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*NATO's
50th
Anniversary*

March 1999

Defending Freedom, Maintaining Peace



President Clinton, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, prior to the start of the 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid, Spain.

PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF NATO

As we mark the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we celebrate the Alliance's success in defending freedom and maintaining peace over the past five decades. Americans have learned at great cost in this century that if we want to be secure at home, we must stand up for our interests, our ideals, and our friends around the world. Nowhere has our engagement been more vital than in Europe, where we have fought and won two world wars and the Cold War in this century. And no institution embodies this commitment more than NATO.

But this anniversary is not only about recognizing past accomplishments. It also presents an opportunity to chart the course of our partnership for the future and to set forth a vision of NATO for the coming decades: a larger, more flexible Alliance capable of meeting a broad range of challenges to our common interests.

NATO's purpose remains unchanged. Its mission is to defend the security, prosperity, and democratic values of its members. But the environment in which the Alliance must carry out this mission has changed. Over the last five years we have been building a new NATO that is better equipped to deal with different challenges — with new missions, new members, and new partners across Europe, including Russia and Ukraine. Yesterday's NATO guarded our borders against military aggression. Tomorrow's Alliance must continue to safeguard our shared security while contending with new threats that recognize no borders — the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence, and regional conflict.

In April 1999, the leaders of the European nations and Canada will gather with us in Washington to welcome three new democracies — Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic — as they join us in our mission to guide the Alliance into the 21st century. NATO's doors will remain open to all those willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities of membership, and we will continue to work to strengthen our partnerships with nonmembers.

As we look ahead to the future, our goal is to build an even stronger transatlantic partnership with a Europe that is undivided, democratic, and at peace. I am convinced that succeeding generations of Europeans and Americans will enjoy peace and security because of NATO's ongoing efforts to fulfill the mission outlined 50 years ago: defending freedom, preserving peace and stability, and fostering a climate in which prosperity can flourish.

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NATO'S 50TH ANNIVERSARY

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FORGING NEW WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

*An assessment by Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council*

While NATO's continuing "essential" purpose is "to guarantee the freedom and security of its members...what is new as NATO enters the 21st century are the ways" in which it "carries out this function," says Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council. He cites a number of initiatives that "will clearly demonstrate to all our publics that NATO is the key to building a more stable, secure, and united Europe for the next century." Following are Vershbow's responses to questions posed by "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda."

QUESTION: How would you describe NATO's primary mission and key challenges as it enters the 21st century?

VERSHBOW: NATO's essential purpose, as it has been since 1949, is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members. This is unchanged. What is new as NATO enters the 21st century are the ways in which NATO carries out this function. NATO is no longer faced with a massive military threat poised on its borders. But it is faced with a variety of challenges — for example, weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, and ethnic conflict. As a result, NATO has already put increasing emphasis on crisis response operations and on partnership and cooperation with the other states of Europe, aimed at promoting stability, integration, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

This is not to say that, on the one hand, collective defense is no longer NATO's primary purpose or, on the other hand, that NATO is going to turn into some form of "globo-cop" set to intervene in every crisis both in Europe and out. Rather, it is merely a recognition that many of the threats to the security of the allies emanate from outside NATO territory — whether through weapons of mass destruction or regional conflict — and that NATO must be prepared to deal with these kinds of threats whenever there is an Alliance consensus to do so.

In practical terms, NATO is already doing so through the Bosnia and Kosovo missions. By raising the profile of this kind of action in the Strategic Concept, we will be giving guidance to NATO's defense planners to prepare the forces necessary to carry out these kinds of missions in the future.

Q: How do you see the U.S. role in NATO evolving in terms of U.S. participation in and commitment to the Alliance?

VERSHBOW: For the United States, NATO is the linchpin of European security, which continues to have a direct bearing on U.S. interests. We will therefore maintain the strongest possible commitment to NATO for as far as the eye can see. I think the strength of the Senate vote in favor of ratifying NATO enlargement (80-19) shows the strength of bipartisan support for NATO and the U.S. leadership in it.

In terms of relative weight, however, we are pleased that the European allies are interested in strengthening the so-called "European Security and Defense Identity" or "ESDI." We see the idea of Europe taking on a greater role in providing for its own security within a strong transatlantic framework as very much in the U.S. interest. If backed by effective military capabilities and political will, ESDI can be a "win-win" for the U.S. and Europe and increase domestic U.S. support for the Alliance. So while the U.S. commitment will remain strong, we hope the European side of the equation will get stronger.

In the past, discussions about ESDI focused almost exclusively on institutional arrangements. Such arrangements are indeed important. But a discussion about ESDI that is not based on real capabilities will be just a paper exercise. These points were very much the center of UK Prime Minister Blair's calls for a renewed European dialogue on ESDI and we welcome this focus on capabilities. We hope the NATO Summit will give a new impetus to the development among the European

allies of the effective, mobile, and sustainable forces needed to perform future peace support operations without undue reliance on the United States.

Our chief concern is that in proceeding with institutional developments on ESDI, we not lose what has already been achieved in building ESDI within NATO. We expect that the Washington Summit will mark the completion of arrangements on ESDI agreed at the 1996 Berlin NAC (North Atlantic Council) Ministerial — including mechanisms for sharing NATO assets with the WEU (Western European Union). This arrangement preserves NATO as the framework for collective defense and avoids the waste and political divisiveness that could come from efforts to establish separate European capabilities and structures. It also preserves the kind of genuine, open consultations we have within NATO and a role for the six European allies that are not members of the European Union. Efforts to further develop ESDI beyond the Berlin framework should preserve these gains.

Q: What will be the long-term impact of the Partnership for Peace on NATO, as well as on European and transatlantic security?

VERSHBOW: It is a cliché to say that the Partnership for Peace has been successful beyond anyone's wildest imagination — but it is true. PfP has given NATO a way to work with all the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area to encourage a commitment to cooperation and to enhance security and stability. It is helping shape the environment in ways that make both NATO and the Partners more secure. It is also becoming more and more of a vehicle for NATO and Partners to act jointly in preventing and managing crises in Europe. So PfP will continue to have an enormous impact on improving the overall security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area.

While PfP is important in its own right as a contribution to European security, we also recognize that some PfP states want to take the further step of becoming members of NATO. NATO enlargement remains a central part of NATO's strategy for creating a secure, undivided, and democratic Europe. We expect that summit leaders will approve a package of measures which the U.S. has proposed calling "The Membership Action Plan." Under the "MAP," NATO will commit itself to help aspiring members become the strongest possible candidates, recognizing that the issuance of an invitation will require a

political decision by the allies that a nation's membership in NATO will contribute to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Membership Action Plan will allow NATO to give aspiring members more feedback and guidance in their defense modernization and reform efforts. It will demonstrate that NATO has a tangible expectation to admit additional countries in the not-too-distant future.

Q: Why is the NATO-Russia relationship important and in what directions do you see it going?

VERSHBOW: For historical, geographic, and military reasons, Russia remains one of the most important interlocutors for NATO on a number of political and security issues. How NATO and Russia cooperate can have a tremendous impact on the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Our vision of an integrated European security system is one that has welcomed the full participation of a democratic Russia, not only through the NATO-Russia relationship, but also through the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and other institutions. NATO has already established a strong pattern of cooperation with Russia through the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). Few people know — not least of all in Russia itself — that Russian soldiers are serving alongside NATO in the Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR), under a U.S. general.

The PJC has proved itself as a constructive forum for exchanging views and developing specific areas of cooperation — for example, in discussing peacekeeping operations, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, science and the environment — and even the year 2000 problem. Just as important, the PJC has proven itself a key forum for consultation with Russia on difficult and contentious issues such as Kosovo. Allies and Russia were able to exchange views candidly, and this indeed helped to manage differences and focus attention on our common goal of reaching a peaceful settlement. As for the future, I am convinced that as Russia comes to know NATO better, we will see even more NATO-Russia cooperation in tackling jointly the opportunities and risks of the new century. This will only strengthen the security of Europe as a whole.

Q: Are there tangible outcomes that you would like to see as a result of NATO's 50th anniversary commemoration in Washington in April?

VERSHBOW: There are dozens. For starters, we will celebrate the inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in NATO — and this is an important point because it shows that Stalin’s dividing line in Europe is being erased forever. NATO will also reaffirm its commitment to further enlargement and take practical steps to help candidate countries in the form of the Membership Action Plan I mentioned earlier. We will take steps to make PfP a more operational instrument — a standing coalition of democratic states acting together in response to crises.

NATO will also be providing its own answer to your first question — “What is the role of NATO in the 21st century?” It is important for our publics and for other countries to get a clear message on what NATO is all about. Helping answer this question will be an update of NATO’s Strategic Concept. The last version was written in 1991, as the Cold War was still coming to a close. The new version will speak directly about

NATO’s future — including “non-Article 5” crisis response operations, and a greater emphasis on partnership and cooperation, alongside its continuing commitment to the defense of NATO members.

We have a number of other initiatives that I won’t describe in detail, but which are also very important. We have, for example, a “Defense Capabilities Initiative,” aimed at making sure that U.S. and European military forces take maximum advantage of advanced technologies and are able to deploy and sustain themselves in crisis response operations away from their home bases. We have also proposed an initiative on “Weapons of Mass Destruction” that aims to get NATO to focus more directly on one of the most important emerging security threats for the next century. Taken together, these and other initiatives will clearly demonstrate to all our publics that NATO is the key to building a more stable, secure, and united Europe for the next century. ●

NATO'S ROLE IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM: CONSTANT AND EMERGING GOALS

*An assessment by Ambassador Marc Grossman
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs*

As NATO enters the new millennium, its core objective will continue to be "collective defense," says Ambassador Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. "The Alliance must also improve its flexibility and capacity to prevent, deter, and, if necessary, respond to a broad range of threats, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." Stressing the importance of enlargement, Grossman predicts that the three new members of NATO will not be the last ones. "The summit will reaffirm that NATO's door remains open, and that the Alliance will be active in helping aspirants walk through it," he says. Following are Grossman's responses to questions posed by "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda."

QUESTION: How does NATO fit into the overall U.S. relationship with Europe?

