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*Foreign Policy
and the 2000
Presidential
Election*

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

Foreign Policy and the 2000 Presidential Election

U.S. political campaigns characteristically produce energetic, sometimes heated, exchanges as the candidates attempt to differentiate their positions from those of their opponents on a range of issues, including foreign policy. One such “hot button” issue between Republican George W. Bush and Democrat Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election is a National Missile Defense program.

“The Clinton administration at first denied the need for a National Missile Defense system. Then it delayed. Now the approach it proposes is flawed — a system initially based on a single site, when experts say that more is needed. A missile defense system should not only defend our country, it should defend our allies, with whom I will consult as we develop our plans. And any change in the ABM Treaty must allow the technologies and experiments required to deploy adequate missile defense.”

— Governor George W. Bush, Remarks on “New Leadership on National Security,”
Washington, D.C., May 23, 2000



“Governor Bush used his brief meeting [in April 2000] with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov to issue a warning that his intention would be to build and deploy a global Star Wars system that he believes could defend the U.S. and all our allies against any missile launch from any source. In the 1990s, most serious analysts took a look at the implausibility of this endeavor, the fantastical price that our taxpayers would be expected to pay, and the dangerously destabilizing consequences of traveling down that path and rejected this notion. . . . Instead I favor, and we are negotiating with the Russians, changes in the ABM Treaty that would lead to a responsible and practical defense against a nuclear attack from a rogue state.”

— Vice President Al Gore, Remarks to the International Press Institute,
Boston, Massachusetts, April 30, 2000

This journal attempts to put into context the relationship between foreign policy and U.S. presidential campaigns. It offers an historical perspective of the impact of foreign policy in earlier elections as well as assessments of the role it is playing in the current campaign. In the Focus Section, an expert describes the new partisanship that is shaping the politics of U.S. foreign policy. In separate interviews, two foreign policy advisers to presidential candidates Al Gore and George W. Bush discuss key foreign policy concerns of their respective parties. Other articles explain how the media covers foreign policy issues in the campaign, convention platforms as a means to define political parties' positions on foreign policy, and recent public opinion polls and how they reflect voters' concerns. Also included are foreign policy statements by the Democratic, Republican, Reform, and Green Party nominees for President.

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FOREIGN POLICY AND THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

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A G E N D A**

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THE NEW PARTISANSHIP: THE CHANGED POLITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

*By James M. Lindsay
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution*



“The new partisanship in foreign affairs reflects deep currents in American society that will shape the politics of U.S. foreign policy for years to come,” says James Lindsay, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former Director for Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council. The rise of this new partisanship, in the author’s view, “has created a paradox: the United States enjoys unparalleled power on the world stage, but presidents are finding it harder to mobilize support for their foreign policies.”

Americans cherish the idea that partisan politics should stop at the water’s edge. But in practice, bipartisanship has become a scarce commodity in American foreign policy. Democrats and Republicans regularly squabble over what the United States should do abroad, and the congressional wings of both parties seem less and less inclined to defer to whoever sits in the Oval Office. Indeed, rather than ushering in a new era of harmony, the end of the Cold War seems only to have fueled disagreement.

This partisan rancor has left many nostalgic for a return to what President Bill Clinton has called “the great tradition of Harry Truman and Arthur Vandenberg — a tradition...that casts aside partisanship and brings together Republicans and Democrats for the good of the American people and the world.” But anyone hoping that the next president will be able to restore a bipartisan foreign policy will be disappointed. The new partisanship in foreign affairs reflects deep currents in American society that will shape the politics of U.S. foreign policy for years to come.

FROM PARTISANSHIP TO BIPARTISANSHIP

Bipartisanship is not the natural state of affairs in American foreign policy. The reason is simple — Americans disagree about what constitutes their interests overseas and how best to achieve them. More often than not, these differences have fallen along party lines.

Consider one of America’s most contentious foreign policy debates of the 20th century, the Senate’s

rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. While World War I was being fought, Democrats and Republicans put aside their differences and formed a united political front (something seen in almost all of America’s wars). But just a month before the war ended and on the eve of the 1918 midterm congressional elections, President Woodrow Wilson stuck a stick in a wasp’s nest by urging his fellow Americans to reelect a Democratic Congress. A vote for Republicans, he argued, would undercut his ability to fashion a just and lasting peace.

The public disregarded Wilson’s advice, and the Democrats lost control of Congress. Not surprisingly, the new Republican majority came to Washington with little interest in rallying around the president. It wanted payback, and the Treaty of Versailles provided the target. While nearly all Senate Democrats supported the treaty, their Republican counterparts buried Wilson’s beloved Covenant.

The bitterness of the debate over the Treaty of Versailles and the suspicion that the treaty’s defeat had helped pave the road to World War II facilitated the rise of bipartisanship after World War II. In the first few years after the war, Democrats led by President Truman and Republicans led by Senator Vandenberg, the former isolationist turned internationalist who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, cooperated on historic pieces of legislation such as the UN Charter, the Marshall Plan, and the NATO Treaty. The bipartisan tradition that Truman and Vandenberg established grew stronger in the 1950s under President Dwight Eisenhower. By the early 1960s, Democrats

and Republicans were nearly unanimous in supporting freer trade, high levels of defense spending, and most important, military intervention in Vietnam.

This is not to say that partisan conflict over foreign policy disappeared in the first two decades after World War II. Democrats and Republicans found things to bicker over, especially U.S. policy toward China. Still, these disagreements paled in comparison to a level of bipartisan cooperation that, looking back decades later, is remarkable. No speaker of the House today would respond to a president from the other party who requested congressional authorization to use military force by saying that “if the President had done what is proposed here without consulting Congress he would have had no criticism from me.” But Sam Rayburn (Democrat of Texas) said precisely that when Eisenhower asked Congress in 1955 to authorize him to use U.S. forces to protect Taiwan from attack.

THINGS FALL APART

Vietnam rocked the bipartisan tradition. The war split the country and the two parties as well. The Republican Party, once the stronghold of isolationism, held firm to a muscular form of internationalism. Republicans argued that the Soviet Union was overtaking the United States, called for spending more on defense, and continued to uphold the banner of freer trade.

Democrats, meanwhile, moved in the opposite direction. The party that had once embraced President John F. Kennedy’s pledge to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship” to assure the survival of liberty became skeptical of foreign entanglements. Democrats argued that most third-world conflicts had nothing to do with Moscow, embraced the idea of detente with the Soviet Union, and moved away from their support for freer trade.

Yet even as foreign policy issues increasingly came to divide Republicans and Democrats in the 1970s and 1980s, the legacy of bipartisanship continued to hold sway. Although Vietnam destroyed the knee-jerk willingness of Congress to support the president, congressional deference survived (albeit tattered) well into the 1980s. President Ronald Reagan’s great ally in fights over arms control, aid to the contras in Nicaragua, and other foreign policy issues was the

reluctance of moderate Democrats to hand him a foreign policy defeat. That caution stemmed partly from political calculations — they feared being blamed for playing politics with national security — but also from the belief that publicly rebuffing a president would harm the country’s long-term interests abroad.

Such fears largely disappeared with the end of the Cold War, and, as a result, the tattered bipartisanship of the 1980s gave way to a new partisanship. The change in the politics of American foreign policy is evident in the enmity congressional Republicans have displayed toward Bill Clinton. Senator James Inhofe (Republican of Oklahoma) spoke for many in his party when he called Clinton “unquestionably the worst Commander in Chief in the history of America.” And Republicans have seldom missed the opportunity to torment their nemesis. During the Kosovo conflict, congressional Republicans sharply criticized Bill Clinton both before the conflict and during it. The House went so far as to refuse to vote to support the bombing. Not to be outdone, the Senate brought back memories of the Treaty of Versailles by voting down the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), even though President Clinton and 62 senators asked that the vote be postponed in order to avoid damaging America’s reputation overseas. Both these episodes broke with past practice. When Congress sought to wrest control of foreign policy from the president on issues such as Vietnam and the MX missile, it had vocal public support. On Kosovo and CTBT, Republicans challenged Clinton even though most Americans backed his positions.

To be fair, the temptation to use foreign policy for partisan gain is hardly restricted to members of Congress or Republicans. The potential for domestic political gain apparently drove many of President Clinton’s foreign policies, including the decisions to expand NATO and to push for a National Missile Defense. And Senator Joseph Biden (Democrat of Delaware) was simply being more honest than most when he acknowledged that Democrats believed that the CTBT’s defeat would help them at the polls: “(Republican Senator) Bill Roth says he will vote against the treaty. Bingo! That’s \$200,000 worth of ads” against his reelection.

What accounts for the new partisanship? It is tempting to blame it all on Clinton’s polarizing personality, but,

in fact, it reflects several deeper causes. One is that the United States no longer faces a looming threat. With the demise of the Soviet Union, there is now greater room for legitimate disagreement on the means and ends of U.S. foreign policy. And because the Democrats and Republicans represent different constituencies with different interests, it is hardly surprising that they see the world differently.

A second cause is generational change. Elements of the old bipartisan ethic survived into the 1980s because so many members of Congress were a product of that tradition. But by the 1990s these legislators began to retire from politics. Today, 45 percent of senators and 61 percent of representatives first took office after 1992. (The numbers will be even higher after the November elections.) These new members have known only the fractious politics of the new partisanship. Resurrecting old norms that members of Congress should defer to presidential leadership and leave politics at the water's edge will hardly be easy.

The third and most important cause of the new partisanship ironically is foreign policy's fading *political* importance. The American public's interest in foreign affairs, which was fairly high during the Cold War, plummeted during the 1990s. Americans concluded that their country's unparalleled power means they have little at stake abroad. With the public now absorbed with domestic politics, the inhibition against using foreign policy to score political points has broken down. Politicians find that they can energize their core supporters by demonizing opponents and exaggerating policy differences without alienating the more numerous moderate voters. In short, foreign policy has become — to paraphrase German military strategist Karl von Clausewitz — the continuation of domestic politics by other means. And as academics have long known, the lower the stakes, the pettier the politics.

THE PARADOX OF POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONALISM

The rise of the new partisanship has created a paradox: the United States enjoys unparalleled power on the world stage, but presidents are finding it harder to mobilize support for their foreign policies. They can no longer assume that Congress and the public will follow their lead. Clinton triumphed on issues such as

enlarging NATO, ending the war in Bosnia, and securing Senate approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention only after he committed the full powers of his office to building bipartisan support in Congress. Even then, the margins of victory were slim. On other issues, ranging from China policy to trade policy to global warming, Clinton saw his initiatives fall victim to partisan squabbling on the Hill.

Can the next administration restore the old spirit of bipartisanship? Probably not. The tradition of Truman and Vandenberg rested on a consensus about America's role in the world; Vietnam shook that consensus and the end of the Cold War buried it. A renewed threat to American security might force Americans to reach agreement on the means and ends of American foreign policy in the 21st century, but no adversary equivalent to the Soviet Union is on the horizon.

A national debate might also produce a new foreign policy; ideally, that is a purpose elections can serve. But foreign policy has been largely an afterthought in the 2000 presidential campaign. Vice President Gore did not outline his foreign policy platform until April 2000, after the primaries were over, and he devoted only four sparse paragraphs to the topic in his acceptance speech at the Democratic Convention. Governor George W. Bush has attacked the Clinton administration for letting military readiness decline and for failing to pursue missile defense more aggressively. Otherwise, his foreign policy comments have been long on rhetoric and short on substance.

Gore and Bush have tread lightly on foreign policy partly because, putting their rhetorical differences aside, they agree on the basic outlines of America's role in the world. Both are internationalists at odds with the neo-isolationists within their own parties. But the more important reason why neither has made foreign policy a focal point of his campaign is the same one behind the new partisanship: public apathy about foreign affairs. Presidential candidates naturally gravitate toward issues that ordinary Americans care about. Today, that means prescription drug benefits for seniors and not U.S. policy toward Russia.

So whoever takes the oath of office next January can expect more of the partisanship that buffeted the Clinton administration. Whether this is for good or

for ill lies in the eye of the beholder. Bipartisanship on behalf of an imprudent policy can be folly, just as partisanship on behalf of a just cause can be wise. What is clear is that politics will not stop at the water's

edge simply because presidents plead for it. American foreign policy will return to the tradition of Truman and Vandenberg only when the American public demands it. ©

FROM THE CAMPAIGNS

In the following two interviews, key foreign policy advisers in the presidential campaigns of Vice President Al Gore and Governor George W. Bush give the Democratic and Republican views on the future of U.S. foreign policy and discuss what each sees as the flaws in the opposing candidate's approach. As the reader will note in other media, the rhetoric on both sides will become even more intense as the campaign progresses toward election day.

A REPUBLICAN VIEW: MANAGING RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, CHINA, INDIA

*Interview with Ambassador Richard Armitage
A Senior Foreign Policy and Defense Adviser to
Governor George W. Bush*

The key elements of Republican foreign policy involve “the management of the rise of two great powers — China and India — and the further management, at least temporarily, of the decline of another great power, the Russian Federation,” says Ambassador Richard Armitage, a senior foreign policy and defense adviser to Governor George W. Bush and former senior troubleshooter and negotiator in the Departments of State and Defense, and the Congress. On National Missile Defense, he says George Bush wants to field a missile defense system “as soon as possible,” adding, “I think the major difference between ourselves and the Democrats is in the true desire for the system.” He was interviewed by Contributing Editor Susan Ellis.

