

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

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*U.S. National Security:
The Bush Team*

March 2001

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

U.S. National Security: The Bush Team



The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. We will defend our allies and our interests. We will show purpose without arrogance. We will meet aggression and bad faith with resolve and strength. And to all nations, we will speak for the values that gave our nation birth.

— President George W. Bush,
Inaugural Address, January 20, 2001

Our Nation also needs a clear strategy to confront the threats of the 21st century, threats that are more widespread and less certain. They range from terrorists who threaten with bombs to tyrants and rogue nations intent on developing weapons of mass destruction. To protect our own people, our allies and friends, we must develop and we must deploy effective missile defenses. And as we transform our military, we can discard Cold War relics, and reduce our own nuclear forces to reflect today's needs.

— President George W. Bush,
Address to Joint Session of Congress,
February 27, 2001

“We have assembled the finest national security team of any administration,” President Bush said March 4. This issue of *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* explores the Bush administration’s foreign policy priorities as viewed by members of the President’s national security team, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, as well as by two prominent members of Congress and a leading academic. It includes background information on the key players and a listing of bibliographic materials and Internet sites.

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U.S. Department of State*

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY: THE BUSH TEAM

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**U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
A G E N D A**

AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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U.S. INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT: A TIME OF GREAT OPPORTUNITY

Statements by Secretary of State Colin Powell on Key Foreign Policy Issues



Secretary of State Colin Powell says this is “a time of great opportunity” for the United States because “there is no other ideology...that can truly compete with what we can offer to the world.” America, he says, must “use the power we have — our political power, our diplomatic power, our military power, but especially the power of our ideas — to remain engaged in the world.” Powell became the 65th Secretary of State January 20, after having served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989-1993) and as national security adviser during the Reagan administration. The following are excerpts adapted from recent public statements made by Secretary Powell that reflect his perspective on key foreign policy issues confronting the administration of President George W. Bush during his first year in office.

U.S. INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

When I look at today’s challenges — whether it’s Iraq, whether it’s the Middle East, whether it’s weapons of mass destruction, whether it’s trafficking in women, whether it’s human rights — what gives me the strength every day to deal with them, and what gives me hope, is the certain knowledge that we have the system that works. It is our system of freedom. It is our system of democracy. It is the free enterprise nature of our economic model. It is our system that believes in the individual rights of men and women.

If we hold true to the principles of our system, and if we keep advocating that system around the world, we are going to continue to reshape this world in a way that will benefit all mankind.

And so I think this is a time of great opportunity for us. There is no other ideology out there that can truly compete with what we can offer to the world. We know it works. It defeated the Soviet Union. And, although we’re not unmindful of the challenges that are still there, it is changing China.

And what we have to do is build on our successes and not be afraid of the challenges and the risks, and to use the power we have — our political power, our diplomatic power, our military power, but especially the power of our ideas — to remain engaged in the world.

And that is exactly what President Bush and his national security team intend to do.

— Opening Statement before the
House International Relations Committee,
March 7

NATO

On my first trip (since becoming secretary of state) I not only went to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, but I came back through Brussels to meet with my NATO colleagues and with my new EU [European Union] partners. It’s a different NATO. It’s a different Europe than the Europe I knew so well as a soldier during the Cold War, when I stood aside the Fulda Gap waiting for that Soviet Guards Army to come at me....

That’s wonderful, but we have to remember that the Alliance is still vital. And the message I gave to them: the United States will remain engaged in this Alliance and with the European Union as well. And we can build it up. It is not going away. It is not going to fall apart. Our European allies may want to look at things like the European Security and Defense Identity [ESDI]. We’ve made the case that ESDI has to be an essential part of our NATO efforts as well, and we think they understand that. NATO is still alive and well, and that’s why nine more countries are standing there waiting to see if they can join this great Alliance.

Why do they (the former Warsaw Pact nations) want to join NATO? Is it to become a partner with their other European friends? Yes. But the real reason: they want to join so that they can have that connection with the bastion of freedom, and that's here in North America, represented by the United States and Canada. That's why they want to be part of NATO, and that's why we have to keep letting this Alliance grow. And I think we have the potential to cause NATO to be that, in the future, which it was in the past: the bulwark of security, peace, and freedom on the Eurasian land mass, and something that Russia will have to deal with. Russia's future is to their west, because they need the technology, the information, the economic know-how that comes from the West.

One of the challenges that NATO is going to have over this spring and summer is to come to some judgment within the Alliance as to the standards we want those nine countries to meet before we consider admitting them into NATO. As you know, with three of those countries in particular, there is a set of sensitivities: the Baltic states and our relationship with Russia.

The basis that membership will ultimately rest upon is this: have they met the standards, can they contribute to the Alliance, are we able to defend them under the provisions of the Alliance, and do they meet especially the standards of democracy and economic reform and stability?

— Testimony before the
House International Relations Committee,
March 7, and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, March 8

BALKANS PEACEKEEPING

The United States is committed to the success of peacekeeping forces in the Balkans. With our NATO allies, we will review carefully and on a regular basis the right types and levels of our forces. We are determined to meet our commitments to stability in the region, and we would avoid any steps that would jeopardize the Alliance's success so far. We are committed to ensuring that as we review our force posture in the Balkans, we do so in full consultation with our NATO allies. The simple proposition is that "we went in together, we will come out together," and in the process of doing so,

make sure that we have the right mixture of balance of forces at all times.

— Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary
General George Robertson, Brussels,
February 27

MACEDONIA

We have made it clear to all the leaders in the region, and [to] those who...are trying to disrupt progress — those who act as radicals and try to disturb the practice of democracy...that we will stand with the Macedonian government. We made it clear that we will support the territorial integrity of Macedonia. We made it clear that we will work closely with that government, that is a coalition government, so that it is not shattered by this kind of gangster activity within Macedonia, spilling over from Kosovo.

American troops, alongside their NATO colleagues, will do everything they can to patrol the Kosovo side of that border, to stop the infiltrators from coming in and putting this nation at risk. We will engage diplomatically in every way possible to make sure that Macedonia can stand free and democratic, and free to choose its own future without being disturbed or upset by these kinds of armed radical elements.

— Remarks to the National
Newspaper Association,
March 23

RUSSIA

We want to be good friends with Russia. We are not standing back from Russia. We are not looking for ways to offend Russia, but we have made it clear to our Russian counterparts that it is a mature relationship, and we have to speak candidly to one another...

There was a problem this week [the week of March 19], a problem that had to be dealt with...having to do with an [American] spy by the name of [Richard] Hanssen. As we examined that case, and as we also examined a continuing problem that we have had with Russia concerning the level of their intelligence presence here,

we decided that we had to respond. [The United States responded to the discovery that senior Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Richard Hanssen had been spying for the Russians since 1985 by announcing the expulsion of about 50 Russian diplomats.]

We responded in a way that was measured, realistic, practical, and as far as we are concerned, that ended the matter. And it is not part of a great scheme; it was a stand-alone problem we had to deal with. We didn't shrink from it. We didn't walk away from it. We dealt with it in a realistic way.

And I had a long talk with Minister [of Foreign Affairs Igor] Ivanov about it, and he of course expressed his view on it in very, very strong terms....

And we will get through this, because the world needs a good relationship between Russia and the United States. The world needs us to explore all of these issues of concern together: bilateral relations, trade relations, regional problems, weapons, missile defense — all of those will be discussed.

— Remarks to the National
Newspaper Association,
March 23

CHINA

China is a giant trying to find its way in the world, with a communist leadership still, yet with distinctly Chinese textures that belie any real categorization other than capitalism now weaves a strong strain throughout. Our challenge with China is to do what we can that is constructive, that is helpful, and that is in our interests. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and our other allies and friends in the region have a stake in this process of nurturing a constructive relationship — and we will want to work with them in responding to a dynamic China.

With full membership in the World Trade Organization, with increasingly responsible behavior in the region and in the world, and most vitally with increased freedom for the Chinese people, China may yet fulfill the promise that Sun Yat-sen began almost a hundred years ago. But in the meantime, we will treat

China as she merits. A strategic partner China is not. But neither is China our inevitable and implacable foe. China is a competitor and a potential regional rival, but also a trading partner willing to cooperate in the areas — such as Korea — where our strategic interests overlap. China is all of these things; but China is not an enemy and our challenge is to keep it that way.

The U.S. has long acknowledged the view that there is only one China. In that respect, Taiwan is part of China. How the PRC (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan resolve the differences in interpretation of that view is up to them — so long as military force is not one of the methods used. In the meantime, we will stand by Taiwan and we will provide for its defense needs in accordance with our Taiwan Relations Act, which is the foundation for our commitment to that hardworking and prosperous democracy. Let all who doubt, from whatever perspective, be assured of one solid truth: We expect and demand a peaceful settlement, one acceptable to people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This is one of the fundamentals that we feel strongly about and that all should be absolutely clear about.

— Opening Statement,
Confirmation hearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee,
January 17

VISIT OF CHINA'S VICE PREMIER QIAN QICHEN

We had an excellent series of meetings [March 21-22 in Washington] with China's Vice Premier Qichen, who...was open [and] wanted to hear from the new administration. He wanted to convey very strong feelings about what's happening in their economy. He wanted to make sure we understood their concern with respect to Taiwan, and we made sure he understood our concern.

