Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 2, Summer/Fall 2000

CIAO DATE: 05/02

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Volume 1, Number 2, Summer/Fall 2000

Modern Humanitarianism: Rethinking Neutrality
Mark Bartolini^*

The collapse of the Cold War security paradigm has given rise to a new system that poses more dynamic challenges to purveyors of humanitarian assistance. Between 1975 and 1985 there were an average of five humanitarian emergencies a year. According to the United Nations, in 1998 there were forty emergencies, plus an additional eight “critical cases.” The evolution of twentieth–century warfare, marked by the atrocities of urban combat, scorched earth policies, and ethnic cleansing, has fed the expanding number of conflicts where civilians are often the primary targets and casualties. These destructive trends pose unique challenges and dilemmas for the practitioners of humanitarian assistance, prompting a widening debate over the fundamental nature of humanitarian response.

In addition to such a debate, the reality of modern military techniques and the rise of a more anarchical global system have changed the methods of response and called into question some of its very definitions. A “refugee crisis” no longer adequately describes today’s complex emergencies. The plight of refugees, people forced to flee across an international border out of a credible fear of persecution, is hardly distinguishable from, and is often preferable to, the plight of internally displaced people, those driven from their home and unable to flee their country of persecution. While there are numerous international agencies dedicated to the needs of refugees, there are none dedicated to the needs of internally displaced persons. Assistance agencies often find ways to assist internally displaced persons, but questions of sovereignty and scarcity of resources have stalled a formalized approach.

Along with refining definitions to meet the new realities of complex emergencies come the practical questions of how to best render assistance. Such questions are not easily answered due to the nature of modern war as well as the multiplicity of actors and interests typically present in today’s complex emergencies. Warring parties, factions within national governments, black market operators, foreign governments, and international organizations intervening in a crisis all have unique agendas.

Organizations attempting to provide life–saving assistance face ever–greater threats to their own security from belligerents. Some agencies also see a need to enhance their capacity to provide protection to beneficiaries and thus revisit questions of neutrality and advocacy within the context of providing impartial needs–based assistance. Many agencies continue to push for reforms within the United Nations system while concurrently acting as implementation partners. Assistance agencies are increasingly utilizing the resources of Western militaries, while trying to maintain their independence.

The complexity of modern emergencies demands that assistance agencies continually examine the practical and political impact of their work. In crises where political solutions are required, humanitarian assistance can be used inappropriately by foreign governments as cover for a lack of political resolve. In order for humanitarian assistance to avoid being co–opted by the multitude of agendas that come into play in today’s emergencies, there needs to be flexible and creative responses, more clearly defined divisions of labor among aid agencies, and a sober evaluation of the limits and potential dangers of assistance.

The Question of Neutrality

By far, the most contentious issues raised by the new global environment are those that challenge the core ideology of the humanitarian movement–neutrality.

Modern day humanitarianism was born in 1859 when Jean–Henri Dunant witnessed injured and dying soldiers lying unattended on a battlefield at Solferino, Italy. Dunant went on to establish a moral code of war and an organization of first–aid societies that, under the banner of neutrality, could minister to fallen soldiers: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Nearly a century and a half later, the ICRC continues to play a critical role in saving lives during wartime. Its principle of neutrality and its mandate allow the ICRC to access prisoners of war, negotiate their release, and perform numerous other indispensable assistance functions under its universally recognized humanitarian banner. Despite its well–known adherence to the principle of neutrality–and sometimes because of it–ICRC delegates have suffered grievous losses in the field. In the past decade, more ICRC delegates were killed in the line of duty than in any other decade of the organization’s history.

A long–running debate dating back to the ICRC’s work during World War II questions whether the code of strict neutrality to which the ICRC adheres is always appropriate during wars in which civilians are the primary targets and crimes against humanity, including genocide, occur. Is there a moral duty to speak out against such atrocities, or is there an imperative for neutrality?