GROSSMAN: Our relationship with Europe is vital and extensive. When we work together we can successfully overcome larger problems and set the global agenda. NATO is one of the most important institutions we and the Europeans have for making that happen. But it is also part of a wider set of institutional relations with Europe that includes the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU). The kinds of challenges confronting us now and that will continue to confront us in the 21st century are such that no single country can cope with them alone. Whether it's weapons of mass destruction or international organized crime, just to mention two, we need a strong partnership with Europe and an array of institutions to promote and defend our common interests. At this year's NATO, OSCE, and U.S.-European Union Summits we'll be working with our European partners to create a strategy that allows each of these institutions to do what they do best while reinforcing each other.

Within this institutional framework, it is the NATO Alliance that preserves our security and protects our common interests. NATO is a key instrument for promoting security and stability throughout Europe as a whole. Through NATO crisis management operations like SFOR (Stabilization Force) in Bosnia, we deal with regional conflicts that undermine the security of a far broader area. And NATO open to new members helps

to end Cold War divisions. NATO's special ties to Russia and Ukraine encourage cooperation and consultation, helping overcome years of antagonism and distrust.

Q: Have the expansion of NATO and the U.S. introduction of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) concept had an impact on the expansion of the EU?

GROSSMAN: Most definitely, and it's been positive. We support EU enlargement for the same reason that we support NATO enlargement: to foster democracy, prosperity, and security among the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

The NATO enlargement process provides confidence to EU candidate countries that their security needs are being supported. It also gives them valuable experience through increasingly close collaboration and consultation with the Alliance. Both make it easier for EU applicants to take the steps necessary to join the EU. Similarly, PfP provides its members essential practice in democratic procedures. They see how civilians run militaries and how legislatures decide military budgets and policies. Learning and incorporating democratic values is what prepares candidate countries for joining both NATO and the EU.

Q: Do the EU and OSCE have any role in transatlantic security? If so, how does the security role of NATO relate to the security concerns of OSCE?

GROSSMAN: Both the OSCE and the U.S.-EU relationship play important and complementary roles in

our Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The EU is not a transatlantic institution, of course, but the U.S.-EU relationship is vital to our security and prosperity. As Secretary of State Albright has said, "NATO will always be the institution of choice when North America and Europe decide to act together militarily." The OSCE is the premier institution when it comes to promoting human rights and democracy in Europe.

The OSCE plays an essential role in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. The past several years in Bosnia and more recent events in Kosovo illustrate how NATO and the OSCE work together. Only NATO, for example, had the ability to separate the warring forces in Bosnia. Only the OSCE had the capability to supervise elections. Both elements were critical to the success of the Dayton Peace Accords. The "New Transatlantic Agenda," which was launched by President Clinton and EU leaders in December 1995, gives us a flexible way to address a whole host of security concerns. On the agenda, for example, are diplomatic cooperation on regional crises, development assistance, and human rights; joint approaches to counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and counter-narcotics; and cooperation on environmental protection, disease control, international crime, and law enforcement.

Q: Is the experience in Kosovo a good model for the integration of European security institutions?

GROSSMAN: Both in Bosnia and Kosovo, our transatlantic institutions have worked together to try to resolve serious conflicts and promote stability. In Bosnia, NATO provided the security framework for the Dayton peace agreement. The OSCE devised the election system and managed the arms control negotiations. The EU gave assistance crucial to rebuilding civil society throughout the country. Carrying out these functions required regular and close cooperation.

The situation in Kosovo is different from Bosnia. But these three institutions are working there. NATO has provided the military might to stave off both full-scale war and an enormous humanitarian disaster. The international community called upon the OSCE to monitor the situation on the ground with the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). And the EU, in

cooperation with the United States, will play a major role in post-settlement assistance to rebuild civil society there.

Q: What influence do Russia and Ukraine have on the U.S.-transatlantic relationship?

GROSSMAN: Our relationship with both countries is very important. We work with them on a whole range of issues. When we think about Russia and Ukraine in the context of the Euro-Atlantic relationship, the emphasis is on integration.

We were very pleased when both countries became members of PfP. To intensify interchange, NATO created the Permanent Joint Council with Russia, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Both countries are also members of the Council of Europe and play a very important role in the OSCE. As we move ahead with our transatlantic agenda, we will continue to encourage as much exchange and interaction among the Euro-Atlantic community, Russia, and Ukraine as possible.

Q: What are the implications for the U.S.-European relationship as a result of the increasing economic integration of Europe as reflected in the introduction of the euro?

GROSSMAN: We think the euro will be good for Europeans and for us. It is an historic milestone in the history of European integration, which has been supported by the United States since the very beginning. It is important to everyone that the euro succeed.

The United States will benefit from an economically dynamic Europe. Europe will be a bigger market for our exports and a better place for U.S. firms to conduct business. If the euro, as we hope, stimulates the development of a continent-wide capital market and leads to structural reforms, then European demand for U.S. imports will increase.

Q: What are the U.S. goals for the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meeting that will follow the NATO Summit in Washington?

GROSSMAN: The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meeting takes place on the second day of the Washington Summit. This meeting can make clear that the EAPC is

becoming the nucleus of a cooperative security network bringing all the democracies of Europe together to address common challenges.

We hope the meetings of the Washington Summit will highlight the importance of deepening the integration of all Partners — whether or not they aspire to NATO membership — in the work of the Alliance, since we see this cooperation as a critical element in projecting security and stability in and for Europe.

These meetings give us an opportunity to discuss how to make our partnership as operational as possible. One key goal is to define a framework that allows for closer involvement of Partners in the planning and direction of future non-Article 5 operations. So we will be looking at how to build the right arrangements to ensure that Alliance and Partner units can operate together effectively.

Q: How do you see NATO's evolving role and key objectives as it enters the new millennium?

GROSSMAN: As Secretary Albright said at NATO's Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 1998, "We want an Alliance strengthened by new members; capable of collective defense; committed to meeting a wide range of threats to our shared interests and values; and acting in partnership with others to ensure stability, freedom, and peace in and for the entire transatlantic area."

NATO's core objective will remain collective defense. The Alliance must also improve its flexibility and capacity to prevent, deter, and, if necessary, respond to a broad range of threats, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

NATO enlargement is also important. It is a natural and continuing consequence of the enlargement of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe; the three new members will not be the last ones. The summit will reaffirm that NATO's door remains open, and that the Alliance will be active in helping aspirants walk through it. ©

TRANSFORMING NATO'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

By Admiral Harold W. Gehman

The Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic is in a unique position to evaluate new dangers that NATO faces, including "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increases in the lethality of terrorism," and "non-state sponsored adventurism." Admiral Harold W. Gehman points out that the Alliance's recent experiences in Bosnia demonstrate that NATO is well on its way to moving from "a fixed, positional defense" to "flexible, mobile operations." Whatever changes are made to NATO's Strategic Concept, he says, three pillars must continue to support the Alliance's fundamental base: common defense, nuclear deterrence, and the transatlantic link.

INTRODUCTION

The transatlantic relationship cemented by the Washington Treaty of 1949 has been uniquely enduring, peaceful, and successful in warding off common dangers, both external and, equally important, internal. However, NATO's success has led to a new era, one that is not characterized by a simple "us versus them" scenario. Ethnic conflict, political instability, and territorial disputes around the periphery of NATO's defended territory are mounting. We face the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increases in the lethality of terrorism, non-state sponsored adventurism, and other asymmetric challenges. These new dangers have forced us to reconsider the definitions of peace, territorial integrity, and security — concepts that are the *raison d'être* of the Alliance.

The Alliance has embraced the need for change in order to remain as relevant in the future as it has been for the past 50 years. This evolution is demonstrated by NATO programs like the Founding Act with Russia and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, both of which are extending transparency and dialogue east and south from the center of NATO. Likewise, the Alliance is establishing solid relations with key organizations that have capabilities that complement those of NATO, such as the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The most visible of new NATO missions has been the assumption of leadership of the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), followed by the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

NATO's experience in Bosnia has been a significant success — both in humanitarian and geopolitical terms

— but it also demonstrated that the Alliance's transformation from a fixed, positional defense to flexible, mobile operations is well underway. Other significant changes focus on organization, technology, and doctrine to ensure that NATO military forces can serve as an effective crisis management tool wherever the collective interests of members are threatened.

NATO'S LEGACY

Given the peaceful demise of its former adversary, NATO is arguably the most successful alliance in history. NATO members enjoy unprecedented freedom, prosperity, and security. Although mutual defense obligations lie at the heart of the Alliance, the psychological impact on the political and economic evolution of Europe may turn out to be its most important function. Under the umbrella of NATO, Western European economies were built anew, as were the organs of civil society and stable political parties. Today's EU and the revitalized WEU are products of the trust, confidence, and sense of community developed within the Alliance.

The security provided by NATO created a climate that energized Europeans to work, save, and invest until they created for themselves a prosperity they had never before enjoyed. In the years after World War II, North America gave much to Europe in economic aid and military protection and has received a lot in return. Europe's renewed affluence provided markets, goods, and capital that fed North America's continued economic growth. Europe is now North America's most important trading partner. This year's launch of the euro is a significant milestone in the development of a

strong and unified European economy and will significantly increase trade across the Atlantic. These remarkable economic developments are a direct result of 50 years of stability provided by NATO.

The Alliance has also provided a rationale for maintaining robust military forces in peacetime. During the Cold War, the NATO force planning process encouraged nations to maintain sufficient force structure to permit a strategy of flexible response. While all NATO nations have decreased the size of their armed forces since the end of the Cold War, the NATO force planning process has served to check the rush to disarmament. The Alliance provides nations a valuable structure to examine the future security environment and to develop new strategies and capabilities.

PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR NATO'S MILITARY AUTHORITIES

The past 10 years have been a period of unprecedented change within NATO. The 1991 version of NATO's Strategic Concept expanded the definition of security and set the stage for NATO operations in Bosnia. The current challenge for Alliance members is to create a new Strategic Concept that provides visionary, yet practical, guidance to NATO military authorities. In order for the next Strategic Concept to guide us into the 21st century, it must reflect changes that the Alliance has undergone as well as allow for changes yet to be encountered. The revised Strategic Concept must also provide useful guidance for the military, so that a military officer like myself can develop contingency plans, establish force goals, and design realistic training exercises — in other words to accomplish everything that is expected of a military force.