We were not looking for a single word to describe this complex relationship, but to acknowledge that it is a complex relationship. We are trading partners, we will be regional competitors, but there is so much we can work on together, and must work on together, to try to bring China more into the international global community, to get accession to the World Trade Organization. And together, we can leave the past

behind and move forward in more positive ways, and more positive directions, while protecting our respective interests.

— Remarks to the
National Newspaper Association,
March 23

NORTH KOREA

North Korea is a regime that is despotic; it is broken. We have no illusions about this regime. We have no illusions about the nature of the gentleman who runs North Korea. He is a despot, but he is also sitting on a failed society that has to somehow begin opening if it is not to collapse. Once it's opened, it may well collapse anyway.

President Bush has indicated that he appreciates what South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has done with respect to opening that window, as it is often referred to (in meeting with his North Korean counterpart Kim Jong Il in June, 2000), and supports him and supports the additional things he's going to be doing this year... while at the same time, we'll review what it is we plan to do with respect to our engagement with North Korea, when we decide it is the appropriate time to re-engage.

At the same time, we have expressed in the strongest possible terms our concerns about North Korea's efforts toward development of weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of such weapons and missiles and other materials to other nations, not only in the region but around the world. A major source of proliferation.

And as we look at the elements of the negotiation that the previous administration had left behind, there are some things there that are very promising. What was not there was a monitoring and verification regime of the kind that we would have to have in order to move forward in negotiations with such a regime.

And the North Koreans had not engaged on that in any serious way in the period of the Clinton administration.

And so what the President has said is that we are going to take our time, we're going to put together a

comprehensive policy, and in due course, at a time and at a pace of our choosing, we will decide and determine how best to engage with the North Korean regime.

— Testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
March 8

MIDDLE EAST

In the Middle East, we have a major challenge to the peace process. I applaud the commitment of our past presidents in their tireless efforts to help find a resolution to this half-century-old conflict with its roots in antiquity. President Bush shares this goal. We seek a lasting peace based on unshakable support for the security of Israel, the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, our friendships in the Arab world, and a hard-headed recognition that the parties themselves must make the peace.

We deplore the increased violence in the area and encourage the parties to do everything possible to bring it to an end. You can't successfully pursue peace in the midst of such violence. We also pledge to focus our own efforts on the region as a whole and not just on the peace process itself. We are ready to work with all the parties in the region to achieve a comprehensive solution. Peace for Israel means peace with all her neighbors, Syria included, where we need to build on the opportunity created by Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon.

— Opening Statement,
Confirmation hearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee,
January 17

SHARON VISIT

[Israeli] Prime Minister Sharon was [in Washington March 20], and we had very, very open, candid talks between two friends. We made sure that Israel understood our complete commitment to their security....And at the same time, we talked about what we should try to do -- working with our Arab friends in the region, working with Chairman Arafat -- to get the violence...under control, both sides showing all the restraint possible to get things to a lower level so that

economic activity can pick up again and people can once again feel safe and secure in their neighborhoods.

Let's get security cooperation and coordination going again between the two sides. And then when we have a more stable situation, we can take action to begin discussions toward peace once more, something that both sides want, something that both peoples need in order for them to share this blessed land together.

— Remarks to the National
Newspaper Association,
March 23

IRAQ

The situation in Iraq was the principal purpose of my trip throughout the Persian Gulf and Middle East area in February. When the Bush administration took over on the 20th of January, I discovered that we had an Iraq policy that was in disarray. We were losing support for the UN sanctions regime that had served so well over the last 10 years.

It seemed to me the first thing we had to do was to change the nature of the debate. We were being falsely accused, and we were taking on the burden, of hurting Iraqi people, hurting Iraqi children, and we needed to turn that around. The purpose of these sanctions was to go after weapons of mass destruction.

So let's start talking about how the Iraqi regime is threatening children, their own children and the children of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Syria and all over the region, how they were in danger (because) of what Saddam Hussein was doing, and take away the argument he was using against us.

We then had to take a look at the sanctions themselves. Were they being used to go after weapons of mass destruction or, increasingly, were those sanctions starting to look as if they were hurting the Iraqi people? And it seems to me one approach to this was to eliminate those items in the sanctions regime that really were of civilian use and benefited people, and focus the sanctions exclusively on weapons of mass destruction and items that could be directed toward the development of weapons of mass destruction.

I carried that message around the region and I found that our Arab friends in the region, as well as members of the Perm Five (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia), as well as a number of my colleagues in NATO, found this to be a very attractive approach and felt that we should continue down this line. Let's see if there is a better way to use these sanctions to go after weapons of mass destruction and take away the argument we have given him that we are somehow hurting the Iraqi people. He is hurting the Iraqi people, not us.

There is more than enough money available to the regime now to take care of the needs they have. No more money comes in as a result of a change to this new kind of sanctions policy, but there is greater flexibility for the regime, if they choose, to use that flexibility to take care of the needs of its people.

How do we get out of this sanctions regime ultimately? The inspectors have to go back in. If he wants to get out of this, if he wants to regain control of the Oil-for-Food escrow accounts, the only way that can happen is for the inspectors to go back in. But rather than us begging him to let the inspectors in, the burden is now on him. We control the money; we will continue to restrict weapons of mass destruction; you no longer have an argument, Mr. Iraqi Regime, that we are hurting your people.

If the inspectors get in, do their job, we're satisfied with their first look at things, maybe we can suspend the sanctions. And then at some point in the future, when we're absolutely satisfied there are no such weapons (of mass destruction) around, then maybe we can consider lifting (the sanctions). But that is a long way in the future. So this wasn't an effort to ease the sanctions; this was an effort to rescue the sanctions policy that was collapsing.

As part of this approach to the problem, we would also make sure that the Iraqi regime understood that we reserve the right to strike militarily any activity out there, any facility we find that is inconsistent with their obligations to get rid of such weapons of mass destruction.

That takes care of the UN piece. On the no-fly zones, we're reviewing our policies to see if we are operating those in the most effective way possible. And with respect to the Iraqi opposition activities, we are

supporting those. Our principal avenue of support is with the Iraqi National Congress, and last week I released more of the money that had been made available to us by the Congress for their activities. And we're looking at what more we can support and what other opposition activities are available that we might bring into this strategy of regime change.

And so I think it is a comprehensive, full review to bring the coalition back together, put the burden on the Iraqi regime, keep focused on what is important — weapons of mass destruction — and keep him isolated and make sure that he is contained. And hopefully, the day will come when circumstances will allow, permit, or it will happen within Iraq, we see a regime change that will be better for the world.

— Opening Statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
March 8

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

It was no accident that President Bush's first meetings were with Prime Minister Chretien of Canada and President Fox of Mexico. We understand how important Mexico is to us — our second largest trading partner after Canada. And we have begun work with President Fox to start a new way of approaching mutual problems. I will be chairing committees that were formed at that summit to deal with the problems of immigration. NAFTA [North American Free Trade Association] is the great engine that can help break down barriers and give opportunities to Mexico to provide jobs in Mexico for Mexicans and deal with the immigration problem that we all face.

We are going to be committed to an Andean plan, going beyond Plan Colombia, in order to make sure that we deal with the drug supply problem in that part of the world. It's the same reason that we're looking forward to the April Summit of the Americas in Quebec, where all of the democratic nations of this hemisphere will come together to talk about democracy

and education. Those are the two principal agenda items. And then we'll talk about trade and a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas so that we will be linked from the top of our hemisphere to the bottom, with trade barriers going down for the purpose of all the nations of this hemisphere getting access to information about technology and the wealth-creating potential of the free enterprise/free trade system.

— Opening Statement before the
House International Relations Committee,
March 7

AFRICA

We need to maintain our outreach to Africa — and with more substance. One of the most important actions the Congress undertook this past year was the passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Free trade is important the world over, but different regions require different formulas for fostering free trade. This Act is the right way to begin to bring Africa into the more prosperous world of free-flowing capital and open markets.

With powerful economies such as South Africa's, and eventually Nigeria's and other transforming African states, we can begin to change the lives of Africa's poorest peoples. We know also that Africans must do more for themselves. In Nigeria, this means full speed ahead with privatization and opening further the Nigerian economy. In Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the Congo, and elsewhere, this means stopping the killing, taking the weapons out of the hands of children, ending corruption, seeking compromises, and beginning to work in peace and dialogue rather than war and killing. It means giving the profits from oil and diamonds and other precious resources to schools and hospitals and decent roads instead of to bombs, bullets, and feuding warlords.

— Opening Statement,
Confirmation hearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee,
January 17

THE U.S. DEFENSE CHALLENGE: PEACE AMID PARADOX

Statements by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on Key Defense Issues



“We enjoy peace amid paradox. We are safer from the threat of massive nuclear war than at any point since the dawn of the atomic age. And yet, we are more vulnerable to suitcase bombs, to cyber-terrorists, to raw and random violence of an outlaw regime,” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said at Pentagon welcoming ceremonies on January 26. He became the 21st secretary of defense January 22, and held the same post previously from 1975-77 during the Ford administration. The following are excerpts adapted from recent public statements made by Secretary Rumsfeld that reflect his perspective on national security issues confronting the administration of President George W. Bush during his first year in office.

DEFENSE GOALS

President Bush took office with three goals in mind: to strengthen the bond of trust with the American military, to protect the American people both from attack and threats of terror, and to build a military that takes advantage of remarkable new technologies to confront the new threats of this century.