QUESTION: In your view, how much of a role is foreign policy playing in the current presidential campaign?

ARMITAGE: Absent some major problem, I don't think foreign policy will play a major role in this campaign, and certainly we hope that no major problem will develop.

Q: Are there any foreign policy issues that could influence the outcome of the election?

ARMITAGE: There are always things that could happen between now and the election that could influence the outcome, and there are certainly things that raise questions: Vice President Gore's handling of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission at a time when the Russian coffers were being drained, *(see Armitage, page 10)*

A DEMOCRATIC VIEW: FACING KEY FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES

*Interview with Ambassador Marc Ginsberg
Senior Coordinating Adviser on Foreign Policy to
Vice President Al Gore*

The Democratic Party is prepared to address the new foreign policy challenges that the United States faces today, including the spread of AIDS, nuclear terrorism, and global warming, says Ambassador Marc Ginsberg, senior coordinating adviser on foreign policy to Vice President Al Gore and former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco and United States Coordinator for Mediterranean Trade, Investment and Security Affairs. On National Missile Defense, he says Vice President Gore believes the United States needs an effective security deterrent to deal with missile threats from rogue states, but will not “rush headlong” into a missile defense system “that hasn't been proven and tested.” He was interviewed by Contributing Editor Ralph Dannheisser.

QUESTION: In your view, how much of a role is foreign policy playing in the current presidential campaign and, more broadly, how much of a role does it ever play?

GINSBERG: Generally, foreign policy does not play a significant role in presidential election campaigns, with the exception of times when there are international crises — conflicts that concern the American people — such as the Korean conflict in the 1950s, and, of course, the war in Vietnam. These are issues that were clearly important to the American public during elections held at those times. In this campaign, the American people are clearly focused on domestic issues. They are content with the status quo, by and large. The world is at peace, and Americans *(see Ginsberg, page 13)*

(Armitage, from page 9)



is one; the approach in Asia to China is another. There are real questions about the connection between the single-minded approach to China on the foreign-policy front and fund-raising on the domestic front.

But I don't think, frankly, that these are yet major concerns in the minds of the American people.

Q: Do you see basic philosophical differences between Republicans and Democrats on foreign policy issues?

ARMITAGE: Oh, certainly. Start with trade. Republicans, and certainly George W. Bush, are much more free trade-oriented. Governor Bush has steadfastly supported WTO membership for China, and sees trade liberalization as a rising tide which raises all boats. His recent speech on the Western Hemisphere was replete with references to an expanded trade agenda with our southern neighbors.

I've already suggested that there is a major difference in Asia, where Republicans, by and large, believe that our most important strategic relationship is with Japan, and apparently Democrats see the most important strategic relationship as being with a communist country, China.

Another major factor in the way that the Republicans would approach foreign policy is the strong use of alliances. We believe in them. George Bush believes very strongly in the need to nurture and maintain alliances, and he believes that if you're going to rely on allies in times of travail and difficulty, you have to respect them in times of peace and stability. That is, it's important to maintain consistently good relations with our friends and allies.

Finally, I think the major difference, and I would put it in a sentence, is that George Bush is very aware of the need to be excellent in the international arena without being arrogant. And I don't think that's something that the present administration can particularly say.

Q: What do you think is the most significant area of disagreement on foreign policy between the two presidential candidates?

ARMITAGE: I think there are several differences of emphasis. For instance, even this morning, Mr. Bush gave a major foreign policy address on the Western Hemisphere, stating his intention to pay close attention to important issues involving countries in our own neighborhood.

Secondly, Mr. Bush has been very keen, as I've suggested, on the need to nurture and make more robust our alliances.

Thirdly, we have a difference of opinion with the Democrats regarding Asia and just where our interests lie. Republicans, by and large, feel that our interests lie in having a very close and congenial relationship with our major democratic partner in Asia, and that is Japan. It is the relationship with Japan, after all, that allows the United States to effect all of our security cooperation in Asia. Our ability to use Japanese bases allows us to have a military presence in all of Asia, as well as to preserve peace and stability in Northeast Asia. This relationship must be nurtured and restored. So these are among the differences.

Q: What foreign policy issues are of key importance to the Republican party at this time?

ARMITAGE: In the main, we see the key elements of Republican foreign policy as being the management of the rise of two great powers — China and India — and the further management, at least temporarily, of the decline of another great power, the Russian Federation. And we need to manage these three events simultaneously in a way that brings general stability and peace and, hopefully, prosperity to all concerned. And that's a very difficult task.

We acknowledge the desire and right of India and China to take a place on the world stage. A benign, stable, and economically healthy addition to the world stage will be most welcome. But we want this to be accomplished with minimum disruption to regional stability. Regarding Russia, we understand the high gulf between her national aspirations on the one hand and her national capability on the other. We need to be respectful in our dealings with Russia, while being firm about the need for political openness, including freedom of the press.

Q: What is George W. Bush's view regarding a National Missile Defense (NMD) system and how does it differ from the Democratic position?

ARMITAGE: First of all, Mr. Bush has indicated that he wants to field an effective National Missile Defense as soon as possible. I think the major difference between ourselves and the Democrats is in the true desire for the system. Mr. Bush wants a missile defense system to protect our citizens. The Democrats, we feel, are doing the absolute minimum to assuage the Congress and the American public without doing anything really meaningful toward the creation of such a system.

Q: You spoke of the need to nurture our alliances with countries overseas. How would a Republican administration deal with the concerns that have been expressed by U.S. allies about an NMD system and about the U.S. failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?

ARMITAGE: Well, these are two different things. First of all, regarding the NMD and our allies, my first suggestion would be to change the terminology from National Missile Defense to Allied Missile Defense. I think if we made very clear that what protects us can in large measure protect our allies, then there might be a little different view of this.

On the CTBT, the Republican view has been discussed many, many times. We're not in the business of ratifying treaties that are unverifiable. I think a Republican administration would be much more inclined to negotiate a treaty that actually would hold water and might have verification measures in it that would withstand scrutiny.

Q: How do you respond to the criticism by some Democrats that George W. Bush lacks foreign policy experience and expertise?

ARMITAGE: George W. Bush has been the governor of a U.S. state. I might respond, if I were being facetious, by saying that Vice President Gore lacks executive expertise. After all, he's been in the U.S. Congress, which is not an executive body, and he's been vice president, where he had no executive duties.

But I think I would rather concentrate on the areas where George Bush does have expertise — that is in

decision-making, not passing the buck, and taking responsibility for his actions.

More on point, he has had, as governor of Texas, a very robust and well-developed relationship with Mexico and countries in the Southern Hemisphere, so to classify him as a neophyte in the world of foreign affairs is to be unfair.

Q: Do you believe that both major political parties could do a better job in handling foreign policy issues during presidential campaigns? And, if so, what advice could you offer to improve the treatment of foreign policy in U.S. elections?

ARMITAGE: Well, there are those who believe that foreign policy should not be a partisan issue. I myself think that foreign policy should enjoy a very in-depth debate just as every other issue should, whether it's taxes or social issues or anything else.

The last truly bipartisan vote in the U.S. Congress that I remember on a foreign policy issue was the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution authorizing presidential action in Vietnam, which didn't turn out very well. So I don't think that we should continue to insist on bipartisanship; these are issues that have a partisan flavor, number one.

Number two, I think that in order to bring the American public more into the debate, we'd have to go back to basics and try to develop in our schools and in our institutions of higher learning a greater appreciation, not only for world history and foreign cultures, but for the fact that although we're a great power and, perhaps for a time, the most powerful nation on earth, we live in this world, we're a citizen of the world, and we should take a greater interest in the activities of the world. And some schools do this.

There is good news and bad news, I think, associated with this. The good news is that in a time of relative peace our citizens concentrate on other things, and that's good. We don't want there to have to be a tragic world crisis in order to get people's attention. But the bad news is that, for a time, people are occupied with other things rather than looking at our responsibilities and duties in the world.

Q: How would you assess the American public's knowledge of and interest in foreign affairs?

ARMITAGE: I think it's an interesting question. On the one hand, we've got more Americans going abroad than ever before. We've got a very vibrant immigrant culture developing in the United States again, yet another wave. Birth rates are down in this country, yet we're sustaining ourselves with valuable immigrants who bring skills, energy, and vibrancy to our society. And this is something that benefits us as a nation and I think makes us more eclectic as a society. So from that point of view, Americans are very involved in international affairs.

Now when it comes to specific knowledge about different foreign countries, or certainly when it comes to linguistic ability, I think Americans fall far short. Perhaps they ought to spend a little more time really getting in-depth into other cultures, to include languages.

Q: How do you view the role and character of security policy in the elections now that the Cold War is history?

ARMITAGE: Well, there is a debate right now, in the security sphere, about the state of our military. The question revolves around readiness. There's no doubt, and I think the Democrats would agree, that the U.S. military is the best-trained, the best-equipped military in the world.

The debate revolves around the direction in which that military is headed. We on the Republican side feel that there's been a lapse of readiness. We do note that in this last year of the Clinton administration there's been an increase in the defense budget. This is not unlike 1980, the last year of Jimmy Carter's administration. But I don't think anybody will be particularly fooled by that.

Defense Secretary William Cohen has probably put forth very strenuous efforts to try to bring the defense debate forward, but it wasn't until this last year that he was able to prevail upon the President to put a more robust military budget in place. In previous years, you'll notice,

the direction of the budget was not very congenial to fixing our readiness. It was not congenial at all to recapitalizing in our procurement accounts. And the over-extension of military forces — that is, their use in so many different places at the same time — has seriously hampered the training process and has harmed morale.

Beyond the immediate readiness question, there's a question of how we transform our military and, by extension, our security policy to be able to handle the new missions and challenges of the 21st century — for instance, how to project power without access to forward bases; how to conduct operations in an urban environment; how to handle conflict in space; how to deal with information assurance and information dominance. These are areas of great debate between Republicans and Democrats nowadays. Therefore the debate has been confined to arguments over readiness and has been confined to sterile numerical indicators. Governor Bush wants to broaden the debate to include how we can best use all the levers of our national power, not just the Department of Defense, to bring about a more stable security environment. And then we can get to the question of which party is best suited to lead us to a new and stable future.

Q: What would be the top foreign policy priority of a Bush administration?

ARMITAGE: Well, I think it would be, as I indicated earlier, to be excellent in the international environment without being arrogant. It is one thing to be, for a time, first among equals — or as journalist Charlie Krauthammer would say, the “sole superpower,” one who has interests in every part of the globe and without whose participation nothing very meaningful can take place in any part of the globe. It's one thing to know that is the case; it's quite another to trumpet it, saying that we're the indispensable power.

Mr. Bush feels that we ought to be much more quiet and excellent, and by our excellence be the “shining city on the hill,” not by our rhetoric. ©

(Ginsberg, from page 9)



— while stationed abroad — are not in active ground combat, and consequently, foreign policy and national security issues are playing a peripheral role.

Q: Notwithstanding that general situation, are there any foreign policy issues that could influence the outcome of this election to any degree?

GINSBERG: Well, no one can predict the future. The key issue that will affect the election is the comparative experience of Vice President Gore and Senator Joseph Lieberman versus George W. Bush and Dick Cheney. On a pure empirical scale, voters need to compare the 30 years of significant national security experience that the Vice President brings to the table with Governor Bush's more limited experience in this field.

Q: Beyond what you see as the experience gap, are there any foreign policy issues that divide the Democratic and Republican parties or the candidates on philosophical grounds?

GINSBERG: Oh, absolutely. The Republican Party and George Bush are focused on the Cold War and on their achievements in the Gulf War. They have not focused on the challenges that we face in a post-Cold War era in which the United States now finds itself at the peak of its authority around the world in a new global age. We have challenges that we face that are what we would call transglobal, which require the United States to deal more effectively with areas of the world in potential conflict. George Bush and his party have shown no interest in addressing the new security challenges at their source. So that's the first issue.

The second issue is the unilateralism of the Republican Party. The inherent inconsistencies in the Republican platform suggest that, while on the one hand George Bush talks about a policy of distinct American internationalism, on the two key issues that concern our allies and our alliances abroad and the integrity of those alliances (the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and National Missile Defense), George Bush is prepared to act unilaterally.

This represents a fundamental disagreement between the Republican and Democratic parties. The Democrats and Al Gore are not prepared to rush headlong into a National Missile Defense system that hasn't been proven and tested. We also favor passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. So on areas of nuclear security as well as alliance-strengthening, the Republicans are prepared to act unilaterally; the Democrats believe in engaging our allies and working together with them to address and resolve these issues. That's a clear distinction between us and them.

Q: So you'd see those nuclear issues as the most significant area of disagreement?

GINSBERG: Yes.

Q: Agreement or disagreement aside, what foreign policy issues are of key importance to the Democratic Party at this time?

GINSBERG: Well, first and foremost, the most important issue is continuing the prosperity at home by maintaining stability abroad. Our economy is increasingly dependent on stability in foreign markets and the economic prosperity of our key allies. Al Gore wants to continue to build on the track record of helping our allies resolve their international financial difficulties — whether it be the Mexican peso crisis, whether it be the Southeast Asian financial crises, it's a way of insuring that American prosperity continues. So that's first. Second, and not any less important, is obviously maintaining American security and insuring that our military continues to remain strong, is capable of dealing with and addressing the issues that challenge the United States. In coming years, that means helping to enhance the quality of life for our men and women in uniform, ensuring that the revolutionary technology that the United States is producing in this information age is available to them and ensuring that the military is able to do the job that it's called upon to do as we address the new global issues that we face.