TRANSFORMING NATO DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

In April of this year, NATO heads of state will mark the 50th anniversary of the Alliance. In addition to commemorating the past, the Washington Summit presents a unique opportunity to focus on transforming NATO's defense capabilities for the next 50 years. I am convinced that NATO needs a more systematic and methodical process to develop the military capabilities that will be required by the Strategic Concept. Before discussing these changes let me emphasize that the three

pillars of the Alliance — common defense, nuclear deterrence, and the transatlantic link — are and must remain the underpinnings of our efforts. They represent the core policies that made our Alliance so successful in the past and are critical for our success in the future.

Experts often disagree on the nature of the future security environment and on which military capabilities and war-fighting concepts will be required. After all, the future is hard to predict. My crystal ball is not any better than anyone else's, so I don't put my faith in any one scenario for the future. Instead, I want to ensure that we have a systematic transformation process. I believe this process should include a common operational vision to describe how NATO commanders will employ future military capabilities. Such a vision will provide a template that NATO force planners can use to optimize force structure and decide how the Alliance can best exploit new technology.

Even with a common operational vision, NATO force planners will have a number of competing investment strategies from which to choose. We must prioritize, coordinate, and integrate our efforts to ensure that what the Strategic Concept states will result in actions that improve our national and Alliance defense capabilities. We should experiment to determine which strategies are most likely to provide the greatest increase in defense capability. Experimentation can also help us solve technical, organizational, and doctrinal problems and hedge against nasty surprises from potential adversaries (especially of the asymmetric variety). Experimentation may take the form of seminars, war games, command exercises, or field exercises depending on the subject.

Our experience in Bosnia and in recent Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) exercises indicates that the most immediate focus of our transformation process should be in the area of communications and logistics. We must improve the speed and effectiveness of command through more compatible, interoperable, and integrated command-and-control systems. This will improve our ability to exploit future commercial and military technological developments. We have learned that Cold War logistics systems are not up to the task of supporting NATO forces that are deployed beyond traditional operating areas. We must have the ability to quickly locate and move assets and the ability to perform multinational logistics operations.

ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC AND THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK

Throughout NATO's history, the transatlantic link has referred to the political, economic, and military ties between North America and Europe. Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, represents the western pillar of the transatlantic link. ACLANT was created to ensure that military forces and supplies could flow from North America to assist in the defense of Europe. In the event of hostilities during the Cold War, ACLANT's primary mission was to conduct anti-submarine and anti-surface ship operations and to challenge the Warsaw Pact by creating a second front on NATO's northern flank. Traditional defensive operations, known in NATO as Article 5 operations, are at the heart of the Atlantic Alliance and remain ACLANT's primary mission; however, the changing security environment provides an opportunity to use ACLANT's maritime expertise in new ways.

Today ACLANT is at the forefront of planning and conducting sea-based combined and joint operations designed to employ the full spectrum of military capabilities from different military services — capabilities that will provide the means to deal with crises on the periphery of NATO's defended territory. These efforts benefit from having a maritime officer's approach to war-fighting, which includes an appreciation for flexibility, speed of information, mobility, self-sustainment, and integrated logistics. The development of progressive issues such as CJTF, PfP, European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, and counter-proliferation will be vital to the Alliance in the future and are given the highest priority. Solving interoperability problems and learning to exploit new technology are major focus areas.

The character of the ACLANT staff has changed greatly to meet these new challenges. The staff has representatives from all the services. Exercises and operations are planned to combine the capabilities from different military services to create an effect that is greater than the sum of the parts.

NEW MISSION FOR MARITIME FORCES — THE CJTF CONCEPT

The new security environment increases the likelihood that NATO military forces will be required to conduct

operations around the periphery of NATO's defended territory. The CJTF concept provides a framework for organizing forces for missions beyond NATO's network of fixed headquarters. NATO envisions a CJTF as an ad hoc organization built from an existing headquarters to perform a specific mission. Sufficient equipment, personnel, logistics support, and related assets are assembled to conduct the operation and are dissolved when the operation is complete.

In March 1998, ACLANT conducted the first major trial of a NATO sea-based CJTF headquarters. Exercise "Strong Resolve Crisis South" was part of an exercise employing more than 50,000 personnel. The sea-based CJTF headquarters was formed from the headquarters of Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic onboard the command ship, USS Mount Whitney. The CJTF commander was tasked to prepare for a peace-support operation in a fictional country.

The trial demonstrated the advantages of a sea-based CJTF headquarters with the speed and flexibility to reach all likely areas of conflict. A sea-based headquarters must be logistically self-sufficient for extended periods and may be the only option in a contingency operation in certain geographical areas which are difficult to reach, have no host nation support, or where the situation is too volatile to risk establishing a headquarters on land.

Trials have shown that the CJTF concept is viable and that the land- and sea-based CJTF headquarters have proven capable of dealing with the challenges of assigned missions. The next phase of the concept will concentrate on staff analysis of the trial evaluation results, lessons learned from operations in Bosnia, and additional study. The outlook is encouraging and both major NATO commanders (the Supreme Allied Commanders for the Atlantic and for Europe) look forward to implementing fully the CJTF concept into the Alliance Command Structure.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY

A significant outcome of the 1997 Madrid Summit was the reaffirmation of NATO's commitment to a strong, dynamic partnership between the European and North American member nations. This commitment centers

on the vitality of the transatlantic link. For NATO's first 50 years, this link was primarily one-way in nature with support flowing from North America into Europe. With the Berlin Summit came the declaration that NATO would begin to build a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) that would develop a more balanced partnership between North America and Europe. Creation of an ESDI calls for force elements separable, but not separate, from the NATO force structure that could be made available for use under the political direction and strategic control of the WEU.

The essential elements for building a viable ESDI include making NATO assets available for WEU operations, adaptation of the CJTF concept to WEU-led operations, and commitment to transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management. ACLANT has been developing a concept for a European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF) to begin to address the issue of maritime support to ESDI. The EMMF concept seeks to capitalize on NATO's strengths — the existing trained multinational forces, our common doctrine, our practiced exercise structure, and our mature command-and-control organization.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The introduction of the PfP initiative in 1994 added a new dimension to the relationship between NATO and its Partner countries. Together with the special relationships that are being developed between the Alliance and Russia, and the Alliance and Ukraine, PfP is helping to set the stage for new enhanced security arrangements in Europe. PfP aims at enhancing peacekeeping abilities and interoperability of Partner countries' military forces with those of NATO through joint planning, training, and exercises. It also facilitates

transparency in the defense planning and budgeting process and promotes democratic control of defense forces.

ACLANT sponsors an extensive series of maritime-related military exercises and other training activities ranging from language training to workshops on strengthening the roles of non-commissioned officers. A number of Partner countries have officers serving at ACLANT headquarters, and we are looking forward to an exchange of officers with Russia, perhaps in the next year.

CONCLUSION

For 50 years the Atlantic Alliance has provided the security and stability that have underpinned the peace and prosperity that members enjoy today. The 1991 Strategic Concept began a transformation of the Alliance and its military forces that continues apace. Transforming NATO defense capabilities is a daunting challenge since it involves a complex reallocation of resources and significant work to implement new organizational structures. Because our energies are no longer focused on winning the Battle of the Atlantic, ACLANT now concentrates on redefining the transatlantic link to include new ideas, concepts, doctrine, and technology in addition to providing North American military power to the Alliance.

During this transition period, the Atlantic Command will serve as a flexible and innovative center of excellence — one that identifies ideas and proposes solutions to keep NATO the military organization of choice for the next 50 years. I am encouraged by our progress thus far, and I believe NATO will enter the 21st century on a successful and positive note. ©

NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY

By Senator William V. Roth, Jr.

NATO in the next millennium “should be an enduring political/military alliance among sovereign states whose purpose is to apply power and diplomacy to the collective defense and promotion of allied security, democratic values, the rule of law, and peace,” says Senator Roth in a North Atlantic Assembly report released in October 1998.

Urging a sustained U.S. commitment to NATO, Roth also stresses that “the active participation of NATO allies in responses to emerging security challenges in and beyond Europe will be essential to the viability of the Alliance.” Following are the summary recommendations of the report prepared by Roth, former president of the North Atlantic Assembly, with guidance provided by a steering committee composed of legislators from the European and North American members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The NATO Summit planned for April 1999 in Washington is an opportunity for the allies to celebrate NATO’s 50 years of success and, more importantly, to lay the foundation for the future. This event must produce a balanced outcome, clearly articulating the reasons for NATO’s continued existence, adopting a new Strategic Concept that reflects contemporary security conditions and requirements, and continuing the process of opening NATO to other European democracies. The allies cannot afford simply to celebrate either historic or recent accomplishments. They must demonstrate foresight and courage to meet the challenges of the 21st century. In this light, the following recommendations are offered.

— A vision for NATO: NATO in the 21st century should be an enduring political/military alliance among sovereign states whose purpose is to apply power and diplomacy to the collective defense and promotion of allied security, democratic values, the rule of law, and peace.

— NATO’s purpose is to defend values and interests, not just territory: The allies at the Washington Summit in April 1999 must strongly reaffirm that the North Atlantic Treaty provides an unequivocal mandate for the collective defense of common values and interests as well as the defense of territory.

— The United States must sustain its commitment to the Alliance: U.S. commitment to and leading role in the Alliance remain critical to NATO’s future viability. At the same time, the active participation of NATO

allies in responses to emerging security challenges in and beyond Europe will be essential to the viability of the Alliance.

— Strengthen the relationship between NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA): NATO’s effectiveness and political vitality ultimately depend on support from parliaments and publics in the member states. In view of the centrality of the democratic process to future security and stability and the contribution made by the NAA to strengthening the process, the relationship of the NAA to NATO should be enhanced through intensified consultations and cooperation.

— Pace, don’t pause, the enlargement process: At the Washington Summit, the allies should invite Slovenia to begin accession negotiations. Slovenia is qualified for membership. Its invitation would demonstrate that the allies remain committed to their open door policy without overloading NATO’s agenda. Acceptance by the allies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland today, and of other qualified nations in the coming years, highlights the fact that NATO is organized around transcendent values and goals that do not require an “enemy” to validate their continuing relevance.