Reaching those goals is a matter of mission and of mindset. Among the things we must combat is a sense that we have all the time in the world to get to the task that’s at hand. There’s a sense out there that we can’t or we needn’t act, because the world is changing; that we’re in a transition period between the Cold War and the next era, whatever it may be; and that we can wait until things shake out and settle down a bit.

But it seems to me that the state of change we see in our world may well be the new status quo. We may not be in the process of transition to something that will follow the Cold War. Rather, we may be in a period of continuing change, and if so, the sooner we wrap our heads around that fact, the sooner we can get about the business of making this nation and its citizens as safe and secure as they must be in our new national security environment.

— Remarks at Official Pentagon
Welcoming Ceremonies,
January 26

PRIMARY DEFENSE OBJECTIVES

I plan to pursue five key objectives and implement policies and allocate resources needed to achieve those objectives.

First, we need to fashion and sustain deterrence appropriate to the contemporary security environment — a new national security environment.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are increasingly a fact of life that first must be acknowledged and then managed. While striving to prevent further proliferation remains essential, a determined state may, nonetheless, succeed in acquiring weapons of mass destruction and increasingly capable missiles. As a consequence, a decisive change in policy should be aimed at devaluing investment in weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems by potential adversaries.

In a world of smaller, but in some respects more deadly threats, the ability to defend ourselves and our friends against attacks by missiles and other terror weapons can strengthen deterrence and provide an important complement to purely retaliatory capabilities. Moreover, the ability to protect our forces is essential to preserving our freedom to act in a crisis. To this end, effective missile defense — not only homeland defense, but also the ability to defend U.S. forces abroad and our allies and friends — must be achieved in the most cost-effective manner that modern technology offers.

Nuclear deterrence remains an essential element of our defense policy. The credibility, safety, reliability, and effectiveness of the nation's nuclear deterrent must remain unquestioned. But it must be adapted to 21st century deterrence needs. Credible deterrence no longer can be based solely on the prospect of punishment through massive retaliation. Instead, it must be based on a combination of offensive nuclear and non-nuclear defensive capabilities working together to deny potential adversaries the opportunity and benefits from the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against our forces and homeland, as well as those of our allies.

Second, the readiness and sustainability of deployed forces must be assured.

When U.S. forces are called upon, they must be ready to cope with any contingency they may face, and be able to sustain military operations over an extended period of time if necessary.

Third, U.S. command-control-communication, intelligence, and space capabilities must be modernized to support 21st century needs.

As the threats we face change, our defense capabilities must adapt and change with them....The development and deployment of a truly modern and effective command-control-communication and intelligence system is fundamental to the transformation of U.S. military forces, and indispensable to our ability to conduct effective diplomacy.

Fourth, the U.S. defense establishment must be transformed to address 21st century circumstances.

The present weapons system acquisition process was designed for a different environment than the one that exists today. It is ill suited to meet the demands posed by an expansion of unconventional and asymmetrical threats in an era of rapid technological advances and pervasive proliferation....I will work to develop a new acquisition strategy — one designed to take advantage of modern U.S. industrial practices — that will enable us to develop and field weapon systems at a speed that reflects the needs and possibilities of the new century.

Fifth, reform of DOD structures, processes, and organization.

I will examine, in consultation with the Congress, omnibus approaches to changing the statutory and regulatory basis for the most significant obstacles to reform.

— Opening Statement,
Confirmation Hearing before the
Senate Armed Services Committee,
January 11

MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

This so-called post-Cold War world is a more integrated world and, as a result, weapons and technologies once available only to a few nations are proliferating and becoming pervasive. And not just to nations but to non-state entities.

I believe we need to recognize that the deterrence of the Cold War — mutual assured destruction and the concept of massive retaliation — worked reasonably well during the Cold War....The problems today are different. The demands are different. And we have an obligation to plan for these changing circumstances to make sure that we are arranged — first and foremost — to dissuade rash and reckless aggressors from taking action or threatening action.

Missile defense, it seems to me, is very reasonable. What we know is that, with the end of the Cold War, proliferation has spread these technologies and weapons of mass destruction around the globe. Any president, looking at his responsibility as commander-in-chief, would have to say that a policy that is designed to keep the American people totally vulnerable does not make much sense.

Let there be no doubt: a system of defense need not be perfect; but the American people must not be left completely defenseless. It is not so much a technical question as a matter of the President's constitutional responsibility....Therefore, the United States intends to develop and deploy a missile defense designed to defend our people and forces against a limited ballistic missile attack, and is prepared to assist friends and allies threatened by missile attack to deploy such defenses. These systems will be a threat to no one. That is a fact. They should be of concern to no one, save those who would threaten others.

The United States has no interest in deploying defenses that would separate us from our friends and allies. Indeed, we share similar threats. The U.S. has every interest in seeing that our friends and allies, as well as deployed forces, are defended from attack and are not vulnerable to threat or blackmail. Far from being a divisive issue, we see this as a new opportunity for a collective approach to enhancing security for us all.

— Remarks at Munich Conference on European Security Policy, February 3, and in Fox TV News Sunday interview, February 11

“NATIONAL” AND “THEATER” MISSILE DEFENSE

I’ve concluded that “national” and “theater” [missile defense] are words that aren’t useful....What’s “national” depends on where you live, and what’s “theater” depends on where you live. The United States has friends and allies that we’re linked very tightly to. We have deployed forces in the world. Our interest is in recognizing that ballistic missiles constitute a threat and weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat...Over time, one has to recognize that it’s every bit as important to us to be able to defend this piece of real estate, and our population in this location, as it is to defend our deployed forces, and to have our allies feel equally secure to the extent that’s possible. So I’ve pretty much stopped using the words.”

-- Pentagon News Conference with NATO Secretary General George Robertson, March 8

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY

We’ve asked our people to look at missile defense unconstrained by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, to see what makes the most sense in altering defense plans from a cost-effectiveness standpoint, deployment dates, and reliability. We have no desire to proceed in a way that could decouple the U.S. from our allies and friends....

I don’t see the ABM Treaty as having a central role in strategic stability. My view is that the Cold War is over.

That treaty was fashioned by (former Nixon National Security Adviser) Henry Kissinger, among others, who today agrees that it no longer has the relevance that it did then....

If we’re going to need to make changes in the ABM Treaty, which we will, then you have to give six months notice to start that process. If you need to do that, you have to start consultations well before that with your friends and allies, and ultimately with Russia....We’re at the point where we’re discussing those things, but we have not come to conclusions.”

— Interview with the *Sunday Telegraph* (London), March 18

NATO

It is the willingness of nations to act in concert that helps sustain security and strengthen the peace....As a former Ambassador to NATO, I have enormous respect for the value of the Alliance. It has been the key instrument in keeping the peace in Europe for over 50 years. I think it is fair to say very simply that it is the most successful military alliance in history. And NATO has developed, establishing the Partnership for Peace, which has led all of Europe to participate in developing security together, as demonstrated by the Partner forces in Bosnia and Kosovo today.

The European Security and Defense Identity is another development....Our European allies and partners know that NATO is at the heart of Europe’s defenses. Therefore, to sustain our past success into the future we must first and foremost maintain NATO as the core of Europe’s security structures for Europe.

...What happens within our Alliance and what happens to it must comport with its continued strength, resilience, and effectiveness. Actions that could reduce NATO’s effectiveness by confusing duplication or by perturbing the transatlantic link would not be positive. Indeed they run the risk of injecting instability into an enormously important Alliance. And...whatever shape the effort may finally take, I personally believe it should be inclusive — open to all NATO members who wish to take part.

To be sure, as NATO membership is enlarged, it must at least preserve — and, eventually, enhance — our capacity for effective action. New members should share the values of allied nations and be prepared to shoulder the burden — to make the necessary security investments to participate fully in the pursuit of our aims.

The Alliance has said it will address enlargement at the next summit in 2002 — an opportunity for states to make their case for membership. Membership in NATO, in my view, is more than just a step in the evolution of European democracies. Member nations assume a commitment to the common defense, and they must be capable of acting on that commitment.

Weaken NATO and we weaken Europe, which weakens all of us. We and the other nations of the alliance are bound together in pursuit and preservation of something great and good, indeed, something without parallel in history. Our greatest asset still lies in our values — freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. And in the face of shared risks, we still must share the responsibility.

— Remarks at Munich Conference on
European Security Policy,
February 3

PEACEKEEPING

Clear criteria for the use of U.S. military forces should be established prior to U.S. participation in specific peacekeeping operations. There should be clear objectives, a coherent strategy to achieve them, a reasonable chance of success, acceptable command-and-control arrangements, and an exit strategy. When the main burden of the U.S. presence shifts to infrastructure and nation-building, however, we are into missions that are not appropriate for the U.S. military.

— Written answers to questions from the
Senate Armed Services Committee in
conjunction with his Confirmation Hearing,
January 11

INTELLIGENCE

We are in a new national security environment. Characteristics of this new environment include:

— A relaxed attitude with the end of the Cold War;

— The proliferation of powerful weapons and technologies throughout the world;

— As a result of the Gulf War, a set of threats less likely to be deterred by the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation;

— Considerably more complex intelligence challenges given the larger number of targets and the proliferation of deception and denial capabilities;

— Increasing dependence on space assets and therefore increased vulnerability.