Q: From what you've said, it appears to be your view that economic security issues have come to be at least co-equal with military security.

GINSBERG: Oh, they go hand in hand. Americans will not feel secure economically or military unless

we use our global leadership to prevent conflicts that undermine American security and our financial markets. We are increasingly interdependent in a globalizing era where our economic and military strengths go hand in hand.

Q: Given the low profile of foreign affairs issues in election campaigns, do you think either or both parties could do a better job somehow of handling those issues during campaigns?

GINSBERG: Well, I don't subscribe to the view that we have not focused on foreign policy. What I said in my earlier comments was that generally foreign policy doesn't play an important role in the campaign. The Vice President has given several major foreign policy addresses, the most important of which was in Boston in April, in which he spelled out his policy initiatives for when he becomes President. His policy of forward engagement was articulated. He also addressed the West Point graduating class, where he articulated a new policy toward America's military. George Bush has given several speeches on foreign policy. There have been some questions, of course, from the press on such issues as National Missile Defense and the Middle East peace process. So as the campaign progresses into higher gear, I'm sure that there will be more issues relating to national security and foreign policy. So, on the one hand, foreign policy is not going to be pivotal in this election, but the American people certainly remain interested in these issues and continue to ask us about them, judging by the sheer volume of media inquiries that each campaign receives.

Q: How do you view the role, the character of security policy in the elections now that the Cold War is past?

GINSBERG: Well, as I said earlier, the United States faces new challenges that we didn't face in the Cold War era. That's again the major difference between the Republicans, who are stuck in the mindset of the Cold War, and a Democratic party and a President and a Vice President who have been prepared to address the new security challenges that the United States faces. A perfect example is the spread of disease around the world — AIDS in Africa. The Vice President gave a major address to the United Nations in January of this year, in which he for the first time indicated that the spread of AIDS in Africa poses a long-term national security threat to the

United States. Why? It's not just a humanitarian issue that's at stake here, it's the fact that a whole generation of young African leaders is being wiped out by a disease, and that could accelerate instability on that continent. And we consider Africa to be important.

There are issues of nuclear terrorism that have to be dealt with. There are issues of the environment, global warming — issues that threaten our children and grandchildren — that a good President, a forward-looking President, needs to address. You can't just deal with the issues of nuclear security and pretend that by dealing with these issues we've somehow been able to address all of the long-term threats that the United States faces.

We are in a unique position in our history. The United States is, by far, the strongest power in the world, and a power that most countries still look to for guidance and advice and counsel and leadership. In this unique posture, we have an opportunity to help address these issues that are going to affect our children and grandchildren, and that's why it's important to engage in these global issues. And we're not just sounding an alarm. All one has to do is look at the threats on the Asian subcontinent, for example — Kashmir. One only has to look at the threats that Taiwan faces from China. One only has to look at the evolution of the peace process in the Middle East and what will flow from that process; the consequences to American security from ethnic conflicts and hatreds; the spillover from the Cold War that has now given the United States more challenges to address; just this year, the spread of information technology and the opportunities and challenges it presents. These are all issues that a 21st century American leader is going to have to address. Al Gore has shown the leadership and the ability to not only think about these issues, but to develop new ideas and ways to address them.

Q: On those lines, you've mentioned several times that Gore has the background in foreign affairs that you say Bush lacks. What do you see as the current administration's key foreign policy successes, and could you talk a bit about what role Vice President Gore played in achieving them?

GINSBERG: Well, first of all, the Vice President has been a principal on the National Security Council of the

United States. In addition to his 30 years of experience in Congress and the Senate on arms control issues, he conceptualized the binational commissions that were formed between the United States and South Africa, the United States and Egypt, and the United States and Russia. What were the purposes of these binational commissions? This is the type of work that goes on behind the scenes that is not trumpeted in the media that shows the sheer intellectual capacity and commitment of the Vice President to address issues that are important to the United States in the long run. For example, on our binational commission with South Africa, he's helped accelerate market reform to help open up markets for the United States and to help the South Africans transition from apartheid to democracy. The same in Egypt. He has focused his efforts to help open up the Egyptian economy for foreign investment to help stabilize Egypt, to bring more foreign investment, and ensure that America finds a real role to play in the Arab world in helping to address issues of economic development and prosperity. His track record on his role in the binational commission with Russia: he not only helped accelerate the denuclearization of nuclear threats to the United States through this commission work, but worked hard with a vast number of Russian officials and civil society to help accelerate the development of market reforms in the country. So those are important achievements.

But he has worked hard, too, to close the gates of war around the world. That has been the unsung success of this administration, whether it be in Northern Ireland, in Haiti, on the Korean peninsula, in the Middle East, this administration has doggedly pursued the process of peace where ethnic conflict and civil strife threaten to boil over into national threats to the United States. We have effectively ended genocide and ethnic conflict in Africa and in Europe. This administration is very proud of its record of helping to stop the genocide that was taking place in Bosnia and in Kosovo, as well as in Africa in Sierra Leone. We could have done better, clearly, in Rwanda — all of us admit that that was a policy that was ineffective. We worked hard to end the strife in East Timor. This is the hard, slogging work of diplomacy that this administration has a great track record on and which the Republicans only criticize,

since they've never come up with any better approach.

Q: Which of those has the Vice President taken a leading role in?

GINSBERG: In every one of them. In every one of them.

Q: You made a couple of references earlier to National Missile Defense. What is the Vice President's view on whether or not the United States should proceed with the development of an NMD system?

GINSBERG: The Vice President has clearly stated that he believes that the United States faces a missile threat from rogue states, and not only from rogue states but also from terrorist organizations, and the United States needs to have an effective security deterrent to deal with those threats in the years to come. But he believes that there are four factors that need to be addressed before making a decision on National Missile Defense.

First of all, the technical feasibility of the system. There's no point in having the American taxpayers spend billions of dollars on a program that is technically not feasible. No one knows yet the feasibility of such a program — whether it would be a land-based system or a Star Wars-based system as the Republicans favor, but that's the first factor. The second factor is the threat assessment. The third is the effect that a deployment will have on arms control and our alliance system abroad, and so that has to be taken into account. The fourth factor is the cost. This is the American taxpayer's money. We have to make sure that when we spend their money, the money should be spent wisely and in a way that accomplishes the objective. We're not prepared to do what the Republicans and George Bush favor, which is to arbitrarily decide, before there has been any effective determination of the feasibility of the project, to spend \$140 billion — which would break the back of our budget — on National Missile Defense. The threats that they claim that their system is going to address are threats based on a Cold War mentality that no longer is applicable. But what the Vice President has said is that National Missile Defense must deal, not with old threats, but with the new threats that we face. ●

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: FROM KOSOVO TO CUBA BY WAY OF A POP QUIZ

By Andrew Bennett
Associate Professor of Government, Georgetown University



Although the importance of foreign policy in presidential election campaigns has declined relative to other issues, and partisan differences on policy positions have narrowed, “voters still judge candidates by their foreign policy values, competence, and leadership skills, particularly their ability to manage crises,” says Andrew Bennett, Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University and an adviser on foreign policy issues in several presidential campaigns. As a result, he says, mistakes or gaffes by the candidates in the course of the campaign can have “important long-term effects on the election.”

THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: FOREIGN POLICY DOESN'T MATTER IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

The conventional wisdom among political observers is that in the absence of major crises or wars, foreign policy has never mattered much in American presidential elections, and that the end of the Cold War has reduced the importance of foreign policy still further. In this view, the complexity of post-Cold War policy dilemmas and the absence of a powerful foreign adversary have diminished the policy differences between the Democratic and Republican parties. Some analysts also suggest that the American public has returned to its history of isolationism and unilateralism, and that the public is generally inattentive and uninformed on foreign policy and extremely averse to any casualties in war, further constraining the foreign policies of presidents and candidates.

This conventional wisdom is true in some respects, exaggerated or oversimplified in others, and simply wrong on some issues. Foreign policy was at the height of its importance in Cold War presidential elections during crises or wars, but competition with the Soviet Union made it important even in the absence of specific ongoing crises. The end of the Cold War reduced the prominence of foreign policy in presidential elections, most clearly in 1992, and policy differences between the Republican and Democratic parties narrowed in 1992 and 1996, but these developments have been exaggerated. Although the importance of foreign policy has declined relative to other issues, and partisan

differences on policy positions have narrowed, voters still judge candidates by their foreign policy values, competence, and leadership skills, particularly their ability to manage crises.

As for public opinion, most of the American public has been generally inattentive to foreign policy, especially since the end of the Cold War. There has been almost no change in the public's internationalist and multilateral foreign policy instincts since the end of the Cold War, however, and the public becomes informed and exercises good judgement when particular crises arise. Moreover, the public is attentive to the “intermestic” issues (international issues with a large domestic component) that affect daily life in the United States, such as immigration, drug smuggling, and international trade. In addition, many ethnic and business interest groups are highly focused upon foreign policy and are influential during presidential campaigns through financial contributions and grass roots lobbying. Finally, polls show that the American public, while currently suffering from “compassion fatigue” with regard to peacekeeping in ethnic conflicts and failed states, is willing to risk casualties if U.S. strategic as well as humanitarian goals are at stake.¹

As a consequence, foreign policy has already made a difference in the 2000 presidential campaign, and it will continue to do so. Both Al Gore and George W. Bush have espoused internationalist foreign policies and

¹ John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999*, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999. The results of this poll are available online at: <http://www.ccfcr.org/publications/opinion>

distanced themselves from the isolationist wings of their parties. Both have been responsive to particular issue groups on foreign policy. And even though the two candidates do not have dramatically different positions on foreign policy and the public has not yet favored the foreign policies of one over the other, both candidates have suffered the consequences of particular foreign policy gaffes, or perceived mistakes, during their campaigns. On the whole, this process has cost Bush more support than it has Gore.

This article lends weight to these conclusions by first briefly reviewing the effect of foreign policy in previous campaigns. It then looks at how Gore and Bush have managed foreign policy during their campaigns, focusing on the consequences of Bush's waffling on the conflict in Kosovo and his repeated gaffes on the names of leaders and peoples, as well as the consequences of Gore's awkward handling of the case of Elian Gonzalez. These perceived mistakes, while not directly and dramatically altering the presidential race, have had important long-term effects on the election, and any foreign policy crises or gaffes before the election could have still larger and more immediate consequences.

CRACKS IN THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: FOREIGN POLICY IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AFTER WORLD WAR II

Most arguments that "foreign policy doesn't matter" in U.S. presidential elections focus on the "salience" of foreign policy issues, or the importance the public places on these issues in polls. The salience of foreign policy is indeed one key factor in judging its impact on elections, but other factors are important as well, including perceived differences in candidates' positions, values, and competence on foreign policy issues. While the prominence of foreign policy has dropped sharply since the end of the Cold War, these other factors remain important.

In almost every poll from the end of World War II through the 1980s, the public rated foreign policy as one of the top three most important issues facing the United States, often the very top issue. The overall importance of relations with the Soviet Union drove much of this concern, and, in addition, specific issues mattered greatly in particular elections: the Korean War in 1952, the alleged "missile gap" in 1960, the Vietnam War in

1968 and 1972, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran in 1980, and the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union in 1988. The prominence of foreign policy issues changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War, however. Since 1992, foreign policy has barely ranked in the top dozen of the issues the public deems most important. For example, in a January 2000 Gallup poll asking voters which of a long list of issues were important to them, military spending ranked only 20th and the U.S. role in world affairs ranked 22nd in importance.²

Many observers point to the 1992 election as a demonstration of the limited importance of foreign policy after the Cold War, noting that the public felt President Bush was inattentive to domestic issues, and that Bush went from approval ratings of around 90% after the Gulf War to a loss in the election little more than a year later. Foreign policy was indeed lower than domestic issues on the list of voters' priorities in 1992, but this interpretation overlooks that Bush's loss was also a consequence of setbacks and missed opportunities in foreign policy. Despite Bush's largely successful management of the end of the Cold War, Saddam Hussein remained in power after the Gulf War, critics complained of Bush's lack of "vision" and his failure to define the goals and policies behind his rhetoric on a "New World Order," and Bush did not take effective action on Somalia (until after the election) or Bosnia. Even former President Nixon criticized Bush for being too timid in helping to consolidate democracy and markets in Russia. In addition, it is worth recalling that the more isolationist candidates — Patrick Buchanan, Senator Tom Harkin, and former California Governor Jerry Brown — did not win their parties' nominations.

Thus, candidates' positions and competence on foreign policy matter as well as the overall prominence of foreign policy issues. Through most of the Cold War, Republican candidates benefitted from a reputation for being tougher on the Soviet Union, but with the end of the Cold War positional differences have diminished. Despite some differences in symbolism and values in the 1996 elections, such as Senator Robert Dole's criticisms of U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros Gali, there were no sharp differences between Dole and

² Gallup Poll Monthly, January 2000. Subsequent polling numbers cited herein, unless otherwise noted, are also from the Gallup Poll Monthly of the relevant dates.

Clinton on most foreign policy issues, including the U.S. peacekeeping deployment in Bosnia. Perhaps the clearest generalization on foreign policy positions is that the candidate or the party holding the White House tends to be more internationalist than the opposition candidate or party. President Clinton, for example, focused on his domestic agenda in the 1992 campaign, but since then he has been on the internationalist side of issues like U.S. funding of the United Nations, peacekeeping, fast-track trade negotiating authority, and funding of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while the Republican Congress since 1994 has been on the more isolationist side of these issues.