— Integrate NATO’s inner and outer core missions: Collective defense against an attack on any Alliance member, as provided in Article 5 of the Treaty, must remain NATO’s core mission. In addition, NATO nations must focus increased political attention and defense resources on emerging outer core, non-Article 5,

missions, including promoting stability in Europe, dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, responding to the challenge of terrorism and providing options to deal with threats that arise beyond NATO borders. The allies should ensure that there is a seamless continuum between essential political and military aspects of NATO's inner core and outer core missions and capabilities. In this regard, NATO military authorities should develop training, exercising, deployment, and rotation concepts that enable regular forces to maintain combat capabilities while being employed in peace support and other non-Article 5 operations.

— NATO's missions neither global nor artificially limited: The allies should neither suggest that NATO's non-Article 5 outer core missions will assume a "global" character nor impose artificial geographic limits on such missions.

— NATO must preserve its freedom to act: The allies must always seek to act in unison, preferably with a mandate from the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the framework for collective security in Europe. Even though all NATO member states undoubtedly would prefer to act with such a mandate, they must not limit themselves to acting only when such a mandate can be agreed. All NATO actions should nonetheless be based on appropriate legal authority.

— NATO must address terrorist challenges: Effective burdensharing in the future will require that all allies contribute in a demonstrable fashion to the goal of combating terrorism. NATO should be used more actively as a forum for sharing of intelligence, consultations on counter-terrorist approaches and strategies, and joint actions against terrorist threats.

— Move relations with Russia beyond arms control: The allies should use defense cooperation with Russia to move the NATO-Russia relationship beyond Cold War assumptions and arms control relationships toward a qualitatively new level of political and military engagement.

— Make ESDI real: The European allies must develop the military capabilities to give real meaning to a

European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). France should return to full participation in NATO's Integrated Command Structure. If France decides to do so, NATO should divide its Southern command into South-Eastern and South-Western commands to enhance European responsibilities in the region. A European commander and deputy (from France and Spain) should lead the South-Western command; a U.S. officer and European deputy should lead the South-Eastern command.

— Make NATO defense planning and force goals transparent: At a time when threats are not as self-evident as during the Cold War, public and parliamentary support for defense efforts would benefit from greater transparency concerning defense plans and performance. To this end, NATO should annually prepare, publish, and deliver to the President of the North Atlantic Assembly an unclassified report that would assess progress made toward developing capabilities required by NATO's new mission profile and identify the gaps that remain, with recommendations concerning how such shortcomings can be remedied.

— Build a floor under allied defense spending: The allies should at the Washington Summit call for a voluntary moratorium on further defense budget reductions. The voluntary moratorium should continue until the allies have decided what capabilities and expenditures are required to implement NATO's revised Strategic Concept.

— Bridge emerging gaps in military capabilities: The allies should agree at the Washington Summit to develop a NATO Technology and Industrial Base Strategy. Its objective should be to preserve vital, competitive, and complementary defense industrial bases on both sides of the Atlantic, to seek progressive elimination of barriers to defense trade on a NATO-wide basis, to encourage harmonization of competition policies, and to remove barriers that inhibit sharing of technology among allied states. The allies should also launch a Coalition Technology Initiative that would establish a specific requirement as part of NATO's annual defense planning process to identify technologies under development that could critically affect, either positively or negatively, the ability of allied forces to work and fight together in future

contingencies. The United States, as the military and technological leader of the Alliance, should devote a high priority in its national planning to the continued ability of its military forces to work in coalition with those of NATO nations.

— Take missile defense seriously: The Alliance should give urgent attention to missile defense. The proliferation of missile technologies and systems, especially those that can deliver weapons of mass destruction, is an increasingly worrisome security threat. In a time of limited resources, NATO nations need to work together to develop missile defense systems that could preserve the ability of allied forces to fulfill assigned missions.

— Face the facts in the Balkans: As long as there is a tinderbox in the Balkans, there can be no stable peace in Europe. NATO's military operation in Bosnia has been a clear success. The experience demonstrates, however, that in such crises decisive action earlier rather than later can save both lives and money. Another clear lesson, particularly with regard to the crisis in Kosovo, is that NATO should threaten military action only when it is clearly and credibly prepared to fulfill that threat. A continued U.S. military contribution to allied forces operating in the Balkans obviously remains critical for the time being. However, in the future, a European leadership role in the Bosnia operation and in other possible NATO operations in the Balkans should receive increased emphasis. ●

NATO AT FIFTY: FUTURE CHALLENGES, HISTORIC TASKS

*By Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher
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INTRODUCTION

In time-honored NATO fashion, NATO's 50th birthday party should contain few real surprises. There may well be a few flurries around critical phrases among hard-working staffs; there will surely be some regrettable protocol babble given the presence of so many heads of state and of so many journalists interested in a new angle on the summit story. In the end, there will be a carefully crafted summit declaration touching on all the key issues, summing up the months of negotiation, of maneuver, and of the strategizing that characterizes the best of NATO policymaking. Many of the NATO cynics and the NATO critics will come to the same conclusion: nothing much really new, not much of a critical forward leap into the next century.

They will be mistaken. The NATO story continues to demonstrate how truly remarkable the organization is in the history of international organizations. Ten years ago some consigned it to yet another dustbin of history; in the post-Wall *Europhoria*, it seemed unnecessary, if not irrelevant, to the new pacific age. In the interim, its very familiarity has led many to miss the significant changes in the organization itself, its hard-won adaptations to the new missions and requirements of transatlantic security and cooperative decisionmaking.

Most amazing even to close observers have been the challenges and achievements of the past five years. In comparison with the past, the pace has been almost dizzying, driven mostly by the lessons and pain of Bosnia, but also flowing from the decisions to enlarge NATO's membership and to restructure the Alliance's military command, the efforts to deepen and implement the outreach Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the search for new channels of communication, if not partnership, with the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Indeed, the last three Secretaries General have led remarkable campaigns for organizational and procedural change — within NATO itself and across

the security policymaking patterns of member and partner states alike.

THE PAST AS PROLOGUE?

How does this record of change from 1994 to 1999 compare with NATO's past? The most obvious changes and some of the hardest policy and procedural problems will come with the growth in the size of NATO to 19 members. In contrast to the European Union, NATO started big and completed most of its growth in the first decade of its existence. The parameters seemed clear and fixed, with the last entrant, Spain in the early 1980s, seeming simply part of NATO's manifest destiny and only the final touch to the interchanges under the Spanish-American tie. Few of the states outside seemed appropriate candidates or interested.

Spain's entry in 1982 did set a precedent, though. The negotiations through which post-Franco Spain became a NATO member set the guidelines for new candidacies and determined the political, military, and security hurdles that new members would have to clear before admission. The concepts that all new members would have to pursue the best democratic practices, that they would have to settle outstanding diplomatic and policy debts or squabbles before entry — are all foreshadowed in the debates on Spanish accession. This must have had particular saliency for a Spanish Secretary General who has had to preside over the entry of three new members and the contemplation of others under NATO's policy of an "open door" of membership.

More complex is the comparison of past and future with respect to the scope of NATO's mission. The original Washington Treaty was quite specific about the scope of Article 5's promise on the defense of member territory. But in other places, the treaty leaves wide room for interpretation of NATO's geographic interests and joint intentions, particularly under the wide-ranging domain of consultation toward cooperative

action on almost all foreign policy issues encouraged under Article 4.

How wide NATO's field of action should and must be is still largely left to case-by-case decisions — yes in Bosnia and Kosovo, no in Albania, or Iraq, to mention only the latest cases. Earlier, the 1950s and the 1960s saw continuing debates on the protection of France's Algerian departments, and of other potential colonial legacies. The 1960s saw renewed but always unsuccessful U.S. pressure for allied commitment to out-of-area missions, most notably with regard to the participation of allied troops in Vietnam, but also elsewhere in Asia and in the Middle East. And on more than one occasion, there were hints of what one or more members thought were "logically included" cases — the defense, however unsought, of the critical European neutrals; the problems of post-Tito Yugoslavia; the Gulf conflict; the implicit links to Mexico and the key Latin American states, not to mention outreach to the Baltics or Southeastern Europe or Israel. At least for now, Bosnia and Kosovo will almost surely prove the exceptions, not the rule, for the geographic scope of NATO's common interests or its willingness to engage defensive forces.

In terms of structure, whatever the usual beliefs about its stability, NATO has almost always been in a state of structural change. From the outset, there has been constant discussion of organizational change, and of the balance of rights and privileges within the organization. Unquestionably, the greatest initial change was the development in the first decade of the permanent military command structure, and of mechanisms for joint planning and leadership sharing. France's withdrawal from that military organization in the mid-1960s required wide-reaching structural adjustment — from the powerful Standing Group to the plans for small unit exercises, even though informal military liaison and eventually French exercise participation continued quietly in parallel with French "politics alone" engagement. DeGaulle's scheme of a France, United States, and United Kingdom triumvirate from the late 1950s was never formally pressed, and once Germany attained its full membership status, was quickly set aside for an operational Big Four, sometimes resented for its policy reach by the smaller and middle-size NATO members.

What have been more interesting have been NATO's add-ons, the spurts of creative reorganization to reflect

and attach new areas of interests or to recognize new concerns. The creation of the North Atlantic Assembly, NATO's not-quite parliament, reflected both external political demands and internal musings about democratic deficits and the need for domestic political support. The last "architectural" NATO decade has been rich in attempts to create new channels of discussion and influence, particularly if they can be used both to win further political friends and to offset standing criticism at home about NATO's relevance or future. The results on the whole are impressive — the self-driven PfP, the Permanent Joint Council with Russia, the Commission with Ukraine, and the flexible evolution of older structures, from the regional military forces to the office of the Secretary General itself. Somewhat more troublesome have been the efforts to set up new member/nonmember channels for political consultation — first, the NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council), now the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), or even the initial tries at consultative groups for the broad "coalition of the willing" with troops in Bosnia.