Many in the humanitarian assistance field fear taking on issues beyond the impartial delivery of aid. They believe that adopting an agenda that incorporates political and human rights concerns will inhibit access, endanger its staff members, and compromise the viability of life–saving programs. They argue that such activities are more appropriately addressed by the already numerous network of governmental and intergovernmental agencies dedicated to advocacy and reporting on human rights.

What is needed, however, is a division of labor that allows some assistance agencies to apply a human rights perspective to what they witness. Such a move is both a moral and practical imperative. At present, human rights groups rarely enjoy the level of access afforded assistance agencies. Their presence in the field is often limited to the time it takes to write a report, whereas the staff of assistance agencies witness the conflict twenty–four hours a day for months, or even years, at a time.

The traditional division between assistance and advocacy groups affirms the principle of neutrality which demands that humanitarian relief based on need be available to all parties in a conflict. Yet some assistance agencies assert that the principle of need–based assistance can be maintained while speaking out and adopting strategies against human rights violations. One example of a melding of these two agendas occurred during the Kosovo crisis. Following a White House meeting with President Bill Clinton, several representatives of non–governmental organizations (NGOs) working with refugees fleeing Kosovo expressed support for the NATO–led intervention during an impromptu press conference. At least two of the organizations offering such support continue to implement long–standing need–based assistance programs in Serbia today.

Assistance agencies must tailor their response to individual emergencies. While activities should sometimes be limited to discreet lobbying, other crises will call for overt actions in the field. During the Kosovo crisis, some assistance agencies operating in the relative safety of Albania and Macedonia referred refugees to human rights groups seeking evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Supporting a human rights agenda in Chechnya is more complicated, because the politics of the region demand greater consideration of the significant risks to the victim of abuse, the safety of the agency’s personnel, and the potential impact on regional aid operations.

To be sure, it is difficult to determine the boundaries separating advocacy, human rights, and protection. Possible benefits must be weighed against the level of risk an activity will pose to staff members, the organization’s programs, and its beneficiaries. The fact that mistakes will be made in such calculations is used as justification by those who believe that such activities are not the role of assistance agencies. But there are also a plethora of cases in which the failure to act beyond providing assistance rendered agencies mere bystanders to the tragedies befalling their beneficiaries. In Bosnia, the sometimes apparent futility of providing aid was referred to as providing for the “well–fed dead.”

The post–Cold War phenomenon of military humanitarian intervention further complicates the neutrality debate. Some aid agencies express concern that working with a sovereign military force or alliance, such as NATO, is a de facto breach of neutrality, especially when it is a party to the conflict, as in Kosovo. Military interventions involve political motives that can be antithetical to a humanitarian agenda. Yet, as the recent flight of nearly one million refugees from Kosovo demonstrated, in some instances only military forces will have the logistical capacity and resources to adequately respond to the needs of refugees in the early weeks of a crisis.

The fact that the military’s humanitarian impulses are at times subservient to its public relations needs or political directives should not come as a surprise. Rather, it is the nature of the beast. Instead of shrinking in horror, assistance agencies need to consider engagement on a case–by–case basis. Although the maintenance of neutrality on the part of assistance agencies is critical, they must ask: Is it fair to do so at the expense of beneficiaries? When a crisis erupts beyond the capacity of assistance agencies to respond adequately, humanitarian responses coordinated with the armed forces can employ the superior logistical capacity and resources of militaries. Such cooperation in the early days of a crisis can greatly ease the transition phase, when the structures created to assist and house refugees are turned over to the sole control of humanitarian agencies.

It should also be noted that while assistance agencies are generally more comfortable with humanitarian interventions that operate under the banner of the UN, the performance of UN forces in Bosnia and Rwanda demonstrated that in such interventions, proper humanitarian behavior is hardly guaranteed. The murder of inhabitants of UN–designated safe havens, the indiscriminate killing of civilians that continued despite the presence of UN soldiers, the abhorrent deals made with Serb militants, and the failure to transmit and respond to grave warnings of impending genocide in Rwanda are but a few testimonials to the flaws of collective response and the pernicious influence of individuals within the UN bureaucracy.