Foreign policy experience matters as well as specific policy positions, but it is not overwhelmingly important: the candidate with less foreign policy experience won in 1992 (Bush-Clinton), 1980 (Carter-Reagan), and 1976 (Carter-Ford). More important than direct foreign policy experience is the voters' sense of the candidates' overall judgement, competence, and character on foreign policy issues, particularly their abilities to manage crises. Voters judge these key foreign policy skills in a variety of contexts during the campaign, including those not directly related to foreign policy. Clinton's crisis management skills were on display, for example, when he survived the New Hampshire primary in 1992 despite a media feeding frenzy over an alleged extra-marital affair. Senator Gary Hart's judgement and character on foreign policy were called into question in 1984 when he appeared to change his position before the New York primary on the issue of moving the U.S. embassy in Israel to the city of Jerusalem. Hart's crisis management skills also proved inferior to Clinton's when Hart was in the similar position of responding to allegations of an affair in 1988. These events contributed to Hart's failure to win the Democratic presidential nomination.

It is thus likely that crisis management ability is a kind of "litmus test" for voters when they decide whom to vote for as president. Even if voters generally rank foreign policy low in their priorities, they may still shy away from candidates who seem to be unable to manage a crisis.

HOW HAS FOREIGN POLICY AFFECTED THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN?

The presidential candidates in 2000 face an electorate that places low priority on foreign policy, but that remains internationalist in its policy views and that is looking for a president who is competent in managing foreign policy crises. The candidates have responded with foreign policies that are similar in their broad outlines but different in details, symbolism, and presentation. Thus far the polls do not show that the voters have given either candidate a significant edge on foreign policy issues, but as the election approaches the issues of competence and crisis management are likely to loom larger. In the end, despite the low salience of foreign policy and the limited positional differences between the candidates, the public's perceptions of foreign policy gaffes in the campaigns, plus its reaction to any new mistakes, could prove important in deciding the outcome.

Reflecting the low salience of foreign policy, neither Gore nor Bush has placed much emphasis on foreign policy in public statements. Both candidates articulated their foreign policies in a few key speeches early in their campaigns, adopting generally internationalist policies.³ Bush's foreign policy advisers and supporters, including Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Henry Kissinger, and Norman Schwarzkopf as well as vice-presidential candidate Richard Cheney, have played a prominent role in Bush's campaign, often appearing with him on the stage at important foreign policy speeches to allay concerns over Bush's lack of foreign policy experience. Due to Gore's long foreign policy experience, his foreign policy advisers have had a less prominent and public role.

Both candidates made very little reference to foreign policy in their convention speeches. Bush drew attention to the issue of defense readiness in his convention speech and in the weeks that followed, but while this has given him a slight edge in polls on the defense issue, it has had limited effect because of media stories indicating that Bush had exaggerated in his claim at the convention that two U.S. army divisions were not combat ready. Similarly, Bush has attempted

³ The official Gore and Bush campaign web sites each contain the text of about 8-10 speeches on foreign policy; those that received perhaps the widest coverage include Bush's speech of November 19, 1999, and Gore's speech of April 30, 2000.

to gain advantage from his emphasis on building ballistic missile defenses, but this has won him limited support in the face of Gore's continued support for research on missile defenses and in view of repeated failures in tests of missile defense systems. As for the Democratic convention, Gore discussed foreign policy in very general terms for a few paragraphs, overriding the suggestions of some of his advisers to cut out any mention of foreign policy.⁴ The candidates' policy differences on other highly visible issues were limited: both supported the establishment of Permanent Normal Trading Relations with China, and both opposed a bill proposed in the Congress to set a deadline in the summer of 2001 to withdraw U.S. troops from Kosovo.

Perhaps due to the limited differences in the candidates' foreign policy positions and the low salience of foreign policy, polls in the spring of 2000, the latest available on this subject as of this writing, showed that the public was evenly divided on whether Gore (42%) or Bush (43%) would handle foreign affairs better.⁵ Despite this seemingly even balance, there are signs that foreign policy has played to Gore's advantage thus far in the campaign. First, in June 1999 Bush began with a substantial advantage of 53% to Gore's 36% on the question of who could better handle foreign policy.⁶ Some of the erosion of support for Bush's foreign policy in the intervening year was no doubt due to the typical rise in a vice president's stature upon becoming the nominee. More detailed polling results, however, suggest that Bush's mistakes and gaffes on foreign policy — lack of leadership on Kosovo and lack of facility with the names of leaders and peoples — have cost him more support than Gore's abrupt policy change regarding Elian Gonzalez.

BUSH'S HESITATION ON KOSOVO

Bush's hesitation in stating a clear policy on the crisis in Kosovo was arguably his most costly foreign policy mistake in the campaign. When the crisis erupted in late March of 1999, Senator John McCain, who then opposed Bush in the Republican primary election for president, immediately stated that if the United States

used force, it should use it to win, and it should not rule out the use of ground forces. This stand, together with McCain's reputation as a Vietnam War hero, gave McCain tremendous national exposure on television news and talk shows. In contrast, Bush avoided making a clear policy statement on the crisis for several weeks before finally echoing McCain's policy position. This delay may have resulted in part from Bush's caution as a front-runner in the campaign, but it also reportedly reflected divisions among Bush's foreign policy advisers.⁷ Whatever the reason for Bush's indecisiveness, this episode clearly marked the start of McCain's rise over the other candidates for the Republican nomination, helping him eventually to force Bush into a longer, more expensive, and more politically damaging nomination fight. Polls in New Hampshire in April and May showed McCain rising to third place in the Republican race, behind Bush and Elizabeth Dole, and in national polls McCain rose from 3% in March to 6% in May.⁸

BUSH'S FAILURE ON THE "POP QUIZ"

Bush's better-known gaffes concern his ability to name only one of four foreign leaders in response to a reporter's "pop quiz" in November 1999 and his frequent mis-naming of foreign peoples (such as calling the Greeks "Grecians"). These mistakes did not cause any immediate or marked drop in Bush's standing in the polls. Public attention to the campaign at the time was limited, and the public distinguishes between substantive knowledge of policy details and judgement in a crisis. The defensive manner of Bush's response to the pop quiz, however, and its resonance with his earlier mis-naming of foreign peoples, gave the story a long lease on life and reduced the public's confidence in Bush's knowledge of foreign affairs. The Lexis-Nexis database of newspaper stories shows 96 stories with the keywords "Bush" and "quiz" in the first week after the quiz, and 236 stories with these terms through the end of December 1999. The same database shows 91 news articles mentioning Bush's name and the word "Grecians" from September 1999 to mid-September 2000, continuing even at the end of this period at the rate of 1-2 articles per week. Meanwhile, confidence in

⁴ Melinda Henneberger, "In Reversal of Speech Process, Gore Wrote and His Aides Then Whittled," *The New York Times*, August 18, 2000, p. 17.

⁵ *The Gallup Poll Monthly*, May 2000, p. 11.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *The Washington Post* 11/19/99 reported that Bush adviser Dov Zakheim was against taking military action to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, while Paul Wolfowitz was for it, contributing to Bush's indecisiveness on the issue.

⁸ Ronald Brownstein, "Crisis in Kosovo Gives McCain's Presidential Bid a Boost," *Los Angeles Times* April 22, 1999, p. 8; *Gallup Polls March-May, 1999*.

public opinion polls on whether Bush would do a “good job” on foreign policy fell from 61% in mid-September 1999 to 55% in mid-January 2000. A December 1999 poll showed that 58% of the public thought Gore knew enough about foreign affairs to be a good President, versus only 44% who thought this of Bush. In contrast, the public’s assessment of the two candidates’ knowledge of economic and education policy differed by only 1 to 2 percent. The large gap in the public’s perceptions of the candidates relative knowledge of foreign affairs continued through the spring, and the public gave Gore a five to six percent advantage on “understanding complex issues” and “has the knowledge necessary to be president.”

GORE’S POLICY SHIFT ON ELIAN GONZALEZ

Gore’s foreign policy standing suffered when he abruptly endorsed proposed legislation in late March to grant permanent resident status to Elian Gonzalez, a Cuban boy who had barely survived a raft trip to the United States, and his father and relatives. This position put Gore at odds with the strong majority of the public, who felt that Elian should be reunited with his father, who insisted on returning to Cuba. More important, like Hart’s policy change on the status of Jerusalem in 1984, Gore’s decision raised concerns that he was conceding to pressure from an interest group (in this case Cuban Americans concentrated in Florida). Consequently, a USA Today poll on April 24 showed that 25% approved of Gore’s handling of the Elian case, but 37% disapproved of Gore’s actions, and between March 30 and April 7 Gore dropped from 45% to 41% among likely voters in polls pitting him against Bush.

Unlike Bush’s gaffes, however, it is difficult to find in the polls any lasting damage to Gore’s standing with the public. Since Gore has been familiar to the public for a much longer period than Bush, his image was not as likely to be affected greatly by any single policy or perceived mistake. Also, in part due to his transformation from being viewed primarily as a vice president to being viewed mostly as a candidate for president, Gore’s ratings as a strong and independent leader who puts national above personal interests rose significantly with his convention speech and have remained at higher levels than in the spring.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the low importance the public has attached to foreign policy and the diminished foreign policy differences between the Democratic and Republican parties since the end of the Cold War, the public takes into account presidential candidates’ values, competence, and crisis management abilities on foreign policies. In this context, foreign policy gaffes can assume an out-sized importance. Such gaffes do not necessarily weigh more heavily than policy positions or mistakes on domestic issues, but in a tight race like the 2000 campaign they can make a crucial difference in the outcome. Any foreign policy mistakes by either candidate in their debates or statements or in any crises before the election will take on even greater importance than errors made earlier in the campaign when the public was less attentive. Thus far, the foreign policy equation has worked to Gore’s advantage, but it remains to be seen if this will still be the case on election day. ●

MEDIA COVERAGE OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN CAMPAIGN 2000

By Wesley G. Pippert

Director, University of Missouri School of Journalism's Washington Program



Media coverage of foreign policy issues in the presidential election campaign is important, not because it can influence the way citizens vote, but because it serves "to inform the citizenry and help set the agenda for public discussion," says Wesley G. Pippert, who is director of the University of Missouri School of Journalism's Washington Program and served for nearly 30 years as a reporter with United Press International, including three years in the Middle East. It is clear, he says, that both the candidates and the media in the 2000 election campaign "should be paying closer attention to the international scene."

Media coverage of foreign policy issues during the 2000 presidential election campaign has been sketchy. The candidates themselves are partly responsible for not discussing these issues; however, the media have not pressed the candidates to talk about them.

There are three ways in which issues typically gain publicity during election campaigns. First, the candidates' campaigns issue position papers on a range of issues — though these may receive scant media attention, except for "hot-button" topics. Second, a candidate may take the opportunity for an in-depth discussion of a controversial topic, thus generating media coverage. However, the public probably gains the greatest insight on a candidate's ability to deal with foreign policy matters from spontaneous remarks to the media in a public venue such as a press conference or a debate.

Media coverage of election campaigns is important, not to influence citizens on how to vote — a popular notion of the power of the press that is more myth than reality — but to inform the citizenry and help set the agenda for public discussion. Thus, when media coverage is sparse or skewed, the electorate casts ballots based on limited knowledge or perhaps may stay away from the polls altogether.

Apart from coverage of controversial issues, in-depth media coverage of candidates' foreign policy agendas in the 2000 presidential election campaign has been the exception, not the rule. In one of the few network programs that focused on these issues, the Cable News

Network (CNN) devoted a part of its August 18 evening news program to the foreign policy aspects of the campaign. The program called attention to the fact that the Republicans devoted a whole evening during their national convention to international issues, while the Democrats scarcely mentioned these issues at their convention. Former Democratic Senator Jim Sasser of Tennessee, who also served as ambassador to China, was quoted as saying that American voters do not often cast ballots based on international issues, unless there is a war or crisis underway.

Consistent with Sasser's view, foreign policy was strongly in the news in earlier campaigns — the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon campaign in which the tiny Asian isles of Quemoy and Matsu were much debated, the 1964 Johnson-Goldwater campaign in which the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was a major issue, and the 1980 Carter-Reagan campaign that came during the American hostage crisis in Iran.

Besides the CNN program, there have, of course, been other exceptions in this campaign. The *New York Times*, in its lead editorial August 7, said there were "clear and important differences" between Vice President Al Gore and Governor George Bush on foreign policy. The *Washington Post*, in its lead editorial September 1, said: "It is encouraging to see the presidential campaign sliding toward a debate about foreign policy, military readiness and the U.S. role in the world. These are issues that have received too little attention." But with the end of the Cold War, and no super power conflict brewing, the candidates — and the media — are, for

the most part, paying little attention to foreign policy issues.

In preparation for writing this article, I surveyed the period between the breakdown of the Middle East peace talks at Camp David in late July and Labor Day (the first Monday in September). The survey — conducted using the abstracts of the Television News Archive at Vanderbilt University — examined the extent to which foreign policy issues were covered by the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*; the three weekly news magazines; and the evening newscasts of the four major television networks, including ABC's noted *Nightline*. The results showed that, of the networks, CNN had, by far, carried the most international news, but seldom did CNN get comment from Gore or Bush on these stories. Of the printed media examined, the *Associated Press* had the most extensive coverage of the international scene.