NATO'S UNIQUE TASKS

Above all, however, the greatest amount of both change and continuity has come in the drawing together of members in NATO's most significant tasks, the crafting of policy consensus supported by an increasingly convergent civilian and policy culture, and a coordinated language for negotiation and dispute resolution. *NATO policy* or *NATO speak* does not yet exist, but there are now at least three generations of bureaucrats, civil and military, and Alliance political leaders who have learned the walk and talked the talk. Building on the wartime experience of joint staffs and policy consultation, this represents an unprecedented change in the way in which even allied sovereign states have usually cooperated in the sphere of security, the area thought often to be at the core of national identity and capacity. That identity is not replaced but supplemented in new and measurable ways. Within the Alliance, at almost every level, there are now measures of confidence and interdependence that exceed standard theoretical models in international relations and even the expectations of NATO's Founding Fathers themselves.

At NATO Headquarters and throughout the organization, these are not dramatic findings or items

for conversation among representatives. The tone is usually civil; the meeting room atmosphere, unfailingly depersonalized and forward-looking. Most national representatives enter a meeting, formal or informal, expecting that some progress toward decision or solution will result that exceeds lowest common denominator thinking. Most expect that they will not have to defend their country's honor against all comers. International staff members see concrete evidence that they can serve the organization faithfully and still continue their national governmental career thereafter. The informal contacts lead to certain camaraderie among both groups, while the formal interactions in Council remain more traditional and often far more theatrical.

At point here, though, is a clear and rather remarkable overarching belief that this is an organization that works, that NATO is not just a collection of potential vetoes (as some characterize the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] before it) or a standing diplomatic conference (such as the Council of Europe or the UN's First Committee dedicated to issues of security and arms control). Undoubtedly, the signs are most observable within the mechanisms for joint military planning and organization. Here transparency in the disclosure of national aims and capacities is the norm, the beginning point for policy dialogue and joint burdensharing. From infrastructure to intelligence, from bilateral talks to field exercises, there is not just the brotherhood of arms but a sense of shared jointures and of capability for the defined task. French forces felt the lack of this in their Gulf War participation, a question of culture and preparation rather than language or even hardware. Moreover, military careers are generally enhanced or at least not harmed by "NATO time," and they are often quite different because of it.

NATO culture has some unique national reflections as well. It is perhaps the only occasion in traditional Western diplomacy where there is close, relatively equal representation of political and military goals and views. In every case, the Ambassador and the Foreign Service rule. Yet, especially in an age of professional, not conscript, armies, duty at NATO is often one of the few occasions in which there can be full and frank exchange between civilian diplomats and military officers, and a peacetime requirement for day-to-day contact. There

can be little broad compartmentalization and papering over of disagreements. Again, the results for national policymaking can be long-lasting and enhance cross-ministry links and understanding.

It is this sense of shared experience and expectation that is the benchmark of efforts under the PfP to allow self-selected partners to come within a "hair's breadth" of the role of members with respect to Article 4. On-the-job training in Bosnia for the more than a dozen PfP countries that have contributed forces to IFOR/SFOR (Implementation Force/Stabilization Force) has provided vivid operational learning; the ambitious program of PfP joint exercises reinforces the lessons.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

How will NATO's start into its next 50 years compare with the impressive list of changes in the decade since the Berlin Wall came down? In what is still a period of transition, this is impossible to answer. Is this summit the end of a phase of transformation? Alternatively, is it merely a way station on the road to further change in the short term, organizationally and politically as well as structurally and operationally?

Four questions appear from the vantage point of 1999 to be central drivers of further change. First, how will the Alliance adapt to the emergence, slowly or quickly, of a significant European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) expressed in both "hardware and software," that is, in both policy and operational terms? In the past decades, NATO has struggled with what have often been ephemeral ESDI precursors; for example, the relationship with the Western European Union (WEU) and its efforts to develop a planning cell that only focused on European forces. More serious and ultimately more thought-provoking was the long wrangle over Combined Joint Task Forces, units that would allow European NATO forces to use all of NATO-assigned assets, even if the United States and other nations were not involved in a specific mission.

In many respects, this is a dialogue of the European states with themselves, whether the site is NATO or the EU, and perhaps not accessible to most of the public. Yet, the commitment of governing elites has been relatively unequivocal since the signing of the Treaty on European Union at Maastricht in 1992 and

the conclusion of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. How precisely this will function within the present Alliance framework is the work of the next decade. The early experience of the need for American involvement on the ground in Bosnia is one indicator; the European engagement in Kosovo and in Albania may prove a counter-indicator. It is clearly an area for far greater conceptual and operational work over the next decade.

A second related question is now the subject of expert discussion, civilian and military. How will the changing nature of military forces, U.S. and European, affect the nature of and the potential for common military action and planning? The changes are largely driven by economic and political factors: the substitution value of high tech assets for expensive manpower in the United States and the decline of conscription throughout Europe, to name just two critical examples. Numbers are unquestionably lower; there is little reason in a continuing post-Cold War era to expect broad public support for higher defense spending or greater investments in procurement for global missions. Humanitarian crises point in different directions: new and different training and equipment but perhaps longer, more randomly violent missions. All of this must be discussed in the context not only of the implementation of a new Alliance strategy but also of new methods of training and planning, of mobilizing and equipping forces in war and peace.

A third challenge is how NATO's open door policy on the further admission of members will actually affect the organization itself and its broader relationships. Where are the borders or limits that will find common agreement? Will there be a sliding scale of association determined largely by distance or by economic development? Will the criteria which initially determined the membership of the PfP still be relevant — the republics of the former Soviet Union, the emerging states of Central and Eastern Europe, the excluded neutrals? And if the rate of new admissions is to be measured in half-decades rather than months or single years, how will that affect the positive influence

potential membership has had on national behavior — the settlements of long-standing border questions, the more benevolent treatment of national minorities, the preparedness of armed forces?

Last and hardly least, is the factor of how NATO's new missions will affect the prospects for cooperation outside of its area of association and responsibility. Article 4 tasks are by definition less obviously compelling for all members; the prospects for cooperation may be stronger with others — say Japan — than with those that are now members or partners. Moreover, the definition of security and cooperation in a low-threat environment may also differ widely. How will NATO's changes in a changed environment prepare for further changes and adaptation? Moreover, is there really a chance for processes of de-accession, as well as accession, that can be seriously considered?

A LOOK FORWARD

The easy way to project NATO's last half-century forward onto the next 50 years is simply to argue that NATO will as usual muddle through. Policy will define a state of institutional inertia, with changes as must be and adaptation at some rate to further changes we cannot foresee at present. Others posit NATO's uniqueness as also reason alone for survival, relying on a primitive cost-benefit calculation that cooperation is less costly than unilateralism, and probably less politically risky as well.

Neither argument, obviously, is sufficient. However, the results of the past decade against what seemed unfavorable odds are impressive and reflect more than simple survival or an unexpected competitive edge over other parts of European security architecture. The flexibility and the willingness to continue to commit attention and resources shown by member states bode well as does the expression of interest in and association by emerging states. The odds seem definite for a cooperative political and economic transatlantic future, however dark the glass through which we now see. ●

WHAT THE POLLS SAY: U.S., EUROPEAN VIEWS ON TRANSATLANTIC ISSUES

*Compiled by the European Branch
Office of Research and Media Reaction
U.S. Information Agency*

USIA surveys across Western Europe find that while publics see an increasingly important role for the European Union (EU) in world affairs, they still value close ties to the United States. Publics in key allied countries prefer that the United States continue to participate in matters of European security, although in a less dominant capacity, and preferably within a multilateral framework. Yet public views on the ideal size and scope of multilateral institutions such as NATO, the EU, and the United Nations have not fully jelled.

WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE

Key West European publics continue to support the economic and political unification of Europe, expressing confidence in the EU's approach to European affairs and support for their country's membership in the union. Half or more in Britain (56%), France (70%), and Germany (49%) share the view that the EU currently functions more like "separate countries with different agendas" than like a "single country" (Britain 16%, France 16%, Germany 17%). However, many expect this to change. Pluralities in Britain (36%), France (46%), and Germany (37%) say the EU will act more like a single country in the next ten years.

West Europeans tend to favor a common regional approach to social and foreign policies. In fact, when asked which organizations should make the most important decisions about future European security — NATO, the EU, or some other organization — half or more in France (61%), Germany (49%), Greece (67%), Italy (77%) and Spain (68%) think the EU should take the lead; Britons prefer NATO over the EU by only a small margin (40% NATO, 33% EU). West Europeans lack consensus in characterizing the U.S. position on European integration. A slim plurality in Germany (35%) think the United States favors strengthening the EU, while a plurality in France (41%) think the United States opposes it. But in Britain, a plurality (38%) think the United States does not care one way or the other. In each country, many say they don't know where the United States stands on integration.

ON U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

Publics on both sides of the Atlantic continue to value U.S.-European ties. Britons (79%), the French (76%), Germans (81%), Italians (81%), and Spaniards (79%) tend to believe that their country's ties to the United States are equally or more important in the post-Cold War world; Americans similarly value their ties to Europe, according to surveys conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland. PIPA polls found that seven in ten Americans agree that "even though the Cold War is over, we need to maintain strong relations with Europe" both as a partner in addressing world problems and because of significant trade relations. Only a quarter disagree and believe that U.S. relations with Europe are less important now than during the Cold War and that "the U.S. should turn inward and worry less about overseas problems."

In part, U.S.-European ties are based on NATO's defense commitment. Publics in Britain (84%), France (71%), Germany (78%), and Italy (80%) sense that they could rely on the United States to assist them in their defense. However, Greeks and Turks, reflecting tensions on Cyprus, and Spaniards tend to doubt that the United States would come to their aid (76%, 68%, and 55% not confident, respectively). Americans tend to believe that they can rely on their European allies, although a sizable minority are skeptical (55% confident, 43% not confident).