The intelligence community, just as the Department of Defense, needs to be rearranged to deal with the new security environment. The national command authorities need information more than simply numbers of things — ships, missile, tanks, and planes — they need better information on intentions and motives as well.

Certainly the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them pose a threat to the security of the United States, its allies and friends. We must ensure that we are devoting the appropriate resources to identify these newer threats, including cyber attack.

— Written answers to questions from the
Senate Armed Services Committee
in conjunction with his Confirmation Hearing,
January 11

U.S. SECURITY POLICY: PROTECTING THE NATION'S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Statements by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on Key Security Issues



National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice says that protecting the nation's critical infrastructure is a "critically important" national security issue. "It is a paradox of our times: the very technology that makes our economy so dynamic and our military forces so dominating — also makes us more vulnerable," she says. Rice was sworn in January 22 as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The following are excerpts adapted from recent public statements made by Rice that reflect her perspective on key international security issues confronting the administration of President George W. Bush during his first year in office.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Critical infrastructure protection is a critically important issue.... Today, the cyber economy is the economy.... virtually every vital service — water supply, transportation, energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, public health...relies upon computers and the fiber-optic lines, switchers, and routers that connect them. Corrupt those networks, and you disrupt the nation. It is a paradox of our times: the very technology that makes our economy so dynamic and our military forces so dominating — also makes us more vulnerable....

Protecting our critical infrastructure is a classic national security problem. We want to deter action against us through prevention. Deterrence worked during the Cold War. It may not work here.

Unlike the Soviet Union, today's adversaries may not fit the classic game theory models. They may be a small, well-organized group that attacks us through a series of hop [router] points, including neutral countries or from within the United States.

We also have to remember that the same technology that empowers us, empowers America's adversaries. And our very dominance in conventional military strength, may make those adversaries turn to unconventional battlefields such as cyberspace.

In short, it is just not clear that we can count on deterrence to work in this context. That means we

have to be prepared for scenarios where we have to restore and reconstitute critical operations quickly once they've been disrupted. And...this is not something that government can tackle on its own. We need to work hand-in-hand with the private sector.

— Remarks at the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Annual Meeting, March 22

MISSILE DEFENSE

Missile defense is something the President is absolutely committed to. He believes that there is a growing recognition around the world that this is a real threat, and it's a threat of today's world, not a threat of the Cold War. The missile defense [system] that we're talking about is [intended to protect against threats from] states like Iran, like North Korea, where the non-proliferation regime has become quite leaky, and where you have a proliferation of missile technologies into places we're very concerned about.

We believe that when this is properly presented, when we have looked hard at our options for missile defense, and when we have put this in the context of a new strategic environment in which defenses have to play a role to deter conflict, that we will have a very good case to bring to our allies. We intend to take that case to our allies and consult with them, but we'll also have a very good case for others who might also be worried.

What I think we're hearing [from the Russians] is an admission that there is a threat that might be addressed by missile defense. I think it's a welcome recognition of the condition in which we and the rest of the responsible nations of the world find ourselves....I think we look forward at some point, at an appropriate point in time, to discussions and conversations with the Russians about how that threat can be addressed.

I will say this: it goes back to the question of Russian proliferation behavior. If, in fact, Russia is engaged in activities that are helping countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction or missile technology against which the shield is actually working, this is not going to be a very cooperative relationship.

So proliferation behavior and what we can do in a cooperative manner are very much linked here, and I think that's a point that we will want to make to the Russians. We are not, in principle, against cooperation. But we do have a problem with the proliferation behavior.

— White House Briefing,
February 22

BALKANS

President Bush is opposed to any kind of target date or deadline [for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Balkans]....He understands and believes strongly that we have commitments that we have to fulfill to our allies, that anything that we do in restructuring a presence in the Balkans has to be done in the context of allied consultations.

I think that the allies will find that this is going to be a very consultative administration, that they're not going to be subject to surprises...and that is true whether you are talking about troops in the Balkans or missile defense.

— Interview with Wolf Blitzer on
CNN's Late Edition,
February 4

RUSSIA

U.S. policy must concentrate on the important security agenda with Russia.

First, it must recognize that American security is threatened less by Russia's strength than by its weakness and incoherence. This suggests immediate attention to the safety and security of Moscow's nuclear forces and stockpile.

Second, Washington must begin a comprehensive discussion with Moscow on the changing nuclear threat. Much has been made by Russian military officials about their increased reliance on nuclear weapons in the face of their declining conventional readiness.

The Russian deterrent is more than adequate against the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and vice versa. But that fact need no longer be enshrined in a treaty that is almost 30 years old and is a relic of a profoundly adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was intended to prevent the development of national missile defenses in the Cold War security environment. Today, the principal concerns are nuclear threats from the Iraqs and North Koreas of the world and the possibility of unauthorized releases as nuclear weapons spread.

Moscow, in fact, lives closer to those threats than Washington does. It ought to be possible to engage the Russians in a discussion of the changed threat environment, their possible responses, and the relationship of strategic offensive-force reductions to the deployment of defenses.

In addition, Moscow should understand that any possibilities for sharing technology or information in these areas would depend heavily on its record — problematic to date — on the proliferation of ballistic missile and other technologies related to weapons of mass destruction.

It would be foolish in the extreme to share defenses with Moscow if it either leaks or deliberately transfers weapons technologies to the very states against which America is defending.

Finally, the United States needs to recognize that Russia is a great power, and that we will always have interests that conflict as well as coincide.

As prime minister, Vladimir Putin used the Chechnya war to stir nationalism at home while fueling his own political fortunes. The Russian military has been uncharacteristically blunt and vocal in asserting its duty to defend the integrity of the Russian Federation — an unwelcome development in civil-military relations.

The long-term effect of the war on Russia's political culture should not be underestimated. This war has affected relations between Russia and its neighbors in the Caucasus, as the Kremlin has been hurling charges of harboring and abetting Chechen terrorists against states as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

The war is a reminder of the vulnerability of the small, new states around Russia and of America's interest in their independence. If they can become stronger, they will be less tempting to Russia. But much depends on the ability of these states to reform their economies and political systems — a process, to date, whose success is mixed at best.

— Op-ed Column, *Chicago Tribune*,
December 31, 2000
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RUSSIAN PROLIFERATION

We have been quite concerned about Russian proliferation behavior vis-a-vis, for instance, Iran....Russia is a partner and even a potential ally, [but] in the context of proliferation behavior, we have a lot of work to do together. And we would hope, as the relationship of this administration with the Russian Putin administration evolves, that we can start to get a better handle on these proliferation problems.

— *White House Briefing*,
February 22

EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCE

We have said all along that it is our goal to see a strengthening of European defense capacity, including,

hopefully, a greater commitment of resources to European armed forces. We've also said [that] to have Europe do more for its own defense — and, therefore, enhance NATO — is a good thing.

Our goal has to be — as longstanding NATO allies — to make certain that this new chapter in European security and defense is, in fact, augmenting NATO, helping NATO, and not undermining it in some way. But I'm quite confident that with goodwill on all sides, and with an implementation plan that works, that we can get that done.

I think we all have a common goal here, which is to see a strong and secure Europe, to recognize that a lot has happened since the end of the Cold War — there are new members of NATO, NATO is trying to do other things. But we obviously still believe that NATO is the primary security instrument in Europe, and so do our European allies.

— *White House Briefing*,
February 22

IRAQ

The goal now of [U.S.] policy has to be to regain the initiative where Saddam Hussein is concerned; to take a hard look at what we are doing, to make sure that he does not build weapons of mass destruction, that he does not threaten his neighbors; to make certain that he lives up to the obligations that he undertook after the end of the Gulf War. And the tactics by which we pursue those very important goals — let me emphasize, those goals have not changed since 1991 — and the various means by which we pursue those goals we're examining fully, with an effort to try to regain the initiative and make sure that what we're doing is working.

There is a sanctions regime in place. We believe very strongly that it's a regime that now has some problems. There is no doubt about that. But precisely how to focus and make sure that this regime is serving our purposes, that's the purpose of the review.

— *White House Briefing*,
February 22

CHINA/IRAQ

What we've told the Chinese is that we have concerns about Chinese activities in Iraq. We have told them that we are concerned that there may be violations of the sanctions regime, and we've asked them to give us further information and to look into what is going on there.

We certainly hope that the Chinese can help us to clarify what is going on. I want to make clear that, at this point, we're not accusing the Chinese of anything. But we are telling them that we have tremendous concerns about what's going on, that China as a member of the Permanent 5 [the five permanent members of the UN Security Council], has in many ways special responsibilities to make certain that the sanctions regime is enforced, and that we would really appreciate an answer to the inquiries that we've made.

— White House Briefing,
February 22

NORTH KOREA

North Korea is a regime to be carefully watched....We have said that anything that we do with North Korea we will closely coordinate with our allies in the region, both South Korea and Japan.

We have said that we are very concerned about the proliferation of missile technology that is coming out of North Korea, and about the North Korean indigenous program....We are reviewing our policy toward North Korea.

— White House Briefing,
February 22



SETTING THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

By Senator Jesse Helms



Republicans who now control the White House and both chambers of the legislature have an unprecedented chance to set a new course in foreign affairs, says Senator Jesse Helms. He sees an array of foreign policy priorities headed by efforts to promote freedom and democracy around the world and, at the same time, to reduce the size of “America’s bloated foreign aid bureaucracy.” Helms is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His comments are excerpted from a speech he delivered January 11 to the American Enterprise Institute.