I selected this period deliberately. Typically, the July-August period is a quiet news time in Washington, but this was not the case in 2000. The Camp David talks were under way; both the Republican and the Democratic parties held their nominating conventions during August; and Labor Day marks the traditional start of the fall presidential election campaign in the United States. Thus, this period provided abundant opportunity for the media and the candidates to discuss foreign policy issues.

They rarely did. Only infrequently were there full discussions of foreign policy issues and their importance. Occasionally, and then generally only in fragments, did the media discuss the candidates' credentials to carry out foreign policy and their views on these issues.

It wasn't for lack of opportunity. There were several stories that cried out for media coverage of Bush and Gore and their positions.

The Camp David talks on the future of the Middle East, an issue the next president certainly will have to continue to deal with, fell apart the week of July 23. In the wake of the collapse, the Israelis and the Palestinians blamed each other for the breakdown; President Clinton praised Prime Minister Ehud Barak and hinted that he might favor moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The *Times*, the *Post*, the networks, and the news magazines devoted frequent stories to the

issue during late July and all of August. But at no time did the media get from either Bush or Gore their views about Camp David or the subsequent tensions, or how they would have handled the situation. Later, only the AP compared the positions of Bush and Gore on the Middle East (in a dispatch on September 6), including the candidates' views on the peace talks, the situations in Lebanon and Syria, and whether the U.S. Embassy should be moved to Jerusalem.

The same week that the Camp David talks collapsed, Bush named Richard Cheney as his running mate. Cheney, retired General Colin Powell, and former Stanford University Provost Condoleezza Rice, Bush's chief foreign policy adviser, all delivered speeches on foreign policy during the Republican Convention. It was a remarkable opportunity to learn how this trio, who likely would form Bush's closest national security team, would deal with world events. Cheney had been defense secretary during the Gulf War a decade ago, and Powell had been chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is widely believed that Powell would be secretary of state in a Bush cabinet and Rice would be national security adviser.

Again, however, news coverage was sparse. Several of the media noted briefly Cheney's 1986 vote against sanctions imposed on apartheid South Africa. *Newsweek*, in its August 7 issue, in three long articles on Cheney, also referred to his "outspoken opposition to American sanctions against Iran" as well as his earlier opposition to economic sanctions against South Africa. As for Powell and Rice, the coverage of them focused on their being African-Americans — not on their policy stands. In its lead story on August 2, the *New York Times* noted that: "For all their praise of Mr. Bush's personal attributes, (Senator John) McCain and Ms. Rice said little about specific policies or countries." *Reuters* carried an August 14 dispatch on Rice's visit to Israel after the convention when she told the Israelis that Bush would follow Clinton's lead to further peace in the Middle East. None of the American media surveyed carried the story or speculated as to the purpose and timing of her visit.

The media coverage of the foreign affairs agendas outlined in the party platforms was equally thin. Five paragraphs from the end of its long story on the GOP platform, the *New York Times* reported that the

Republicans accused the Clinton administration of mishandling crises from the Balkans to Mexico, and it appropriately carried the Gore camp's response that the GOP was turning back to isolationism. The *Post* noted in one paragraph that Bush had prevailed over conservatives who felt that a policy of "peace through strength" was not stressed enough in the Republican platform. On August 16, the *Post* compared the two platforms listing six "key issues" — and foreign policy was not one of them. In a notable related exception, the AP carried two dispatches comparing the positions of Gore and Bush on the Middle East and the Western hemisphere.

But there were many other regional issues — such as the talks between North and South Korea, the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, the drug war in Columbia, and U.S. embassy security — about which Gore and Bush had little to say publicly — or there was little media coverage of their comments. In its lead editorial August 2, headlined "Half a Foreign Policy," the *Post* asked: "Is Mr. Bush really indifferent to the prospect that India, China and Russia may soon have rates of HIV infection approaching Africa's? Does he have a plan to combat global warming?" The *Washington Post's* foreign policy writer and columnist, Jim Hoagland, one of the few reporters who kept pressing Bush and Gore for specifics, asked in his August 4 column what Bush and Gore would do about the future of international peacekeeping missions — perhaps one of the key issues the new president may have to deal with.

Perhaps the issue to which the candidates paid the most attention during this period was military readiness — and it seems likely that it will remain so during the balance of the campaign. In accepting the vice

presidential nomination on August 2, Cheney accused Clinton and Gore of extending U.S. military commitments while depleting U.S. military power. Bush followed up the next day in his acceptance speech, criticizing America's military readiness. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* covered both speeches with the same relatively brief references to the issue that the candidates had given it.

One of the strongest clashes over foreign policy between the candidates erupted in late August when Mexico's President-elect Vicente Fox visited the United States and conferred with both Gore, in Washington, and Bush, in Texas. The *Post* noted that Bush was seeking stronger ties with Latin America; Gore responded that the Clinton administration had signed 270 trade agreements with countries in the region. The *Times*, in a front-page story on August 26, said Condoleezza Rice charged that Clinton-Gore had not consolidated the progress in peace, democracy, or trade that was under way in the region in 1992 when they were elected. Gore's aides replied that the administration had waged successful efforts to end violence in Ecuador, Peru, and Guatemala and had provided financial aid to Mexico and Brazil during their monetary crises.

While foreign policy issues have occasionally made news during this presidential election campaign, it is clear that both the candidates and the media should be paying closer attention to the international scene. As the *Post's* Hoagland concluded in his August 13 column: "The world will be watching this campaign with heightened interest and concern... The candidates and voters here need to be watching the world back." ©

WHAT THE POLLS SAY: ISSUES OF CONCERN TO AMERICAN VOTERS

*By Alvin Richman, Senior Research Specialist
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As is normal in times of peace, and in the absence of Cold War, the U.S. public today gives highest priority to resolving U.S. domestic, especially social, problems. At the same time, most Americans continue to favor generally active U.S. involvement abroad, particularly in reducing the threats of nuclear arms, international terrorism, and drug trafficking. Support for international involvement is enhanced by the belief among most Americans that the United States is affected at least to some degree by conflicts and economic and environmental crises that take place in other parts of the world.

ISSUES RATED MOST IMPORTANT IN VOTING FOR THE PRESIDENT

Handling the national economy and dealing with social issues — especially education, health care, and social security — are rated as top criteria in voting for the President. About 70-75 percent of the public rates them very important in recent polls (ABC/ *Washington Post*, September 4-6; Gallup, July 25-26). A second tier of objectives includes managing the federal budget, tax policy, handling crime, maintaining the nation's defense, protecting our environment, and handling foreign affairs (about 55-65 percent rates them very important). Handling foreign trade, the abortion issue, appointment of Supreme Court Justices, and campaign finance reform rank as less important criteria in voting for the President (about 30-45 percent rates them very important).

Most important foreign policy problems

Polls on specific foreign policy issues have been scarce during this election campaign. Last year, the Pew Research Center (March 1999) asked about the priority — from “no priority” to “top priority” — the United States should give various foreign policy issues. Heading the list were two instances of nuclear arms proliferation (North Korea and India/Pakistan) and

reducing international terrorism and drug trafficking (about 75 percent gave these issues “top priority”). About 60 percent assigned top rating to protecting the global environment, maintaining a stable international financial system, “getting Saddam Hussein out of Iraq,” and closely monitoring “the development of China as a world power.” Rated somewhat lower in priority were the handling of trade issues, promoting human rights generally, ending ethnic conflict in the Balkans, and facilitating an Israeli-Arab peace settlement (about 40 percent “top priority”).

SUPPORT FOR ACTIVE U.S. ROLE ABROAD SURVIVES END OF COLD WAR

About two-thirds of the American public continue to want the United States to “take an active part” in world affairs (a 65 percent average on two 1999 Gallup polls), rather than “stay out” of world affairs (31 percent). Support for a generally active U.S. role abroad has been fairly stable since these measurements began over 50 years ago — ranging narrowly from lows of about 60 percent who want the United States to “take an active part” in world affairs to highs of nearly 80 percent (e.g., immediately following the Persian Gulf war). The current level of support is similar to the average level on this question obtained on over 40 polls between 1945-1998 (66 percent).

Similarly, the Pew Research Center (March 1999) found that an average of 68 percent support an internationalist position on three questions, compared to an average of 24 percent who favor an isolationist (non-involvement) stance. This includes a 65-26 percent majority who agreed with the statement, “The United States should cooperate fully with the United Nations.” Analysis of this and other polls indicate that the two-thirds majority of Americans who favor an active, cooperative U.S. role abroad consist of two groups: About one-third of the public favors a relatively assertive leadership role, with the United States being

the most active of the leading nations. Roughly another third prefers a more limited role abroad — the United States sharing leadership more or less equally with other major countries.

U.S. elites highly supportive of active U.S. leadership role

Virtually all U.S. leaders in various government and private organizations surveyed in recent years have continually said they favor the United States taking an active part in world affairs (between 96 percent and 98 percent on six surveys by Gallup for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations between 1978-1998). Other surveys have shown that about two-thirds of the elites favor an assertive U.S. leadership role abroad, with the United States being the most active among leading nations, compared to about one-third of the public who favor this role. Elites also are more inclined than the public to support U.S. unilateral action in a crisis, when leaders deem it important to act but lack the support of our allies: 44 percent of U.S. elites support (vs. 48 percent oppose) the United States acting unilaterally, if necessary, in a crisis, compared to only 21 percent of the public who support (vs. 72 percent oppose) unilateral action in such a case (Gallup/Chicago Council, 1998).

The public's support for U.S. intervention abroad generally has been greater when the missions have been described as being multilateral in nature, rather than unilateral. Most Americans usually have been willing to use U.S. military forces unilaterally to defend vital U.S. interests or mount relatively low-cost

humanitarian and counter-terrorist actions. Majority support for U.S. involvement in peacekeeping missions, however, usually has required that these be part of a multilateral effort.

For example, 57 percent of the public believed the United States generally should be willing to “be part of a United Nations international peacekeeping force in a troubled part of the world,” compared to 20 percent who said “we should leave this job to other countries.” A significant minority (16 percent) volunteered that U.S. participation should “depend on the circumstances” (Gallup/Chicago Council, 1998). Support for a particular U.S. involvement would depend on specific situational factors (e.g., perceived threat, importance of the area or country threatened, expectations of accomplishing the mission with available means), as well as general attitude toward U.S. international involvement.

Perception of interdependence underpins support for active role abroad

More than four-fifths of the public believe the United States is affected a great deal (51 percent) or at least somewhat (36 percent) by “wars and unrest elsewhere in the world,” compared to only about one in ten who think the United States is affected little or not at all by such events. Almost as many Americans believe “environmental practices” (46 percent) and “economic conditions” (44 percent) in other countries have a great deal of impact on the United States. (Aspen Institute/Belden Associates, January-February 2000). ●

PLATFORMS: HOW THE PARTIES DEFINE THEIR POLICY POSITIONS

By Ralph Dannheisser, Contributing Editor

The platforms adopted at U.S. political party conventions have had one consistent function over the years: to outline what the party stands for in language that all its candidates in the upcoming election campaign can, hopefully, subscribe to.

It is clear that this striving for inclusiveness is not a new phenomenon; indeed, Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential candidate six decades ago in 1940, referred to platform documents as “fusions of ambiguity.”

Despite this effort to incorporate all viewpoints, the job of assembling the party platform has often in the past produced lively, and even angry, disputes on the convention floor. Thus, for example, Prohibition — the federal government’s ban on alcoholic beverages — proved a contentious issue for the 1932 Republican convention that nominated Herbert Hoover. Fights over civil rights planks actually caused angry convention walkouts for Democrats in the 1940s.

But, with conventions doing less and less actual business and serving instead as a vehicle for candidates to air their views and seek voter support before a prime time television audience, such disarray has been notable for its absence in recent years. Again this year, party platforms and the selection of the presidential and vice presidential candidates were effectively resolved even before delegates assembled at a pair of conventions — the Republicans in Philadelphia, the Democrats in Los Angeles — that were artfully crafted to display minimum conflict and maximum party harmony.

Both party platforms won floor approval without a hint of argument, dissent or fanfare.

How much importance still attaches to the platform document is a matter of some dispute. Some observers have dismissed them as all but irrelevant, and this view has been given credence by some recent political leaders themselves. In 1996, indeed, Republican presidential

candidate Bob Dole said he did not feel bound by his party’s platform, adding that “I probably agree with most everything in it, but I haven’t read it.”

But a leading election scholar, Gerald Pomper of Rutgers University, takes a sharply different view of the relevance of platforms. “They encapsulate what a party believes in,” a recent article in the *Los Angeles Times* quoted Pomper as saying. “To the extent they point toward the future, they also present a statement of where [parties] want to go. And then, when they get into power, they do a lot of it.” Pomper reported that his research covering all the election cycles from 1944 through 1996 disclosed that the winning party ultimately implemented about 70 percent of the specific promises contained in its platform. “They do matter,” Pomper told the *Times*.

Again this year, both parties devote a fair amount of space in their platform documents to foreign affairs. In terms of total words, the Republicans’ foreign policy section runs to almost twice the length of that put forth by the Democrats.

And what is the substance of this year’s platforms?

Setting the stage in time-tested fashion, the incumbent party — in this case the Democrats — “points with pride” to its accomplishments in office while the challengers — now the Republicans — “view with alarm” what they portray as the sorry state that things have come to since voters last turned them out of power.