Whatever side an agency or aid worker takes in these debates is usually defended by the axiom, “Our actions are always aimed at the best interests of our beneficiaries.” Unfortunately in modern warfare where civilians, not soldiers, are the primary targets, it is rarely clear what actions are in the best interest of affected populations. Virtually all humanitarian assistance activities carry political consequences. Food to the starving may prolong a war, create a culture of dependency, or allow a despot to divert funds to other enterprises in order to suppress his people. Funds for reconstructing homes can be used to reinforce the political base of militants through patronage and an inundation of humanitarian assistance and personnel may smother a nascent civil society or harm local markets.

The purveyors of humanitarian aid must recognize that they are operating in a complex environment in which virtually all assistance has a political impact. The value–added that aid organizations can offer is the ability of their people on the ground to analyze these effects and offer donors and policymakers the benefit of their observations. All too often it is the donor or policymaker who designs the aid program in some Western capital and then presents it to the assistance agency as a fait accompli for implementation. There needs to be more substantive dialogue between international NGOs, local stakeholders, and donors to design programs that serve the best interests of a community.

Facing Down a Hostile Environment

The allegiance system promoted by the Cold War superpowers propped up corrupt, authoritarian regimes and, in many places, left a power vacuum to be filled by opportunistic politicians promoting ethnic and religious intolerance. This legacy presents a major impediment to assistance agencies in responding to complex emergencies. Corruption severely hampers the distribution of aid, stunts the growth of civil society, and distorts the impact of aid by favoring entrenched militants and ultranationalists. The political leverage previously afforded by superpower rivalries made the implementation of assistance strategies far less complex.

Even so, it should be understood that the delivery of aid is not a static process. There are creative aid workers capable of adapting to their environments and developing effective strategies to circumvent or diminish the possibly negative impact of assistance. Even in a hostile environment, humanitarian assistance can save or better the lives of large numbers of people. The alternative to assistance, to deny food to the starving, water to the parched, and medical care and sanitation facilities to the sick and injured, is rarely a preferable option. The solution often lies in devising strategies to improve the delivery of aid.

Today the refugee scene is no longer in response to the former Soviet Union. It is about the disintegration of states in that empire as well as in Africa, Asia, and the former Yugoslavia. While the number of refugees continues to decrease, the U.S. Committee for Refugees reports that they now total around 13.5 million worldwide. The number of internally displaced persons, however, has risen to over 20 million. This is due, in part, to two factors: a failure of neighboring countries to honor the principle of first asylum by forcing internally displaced persons to remain inside or along the borders of the country they are trying to flee, and the refoulement (forced return) of refugees by asylum countries. Refoulement occurs at an alarming rate despite its explicit prohibition by the 1951 United Nations Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees.

The situation is not likely to change much in the next decade. More violence seems likely in the states of central Asia and the Caucasus. Africa, with 10 percent of the world’s population, 50 percent of the world’s conflicts, and regrettably, 5 percent of the world’s attention, is the epicenter of the problem. The future of a united Indonesian state is in grave doubt, and there are numerous other candidates for disintegration.

In 1994, U.S. troops withdrew from Somalia after suffering casualties on a humanitarian mission that became a defining event for post–Cold War humanitarian intervention in Africa and the world over. The withdrawal reinforced the opinion of those in the U.S. Congress and Clinton administration who believed that Africa was drifting beyond governance. The debacle in Somalia was used as a pretext for a policy of minimal engagement throughout much of sub–Saharan Africa. This isolationism characterized the international community’s response to the largest genocide of the decade in Rwanda, a sixteen year conflict in Sudan, and horrific atrocities in Sierra Leone, Angola, Uganda, Burundi, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.

The human toll of war pales in comparison to the single largest destabilizing factor in Africa–AIDS. The epidemic has already produced 10 million orphans, and in ten years, that number will quadruple to 40 million. More people will die of AIDS in Africa in the next decade than died in all of the wars of the twentieth century.

Add to this mix of orphaned, impoverished, and highly vulnerable children the availability of cheap weapons and the potential for future conflict rises exponentially. Such grim statistics have unfortunately not convinced international policymakers to devote more attention and resources to Africa.