Overall opinion of the United States remains fairly high across Europe (74% favorable on average), but there is a sense in both Europe and the United States that U.S.-

European relations should be more balanced. Majorities in most European countries surveyed (from 53% in France to 77% in the United Kingdom) think that strong U.S. leadership in world affairs is desirable for their country's interests, although publics tend to disagree in Bulgaria (49%), Slovakia (56%), and some NATO nations in southern Europe — specifically Spain (56%) and Turkey (49%). Yet, across the Continent, many think that the United States is heavy-handed in its relations with Europe, with about half or more (54-80% in Western Europe, 39-56% in East-Central Europe) saying that the United States has “too much influence” over their country's affairs. Moreover, many believe that the United States does not treat their country as an equal partner in matters of bilateral concern (from 50% of Britons to 73% of Italians); only Germans (57%) tend to think their country is treated as an equal.

Many West Europeans desire a greater role for Europe in security matters and many think that they are already contributing their fair share (Britain 48%, France 50%, Germany 44%). Two-thirds or more across Europe — both in current EU members and in Central and East European countries — believe that strong EU leadership in world affairs is desirable for their national interests. In each European country surveyed, more see strong leadership by the EU as desirable than see leadership by the United States as desirable (except in Britain, where it is equal).

Americans, for their part, want a shared leadership role in world affairs. PIPA polls show that eight in ten Americans believe that the U.S.-EU relationship should be one of equal partners (13%, United States should take the lead; 5%, Europe should), and two-thirds (65%) believe that the United States should work closely with the EU when addressing world problems. Yet, most Americans (77%) feel that Europe is not pulling its weight in European security and that the United States is doing “more than its fair share.”

Many West Europeans believe that their countries are “working in the same direction” as the United States on some issues, especially on Bosnia. Britons and Germans also tend to perceive a convergence with the United States on European security (55%, 65% respectively), Iran (62%, 52%), Iraq (69%, 63%), and the Middle East peace process (62%, 55%). The French are more divided in each case.

ON EXPANDING COOPERATION

While generally positive toward the international organizations to which their countries belong, British, French, and German publics lack consensus about which institution should be “primarily responsible” for a number of problems. This suggests that publics remain flexible in their views of each institution's responsibilities. Pluralities in each country think that individual national governments should be primarily responsible for controlling illegal immigration and that the UN should take the lead on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. There is less consensus on who should take primary responsibility for reducing unemployment; coordinating international arms control efforts; and combating organized crime, illegal drug trafficking, and international terrorism. In general, the British and French are more likely than the Germans to say that either national governments or the UN should be responsible for handling these problems, while the Germans are the most likely — and the British the least likely — to name the EU.

Although flexible in their views of each institution's role, West Europeans are receptive to having NATO take on some new missions. Majorities in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Turkey would support the use of NATO forces to provide peacekeeping in conflicts between NATO members (ranging from 65% to 86%) or in bordering countries (60% to 86%), or to strengthen security in a particular region such as the Mediterranean (51% to 82%). Even having NATO combat international terrorism and international drug trafficking garners the support of large majorities (69% to 86%). Publics are somewhat less enthusiastic about using NATO troops to defend Western interests out of area such as in the Persian Gulf, but majorities in Britain (64%) and Italy (61%), and half in Turkey (53%), France (49%), and Spain (46%) are in favor. A plurality in Germany are opposed (46%).

Many West Europeans support their own country's participation in multilateral security missions. In key West European countries, seven in ten or more (Germany 69%, United Kingdom 74%, France 76%, Italy and Spain 82%) favor the participation of their country's troops in the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia. Support is almost as high in most Central and East European countries (63-66% in the Czech Republic,

Hungary, Poland, and Romania). On Kosovo, June 1998 surveys found that majorities of about seven in ten or more in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy would support stationing troops along Kosovo's borders and maintaining a follow-on troop presence if military action were taken. Notably, these key allied publics tend to prefer that any military action in Kosovo be authorized by the UN (Britain 48%, France 50%, Germany 39%) rather than by NATO alone (Britain 34%, France 41%, Germany 35%).

Although supportive of their own country's contributions to particular multilateral actions such as those in Bosnia or Kosovo, many Europeans are not eager to take on an additional financial cost for overall European security. When asked specifically whether they would be willing to undertake an additional financial burden in exchange for a reduced U.S. role in European security matters, support for a greater European role drops in Britain, France, Germany, and Greece. Similarly, many Central and East Europeans wish to join NATO and many West Europeans favor extending an invitation to them, but they tend to oppose an increase in defense spending to cover the costs of enlargement. However, many

Europeans across-the-board accept that their country should contribute a share — either alone or with other NATO members — to cover the cost of NATO enlargement.

METHODOLOGY

The European survey findings presented in this article are based on face-to-face interviews conducted in 1998 with nationally representative probability samples of approximately 1,000 adults (age 18 and older) in each country. A few results from telephone surveys also are included. USIA commissioned local firms specializing in political polling or market research to conduct the fieldwork. Survey questions were prepared by the USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, translated by the local firms, and then reviewed by USIA staff. Nineteen times out of 20, results from samples of this size will differ by no more than about four percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in each survey country. Results from U.S. survey findings are based on a poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland. ©

FINDING PURPOSE — AND SUCCESS — IN BOSNIA

*By Ambassador Robert E. Hunter
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When I arrived at NATO headquarters in July 1993, I found my new colleagues' morale to be low, the Alliance unsure of its directions, and even voices questioning whether NATO had a future. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union had collapsed and there was no clear rationale for keeping NATO going. Conflict was raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina, close by NATO territory, and the Alliance was unable — or unwilling — to do much about it. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had responsibility on the ground but seemed unable to protect anyone, while NATO's role was limited to keeping Bosnia's skies clear of aircraft and its coastline free of arms trafficking.

But what a transformation by the time my term as U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council came to an end four and a half years later! The Alliance clearly had a sense of purpose for the future, clustered around four key goals: to keep America engaged as a European power; to preserve the best of NATO's past; to include the nations of Central Europe fully in the West; and to reach out to Russia. To these ends, NATO had adopted a raft of new initiatives, each designed to meet some particular need of Europe's security future, and all related to, and reinforcing, one another. Three Central European countries (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) were invited to join the Alliance. At the same time, the door was kept open for all other countries ready and willing to shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership.

Meanwhile, NATO was celebrating the success of its landmark Partnership for Peace, its most important initiative in many years, designed both to prepare countries to join NATO and to enable those that did not join to be deeply engaged in the Alliance's work as part of its extended family. In parallel, NATO had created a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to succeed the old North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It had completed work on reforming its command structures, while also creating new Combined Joint Task

Force headquarters, able to project NATO power rapidly and effectively, especially in peacekeeping missions. And the NATO allies had agreed on a new relationship with the Western European Union (WEU), under which NATO officers and military assets could be used for Europeans-only military operations, thus for the first time giving the WEU the capability to act. This was largely the result of a new cooperation between the United States and France, in which the latter moved back toward full membership in NATO's military commands. I was particularly pleased to work closely with France's NATO ambassador to help make this possible.

NATO had also taken the revolutionary steps of concluding a Founding Act with Russia and beginning to meet with Russian representatives in a Permanent Joint Council, signing a Charter and creating a Commission with Ukraine, and completing nearly two years of active military deployments in Bosnia. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) has included all 16 allies, 14 Partnership for Peace countries, and even Russia, keeping the peace in Bosnia and helping its people finally to have hope for building new lives.

So much done in so little time — and done by all 16 allies working together, with ample credit to be shared all around. Needless to say, at the end of 1997 morale at NATO headquarters was high, and everyone there had a clear sense of purpose and achievement. But none of this was obvious in July 1993. The first goal then was to prepare for a NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994 — fulfilling a request that Secretary General Manfred Woerner made to me when I first telephoned him to tell him of my appointment. The prospect of a summit concentrates the mind, and it did so both within the U.S. government and in the Alliance. In the middle of October 1993, allied defense ministers met informally in Travemeunde, Germany, and the relatively new Clinton Administration unveiled its summit strategy.

The centerpiece was “PFP” — the shorthand name for Partnership for Peace — an idea developed by a small team of U.S. officials during a visit to my mission at NATO. By the time of the January 1994 summit, the allies were also ready to commit themselves to taking in new members, to creating a new relationship with the Western European Union, to dealing with emerging challenges from weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them, and to seeking some way of drawing Russia out of its cocoon and into playing a constructive role in European security.

This set the agenda, which focused on reaching out to NATO’s east to include all its nations and peoples in the best hope ever to create security and peace across the Continent. NATO’s “enlargement” formed the pivot, but all of its other actions were designed to make sure that the outcome would be a positive contribution to Europe’s overall security; indeed, I can think of no other foreign policy effort in modern times that, to the same degree, was as systematic: where the goals were set first, followed by a strategy to achieve them, and then step-by-step planning and action.

But something was missing. While NATO’s new security architecture was being designed, it became obvious that this would profit little if the Alliance did not take responsibility for ending the conflict in Bosnia. There was no point in arguing that we had “done everything the United Nations had asked us to do.” The conundrum was simple: NATO was dedicated to security; turmoil and tragedy were taking place unabated on its doorstep; thus NATO had failed.

Fair or not, this judgment challenged the allies to act. But this was not simple or automatic; indeed, perhaps no other issue in NATO history had done more to tear at allied cohesion — and Bosnia nearly destroyed the Alliance. Nine allies had troops on the ground with UNPROFOR, while the United States, which did not, called for the use of air power. The allies could not agree on a common strategy; risks were not being shared equally; there were charges of double-dealing;

NATO’s limited and episodic use of air power — “pinpricks” — produced nothing but further disagreement among allies; and the impasse over Bosnia threatened to pull apart even the common work of building NATO’s future in Central Europe and with Russia.

Tragically, it took the Bosnian Serb atrocities at Srebrenica in the summer of 1995 finally to shock the allies collectively into action. At long last, I found it possible to get allied agreement to use air power that all would unreservedly support, and NATO went into action for the first time in its history. Twenty days later NATO had clearly prevailed and the bombing stopped; and soon thereafter so did the war, opening the way to the Dayton Accords and to deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force — which remarkably has now passed its third anniversary without a single combat fatality.

In a very real sense, Bosnia saved NATO. The allies showed that they could take an alliance designed for one purpose, now fulfilled, and devote it to radically different tasks, militarily shifting its focus 120 degrees from the old European central front to the Balkans. Bosnia proved NATO’s relevance; the renewed importance of America’s leadership; its willingness to share responsibility with its allies; the essential moral and political basis of security; and the continued worth of NATO’s unspoken, borrowed motto: one for all and all for one. NATO’s founders, I believe, would have been proud of what their successors, half a century on, had done to give the promise of peace to another generation.