In one important respect, however, the Republican platform jibes with the Democrats’ version: Although both documents put their main emphasis on domestic issues, both see a vital role for continued U.S. engagement in the world.

The Republicans begin their foreign policy section with an upbeat quote from their presidential candidate,

Governor George W. Bush: “Let us reject the blinders of isolationism, just as we refuse the crown of empire. Let us not dominate others with our power — or betray them with our indifference. And let us have an American foreign policy that reflects American character. The modesty of true strength. The humility of real greatness. This is the strong heart of America. And this will be the spirit of my administration.”

Before edging into a number of specific issues, the platform writers follow up the Bush quote with an optimistic statement built around the thoughts that “the 21st century opens with unique promise for the United States” and that “few nations in history have been granted such a singular opportunity to shape the future... America can help mold international ideals and institutions for decades to come.”

The Democrats’ document cites what it considers the accomplishments of the Clinton administration in advancing peace and democracy around the world, from Kosovo and the Middle East to Haiti and Northern Ireland, noting as well the efforts to reduce Russia’s nuclear arsenals and to strengthen and expand NATO.

But, it continues, “now is not the time to sound the trumpets of triumph. In the wake of the Cold War, America has entered a new Global Age that is altering our security challenges and creating entirely new issues... Today, for both good and ill, our destiny and the destinies of billions of people around the world are increasingly intertwined, and our domestic and international challenges are bound together as never before.

“The Democratic Party recognizes that globalization will continue shaping our future. We also believe that the United States has the means and the responsibility to shape globalization so that it reflects the needs and the values of the American people.”

Here are some other highlights of the two parties’ platforms, as they deal with international affairs:

THE REPUBLICANS

In the best tradition of the “view with alarm” approach adopted by the party out of power, the Republicans’

11,000-plus word section on foreign affairs — titled “Principled American Leadership” — follows close upon the upbeat opening paragraphs with an across-the-board condemnation of the policies of the current Democratic administration.

“In the last eight years the (Clinton) administration has squandered the opportunity granted to the United States by the courage and sacrifice of previous generations,” the indictment begins.

In line with a theme struck throughout the campaign, the administration is found to have “run America’s defenses down over the decade through inadequate resources, promiscuous commitments, and the absence of a forward-looking military strategy.” Meanwhile, according to the Republicans, “the arrogance, inconsistency, and unreliability of the administration’s diplomacy have undermined American alliances, alienated friends, and emboldened our adversaries.”

And what is to be done about this? “A Republican president will identify and pursue vital American national interests... Under his leadership, the United States will build and secure the peace. Republicans know what it takes to accomplish this: robust military forces, strong alliances, expanding trade, and resolute diplomacy.” With respect to defense in particular, the Republicans propose to restore “eroded” military readiness while “transform(ing) America’s defense capabilities for the information age, ensuring that U.S. armed forces remain paramount against emerging dangers.”

As to the threat posed by ballistic missiles, “America must deploy effective missile defenses, based on an evaluation of the best available options, including sea-based, at the earliest possible date.” And, the document notes, a Bush administration would “seek a negotiated change in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that will allow the United States to use all technologies and experiments required to deploy robust missile defenses.”

The platform restates Republican opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, “another anachronism of obsolete strategic thinking” that is “not verifiable, not enforceable, and would not enable the United States to ensure the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.”

Shifting to economic issues, the platform writers pledge a trade policy, based on open world markets, that sees “private initiative encouraged, not stifled, by governments.” They recommend that existing international financial institutions, like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, be “overhauled” to redefine their missions, “but not scrapped.”

The platform goes on to address foreign policy issues region by region, starting with what it terms “the neighborhood of the Americas,” promising close relations with key democracies like Argentina, Brazil and Chile “and — above all — Mexico.” Relations with Cuba, on the other hand, will not be expanded until that country’s government restores civil liberties; until then it promises “active American support for Cuban dissidents.”

In the Pacific, the Republicans posit a strengthened alliance with Japan, efforts to deter aggression on the Korean peninsula, promotion of peace in the Taiwan Strait, and an effort to “obtain the fullest possible accounting” of prisoners of war and missing in action “from the Pacific wars.” A Republican administration, they say, would “understand the importance of China but not place China at the center of its Asia policy.”

The platform writers declare U.S. security to be “inseparable from the security of Europe,” and call for “a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) that is strong, cohesive, and active,” with greater burden-sharing by the European allies. The enlargement of NATO should continue, and “Russia must never be given a veto over enlargement.”

As for the Middle East, the Republicans set four priorities: “First we seek to promote and maintain peace throughout the region. Second, we must assure that Israel remains safe and secure. Third, we must protect our economic interests and ensure the reliable flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. And fourth, we must reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the region.”

Charging that “perhaps nowhere has the inheritance of Republican governance been squandered so fatefully as with respect to Iraq,” the document pledges that “a new Republican administration will patiently rebuild an international coalition opposed to Saddam Hussein and committed to joint action.”

The platform document avows that “Republicans will not ignore the challenges of Africa,” specifically promising efforts “to promote democracy and sound governance...and the prevention and resolution of conflict.” The Republicans would strive to help the continent achieve its economic potential by “implementing measures to reduce trade barriers.”

With respect to the United Nations, the Republicans indicate their intent to continue participation in the organization, but raise a number of caveats. “American troops must never serve under United Nations command,” they say, “nor will they be subject to the jurisdiction of an International Criminal Court.” Additionally, the United States “will pay a fair, not disproportionate, share of dues to the United Nations once it has reformed its management and taken steps to eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse,” and it “will not fund organizations involved in abortion.”

In a section on terrorism, international crime and cyber threats, the platform drafters argue that “nowhere has the administration been more timid in protecting America’s national interests than in cyberspace.” They say that a Republican administration would “work closely with our international partners and the private sector” to reduce “America’s vulnerability to the spectrum of cyber threats, from the adolescent hacker launching a contagious computer virus to the most advanced threat of strategic information warfare.”

THE DEMOCRATS

While the Republican platform is arranged largely into geographic segments, the Democrats’ version proceeds along thematic lines. Thus, it details the party’s thoughts and proposals in eight subject areas: peace, neutralizing the forces that cause chaos and instability, transforming the military, closing the gates of war, engaging former enemies, enhancing existing alliances, preventing new physical threats, and seizing opportunities.

Their dual thrust is to laud President Clinton’s foreign policy approach which, they say, “has brought peace and security to Americans and to millions of freedom-loving people around the globe,” and to assert that a Gore-Lieberman administration would continue in the Clinton-Gore mold.

The platform section headed “Peace” urges implementation of “a new strategy of Forward Engagement to guide our conduct around the world.” It describes that strategy as one that involves “addressing problems early in their development before they become crises, addressing them as close to the source of the problem as possible, and having the forces and resources to deal with these threats as soon after their emergence as possible.”

“Forward Engagement means drawing on all three main sources of American power — military strength; a vibrant, growing economy; and a free and democratic political system — to advance our objectives around the world,” the platform statement continues.

Rejecting what they characterize as the Republicans’ beliefs that “America should turn away from the world” and refrain from using its armed forces “as part of international solutions, even when regional conflicts threaten our interests and our values,” the Democrats call instead for a broad-ranging engagement in world affairs that includes “meeting new challenges, such as international crime and terrorism, environmental degradation, and pandemic diseases head-on.”

In addressing what it refers to as “the forces that cause chaos and instability,” the Democratic platform focuses on three issues: disruption of the world’s ecological system, global epidemics, and organized crime and drugs. With respect to the ecology, the party platform urges U.S. ratification of the Kyoto Protocols, negotiated in 1997, that establish a framework for reducing so-called greenhouse emissions “in an environmentally strong and economically sound way.” On global epidemics, it calls for the United States to take the lead in weaving scores of programs aimed at fighting HIV/AIDS into “a global campaign to defeat this threat.” And on the war against illicit drugs, it urges an approach that combines interdiction and prosecution with “robust investment in alternative ways (for farmers in drug-producing nations) to make a living.”

In marked contrast to the Republicans, the Democrats express the view that America’s military is today “the best-trained, best-equipped, most capable, and most ready fighting force in the world, and that, indeed, the Clinton administration “reversed a decline in defense

spending that began under President Bush.” They call for further increases in pay and benefits for U.S. troops.

The platform section headed “Closing the Gates of War” recites the history of Clinton administration initiatives aimed at bringing peace between Israel on the one hand and Jordan and the Palestinians on the other; the warring parties in Northern Ireland; Greece and Turkey; Armenia and Azerbaijan; Peru and Ecuador, and the disputants in Guatemala and in several African nations. It cites peacemaking efforts with respect to conflicts between North and South Korea and between China and Taiwan, and pledges vigorous continuing efforts to resolve differences between India and Pakistan.

In the Balkans, the platform contends, “the Clinton-Gore administration ended ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo” through use of both military force and diplomacy. It charges that the Republican Party, “having first opposed the administration’s efforts to restore peace in the region, now tries to impede the administration’s efforts to rebuild those shattered societies.”

Turning to the topic of “Engaging Former Enemies,” the Democrats pledge to push efforts to design new relationships with the Russian Federation and with China — efforts that they complain have been “continuously subjected to every form of harassment and attack by the Republicans.”

As for “Enhancing Existing Alliances,” the platform declares security and stability in Europe to be “critical to America’s national security interests,” and promises continued partnership with the European Union and continued work to make the North Atlantic Treaty Organization “even stronger, thereby enhancing stability, promoting prosperity, and fostering democracy throughout Europe.” A Gore administration would look favorably on further NATO enlargement, it indicates. Additionally, the section calls for strengthening alliances in Asia — with Japan and with South Korea — and with the countries of Latin America.

The platform section on “Preventing New Physical Threats” calls for strengthened defenses against proliferation of both conventional and unconventional

weapons, and promises that a President Gore would promptly resubmit to the Senate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that it previously rejected. It pledges continued vigilance in the cases of Iran and Iraq, and continued close cooperation with Israel on developing and deploying new weapons systems.

The Democrats reject Republican efforts to construct what they term “an unproven, expensive, and ill-conceived missile defense system that would plunge us into a new arms race,” and declare that any system ultimately deployed must be “compatible with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.” And they favor aggressive efforts to fight terrorism, whether sponsored by nations

or fanatic individuals, while making sure in the process to “protect the civil liberties of all Americans.”

Latin America and the Caribbean are described as “a focal point of our efforts” to enhance economic development, stability and prosperity in a concluding section headed, “Seizing Opportunities.” But continued efforts are required as well in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, where “prosperity and peace...will only be possible when these regions are fully integrated into the global economy.” In order to reverse “the widening gap between the rich and poor nations,” the platform notes, Gore and the Democrats “back debt forgiveness for the world’s poorest nations. ©

REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE GEORGE W. BUSH CHINA AND RUSSIA — POWERS IN TRANSITION

Two of Eurasia's greatest powers — China and Russia — “are powers in transition, and it is difficult to know their intentions when they do not know their own futures,” says Governor George W. Bush. In what is perhaps the best-known foreign policy speech of his campaign, Bush told an audience at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, on November 19, 1999, that if China and Russia “become America’s friends, that friendship will steady the world. But if not, the peace we seek may not be found.” Following are excerpts of the address. (The full text is available on the Bush/Cheney website at: <http://www.georgewbush.com/News.asp?FormMode=SP>)

DEFENSE

Even in this time of pride and promise, America has determined enemies, who hate our values and resent our success — terrorists and crime syndicates and drug cartels and unbalanced dictators. The Empire has passed, but evil remains.

We must protect our homeland and our allies against missiles and terror and blackmail. We must restore the morale of our military — squandered by shrinking resources and multiplying missions — with better training, better treatment and better pay. And we must master the new technology of war — to extend our peaceful influence, not just across the world, but across the years.

In the defense of our nation, a president must be a clear-eyed realist. There are limits to the smiles and scowls of diplomacy. Armies and missiles are not stopped by stiff notes of condemnation. They are held in check by strength and purpose and the promise of swift punishment.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Military power is not the final measure of might. Our realism must make a place for the human spirit. This spirit, in our time, has caused dictators to fear and empires to fall. And it has left an honor roll of courage and idealism: Scharansky, Havel, Walesa, Mandela. The most powerful force in the world is not a weapon or a nation but a truth: that we are spiritual beings, and that freedom is “the soul’s right to breathe.”

In the dark days of 1941 — the low point of our modern epic — there were about a dozen democracies left on the planet. Entering a new century, there are nearly 120. There is a direction in events, a current in our times. “Depend on it,” said Edmund Burke. “The lovers of freedom will be free.” America cherishes that freedom, but we do not own it. We value the elegant structures of our own democracy — but realize that, in other societies, the architecture will vary. We propose our principles, we must not impose our culture.

U.S. ROLE IN THE WORLD

America must be involved in the world. But that does not mean our military is the answer to every difficult foreign policy situation — a substitute for strategy. American internationalism should not mean action without vision, activity without priority, and missions without end — an approach that squanders American will and drains American energy.

American foreign policy must be more than the management of crisis. It must have a great and guiding goal: to turn this time of American influence into generations of democratic peace.

This is accomplished by concentrating on enduring national interests. And these are my priorities. An American president should work with our strong democratic allies in Europe and Asia to extend the peace. He should promote a fully democratic Western Hemisphere, bound together by free trade. He should defend America’s interests in the Persian Gulf and advance peace in the Middle East, based upon a secure

Israel. He must check the contagious spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them. He must lead toward a world that trades in freedom. And he must pursue all these goals with focus, patience and strength.