Problems of poverty, illiteracy, child soldiers, corruption, and disease are exacerbated by Africa’s perceived limited strategic importance to the West. Africa’s myriad of problems cannot be meaningfully addressed without fundamental changes in the commitment of the developed world to address these problems, and the commitment of Africans to put their house in order.

There are some reasons for optimism, but there is no indication that sweeping changes will occur. Assistance agencies will continue to perform triage in ever more difficult environments, prioritizing food, water, sanitation, and medical assistance based on organizational capacity and providing small–scale income generation projects where funding is available. The tragedy of Rwanda may continually play out on a smaller scale, with the West playing bystander to one new outrage after another.

Today’s humanitarian agencies contend with a transformed political environment in which anarchy, corruption, and terrorism threaten the lives of both civilians and assistance workers. In addition to casualties, what these security problems portend for assistance agencies are higher costs, less efficiency, such as the one assistance agencies currently face in Chechnya, in which an adequate response is not possible because of overwhelming risks to staff and political constraints imposed by major donors. Despite these threats, it is clear from this last decade that aid organizations are willing to face the risk of operating in insecure environments as long as there is an overwhelming need and financial support. Indeed, while the response is far from adequate, the International Rescue Committee and other assistance agencies are operating in Ingushetia today to assist refugees from Chechnya.

Governments seem content to fund aid operations in conflicts that they consider too risky for military intervention. Despite recognizing the risks these situations pose to humanitarian workers, governments have done little to ensure their safety beyond providing them with security training. Given this fact, it is not surprising that anecdotal evidence suggests that far more aid workers were killed in the line of duty this past decade than U.S. soldiers in combat. While there is no single answer to issues of security, the creation of a permanent international criminal court and the designation of attacks against humanitarian aid workers as a crime of war would go far in stripping impunity from the perpetrators of such attacks.

From Serving to Protecting

In apparent contradiction to the increasing risks assistance agencies face, there is a burgeoning interest in expanding mandates to include protection. The definition of protection within the vernacular of humanitarian assistance is extremely broad. It can be as bold as intervening to stop a summary execution, or it can mean ensuring that refugees are not being abused when they are forced to seek private accommodations in a third country. Until recently, protection had been the purview of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the lead agency in humanitarian crises whose mandate specifically encompasses protection. But it has become clear to the UNHCR, and to an increasing number of NGOs, that the protection of refugees should be within the mandate of all agencies working with civilian populations in complex emergencies.

Protection strategies have greatly expanded the scope of work performed by assistance agencies. There are now technical units geared toward implementing a diverse range of programs from microcredit to major infrastructure. During the siege of Sarajevo, the International Rescue Committee rebuilt the city’s gas lines and heating system and erected a sophisticated emergency water system. The gas and heating system repairs protected people from exposure, and the water system protected the lives of those people who would have been otherwise forced to stand in long lines that were easily targeted by sniper fire and shelling.

Coalitions between human rights agencies and assistance agencies have begun to form. Assessment teams in the field from both groups are identifying vulnerable populations and working together to develop protection strategies. Activities run the gamut from supplying full–time staff and monitoring the security of vulnerable populations to creating advocacy campaigns that generate pressure for adequate assistance and protection.

Along with moves toward developing technical capacity and interdisciplinary cooperation, humanitarian assistance agencies have encountered new challenges to their moral authority as they find themselves in increasingly complicated situations. Perhaps the most conspicuous example occurred in Goma, Zaire. In 1994, following the genocide of minority Tutsis in Rwanda, the Tutsi rebels were able to regain power. Over one million Hutus fled into neighboring Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). Among them were fighters from the Interahamwe, the militia that had committed the genocide in Rwanda. The camps were terrible places where people died hourly of disease and malnutrition. Aid agencies rushed in to help, but it soon became clear that the Interahamwe, through force and intimidation, were intent on controlling the camps and using them as bases for attacks in Rwanda. When Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) and the International Rescue Committee declared they would no longer work in the camps, they were harshly criticized for abandoning innocent civilians.