We cannot, and must not, ignore the fact that something has changed in Washington. For the first time in five decades, Republicans control the White House, the Senate, and the House of Representatives. And that means Republicans can have an unprecedented opportunity to set the policy agenda — especially in the realm of foreign affairs. We must, and we will, seize that opportunity.

One of the first priorities of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this year will be to assist President Bush in implementing his vision of “compassionate conservatism.” During the fall campaign, the President outlined a philosophy of empowering private charities and faith-based institutions to help the neediest of Americans. He continued with this pledge: “In every instance where my administration sees a responsibility to help people, we will look first to faith-based institutions, charities and community groups that have shown their ability to save and change lives...We will rally the armies of compassion in our communities to fight a very different war against poverty and hopelessness.”

I put it to you: if we can deploy those “armies of compassion” across America, then we can and must deploy them across the world. The time has come to reject what President Bush correctly labels the “failed compassion of towering, distant bureaucracies” and, instead, empower private and faith-based groups who care most about those in need.

I intend to work with the Bush administration to replace the Agency for International Development

(USAID) with a new International Development Foundation whose mandate will be to deliver “block grants” to support the work of private relief agencies and faith-based institutions such as Samaritan’s Purse, Catholic Relief Services and countless others like them.

We will reduce the size of America’s bloated foreign aid bureaucracy — then take the money saved and use every penny of it to empower these “armies of compassion” to help the world’s neediest people.

While we work to improve the ways America helps those in material need, we must also be attentive to another need — the need for human liberty. Because a foreign policy that does not have freedom at its core is neither compassionate nor conservative.

The 1990s were a decade of enormous democratic advances. In the first years of that decade, we witnessed the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the final year of the decade, we saw the peaceful transfer of power from long-ruling parties to democratic oppositions in Taiwan and Mexico, and the fall of authoritarian leaders in places like Yugoslavia and Peru.

This progress notwithstanding, the global movement toward rule of law, democracy, civil society and free markets still meets resistance in many quarters. Our challenge in the start of this new millennium — and the start of this new administration — must be to consolidate the democratic advances of the last ten years, while increasing the pressure on those who still

refuse to accept the principle that sovereign legitimacy comes from the consent of the governed.

A good place to start is our own hemisphere, and specifically just across our own border. I will do everything I can to help President Fox and President Bush set a new course for U.S.-Mexican relations, and I look forward to collaborating with the Bush Administration to help set our relationship with the new Mexican government on the right course.

And while democracy has finally taken root across the border in Mexico, just 90 miles from our shores the hemisphere's last totalitarian dictatorship still sputters on. The Clinton administration never made Castro's removal from power a goal of its foreign policy. Embargo opponents correctly sensed that Clinton administration officials were never really committed to Castro's isolation and removal, and the administration did nothing to dissuade them of that notion. With the Bush election, the opponents of the Cuban embargo are about to run into a brick wall on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. President Bush is a committed supporter of the embargo. What this means is that, with the embargo finally off the table, the new Bush Administration has a golden opportunity to develop a new Cuba policy.

The model for such a new Cuba policy should be the successful policies that the Reagan-Bush Administration used in the 1980s to undermine Communism in Poland. In the 1980s, the United States hastened Poland's democratic transformation by isolating the communist regime in Warsaw, while at the same time actively lifting the isolation of the Polish people — supporting the democratic opposition and cultivating an emerging civil society with financial and other means of support.

I intend to work with the Bush Administration to do for the people of Cuba what the United States did for the people of Poland 20 years ago. And I will make a prediction here today: Before his term is up, President Bush will visit Havana — to attend the inauguration of the new democratically-elected president of Cuba.

Another place where democracy desperately needs renewed American support is in Taiwan. With the election of President Chen last year, the people of

Taiwan presided over the first peaceful transfer of power from a ruling party to its democratic opposition in 5,000 years of Chinese history. This was an incredible achievement. Yet President Clinton repeatedly let down our friends in Taiwan, first by going to China and repeating Beijing's fictitious constructions on the future of Taiwan, and then by refusing to meet America's legal obligations to provide for Taiwan's self-defense under the Taiwan Relations Act. This damage must be undone.

Yes, we must engage China. But Beijing also must be made to understand that its avenues to destructive behavior are closed off, and that Taiwan will have the means to defend itself. During the campaign, President Bush gave his enthusiastic endorsement to the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. And I intend to work with him to enact the TSEA, and to help ensure Taiwan's democracy remains secure from Chinese aggression.

Another place where aggression is being rewarded because of the Clinton Administration's neglect is Iraq. We must have a new Iraq policy, and such a policy must be based on a clear understanding of this salient fact: Nothing will change in Iraq until Saddam Hussein is removed from power. With the passage of the bipartisan Iraq Liberation Act, Congress took the lead in promoting the democratic opposition to Saddam Hussein. (The Clinton Administration failed to implement the act). I look forward to working with President Bush to implement effectively the Iraq Liberation Act [to] help the people of Iraq get rid of Saddam Hussein.

Perhaps the greatest moral challenge we face at the dawn of a new century is to right the wrongs perpetrated in the last century at Yalta, when the West abandoned the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to Stalin and a life of servitude behind the Iron Curtain.

We began the process of righting that wrong in 1998, when the Senate voted to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the NATO alliance. But the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic has not yet fully erased the scars of Yalta. During the Cold War, I was one of a group of Senators who fought to defend the independence of what came to be known as the "Captive Nations" (the Baltic states of Lithuania,

Latvia and Estonia) — and who worked to make sure that the United States never recognized their illegal annexation by the Soviet Union.

With the collapse of communism, those nations finally achieved their rightful independence from Russian occupation and domination. Yet Russia still looms menacingly over these countries. I intend to work with the Bush Administration to ensure that the Baltic States are invited to join their neighbors Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as members of the NATO alliance. This is vital not only for their security, but for ours as well. If we want good relations with Russia, we must show Russia's leaders an open path to good relations, while at the same time closing off their avenues to destructive behavior. That means taking the next step in the process of NATO expansion, by issuing invitations to the Baltic nations when NATO's leaders meet for the next Alliance summit planned for 2002.

Another immediate priority is National Missile Defense. After eight lost years under President Clinton, we have no time to waste in building and deploying a truly national missile defense that is capable of protecting the United States and its allies from ballistic missile attack.

Last year, when President Clinton threatened to negotiate a revised ABM Treaty with Russia that would tie the hands the new Administration, I went to the Senate floor and warned Mr. Clinton that any such agreement would be dead-on-arrival in the U.S. Senate.

I want to make something perfectly clear to our friends in Russia. The United States is no longer bound by the ABM Treaty — that treaty expired when our treaty partner (the Soviet Union) ceased to exist. Legally speaking, the Bush Administration faces no impediment whatsoever to proceeding with any national missile defense system it chooses to deploy.

President Bush may decide that it is in the United States' diplomatic interests to sit down with the Russians and discuss his plans for missile defense. Personally, I do not think that a new ABM Treaty can be negotiated with Russia that would permit the kind of defenses America needs. But, as Henry Kissinger

told the Foreign Relations Committee last year: "I would be open to argument, provided that we do not use the treaty as a constraint on pushing forward on the most effective development of a national and theater missile defense."

With that caveat by Dr. Kissinger, I concur — President Bush must have, and will have, the freedom to proceed as he sees fit. And I look forward to working with the president to ensure he achieves his goal of a rapid deployment of an effective and truly national missile defense.

Last but not least, there is the issue of the International Criminal Court.

Let me be perfectly clear: All of the issues I have discussed are of immense importance. But if I do nothing else this year, I will make certain that President Clinton's outrageous and unconscionable decision to sign the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court is reversed and repealed.

The Court claims to hold the power to indict, try and imprison American citizens — even if the American people refuse to join the Court. This brazen assault on the sovereignty of the American people is without precedent in the annals of international treaty law.

There are two things I will press for with the new Administration. First, the Bush Administration should simply un-sign the Rome Statute. Second, we must enact the American Servicemembers Protection Act. This legislation, which Senator [John] Warner and I introduced last year along with a number of our House and Senate colleagues, is designed to protect U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

Why is passage of this legislation important? Because by signing this flawed treaty, President Clinton has effectively endorsed the ICC's fraudulent claim of jurisdiction over Americans. We must take action to make clear that, unless and until the United States ratifies the Rome Treaty, we reject any claim of jurisdiction by the ICC over American citizens. ●

THE NEED FOR BIPARTISANSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY

By Senator Joseph Biden



The U.S. public holds a general internationalist sentiment, but President Bush faces a real challenge in translating that sentiment into a truly bipartisan foreign policy, says Senator Joseph Biden. The senator sees such bipartisanship as “not only possible, but necessary to advance our national interests.” Biden, the senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, served as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1987 to 1995.

First impressions are important in all walks of life, including politics and government. Despite the delayed transition, President Bush is off to a fast start. In the area of national security, he has assembled an able team of advisers. But he has far less experience in foreign policy than in domestic policy. He needs to be a fast learner, because foreign policy challenges will almost certainly confront him soon.