CHINA

The challenge comes because two of Eurasia's greatest powers — China and Russia — are powers in transition. And it is difficult to know their intentions when they do not know their own futures. If they become America's friends, that friendship will steady the world. But if not, the peace we seek may not be found.

China, in particular, has taken different shapes in different eyes at different times. An empire to be divided. A door to be opened. A model of collective conformity. A diplomatic card to be played. One year, it is said to be run by "the butchers of Beijing." A few years later, the same administration pronounces it a "strategic partner."

We must see China clearly — not through the filters of posturing and partisanship. China is rising, and that is inevitable. Here, our interests are plain: We welcome a free and prosperous China. We predict no conflict. We intend no threat. And there are areas where we must try to cooperate: preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction...attaining peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Yet the conduct of China's government can be alarming abroad and appalling at home. Beijing has been investing its growing wealth in strategic nuclear weapons...new ballistic missiles...a blue-water navy and a long-range air force. It is an espionage threat to our country. Meanwhile, the State Department has reported that "all public dissent against the party and government [has been] effectively silenced" — a tragic achievement in a nation of 1.2 billion people. China's government is an enemy of religious freedom and a sponsor of forced abortion — policies without reason and without mercy.

All of these facts must be squarely faced. China is a competitor, not a strategic partner. We must deal with China without ill-will — but without illusions.

By the same token, that regime must have no illusions about American power and purpose. As Dean Rusk

observed during the Cold War, "It is not healthy for a regime...to incur, by their lawlessness and aggressive conduct, the implacable opposition of the American people." . . .

China will find in America a confident and willing trade partner. And with trade comes our standing invitation into the world of economic freedom. China's entry into the World Trade Organization is welcome, and this should open the door for Taiwan as well. But given China's poor record in honoring agreements, it will take a strong administration to hold them to their word.

If I am president, China will know that America's values are always part of America's agenda. Our advocacy of human freedom is not a formality of diplomacy, it is a fundamental commitment of our country. It is the source of our confidence that communism, in every form, has seen its day.

And I view free trade as an important ally in what Ronald Reagan called "a forward strategy for freedom." The case for trade is not just monetary, but moral. Economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy. There are no guarantees, but there are good examples, from Chile to Taiwan. Trade freely with China, and time is on our side.

RUSSIA

Russia stands as another reminder that a world increasingly at peace is also a world in transition. Here, too, patience is needed — patience, consistency, and a principled reliance on democratic forces.

In the breadth of its land, the talent and courage of its people, the wealth of its resources, and the reach of its weapons, Russia is a great power, and must always be treated as such. Few people have suffered more in this century. And though we trust the worst is behind them, their troubles are not over. This past decade, for Russia, has been an epic of deliverance and disappointment.

Our first order of business is the national security of our nation — and here both Russia and the United States face a changed world. Instead of confronting each other, we confront the legacy of a dead ideological

rivalry — thousands of nuclear weapons, which, in the case of Russia, may not be secure. And together we also face an emerging threat — from rogue nations, nuclear theft and accidental launch. All this requires nothing short of a new strategic relationship to protect the peace of the world... In an act of foresight and statesmanship, (Senators Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn) realized that existing Russian nuclear facilities were in danger of being compromised. Under the Nunn-Lugar program, security at many Russian nuclear facilities has been improved and warheads have been destroyed.

Even so, the Energy Department warns us that our estimates of Russian nuclear stockpiles could be off by as much as 30 percent. In other words, a great deal of Russian nuclear material cannot be accounted for. The next president must press for an accurate inventory of all this material. And we must do more. I'll ask the Congress to increase substantially our assistance to dismantle as many of Russia's weapons as possible, as quickly as possible.

We will still, however, need missile defense systems — both theater and national. If I am commander-in-chief, we will develop and deploy them. Under the mutual threat of rogue nations, there is a real possibility the Russians could join with us and our friends and allies to cooperate on missile defense systems. But there is a condition. Russia must break its dangerous habit of proliferation.

Dealing with Russia on essential issues will be far easier if we are dealing with a democratic and free Russia. Our goal is to promote, not only the appearance of democracy in Russia, but the structures, spirit, and reality of democracy. This is clearly not done by focusing our aid and attention on a corrupt and favored elite. Real change in Russia — as in China — will come not from above, but from below. From a rising class of entrepreneurs and business people. From new leaders in Russia's regions who will build a new Russian state, where power is shared, not controlled. Our assistance, investments and loans should go directly to the Russian people, not to enrich the bank accounts of corrupt officials.

America should reach out to a new generation of Russians through educational exchanges and programs to support the rule of law and a civil society... We

cannot buy reform for Russia, but we can be Russia's ally in self-reform.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

In the hard work of halting proliferation, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not the answer. I've said that our nation should continue its moratorium on testing. Yet far more important is to constrict the supply of nuclear materials and the means to deliver them — by making this a priority with Russia and China. Our nation must cut off the demand for nuclear weapons — by addressing the security concerns of those who renounce these weapons. And our nation must diminish the evil attraction of these weapons for rogue states — by rendering them useless with missile defense. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty does nothing to gain these goals. It does not stop proliferation, especially to renegade regimes. It is not verifiable. It is not enforceable. And it would stop us from ensuring the safety and reliability of our nation's deterrent, should the need arise. On these crucial matters, it offers only words and false hopes and high intentions — with no guarantees whatever. We can fight the spread of nuclear weapons, but we cannot wish them away with unwise treaties.

INDIA

Often overlooked in our strategic calculations is that great land that rests at the south of Eurasia. This coming century will see democratic India's arrival as a force in the world. A vast population, before long the world's most populous nation. A changing economy, in which three of its five wealthiest citizens are software entrepreneurs.

India is now debating its future and its strategic path, and the United States must pay it more attention. We should establish more trade and investment with India as it opens to the world. And we should work with the Indian government, ensuring it is a force for stability and security in Asia. This should not undermine our longstanding relationship with Pakistan, which remains crucial to the peace of the region.

ALLIANCES

All our goals in Eurasia will depend on America strengthening the alliances that sustain our influence —

in Europe and East Asia and the Middle East. Alliances are not just for crises — summoned into action when the fire bell sounds. They are sustained by contact and trust. The Gulf War coalition, for example, was raised on the foundation of a president's vision and effort and integrity. Never again should an American president spend nine days in China, and not even bother to stop in Tokyo or Seoul or Manila. Never again should an American president fall silent when China criticizes our security ties with Japan.

For NATO to be strong, cohesive and active, the President must give it consistent direction: on the alliance's purpose; on Europe's need to invest more in defense capabilities; and, when necessary, in military conflict. To be relied upon when they are needed, our allies must be respected when they are not.

We have partners, not satellites. Our goal is a fellowship of strong, not weak, nations. And this requires both more American consultation and more American leadership. The United States needs its European allies, as well as friends in other regions, to help us with security challenges as they arise. For our allies, sharing the enormous opportunities of Eurasia also means sharing the burdens and risks of sustaining

the peace. The support of friends allows America to reserve its power and will for the vital interests we share.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Likewise, international organizations can serve the cause of peace. I will never place U.S. troops under U.N. command — but the U.N. can help in weapons inspections, peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts. If I am president, America will pay its dues — but only if the U.N.'s bureaucracy is reformed, and our disproportionate share of its costs is reduced.

There must also be reform of international financial institutions — the World Bank and the IMF. They can be a source of stability in economic crisis. But they should not impose austerity, bailing out bankers while impoverishing a middle class. They should not prop up failed and corrupt financial systems. These organizations should encourage the basics of economic growth and free markets. Spreading the rule of law and wise budget practices. Promoting sound banking laws and accounting rules. Most of all, these institutions themselves must be more transparent and accountable. ●

DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE AL GORE A NEW SECURITY AGENDA FOR THE GLOBAL AGE

“While old threats persist, there are new things under the sun — new forces arising that now or soon will challenge our international order, raising issues of peace and war,” says Vice President Al Gore. In what is perhaps the best-known foreign policy speech of his campaign, Gore told the International Press Institute in Boston, Massachusetts, on April 30, 2000, that “a realistic reading of the world today demands reinvigorated international and regional institutions...and American leadership — to protect our interests and uphold our values.”

Following are excerpts of the address. (The full text is available on the Gore/Lieberman website at:

http://www.algore.com/speeches/sp_fp_boston_04302000.html)

U.S. LEADERSHIP

For all of my career, I have believed that America has a responsibility to lead in the world. That’s why I was one of only a few Democrats in the United States Senate to vote in support of the use of force to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. And even as I was working hard in the Congress to help develop new approaches to arms control, I often disagreed with the predominant view in my own party as I pushed for a strong national defense and a new generation of less destabilizing missiles.

We are now in a new era. To label this time “the post-Cold War era” belies its uniqueness and its significance. We are now in a Global Age. Like it or not, we live in an age when our destinies and the destinies of billions of people around the globe are increasingly intertwined — when our grand domestic and international challenges are also intertwined. We should neither bemoan nor naively idealize this new reality. We should deal with it.

We must now view what could be called the classic security agenda — the question of war and peace among sovereign states — in light of these new realities. But we must also recognize that there is a New Security Agenda, which I discussed at the United Nations Security Council in January — a set of threats that affect us all and that transcend political borders; a set of challenges equal in magnitude to the challenges of the past. Today, at the dawn of the 21st century, we need a foreign policy that addresses the classic security threats — and understands the new ones as well. We need a new approach for a new century — grounded in our own economic and security interests, but uplifted by what is

right in the world. We need to pursue a policy of “forward engagement” — addressing problems early in their development before they become crises; addressing them as close to the source of the problem as possible; and having the forces and resources to deal with those threats as soon after their emergence as possible.

We need a new security agenda for the Global Age based on forward engagement.

DEFENSE

America must have a strong defense. We must never forget that our national defense is about much more than the land within our borders. Just as we fought and conquered totalitarianism during World War II — just as we fought and conquered communism during the Cold War — we are defending the idea of freedom itself. All of our policies, in war and in peace, are extensions by other means of Lincoln’s proposition that our founders’ dream is humankind’s last best hope.

That is why America must have a military capability that is second to none. It is central to the continuing demands of the classic agenda — to resist aggression, and to stop armed conflict. It is crucial to our security in this era of rogue states and international terror. And it is absolutely essential if we hope to wage peace through diplomacy. In our dealings with Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic, we have learned the importance of diplomacy backed with force. I look forward to the day when Serbia and Iraq will be free from the grip of Milosevic and Saddam and the terrors they have wrought on their own people.

We prevailed in those conflicts with minimal American casualties because we have maintained a superbly well-trained fighting force — and because the American people have supported investments in weapons that give us a technological edge.

Today, we need to ensure that our military personnel have adequate pay and benefits and continue to receive the training and leadership which makes them the finest in the world. And we are on the threshold of manufacturing and deploying the next generation of military weapons: weapons that are vitally needed to replace equipment that has been in service for far too long — weapons that are critical to meeting changing needs on today's battlefields.

If I am entrusted with the Presidency, I will lead the effort to ensure that America has the new generation of weapons we need.

RUSSIA AND CHINA

During the Cold War, we worked to contain these two powers (Russia and China) and limit their reach. Our task in the 21st century is not making them weak — but instead to encourage forces of reform.

That is why we have worked hard these past seven years to help Russia make a transition to a market-based democracy. We have helped Russia privatize its economy and build a civil society marked by free elections and an active press. We have brought Russia into a working relationship with NATO through the Permanent Joint Council and the Partnership for Peace program. We have been able to work with Russian forces successfully inside a NATO framework in the Balkans.

We have helped safeguard Russian nuclear material against the danger of theft. We have made it possible for thousands of Russia's nuclear scientists and weapons experts to find peaceful pursuits. And we have helped Russia to reduce its nuclear arsenal by nearly 5,000 warheads.

This work has not been without difficulty, or controversy. We strongly disagree with Russia's course in Chechnya. Russia must intensify its own work to stop the flow of dangerous technologies that irresponsible groups and rogue states can use to create weapons of mass

destruction. Russia must still take decisive steps to combat corruption and achieve reform. But a new Cold War is not the right path to progress. Engaging Russia is the right thing to do. That's why I took on the task of leading our effort to work with Russia — not because it was politically popular, but because it was right for America's security, and right for the spread of democracy around the world.

For these same reasons, we must also follow a policy toward China that is focussed on results, not rhetoric.

Make no mistake: we have strong disagreements with China over human rights and religious freedom, and over Chinese treatment of Tibet. These issues cannot — and must not — be ignored or marginalized. They must constantly be pursued. Human rights and human dignity speak to the deepest bonds we share, across all borders and nationalities. America has to prod China to make progress in all these areas — and as President, that's exactly what I'll do.

We also have concerns over tensions building between China and Taiwan. We need to maintain our commitment to the One China policy, but urge China and Taiwan to intensify their dialogue and to resolve their problems by peaceful means. The Administration is honoring its obligation to make defensive weapons available to Taiwan. But I am deeply concerned that those in the Congress who are pushing the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act are blind to its consequences: a sharp deterioration in the security of the region.

It is wrong to isolate and demonize China — to build a wall when we need to build a bridge.