Today the ruling Tutsi government in Burundi operates so–called “regroupment” camps. Hutus are forcibly relocated, ostensibly for their own protection, as rebels are indiscriminately pursued. Médecins Sans Frontières decided to pull out of, at least temporarily, some camps in protest of the government’s policy. The International Rescue Committee has remained. Despite abhorring the practice of forced relocation, the International Rescue Committee believed that in this instance, withdrawal would only make the plight of the displaced Hutus worse. As in Goma, there are no easy answers.

Fitting in the United Nations

Where does the United Nations fit into all of this? The United Nations has often been slow to respond to crises and reluctant to violate the sovereignty of member states by calling for intervention–even in the face of genocide. But two highly self–critical reports recently released by the United Nations–one on Rwanda and one on Srebrenica, Bosnia–seem to signal a shift in policy. To quote United Nations Secretary–General Kofi Annan’s own words in describing the lessons to be learned from these reports: “National borders should no longer protect leaders who abuse people under their control.” This signals a revolutionary new outlook on the part of the United Nations.

Of course, it is one thing for the Secretary–General to make such a pronouncement and quite another for Security Council members to concur. The importance of the review lies in the United Nations’ willingness to re–examine issues of sovereignty in the face of crimes against humanity.

The recent NATO intervention in Kosovo highlighted the inherent problems of past United Nations interventions. In both its scale and its consequences, Kosovo will eclipse Somalia as the defining humanitarian intervention of the post–Cold War period. One State Department official, when asked before the intervention if the United States would make the same mistakes in Kosovo as it had made in Bosnia, replied testily: “Of course not. We will make new ones.” He certainly was correct. Kosovo wasn’t pretty. While NATO intervention raised a number of legal issues, it also resulted in one of the most dramatic, spontaneous refugee returns in history. Of the 850,000 refugees driven from the country, 777,000 returned within six weeks of a peace accord. It remains to be seen what role Kosovo will be accorded in the terrible annals of Yugoslav disintegration. But for those who witnessed first–hand the genocide in Bosnia and saw the same state organs and tactics at work in Kosovo, NATO intervention represented the first time in history that ethnic cleansing was stopped in its tracks.

The United Nations must learn from NATO’s humanitarian successes in Kosovo. The recent reports on Srebrenica and Rwanda are indicators that the United Nations understands that it must create a new paradigm if it is to maintain its relevance in the post–Cold War world. But the ability of the United Nations to remake itself so that it can respond more effectively to internal conflicts would require overcoming significant barriers in international law, a deeply divided Security Council, a General Assembly loath to trample on principles of sovereignty, and a bureaucracy that has grown to support institutionalized constraints.

Rather than reinvent itself, the United Nations is likely to go on issuing more self–critical reports, this time on failures in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. There seems to be more hope for the various agencies within the United Nations supporting relief and development. Assistance agencies recognize that in the global anarchy they need the UNHCR to assert its role as the lead agency in humanitarian crises and refugee protection. In order for the UNHCR to operate effectively, it must garner the full support of donor governments, work constructively with its sister UN agencies, possess the requisite organizational capacity to do its job well, and be able to depend on the cooperation and professionalism of NGOs.

Conclusion

The dissolution of the Cold War system has challenged assistance agencies to re–evaluate their role as mere providers of humanitarian aid and has prompted them to broaden their role to include advocacy and protection. In addition, assistance agencies increasingly focus on human rights. This expanded role requires assistance agency personnel to become more and more specialized. It also necessitates more training on how to analyze the political dimensions of their work and develop strategies to address human rights violations and corruption among local actors.

Whatever progress assistance agencies are able to make, the role of humanitarian assistance is likely to become increasingly contentious unless the international community becomes more united and committed to resolving regional crises. Adding to the debate will be a more sober look at the impact of aid by the media and continuing fissures among practitioners of assistance as they debate the practical and moral implications of their work. The level of complexity in the field of humanitarian assistance spawned by the demise of the Cold War system has left few options but to adapt to each unique environment and to acknowledge that there will rarely be easy answers.

Endnotes

Note *: Mark Bartolini is Director of Government Relations of the International Rescue Committee. Back.