After 35 years working on European security issues, I was proud to serve with an able team of dedicated American public servants in the U.S. Mission to NATO — civilian and military, representing the State and Defense Departments, USIA, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency — who achieved so much at this historic and hopeful moment. ©

MANFRED WOERNER: FORCE BEHIND NATO'S POST-COLD WAR AGENDA

*By Ambassador William H. Taft, IV
Partner: Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson
U.S. Ambassador to NATO 1989-1992*

I arrived in Brussels to lead the U.S. Mission to NATO in August 1989. Several months earlier the Alliance had celebrated its 40th anniversary. For 40 years, the allies had stood together against the threat of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. While Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms were certainly seen as important and NATO's political and military posture had never been stronger relative to the Warsaw Pact, very few people were predicting that the Cold War in which we had been engaged for four decades was about to end. By the time I returned to the United States three years later, however, it was fast becoming a distant memory.

The largest part of my time at NATO was spent working to enable the Alliance to carry out its functions in the post-Cold War environment. We did not complete this work by 1992; we did, however, make substantial progress on it, most importantly in identifying the core functions of the Alliance for the future and reaching out to our former adversaries to cooperate with us within the institutional framework of NATO to provide security and independence for all European states.

Many people contributed importantly to this work. It could not have moved ahead without each of them. Even in distinguished company, however, the efforts of Manfred Woerner, Secretary General of NATO from 1988 until his untimely death six years later, stand out. It gives me pleasure to recall them here.

Before becoming Secretary General, Manfred had served as Germany's Minister of Defense from 1982 to 1988. In that post his clear understanding that military capability was an essential element in preserving peace and freedom in the face of the Soviet threat, and his tireless efforts to see that such capability as was needed was actually funded by parliament, played a key role in influencing the Soviet Union first to doubt and finally to discard its policies of confrontation toward the West. In carrying out his essential but politically unpopular duties, Manfred

always preserved his good humor. He knew what he thought, and he knew he was right. He also, in the Greek phrase, "knew himself" — his strengths, his weaknesses, his own complex identity. He was at once a Swabian, a German, a European, and an unshakable friend of the United States. And he was each of these completely, seeing no need to rank or compromise any of them.

I will save the Swabian for last. A word first about the German.

In 1988, when he became the first German Secretary General of NATO, the significance of this appointment was evident. It signaled the allies' recognition and appreciation of Germany's vital political contributions to the Alliance. For many years these had been of a more tentative character than its economic and military activities. There was nothing tentative about Manfred Woerner, however, and nothing simply symbolic about his politics either. He was substance. The allies knew that their new Secretary General would enhance Germany's growing reputation as a major influence in setting the policies of the multilateral institutions in which it was a member, including most importantly NATO. What they could not know was that the unification of Germany within the Alliance would be the most important item on NATO's agenda in 1990 and 1991. Having a German Secretary General at this time was an inestimable advantage in the work. It was not lost on the people of East Germany and the other Soviet "allies" that the chief executive of the Warsaw Pact would never have been a German.

No one at NATO headquarters asked where Manfred Woerner was the day after the Berlin Wall came down in November of 1989. He could not have been anywhere but in Berlin from the moment he heard the news. Days later, long after he returned to Brussels, his pride and delight at the events he had spent a lifetime working for were plain for all to see. Yet for all his excitement no

one was more clearheaded or serious about what needed to be done in the wake of East Germany's collapse. Unification was never a question for him. That the eastern *laender* (states) would be as much a part of NATO as Bavaria he never doubted. And if individuals worried that a unified Germany might be inclined to overreach, Manfred Woerner himself, the chief executive of the Alliance, reassured them every day — by his integrity and decency in dealing with large and small nations alike — that this would not be so. He had views, of course, and if they weren't the same as yours, you knew it. But building consensus was his job, and he never failed at it or let his own preferences interfere with fulfilling his responsibility.

Where the unification of Germany was concerned, Manfred never could have thought of it other than as a German and he never would have tried. The force of his arguments always originated in the obvious genuineness of his feelings; he was at his most eloquent when he controlled those feelings without concealing them. When it came to dealing with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, he had another character: Manfred Woerner, European. It was as a European that he extended the hand of friendship to the nations of the East and invited them to join with the allies in the work of maintaining peace and security in Europe. He was tireless in this effort, a true believer in "Europe whole and free."

Early in 1990 and throughout the next two years, the Secretary General's itinerary was filled with visits to the nations of the former Warsaw Pact. As a result of his personal invitations, there also was a constant stream of foreign ministers and heads of government from those countries visiting NATO. He never looked back in this effort; he created institutional contexts for the participation of these former adversaries in every aspect of the Alliance's activity. Inclusiveness and flexibility were his watchwords: Always let people in, if not in one way then in another. His conception of Europe was never confined to the West, to the rich, to the Christian, or to anything less than all of Europe. When he welcomed each new visitor to NATO with a loud voice and a broad smile, his words of welcome were heartfelt, and no one could mistake his pleasure in seeing Europe coming together.

But even all of Europe was too small for Manfred Woerner. North America — both Canada and the United States

— was always in his mind as an indispensable element in the successful realization of his Swabian, German, and European dreams. He could never, of course, be an American, but he studied the United States as few Europeans have and, quite apart from his conviction that the United States must stay engaged in Europe, he had genuine affection and admiration for this nation. He read our literature, traveled, and spoke throughout the country, and regularly spent his vacations here. He even followed our national sports. He rejoiced at our successes and shared our disappointments. It never occurred to him simply that Europeans *ought* to be allies of the United States; he wanted to be an ally. And beyond that, Manfred wanted the United States not simply to be in the Alliance; he wanted it to lead the Alliance. He never met with the President or the Secretary of State without reminding them, "You must lead." Much of the time, of course, we did lead, but more than once I had the feeling we were leading only in the way that a horse leads a carriage — with Manfred on the box urging us forward.

Finally, we come to Manfred Woerner, Swabian. This was his homeland and he never forgot it. Frequently on weekends he would make the journey there from Brussels. And when he wasn't there, he carried its history with him. His enthusiasm on a trip we took together to Palermo was typical. We admired, of course, the Norman mosaics, and Manfred exulted all morning in the warm Sicilian sun, neglecting to work on a speech. One thing, however, he did not neglect. We went to pay our respects at the tomb of his fellow Swabian, Frederick II, Hohenstaufen Holy Roman Emperor during the 13th century. Manfred left a bouquet of flowers and recalled for us with pride the achievements of his countryman. These were, of course, many — some more creditable than others. The one that impressed Manfred most was Frederick's ability, when ordered by the Pope to lead a crusade to recover Jerusalem, not only to do that but also to make himself king of it — all through diplomacy. This, Manfred told us, was always the preferred Swabian method.

Manfred Woerner's untimely death from cancer in 1994 deprived Germany, Europe, and the United States of a great statesman and true friend. That NATO continues today as the principal guarantor of peace, freedom, and security in Europe is, in large part, the result of his work. ©

ACHIEVING ALLIED COOPERATION ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

*By Ambassador David M. Abshire
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U.S. Ambassador to NATO, 1983-1987*

During my first year at NATO, in 1983, I was plagued by a paradox. On the one hand, NATO had won an extraordinary strategic victory. The allies had hung together on the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) deployment of their “Euromissiles”; the Soviet strategy to divide them had failed. The NATO multilateral and bilateral diplomacy was perfectly handled. After the Soviet negotiators walked out of the conference room in Geneva, the allies began to deploy. The Soviets apparently hoped that hints of a return to the Cold War would shake the allies’ resolve. No such thing happened, and the chagrined Soviet negotiators had to return to the table.

On the other hand, this NATO success on nuclear deployments was part of the problem. The nuclear issue so occupied not only NATO Headquarters but, indeed, our State and Defense Departments, that no one was willing to confront the problems of conventional forces.

I knew full well that, sooner or later, we would be headed toward another transatlantic crisis over the shape of conventional defense forces and that there had to be a new, major initiative to improve them. But there was a stumbling block: Europe had not come out of its recession. Unemployment ran high, and coalition governments were fragile. The success of INF created a sense of having done what had to be done on defense at considerable political cost, and the defense of Europe would have to rest on nuclear, not conventional, capabilities. European politicians realized that nuclear forces did not cost the economically depressed Europeans any money, while conventional forces did and were therefore not appreciated.

In the autumn of 1983 the one window into a new conventional defense effort appeared to be through armaments cooperation: to take an initiative to make better use of the superior financial, technological, and

industrial base of the Alliance in the development and production of military equipment. With my staff, I pounded out a cable more than 40 pages long, soon known as the “monstergram.” This was sent to the secretaries of state and defense and the national security adviser. The cable argued that, as 1983 had been the Year of the Missiles, 1984 must become the Year of Conventional Defense Programs. Alarming trends in the NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional force balance had become NATO’s number one problem. But there was another danger, too: growing congressional frustration at Europe’s unwillingness to do something about this inadequacy. Conventional improvements had become imperative. Without new resources, the first step had to be a broad new initiative in armaments cooperation to make better use of existing resources.

German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner told me privately that he wanted to introduce something he termed the Conceptual Military Framework. The Pentagon, he complained, had made a series of disconnected initiatives at NATO, with such exotic names as Air Land Battle, Offensive Counter Air, and the Emerging Technologies initiative. These came in addition to work being done by NATO’s own military people on problems such as hitting targets deep in the enemy’s rear areas. There should be a far more coherent approach, Woerner argued, both to sell programs to parliaments and to improve military performance. A long-term perspective was needed. Woerner asked for my personal support. I was delighted, for I saw it as a centerpiece for developing an overall strategy to better use NATO resources.

