of preparedness might prevent our going. We cannot be like children that refuse to get dressed for school."1 Why does the United States have a "blind spot" that results in failure to plan for the lawlessness that follows military intervention? First, there is a misunderstanding of the nature of failed states. Second, the U.S. military is not trained to deal with banditry and lawlessness and do not have special police capabilities dedicated to establishing law and order. Third, the U.S. government's civilian agencies are not prepared to execute their missions as part of stability operations, and it seems unlikely that a proper reorganization will come about in the near future. If we are to undertake more stability operations in the future, as seems likely, we need to modernize our foreign policy architecture and security forces, which remain essentially unchanged since the Cold War, and create a civilian Stability Force to undertake civilian missions alongside military forces in stability operations.
The United States has neglected to acknowledge the significant role of criminal regimes in weak and failing states. Somalia-the first state in which the United States engaged in post-Cold War UN peacekeeping-was an anomaly because at the beginning of Operation Restore Hope in December 1992, Somalia was without a central government and in a state of civil war. This was not true for the other failed states where the United States has intervened militarily: Panama, Haiti (twice), Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Iraq. While these countries may have had characteristics of weak and failing states, their ruling regimes actually were "kleptocracies" in which the leaders used corrupt intelligence and security services to engage in narcotics trafficking, money laundering, racketeering, and other organized criminal enterprises. Proceeds from illicit activities were used to finance the ruling elites' lavish lifestyles and to purchase the loyalty of the military and police forces. For example, ex- Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic, his family, and political supporters profited handsomely from kickbacks on exports of agriculture products and raw materials.
Given that criminalized regimes were in control of the countries where the United States intervened militarily, it is not surprising that looting, lawlessness, widespread violence, and organized crime have posed the principal challenges in these stability operations.
Having misunderstood the fundamental problem confronting the states where the United States has intervened, namely the persistence of criminal organizations, the United States and the international community have offered the wrong solutions. Early elections and economic assistance have legitimized and financed criminal elements. Failures to rapidly establish effective police, courts, and prisons and to institute the rule of law have prolonged the stay of U.S. intervention forces and stifled democracy and economic prosperity.
Military force has been the U.S. instrument of choice for post-conflict interventions because military forces are maintained in a state of readiness for foreign deployment. They can be transported rapidly over great distances, are self-sufficient upon arrival, and provide their own force protection. The U.S. military can provide protection against regular armies and paramilitary forces, but it is not organized, trained, and equipped to deal with civil disturbances and engage in law enforcement. In the words of the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Wesley Clark, "Experience in peace operations has proven that good soldiers, no matter how well equipped, trained, and led, cannot perform police duties among civilian populations."3 In interventions from Panama to Iraq, U.S. forces were unprepared to control civilian mobs that looted and destroyed critical infrastructure and dealt a crippling blow to public perceptions of the intervention force and any related peace process. The U.S. military is simply not trained to conduct such post-conflict activities.
Robert M. Perito is Coordinator for the Iraq Experience Project at the United States Institute of Peace.