As all of you know, I have friends and supporters who disagree with me on the best way to bring change and reform to China. I understand their views. They are justifiably impatient with the pace of change in China. I am, too. But the question is not whether we should be dealing with China. The question is whether we can afford not to.

Can we really abandon the kind of frank and open exchange that allows us to raise our differences in the first place? Can we really isolate a nation with 1.2 billion people and a nuclear arsenal? Can we really

turn our backs on one of the most dynamic economies on the planet?

I strongly support Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China...I support China's membership in the World Trade Organization — to make China abide by the same rules of international trade that we follow today.

We have to engage China — even as we challenge China on key areas of difference. It is in America's clear national security interest to do so. It is in America's vital economic interest to do so. And in the long run, I believe it is the only way to bring freedom and reform to the people of China.

NEW SECURITY AGENDA

While the old threats persist, there are new things under the sun — new forces arising that now or soon will challenge our international order, raising issues of peace and war: a New Security Agenda. Because of the historically unprecedented power of the technologies now widely available around the world, mistakes that were once tolerable can now have consequences beyond our calculation. Threats that were once local can have an impact that is regional and global. Damage that might once have been temporary and limited can now be permanent and catastrophic.

A rogue state or terrorist group with biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons — or the technical skill to disrupt our computer networks — can bring destruction far out of proportion to its size.

The international drug trade and corruption spill across borders — subverting democracy and the rule of law in country after country.

New pandemics and new mutations of disease can devastate entire societies — with impacts threatening to destabilize entire regions.

The disruption of the world's ecological systems — from the rise of global warming and the consequent damage to our climate balance, to the loss of living species and the depletion of ocean fisheries and forest habitats — continues at a frightening rate. Practically every day, it becomes clearer to us that we must act now to protect our Earth, while preserving and creating jobs for our people.

And at the very same time that these threats are developing, the traditional nation-state itself is changing — as power moves upwards and downwards, to everything from supra-national organizations and coalitions all the way down to feuding clans. Susceptible to tyrants willing to exploit ethnic and religious rivalries, the weakest of these states have either imploded into civil war or threatened to lash out across their borders.

To meet these challenges requires cooperation on a scale not seen before. A realistic reading of the world today demands reinvigorated international and regional institutions. It demands that we confront threats before they spiral out of the control. And it requires American leadership — to protect our interests and uphold our values.

PROMOTING PROSPERITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

But the Global Age is not just a time of security threats, it's a time of unprecedented opportunities.

From Asia to the Americas, from sub-Saharan Africa to our own country, there are still far too many who have not benefited from the explosion of worldwide wealth. More than one billion of the Earth's inhabitants live on less than one dollar a day. And this deep and persistent poverty has a security dimension as well as a moral one — for it invites social dislocation, violence, and war.

I believe that now we have a profound responsibility to open the gates of opportunity for all the world's people so that they can become stakeholders in the kind of society we would like to build at large in the world and at home. Let me be clear: promoting prosperity throughout the world is a crucial form of forward engagement.

We know how to launch this renaissance — for what has worked to spark the economic boom here in the United States is, at its essence, the way we can spark the fires of growth abroad. The difference is one of degree, not kind.

It starts with the rule of law, and with fiscal discipline and sound economic policy — but it does not end there. We must also invest in people, giving them the

education they need to seize the jobs of the future — and in the developing world, that especially applies to women and girls; the health security they require to raise a family; the confidence that when they become old, they will not become abandoned.... We need not only open trading systems, but systems that work for people around the world — taking into account not only the bottom line, but the well-being of working men and women, the protection of children against sweatshop labor, and the protection of the environment. We have to ratify the Kyoto Agreement while making sure that all nations — developed and developing — do their part to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, we should take steps to boost the export of environmentally-clean technologies, an area where we have a decisive trade advantage. It is not only good for the environment. It is also good for economic growth.

We need to promote the stable flow of investment around the world — which, in turn, requires healthy financial institutions that can work to prevent financial instability, and that are capable of dealing with it should it occur.

We need to give the poorest countries a hand up — through passage of legislation such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and the Caribbean Basin Initiative. We need more economic engagement and expanded trade with all the Americas. And we must assist the poorest nations through debt relief. I called for this process last year in Davos. We have begun it. We need to pursue and intensify it.

Certainly, we cannot do this alone — we need to inspire the cooperation of others. The rebirth of Africa's economies, for example, is a task well-matched to the capabilities of the European Union and the United States working together. But if we do not point the way, if we are not as ready to invest in peace as in war, then others will not follow.

I believe that we must not waste this moment. A responsible foreign policy must look outward from a stance of forward engagement, to our broadest hopes for the world — not just inward, to our narrowest fears. ●

THIRD PARTY CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT RALPH NADER AND PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

The presidential election process in the United States is generally perceived as a two-party affair — the parties in question having been the Democrats and the Republicans for 140 years now. But, despite the seeming inevitability that one or the other of those two will win the election, many other parties field candidates for the office — though most fail to qualify for the ballot in more than a handful of states.

So-called “third party” candidates can, however, draw votes from parts of the electorate disenchanted with both “major” candidates — and occasionally they can generate enough public response to induce changes in the programs of the party that does capture the White House.

This year, at least 16 parties are fielding candidates in one or more states. Dozens of other men and women have undertaken campaigns as independent or write-in candidates. But the only two “third party” standard bearers seen as having even a marginally significant impact are Ralph Nader of Connecticut, candidate of the Green Party and the American Reform Party, and Patrick Buchanan of Virginia, candidate of the Reform Party and the Right to Life Party. Even their impact is expected to be minimal: Recent nationwide polls typically show Nader capturing about 3 percent of the vote, and Buchanan garnering 1 percent or less.

Both, however, are running serious national campaigns, and have taken stands on a broad range of issues. Following are their stated positions on issues in the realm of foreign policy.

GREEN PARTY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE RALPH NADER

Preventive Diplomacy: Avoiding Potential Conflict

The following statements by Ralph Nader on foreign policy were featured on the Nader 2000 web site at: www.votenader.org/issues/foreignpolicy.html

The key thing in a presidential position on foreign policy is, how badly do you want to advance justice? How badly do you want to further the health and safety and life's fulfillment for the people of this world to the extent that we can.

— CNN Talk Back Live

We basically engage in a lot of preventive diplomacy, a lot of preventive defense. Preventive diplomacy would have dealt with situations like Indonesia, instead of the Kissinger diplomacy that led to East Timor and a lot of other travails there. The same with Vietnam. We seem to always side with the dictators and the oligarchs and never with the peasants and the workers.

What's really amazing is that any discussion of foreign policy is usually about current hot spots, instead of asking, how did we get into this situation in the first place? What could we have done to avoid it? For example, how many years did we prop up the dictatorship of the former Belgian Congo? Now look how it's all falling apart over there, right? Well, we had no preventive diplomacy, no preventive defense. It's always, who's in charge, and, go out and support them as long as they're anti-communist.

Why do we have a missile defense system that the physicists have just told us is not going to work, even if we wanted to put it into place — assuming it was needed. Is that preventive defense? Is that preventive diplomacy? Don't we need to go on the affirmative and expand the export of democratic processes, of appropriate technology like solar energy, encouraging the world to move into a utilization of natural resources that redefines productivity and efficiency? Then there's the nonmaterial aspect of it

all. How much we can, for example, rescue the languages of indigenous peoples, try to rescue a lot of the culture that's becoming lost to them as commercialism and Western corporatism define their culture.

— *American Prospect Interview*

REFORM PARTY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Are We A Republic or An Empire?

The following remarks by Patrick J. Buchanan on foreign policy are excerpted from a statement entitled "Toward a More Moral Foreign Policy" that is available on the BuchananReform web site at: www.buchananreform.com/library/default.asp?id=9

As we end this American Century and this decade of national preeminence, we remain a people divided over our role in the world. It is a time for what Catholics call a "retreat," not a withdrawal into isolationism, but a day of introspection. Why is America, its economic and military power unrivaled, its popular culture dominant in the world, so resented by so many. Is it envy? Is it because we are an enlightened nation and they are benighted? Or have we, too, succumbed to the hubris of hegemony? Recall: In 1763, the England of Pitt had crushed her great rival, France, seized her vast American estate, and emerged as the world's only superpower. London reveled in its preeminence. As Walpole wrote, his contemporaries were "born with Roman insolence" and "acted with more haughtiness than an Asiatic monarch."

Yet, in less than a generation, Britain had lost the loyalty of its American subjects, who, aided by a defeated, vengeful France, expelled her from the 13 colonies that had been the crown jewels of the empire. And all the world rejoiced in Britain's humiliation, as, one suspects, much of today's world might rejoice in ours.

I count myself a patriot. But if all this Beltway braying about our being the "world's indispensable nation" and "only superpower" grates on my ears, how must it grate upon Europeans, Russians, and those peoples subject to U.S. sanctions, because they have failed by our lights to live up to our standards?

The great foreign policy question before this generation is the one that has bedeviled us since our birth as a nation. Are we to be a city on a Hill, a light unto the nations, Henry Clay's "lamp burning on the Western shore"? Or have we been handed a divine commission to "go abroad in search of monsters to destroy" and impose our values and system on a benighted world? Are we a republic or an empire?

Once again, it is time to choose....

On this eve of a new century, let us cease to hector and discipline the world and try to lead it; let us conform our foreign policy to principles more becoming a godly nation and great republic.



Foreign Policy and the 2000 Presidential Election
ARTICLE ALERT

Chace, James THE NEXT NEW THREAT (*World Policy Journal*, vol. 17, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 113-115)

The author looks at a number of foreign policy issues that U.S. presidential candidates may be called upon to address, including, most importantly, the China-Taiwan potential conflict and the uncertain future of Russia, and, in the near term, looming crises in Latin America and the Caribbean. Acknowledging that foreign policy issues are “not only of secondary importance” in the election, but enjoy “a rough consensus,” he says the campaign will likely focus upon tactics rather than strategies for dealing with these issues.

Cutter, Bowman W., Spero, Joan and Tyson, Laura D’Andrea. CAMPAIGN 2000: NEW WORLD, NEW DEAL - A DEMOCRATIC APPROACH TO GLOBALIZATION (*Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 2, March/April 2000, pp. 80-98)

The authors examine the steps they believe a new Democratic president must take in order “to lead the world in creating institutions and policies to sustain a more equitable process of globalization.” The president, they say, should focus on three broad objectives: “nurturing strategic partnership with old, new and changing players; strengthening existing multilateral regimes; and creating new regimes for emerging transnational issues including the environment, labor rights, and the appropriate governance of the global information economy.”

Kitfield, James. FOREIGN POLICY (*National Journal*, vol. 32, no. 14, April 1, 2000, pp. 1034-1035)

The author describes both George Bush and Al Gore as committed free-traders and internationalists and says foreign policy differences between them are on the surface minor. He notes, however, that the Vice President would extend a Clinton foreign policy of frequent engagement and compromise with major powers such as Russia and China and a belief in the usefulness of multilateral arms control agreements. In contrast, he says Bush would take a harder rhetorical and policy line toward Russia and China and would not embrace most multilateral arms control regimes.

The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered on the International Home Page of the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State: <http://usinfo.state.gov/admin/001/wwwhapub.html>.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION FORUM: THE CANDIDATES ON ARMS CONTROL (*Arms Control Today*, vol. 30, no. 7, September 2000, pp. 3-7)

Presidential candidates George W. Bush and Al Gore respond to questions posed by the Arms Control Association. Bush says he will deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system “at the earliest possible date” that will defend both the U.S. and its allies. He will propose amendments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, but will withdraw from the Treaty if Russia refuses to agree. Gore says he would not let Russia stand in the way of NMD if he concludes “that the technologies are mature enough to deploy.” This article may be viewed on the Web at: <http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/sept00/pressept00.html>

Stokes, Bruce. BUSH AND GORE’S POSITIONS ON TRADE (*National Journal*, vol. 32, no. 14, April 1, 2000, p. 1050)

Presidential candidates Al Gore and George W. Bush hold similar views on many trade-related issues, Stokes says. However, the Clinton administration has allied itself with organized labor and environmental organizations through its commitment to improving labor rights and enhancing environmental standards. This contrasts with the strategic allegiance between the business community and congressional Republicans. This stalemate has so far prevented efforts to grant the President new trade-negotiating authority, Stokes says, and the struggle to secure such authority will be the first challenge facing the next President.

Zoellick, Robert. CAMPAIGN 2000: A REPUBLICAN FOREIGN POLICY (*Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 63-78)

Zoellick says the foreign policy of a new Republican administration would be distinguished by five principles: It would be “premised on a respect for power;” emphasize “building and sustaining coalitions and alliances;” view international agreements and institutions “as means to achieve ends, not as forms of political therapy;” “embrace the revolutionary changes” taking place in information and communications, technology, commerce and finance, and demonstrate a vigilant recognition that “there is still evil in the world — people who hate America and the ideas for which it stands.”

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KEY INTERNET SITES

Please note that the U.S. Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below; such responsibility resides solely with the providers.

AllPolitics: Election 2000: Where They Stand: Foreign Policy
<http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/resources/where.they.stand/index.html#foreign>

American Enterprise Institute: How Would They Govern?: Foreign Policy
<http://www.aei.org/governing/>

Bush on Foreign Affairs
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/shields&gigot/november99/sg_11-19_bush.html

Bush's Foreign Policy Adviser: Interview
Part I
<http://uspolitics.about.com/newsissues/uspolitics/library/weekly/aa062700a.htm>
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