CIAO DATE: 08/07

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 7, Number 2, Summer/Fall 2006

 

Transforming Separatist Conflict
Rodd McGibbon

 

Excerpt

Rodd McGibbon is the manager of the UN Information Management Service at the UN Office for the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias.

Following the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, debates emerged in policy circles regarding its impact on long running disputes in Aceh and Sri Lanka. Aid workers quickly descended upon the two regions that had also suffered from decades of violent separatist conflict. The global humanitarian response raised expectations that the disaster might fundamentally alter the dynamics of the respective conflicts. This article examines the divergent paths that the conflicts have taken in Aceh and Sri Lanka after the tsunami.

By the end of 2005, Aceh was implementing a peace deal brokered by a Finnish organization, Conflict Management Initiatives (CMI), with support from the EU. The agreement was signed between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005. It resulted in a successful process of arms decommissioning, the withdrawal of non-local security forces, and the promulgation of a new law allowing for self-government in Aceh.

In Sri Lanka, the Norwegian government had brokered a fragile ceasefire three years before the tsunami. Negotiations over a peace deal had also been launched, but were abandoned in 2003 due to a lack of progress over core issues. Immediately following the tsunami, there was sound cooperation between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). However, this cooperation soon gave way to a breakdown of the ceasefire. In contrast to the promising moves toward peace in Aceh, post-tsunami reconstruction in Sri Lanka resulted in renewed hostilities.

The tsunami’s main political consequence—and the one that most influenced the different outcomes in Aceh and Sri Lanka—was its impact on the strategic considerations of the combatants. The tsunami shaped the basic political calculus of governments and rebels, resulting in a breakthrough in negotiations in Aceh, and a breakdown in the ceasefire in Sri Lanka. These events show that vague notions of “disaster diplomacy”—the hope that humanitarian cooperation would break down the animosities driving the conflicts—were misplaced.1 The old cycle of violence returned to Sri Lanka in early 2005.  Similarly, in Aceh, at the peak of humanitarian activities, clashes continued between GAM and government forces. Eight months later, a peace deal was achieved. This occurred despite the lack of humanitarian cooperation between GAM and the government on the ground.

While the combatants’ strategic perceptions are central to explaining recent political outcomes in Aceh and Sri Lanka, a forward-looking analysis also suggests that other actors could play an important future role. The final part of this article critically examines how the participation of noncombatants outside the government—so-called civil society—might boost future prospects for peace...

1 See Sayyed Qassem Al, “Diplomacy and Humanitarian Disasters,” El Syassa El Dawliya Magazine, Issue 163, January 2006.