President Bush has assumed office at a time when the United States possesses unrivaled political, military, and economic power. With power, however, comes responsibility — responsibility to vigorously protect and promote U.S. national interests, responsibility to stand with allies, and responsibility to contribute our fair share to global stability and security. Thankfully, most Americans understand that the United States has a duty to lead the world.

A key challenge facing the President is whether he can convert this general internationalist sentiment into a foreign policy that enjoys bipartisan backing. Half a century ago, Senator Arthur Vandenberg said that “politics stops at the water’s edge.” This is so in times of real crisis, but in truth foreign policy debates rarely are immune from partisan politics. Even during the Cold War, when a consensus favored containment of Soviet communism, there was often sharp disagreement about the means to that end, such as whether to support a particular guerrilla movement abroad or fund a particular weapons system at home.

Debate is essential to our democracy. But I remain hopeful that we can avoid divisive partisan fights.

Achieving bipartisanship on the following key issues is not only possible, but necessary to advance our national interests:

A NEW STRATEGY OF CONTAINMENT

The premier threat to U.S. security is the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction. We must forge a new strategy of containment, focused on the danger that nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the missiles to propel them, could be used by terrorists or rogue states.

This threat requires a multi-pronged response. Over the last decade, through nuclear arms control treaties, international cooperation on combating proliferation, and programs like “Nunn-Lugar” (which helps secure and dismantle the former Soviet arsenal), we have diminished the proliferation danger. There is still much more to do — we need additional assistance to keep technology and know-how from falling into the wrong hands, and we must maintain an international consensus to protect against proliferation. These efforts are not cheap — a recent blue-ribbon task force urged that we spend some \$30 billion over the next decade on programs to secure “loose nukes” in Russia and to keep Russian scientists from selling their knowledge to rogue states.

The key test for bipartisanship revolves around our nuclear doctrine. For most of the Cold War, there was general political agreement about U.S. nuclear policy, which ran on two parallel and reinforcing tracks. In the superpower sphere, we sought to deter the Soviet threat while seeking mutual reductions that would

mitigate the dangers of global conflagration. Multilaterally, through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a common set of export controls, we sought to limit the size of the nuclear club. Today the consensus supporting these policies has all but collapsed. Most Republicans question the utility of nuclear arms control, and favor speedy deployment of national missile defense. Most Democrats, by contrast, support arms control and are skeptical about the immediate need to deploy missile defense.

Whether a middle ground can be found is far from clear. Of course, we must fully fund research and development programs. But the President should resist pressure to make a premature missile defense deployment decision. If he looks closely, he will see that the current system proposed by the Pentagon is too flawed to adequately protect the United States, and is likely to provoke a reaction by foreign powers that leaves us less, not more, secure.

The President needs to prepare the world for missile defense, rather than saying, in essence, “build it and they will come ‘round.’” If missile defense is ultimately necessary, our goal should be a system that Russia can accept by amending the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, that China will not see as threatening its nuclear deterrent capability, and that will be supported by allies in Europe and Asia.

The President should also concentrate on the upcoming review of our nuclear deterrent, the first in six years. He must reply responsibly to Russia’s proposal to reduce each country’s deployed strategic warheads to 1,500 or fewer. Simultaneously, the President should promptly review the recommendations delivered by former Joint Chiefs Chairman Shalikashvili on how to move forward on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which provides a key instrument for capping other countries’ ability to build advanced nuclear weapons while leaving our own arsenal intact.

BUILDING THE RIGHT MILITARY

A key responsibility for the Commander-in-Chief is to decide on appropriate roles and missions for the armed forces. President Bush must organize and equip the military to take advantage of cutting-edge technologies to meet new post-Cold War security challenges.

The choice before us is not between fulfilling our peacekeeping commitments or maintaining our military readiness. We can afford to do both. Promoting regional peace and stability — including deployment of U.S. forces as peacekeepers — is one of the best ways to ensure that our ability to fight and win a major war will not be tested. The key to retaining the finest military force in the world will be rigorously prioritizing where we allocate resources.

KEEPING SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN EUROPE AND ASIA

The United States is both a European and Asian power, and is a force for stability in both continents. Key security commitments in both places will provide early tests for the new foreign policy team.

In Europe, we must avoid the precipitous step of unilaterally withdrawing U.S. ground troops from Bosnia or Kosovo, which would cause our European allies to question our commitment to NATO. The Balkans are, slowly, turning away from the destructive tendencies of the past and toward a more democratic future. With the job only partially finished, this is hardly the time to consider troop withdrawals. Nor does U.S. policy represent an undue burden. For five decades, we’ve had hundreds of thousands of forces in Europe. We can surely spare a few thousand forces for Balkan security to stand with our European partners, who make up three-quarters of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. Finally, NATO must expand the zone of stability in Europe by continuing the process of admitting new members — and offer membership in the next few years to any country that meets the Alliance’s rigorous qualifications.

In Asia, creative diplomatic efforts by the United States, South Korea, and Japan to draw North Korea out of its shell are slowly yielding results; the promise of a reduced security threat in Asia, and of a reduced threat of missile proliferation elsewhere, demands that the new Administration be prepared to promptly engage here. A successful outcome in talks with North Korea on its missile program — the main threat upon which U.S. national missile defense is predicated — would give the President more time to consider the missile defense decision. Across the region, U.S. military deployments and active diplomacy are critical to

regional stability. There is no Asian analog to NATO, so we must rely on key bilateral alliances while strengthening the region's nascent security structures.

ENGAGEMENT WITH RUSSIA AND CHINA

Since the Cold War, American policy has struggled to find the right approach toward Russia and China. We may be a superpower, but we lack the ability to control events in either country — though we can help shape them. Neither nation is likely to be a true partner soon, but neither need be an adversary. In an era of globalization, “containment” is not an option. We must engage them — but on what terms?

With both countries, our message should be clear and consistent: we will expect you to act responsibly in the international arena; we will work with you to advance common interests; we will support advancement of democratic values; and we will vigorously oppose proliferation behavior that threatens world security. Whatever we do, we must try to avoid serious partisan disputes; our relationships with Russia and China simply are too important.

ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR DIPLOMACY

To pursue an active international agenda, and to keep the peace, we need both a well-trained and well-equipped military and diplomatic corps. Indeed, the best way to avoid over-using our armed forces is to adequately support our diplomatic corps and our intelligence capabilities. Modest increases in recent years have not made up for deep cuts earlier in the decade. We spend just one percent of our national budget on foreign affairs; we can afford more, but the President and Secretary Powell must make the case for it with Congress and the American public.

The foreign policy agenda is, of course, longer than this short list. But the tone that President Bush sets on these issues in the next few months will do much to determine the tenor of the foreign policy debate for the next four years. The American people are watching to see if Senator Vandenberg's famous maxim can become more than a slogan. ●

FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FACING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

By Robert J. Lieber

Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University



“At least four broad challenges seem likely to top the foreign policy agenda facing the Bush administration,” says Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The first of these, he says, “concerns relations with America’s allies, especially the Europeans and Japanese.” Also of key importance are relations with Russia, the “unique problems and choices” posed by China, and the Middle East, which “represents perhaps the most dangerous single foreign policy challenge facing the United States.” Lieber is editor and contributing author of “Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the 21st Century,” to be published Summer 2001 by Prentice-Hall.

When an American president takes office, he brings with him an entirely new team of foreign policy officials. In contrast with most other democracies, in the United States the changes in personnel are much more extensive and include not just top policymakers — such as the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor — but scores of sub-cabinet and even many working level appointees within these and other agencies of government. The character and tone of policy thus change in ways reflecting the views and ideas of the President and those around him, though it is also essential to keep in mind that America’s world role and the kinds of problems and opportunities it faces dictate a good deal of continuity as well.

Though President George W. Bush does not have an extensive foreign policy background, he has surrounded himself with an unusually experienced and accomplished team. Secretary of State Colin Powell previously served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Advisor. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld returns to a position he held once before. In addition, he previously headed a commission that analyzed America’s vulnerability to missile attack and recommended a missile defense program. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice served on the National Security Council (NSC) dealing with European issues during the end of the Cold War. And Vice President Dick Cheney not only was Secretary of Defense in the earlier Bush administration, but he also worked as White House Chief of Staff under President Gerald Ford. Moreover, the number two officials at State, Defense and NSC (Richard Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz and Stephen

Hadley) also bring impressive credentials and long experience in foreign and defense policy, as does Robert Zoellick in his position as Special Trade Representative. This experience and expertise will be important as the Bush administration confronts the major international challenges now facing the United States.

Specific foreign and security policy issues must be examined against the backdrop of America’s world role at the start of the 21st century. The end of the Cold War a decade ago had an enormous impact on world politics and the consequences of this change still reverberate. As a result, three broad tendencies shape the American role and the context in which the Bush administration responds to foreign policy challenges. First, the United States finds itself in a unique position as the single most powerful and influential country in the world. This exceptional status, or primacy, is a product both of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fact that no other individual country or group of countries has the capacity to compete effectively with the United States. Not only does the U.S. possess a unique degree of military power and advanced technology, but America’s leading role is also evident across a wide range of sectors: economic strength, competitiveness, information technology, and even the realms of entertainment and mass culture. This status creates opportunities as well as problems for the United States.