The actions of the defense ministers during their December 1983 meeting were not advanced enough to avert a transatlantic crisis, however. We were in a race against time, and we were to lose. Senator Sam Nunn, while encouraged by the ministers’ recognition of conventional problems and up-to-date on my activities,

was neither fully confident of Pentagon follow-through nor convinced of any major effort on conventional defense on the part of the lethargic capitals of Europe. Quietly he began to sort through drafts for a troop-withdrawal amendment, and not just a proposal to get some of our troops out. Nunn did not think that way. Rather, as what I would call a resource strategist, he thought in terms of how the superior U.S. investment in NATO was being aborted by allied failures. He cited one glaring example: in a crisis, the United States was to fly 1,500 aircraft costing more than \$50 billion to Europe, but there were not enough shelters to protect them when they got there.

Nunn's logic regarding withdrawal was that the lack of European defense investment was condemning us to a "trip-wire" strategy, so that the large number of U.S. forces would not make much difference. He proposed removing 90,000 troops over three years. His amendment, however, provided allies a way to avoid this; it required the allies either to fulfill their three percent increases mandated in 1977 or meet several output requirements. This would help solve problems like the low number of essential facilities and shelters for U.S. reinforcing aircraft as well as severe ammunition shortages.

When the proposed Nunn amendment was discussed by the Senate's Democratic caucus, it immediately caught on. The White House legislative office estimated it could command more than 75 Senate votes, for Republicans were falling into line behind the highly respected Nunn. The White House began to talk about not actively opposing the amendment, so great appeared to be the majority for it. I was a bit desperate.

I went all out to get those senators I knew on the phone. I argued that if this amendment passed in the wake of the INF deployment, of MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) negotiations, it could be disastrous. In dismay, I appealed to the good sense of Senator John Warner, whom I reached on his Virginia farm. Success! He would stay with us and be in touch with Senator John Tower, who should lead the floor fight. In the ensuing Senate debate, Tower, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was indeed a tower of strength on the Senate floor. He argued that to pass the amendment would be to "kick our friends in the teeth." Tower pointed out that "nobody (would) regard this as a signal; they (would) regard it as

bullying." Nunn replied: "Is it too much to ask your friends and allies to do what they have pledged to do?" He argued that we simply could not send American troops to Europe while looking them in the eye and saying, "Fellows, you are going over there and about the time you arrive the allies are going to run out of ammunition."

At that point, Senator Bill Cohen spoke up, noting that "when it comes to rattling cages, the Senator from Georgia has already rattled cages" and that he had "already sent a message to the European alliance." Cohen proposed a way out, an alternative amendment that provided for reporting on NATO's progress, rather than Nunn's mechanism for automatic troop withdrawal. As the vote margin narrowed, President Reagan himself made the final phone calls and the alternative Cohen amendment passed.

About this time, Lord Peter Carrington replaced Joseph Luns as Secretary General. Despite his pedigree as the sixth baron and his prestige as former First Lord of the Admiralty, Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister, Peter Carrington cared nothing for ceremony — he did not need it — and his first act was to put Luns' cherished Rolls-Royce up for sale. Shortly after his arrival, he asked me to his office to help interpret the warning shot fired at NATO by the United States Senate.

And when I first took him to visit Nunn in his Senate office, Carrington said, "Senator, I am with you. Not your method, mind you, but your end, your objective." The unconventional British Lord and the determined Georgia Senator established instant rapport.

I often thought how Peter Carrington shared similar qualities with former Supreme Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower. Neither long-range thinkers nor conceptualists, they both had a genius for the here-and-now, and at getting different people and difficult allies to work together. Grand strategy almost always involves coalition strategy, and no grand plan has an ounce of a chance of success without the leadership of an Eisenhower or a Carrington. Indeed, the genius of Peter Carrington turned the troop-withdrawal threat into a redoubling of Alliance efforts on conventional defense. This was perhaps the most delicate time in NATO history since the French withdrawal from the military command, certainly in terms of relations

within the Alliance. The problem for Carrington was how to produce concrete results on improvements, sufficient to prevent passage of another amendment the following year.

In autumn of that same year, one year after our monstergram in 1983, Washington began to take a new conventional defense initiative seriously. As usual, the Pentagon and State Department were at odds, and I was very fearful that Washington would come up with a piecemeal approach. Carrington had earlier commented to me that he also believed NATO should concentrate on only one or two key efforts, and do them well. The second problem, a political one, was choosing who should sponsor the new effort. Washington authorities and Carrington wisely recognized the effort should not be “Americanized” and that the Germans had to be persuaded to take the lead. Thus, at an autumn meeting in Washington between President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl, agreement was reached on a “German initiative,” backed by the United States, to be introduced at the December 1984 Defense Ministers Meeting in Brussels.

Woerner picked up the paper, read it with a nod, and in a flash introduced an initiative that led to the most comprehensive reexamination of NATO conventional defense in its history.

Later that spring, Nunn was back as my guest at Truman Hall. After briefings at our NATO mission, he was impressed with the coherence of the program to obtain a better return on overall defense investment and wondered aloud why the Pentagon did not have such a framework. He expressed his pleasure on the positive program over lunch with Carrington, who mused that there might be another amendment to keep the pressure on, but a positive one this time. Later that day, Nunn

confided that he would set his troop-withdrawal amendment aside that year, but he did not want this known. He wanted to work in secret with his staff and mine on a positive-incentive amendment, while everyone thought he might again move on troop withdrawal.

With Nunn’s consent, we opened conversations with Deputy Secretary of Defense William Taft, who became an essential ally as chairman of the new NATO Armaments Cooperation Committee, which was brought into being by our monstergram from Brussels. As finally worked out, the new Nunn amendment would set aside \$200 million, which could be spent by the services only if they worked in cooperation with the allies. Allies had to put up their own money, although not on an exact dollar-for-dollar basis. A second part of the amendment was to set aside \$50 million for side-by-side testing of weapons from the U.S. and NATO countries before acquisition. Two stalwart senators, John Warner and Bill Roth, joined Nunn in sponsoring this monumental step forward for better use of NATO resources. Senator Ted Stevens — who became the influential advocate on the Senate Appropriations Committee — also had visited NATO and concluded that the headquarters “was getting its act together.”

Introduced in a dramatic speech complimenting NATO on its progress while excoriating the Defense Department in other areas, the Nunn-Roth-Warner amendment sent a signal to Europe to get its house in order and to meet the American challenge. The amendment also told our Army, Navy, and Air Force that they should think more about overall strategy in the use of their resources. The Alliance had come a long way in the year since it stood on the brink of American troop withdrawals. A new can-do attitude was developing. ●

NATO's 50th Anniversary:
ARTICLE ALERT

Cooke, Thomas. NATO CJTF DOCTRINE: THE NAKED EMPEROR (Parameters, vol. 28, no. 4, Winter 1998-99, pp. 124-136)

To conduct the deployment in Bosnia, NATO relied upon the concept of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) and has since embraced it "as the likely means by which similar operations will be conducted in the future," says Cooke. But the strategy "was never intended for international coalitions that must achieve unanimity before deciding to act," he argues. Therefore, alternatives to CJTF — including the "lead-nation" concept — should be explored "before embracing a doctrine that may well prove ineffective, costly, and potentially dangerous if ever implemented in a major conflict."

Heaton, Erin; Caires, Greg Alan. EUROPE ON THE MOVE: THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN 1998 (Seapower, vol. 42, no. 1, January 1999, pp. 59-64)

Despite forecasts of decline, the authors contend, "NATO will remain central to transatlantic security." Future NATO operations will be successful "only if its constituent members agree to the coalition-warfare concept of operations, in which each participant's strengths are matched to the missions most suitable," they say. And NATO will not "remain robust unless the new European governments agree to develop interoperable weapons, systems, and platforms that are both compatible with coalition warfare and able to keep indigenous defense industrial bases reasonably healthy."

Ikenberry, G. John. AMERICA'S LIBERAL HEGEMONY (Current History, vol. 98, no. 624, January 1999, pp. 23-28)

"In terms of world order-building, the end of the Cold War is an overrated historical event," says Ikenberry, contending that "continuity, not transformation, has been the hallmark of the post-Cold War era." One element of post-war order-building among the industrial democracies entailed establishing security alliances, which protected their members from outside threats and "also provided institutionalized assurances that the countries would maintain steady and predictable relationships."

The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered on the home page of the U.S. Information Service: "http://www.usia.gov/admin/001/wwwhapub.html".

Lunn, Simon. NATO'S PARLIAMENTARY ARM HELPS FURTHER THE AIMS OF THE ALLIANCE (NATO Review, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 1998, pp. 8-11)

Lunn, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), believes the organization offers a critical service by building consensus as NATO adjusts to the changing security environment. The NAA brings together parliamentarians from member countries, partner countries, and the Mediterranean and thus facilitates broader awareness, trust, and cooperation in Europe. In the view of many Assembly members, he says, the April 1999 Washington Summit to celebrate NATO's 50th anniversary will be an appropriate setting to give recognition to the role and relevancy of the Assembly.

Moss, Kenneth B. U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS AND THE CHANGING BALANCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS (Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 4, Fall 1998, pp. 52-68)

Moss believes the redefinition of national security during the past 20 years "to include factors of economics and commerce and related areas in environment, energy, and social policy" has resulted in "a situation in which congressional powers are much stronger than previously." However the "disparity between the necessary worldwide focus of national policy and the local orientation of Congress in commercial and economic issues possibly poses the major challenge to effective U.S. leadership in foreign policy," he says.

Ruhle, Michael. TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT NATO'S ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY (NATO Review, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 1998, pp. 20-23)

Ruhle, a senior planning officer at NATO, suggests that the way to define NATO's post-Cold War role is not to search for a single purpose but to show how NATO contributes to "the emerging Euro-Atlantic security architecture." He sees this "architecture" as consisting of several political processes that affect the strategic environment, and the successful management of these processes by NATO and other institutions. NATO's contribution to European integration, for example, has included the development of a European Security and Defense Identity and the enlargement of NATO to welcome fledgling democracies in Central Europe. ◎

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Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy: NATO
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North Atlantic Assembly
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization at 50
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 50th Anniversary
<http://www.nato.int/nato@50/nato50.htm>

Partnership for Peace
<http://www.nato.int/pfp/pfp.htm>

SACLANT: Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
<http://www.saclant.nato.int/>

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
<http://www.shape.nato.int/>

U.S. Department of Defense: NATO's 50th Anniversary
<http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/NATO/>

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