Second, American leadership, or at least active involvement, is a prerequisite for many kinds of international collaboration. This is especially relevant in the security realm and has become evident both where the U.S. has

acted (as in Kosovo in 1999, Bosnia from 1995 onward, and in the Gulf), as well as when it has declined to lead (Bosnia from 1992 to 1995, Rwanda in 1994, and initially in East Timor.) In many instances, the alternative to America's taking a leading role is not that some other country or regional or international body will lead, but that there will be inaction. This too poses a problem for the United States, in that it must steer a course between, on the one hand, over-commitment in becoming the world's policeman and, on the other hand, failing to provide the leadership that is in its own interests and that promotes a more stable and benign international environment.

Third, the end of the Cold War makes it harder for the United States to achieve cooperation with its allies and friends. In the past, a sense of a shared threat stimulated cooperation and acted as a restraint on the inevitable differences and quarrels that arise among allies. Absent this threat, countries have a greater temptation to pursue their narrower interests even though these may create obstacles to collaboration in facing common problems. This diminished sense of threat also makes it harder for an American administration to gain domestic support for an effective foreign policy. Without the challenge presented by the Soviet Union, there tends to be a reduced interest in foreign policy on the part of the American public and a lesser priority for foreign affairs as well as for providing the resources essential for sustaining America's world role. This is not a matter of isolationism. The public, the press, and the Congress remain internationalist rather than isolationist, but foreign policy problems tend not to have the same degree of urgency as during the Cold War.

Given these wider considerations, at least four broad challenges seem likely to top the foreign policy agenda facing the Bush administration. The first of these concerns relations with America's allies, especially the Europeans and Japanese. In the case of the Europeans, a series of recent controversies has arisen over missile defense, the planned European Union rapid reaction force, trade disputes, genetically modified foods, and symbolic issues such as the death penalty and gun control. Underlying many of these differences is a European reaction to America's size and power, as well as a perception that at times the United States acts unilaterally without sufficient regard for European sensibilities. On the American side, there is concern about burden-sharing, anxiety that the Europeans may be tempted to go their own

way as the EU develops greater economic and foreign policy coherence, and frustration at the difficulties of consulting and negotiating with the 15 EU countries who often disagree sharply with one another, or else become rigid in their interaction with the United States once they have hammered out a common policy of their own. Despite these very real frictions, the Europeans continue to rely upon the United States in the security realm, and we share fundamental economic interests and values. The Bush administration will need to devote considerable time and energy to consulting European leaders and seeking to assuage some (not all) of their concerns. The overall prospect is for continued friction but no transatlantic divorce.

Second, relations with Russia pose a key challenge. A decade after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, there are fewer illusions about the Russian transition. Russia continues to experience a deep economic, social, and demographic crisis, and it is clear that construction of both a market economy and a genuinely democratic political system will at best be a long and arduous affair. On the other hand, Russia is no longer a global threat to American interests and values. Moscow does, however, tend to pursue policies that the Bush administration will undoubtedly seek to discourage. These include its efforts to reestablish control over some states of the former USSR (especially Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia). Moreover, Moscow has not only been opposing American and British efforts to maintain UN sanctions against Iraq, but it has been making overtures to the rogue regime of Saddam Hussein. In Iran, the Russians have been providing nuclear technology that could allow the Teheran regime to acquire a weapon of its own. On missile defense, the Russians have been actively opposing American efforts, even though these are directed at rogue states such as North Korea. Overall, the Putin government has been following a policy of opposing American influence. Under these circumstances, the task for the Bush administration will be to signal to the Russians that these policies are a serious obstacle to better relations, and that their continuation lessens Russia's opportunities to gain the kind of access to Western capital and technology needed for its own pressing internal problems.

Third, China poses unique problems and choices. Previous administrations have struggled with the balance

between engaging Beijing in order to foster economic modernization and development that could make China a more open and pluralistic society, or confronting the regime in order to deter it from threatening Taiwan, supplying missile and nuclear technology to would-be proliferators, and threatening American interests more broadly. This is not an easy task. An economically dynamic China has opted to increase military spending by more than 17% in an ongoing modernization and strengthening of its armed forces, and China is continuing to deploy ICBMs aimed at the United States while bitterly criticizing Bush proposals for missile defense. On yet another issue, Chinese firms have reportedly been installing fiber optic communications cables that would upgrade Iraqi anti-aircraft capability against American and British aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones. How to orchestrate a mix of incentives and disincentives in shaping China's behavior will thus be a crucial test for the new Bush administration. At the same time, it will need to provide reassurance to Japan and South Korea that its policies can be effective while avoiding both overreaction and retrenchment.

Fourth, the Middle East, including both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Persian Gulf, represents perhaps the most dangerous single foreign policy challenge for the United States. The problem of Iraq is particularly vexing, and Saddam Hussein's defiance of UN weapons inspections as well as the weakening of sanctions against his brutal regime have been among the earliest issues for the Bush foreign policy team. An initial choice will concern whether to implement a more ambitious policy aimed at ousting Saddam. A number of Bush administration foreign policymakers, including Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, previously criticized the Clinton administration's failure to actively support and arm an Iraqi opposition, but it remains to be seen whether this approach or one aimed mainly at reinvigorating sanctions ("smart sanctions" aimed specifically at Iraq's production of weapons of mass destruction) will gain the most support. In any case, Saddam's undiminished effort to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and to link these with missiles is certain to be a preoccupation for the Bush administration.

By contrast, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is less likely to receive the kind of intense attention devoted to it by the Clinton administration.

The outbreak of violence that began in late September 2000, as well as Yasser Arafat's rejection of the most far-reaching peace proposals ever put forward, provide, in my judgement, clear evidence that the Palestinian leadership is currently unwilling to end the conflict with Israel. Under these circumstances, the key task for the Bush administration will be to deter escalation to a wider war while awaiting a time when violence subsides and some form of interim negotiation becomes feasible. During this period, it will be important both to show firm support for Israel, in order to discourage wishful thinking by its hardline Arab opponents that they can somehow prevail, while maintaining effective communication with Arab leaders.

Connected to the above problems is the related but distinct challenge of how to reshape America's defense policy for the 21st Century. Though the topic has been raised during the past decade, the Bush administration has undertaken what promises to be the most serious and sustained effort at an overall review and redesign of the military, taking into account the changed world of the post-Cold War era as well as the revolution in military technology and precision-guided weaponry. Issues of missile defense and threats from weapons of mass destruction and terrorism have an important place in this assessment as well.

The United States continues to occupy a unique role in world affairs. In each of the areas of foreign and security policy cited here, as well as in trade, international economic policy, and non-traditional foreign policy arenas such as the environment, climate change, disease, refugees and humanitarian intervention, international cooperation is rarely effective without an active American role. The task for the new Bush administration will thus be to face these multiple challenges in such a way that it provides leadership without becoming overextended, maintains American primacy, engages other countries to act jointly wherever possible, and sustains domestic support for the policies and the level of resources needed to carry them out effectively. This role is not only indispensable internationally, but it reflects the critical national interests of the United States. ●

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government.)

SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN POWELL

Biography

Confirmed by voice vote in the Senate and sworn in as secretary of state January 20.

GOVERNMENT POLICY EXPERIENCE: 35 years in the U.S. Army, rising to rank of general and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989-1993); national security adviser during the Reagan Administration.

OTHER WORK EXPERIENCE: Following his retirement, Powell wrote a best-selling autobiography and launched a career as a public speaker, addressing audiences across the United States and overseas. In April 1997 he chaired the President's Summit for America's Future, subsequently becoming chairman of America's Promise — the Alliance for Youth, the national non-profit group aimed at improving the lives of the nation's young people that grew out of the summit's deliberations.

EDUCATION: B.S. in Geology, City College of New York; M.B.A., George Washington University.

PRESIDENT BUSH ON POWELL: "Today America calls on Colin Powell again. He is a leader who understands that America must work closely with our friends in times of calm if we want them to be — if we want to be able to call upon them in times of crisis."

PRESIDENT BUSH ON POWELL: "I know of no better person to be the face and voice of American diplomacy than Colin L. Powell. Wherever he goes, and whomever he meets, the world will see the finest of the United States of America. In this office, he follows in the footsteps not only of Jefferson, but also of one of his personal heroes, General George C. Marshall. And I would say of General Powell what Harry Truman said of General Marshall. He is a tower of strength and common sense. When you find somebody like that, you have to hang on to them. I have found such a man."

BACKGROUND: Powell was a professional soldier for 35 years, during which time he held myriad command and staff positions and rose to the rank of a four-star General. His last assignment from October 1, 1989 to September 30, 1993 was as the 12th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest military position in the Department of Defense. During this time, he oversaw 28 crises, including Operation Desert Storm in the victorious 1991 Persian Gulf War. Following his retirement, Powell wrote his best-selling autobiography, *My American Journey*, which was published in 1995.

Powell was born in New York City on April 5, 1937. His parents immigrated to the United States from Jamaica. Powell graduated from the City College of New York (CCNY), where he earned a bachelor's degree in geology. He also participated in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) at CCNY and received a commission as an Army second lieutenant upon graduation in June 1958. He later received a Master of Business Administration degree from George Washington University.

Powell is the recipient of numerous U.S. and foreign military awards and decorations. His civilian awards include two Presidential Medals of Freedom, the President's Citizens Medal, the Congressional Gold Medal, the Secretary of State's Distinguished Service Medal, and the Secretary of Energy's Distinguished Service Medal. Several schools and other institutions have been named in his honor and he holds honorary degrees from universities and colleges across the country. ◎

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD

Biography

Confirmed by voice vote in the Senate and sworn in as secretary of defense January 20.

GOVERNMENT POLICY EXPERIENCE: Secretary of defense, 1975-1977; Ford administration transition chairman, chief of staff and Cabinet member, 1974-1975; U.S. ambassador to NATO, 1973-1974; director of White House Economic Stabilization Program and counselor to the president, 1971-1973; director, White House Office of Economic Opportunity, assistant to the president and Cabinet member, 1969-1971; Republican congressman from Illinois, 1962-1969.

OTHER WORK EXPERIENCE: Chairman and chief executive officer, General Instrument Corporation, 1990-1993; chief executive officer, president, and later chairman of G.D. Searle & Co., a worldwide pharmaceutical company, 1977-1985; naval aviator in U.S. Navy, 1954-1957.

EDUCATION: B.A. in politics, Princeton University.

PRESIDENT BUSH ON RUMSFELD: “Don and I have set three clear goals to guide American defense policy. First, we will strengthen the bond of trust between the American people and those who wear our nation’s uniform. We’ll give them the tools they need and the respect they deserve. Second, we will work to defend our people and our allies against growing threats — the threats of missiles, information warfare, the threats of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. We will confront the new threats of a new century. Third, we will begin creating the military of the future — one that takes full advantage of revolutionary new technologies. We will promote the peace by redefining the way wars will be fought.”

PRESIDENT BUSH ON RUMSFELD: “This is a man who has got great judgment, he has got strong vision, and he’s going to be a great secretary of defense — again.”

BACKGROUND: From 1998 to 1999, Rumsfeld, 68, served as chairman of the Commission on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, which evaluated the United States’ vulnerability to missile attack.

President Bush indicated that his selection was due in part to Rumsfeld’s work as chairman of the commission. “I felt that he did an extraordinary job with a delicate assignment,” Bush said. “He brought people together who understand the realities of the modern world. In picking Don Rumsfeld, we’ll have a person who is thoughtful and considerate and wise on the subject of missile defense.”

Most recently, from 1999 to 2000, Rumsfeld was a member of the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission. During the Reagan Administration, he served as an adviser to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense and as a member of the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. He also chaired the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization. ●

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

Biography

Sworn in as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs January 22.

PRIOR GOVERNMENT POLICY EXPERIENCE: National Security Council Staff, 1989-1991, as director and then senior director of Soviet and East European Affairs; later named special assistant to the national security affairs advisor.

OTHER WORK EXPERIENCE: Professor and provost, Stanford University; Hoover Institute fellow.

EDUCATION: B.S., Ph.D in political science, University of Denver; M.A., Notre Dame University.

PRESIDENT BUSH ON RICE: “Dr. Rice is not only a brilliant person; she is an experienced person. She is a good manager. I trust her judgment. America will find that she is a wise person, and I’m so honored” that she is joining the administration.

RICE ON NATIONAL SECURITY: “George W. Bush will never allow America and our allies to be blackmailed. And make no mistake; blackmail is what the outlaw states seeking long-range ballistic missiles have in mind. It is time to move beyond the Cold War. It is time to have a president devoted to a new nuclear strategy and to the deployment of effective missile defenses at the earliest possible date. George W. Bush knows that America has allies and friends who share our values. As he has said, the president should call our allies when they are not needed, so that he can call upon them when they are needed.”

BACKGROUND: Rice, 46, is known for her expertise on Russian affairs and arms control. She supports ballistic missile defenses for the United States and has raised questions about current U.S. military deployments, saying that U.S. leaders should examine resources and sometimes consider arranging coalitions to share military burdens. Regarding the possibility of negotiating lower U.S.-Russian nuclear levels, Rice has said the current bilateral strategic concept dates back to the Cold War and that “it is time for a new strategic concept.” She has indicated that the number of nuclear weapons the United States needs for the future should be determined through an internal review.

Rice has written or collaborated on several books, including “Germany Unified and Europe Transformed” (1995), “The Gorbachev Era” (1986), and “Uncertain Allegiance: The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army” (1984). Upon her arrival in Washington in 1986, she worked on nuclear strategic planning at the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of a Council on Foreign Relations fellowship. ©

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GEORGE TENET

Biography

Sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence on July 11, 1997 after a unanimous favorable vote by the U.S. Senate. Asked by President George W. Bush on January 16 to remain in his job, making him the first Director of Central Intelligence in 32 years to remain after the U.S. presidency has switched political parties.

GOVERNMENT POLICY EXPERIENCE: Director of Central Intelligence (1997-present); Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (1995-1997); special assistant to the president and senior director for intelligence programs, National Security Council (1993-1995); director, oversight of arms control negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, then staff director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1986-1993); legislative assistant and legislative director, Senator John Heinz (1982-1985)

EDUCATION: B.S., Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; M.A., School of International Affairs, Columbia University (1978).

TENET ON INTELLIGENCE: The role of strategic intelligence “is to work against those who work against America’s safety and security. To capture the secrets that they — nations, organizations, even individuals — most want to hide. To dig out and discover their plans and intentions. In an international environment like ours — where national strength is measured not just in military hardware but in information — we exist to provide our country with a decisive advantage.”

BACKGROUND: As Director of Central Intelligence, Tenet heads the Intelligence Community (all foreign intelligence agencies of the United States) and directs the Central Intelligence Agency. While serving as Senior Director for Intelligence Programs at the National Security Council, he coordinated Presidential Decision Directives on “Intelligence Priorities,” “Security Policy Coordination,” “U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness,” and “U.S. Policy on Remote Sensing Space Capabilities.” He also was responsible for coordinating all interagency activities concerning covert action. Before serving on the NSC, Tenet served on President Clinton’s national security transition team and coordinated the evaluation of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Publication: “The Ability of U.S. Intelligence to Monitor the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty” ●

U.S. National Security: The Bush Team
ARTICLE ALERT

Carter, Ashton B. KEEPING AMERICA'S MILITARY EDGE (*Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 90-105)

Although the near-term proficiency of the U.S. military is "unrivaled," the long-term readiness of the national security establishment to face tomorrow's threats "remains in question," the author says. He outlines a series of managerial changes that he believes are necessary "to ensure that the U.S. military keeps its advantage...in the face of the globalization, commercialization, and information revolutions that are transforming the world."

Cohen, Eliot A. DEFENSE AND THE NEW PRESIDENT: REMAKING THE MILITARY (*Current*, no. 427, November 2000, pp. 3-9)

The U.S. military — despite its inertia toward change — is in need of a drastic overhaul, the author says. The current problems will not have severe repercussions in the short term, but he warns that the long-term consequences could be deadly. The military, he says, needs to focus on four topics: defense against weapons of mass destruction, conventional dominance, short-term contingencies, and peace maintenance. He further advocates a strong role for civilians in changing the military to adequately reflect today's world.

Cohen, William S. PRINCIPLES FOR A NATIONAL SECURITY CONSENSUS (*The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 24, no. 2, Spring 2001, pp. 75-81)

Former U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen argues that today's policy makers can arrive at a bipartisan U.S. foreign policy as long as they reaffirm that national security should never be partisan. To support that principle, he says the executive and legislative branches must work as partners, and at the same time there must be "robust and informed debate on matters of national security." His commentary is joined by the work of seven other political leaders and policy experts, including Senators John Kerry and Charles Hagel, Norman Ornstein, Alton Frye, former Congressman Newt Gingrich and Lee Hamilton, and former deputy defense secretary John Hamre, in a series of articles on bipartisan foreign policy-making.

Graham, Thomas W. NATIONAL SECURITY: OPPORTUNITIES AND DANGERS FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION (*Public Perspectives*, vol. 12, no. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 22-33)

The American public is not as ambivalent about nor ignorant of foreign policy issues as many would believe, Graham says. Foreign policy, he notes, is something that Americans take seriously. According to polls, he says, Americans' foreign policy concerns have shifted and now reflect four main issues: biological and chemical weapons, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and drugs. Graham says the new administration would be well served to regularly poll Americans on their attitudes as this would be useful in making foreign policy decisions and securing American support.

Rice, Condoleezza. RICE TALK (*The International Economy*, vol. 14, no. 5, September/October 2000, pp. 36-39)

In an interview shortly before she became President Bush's National Security Advisor, Rice discusses trade with Mexico, the collapse of the Soviet Union, immigration policy, defense issues, and international economics. Economic issues, she says, are critical because they have the potential "to reshape the entire international political dynamic by creating a more prosperous...democratic environment."

Traub, James. W.'S WORLD (*New York Times Magazine*, January 14, 2001, pp. 28-34)

The foreign affairs outlook of the new Bush administration is strikingly different from that of the administration of the first President Bush, the author says. Noticeably absent from the new administration's pronouncements, he says, are references to humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and nation-building; instead, the incoming Bush administration advocates "realism," extols free markets and trade, and is reluctant to commit U.S. military forces to ground operations overseas.

The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered on the International Home Page of the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State: "http://usinfo.state.gov/admin/001/wwwhapub.html".

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U.S. National Security: The Bush Team KEY INTERNET SITES

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The American Enterprise Institute: Transition to Governing Project
<http://www.aei.org/governing/>

American Foreign Policy Council
<http://www.afpc.org/>

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<http://www.brookings.edu/>

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
<http://www.ceip.org/>

Center for Strategic and International Studies
<http://www.csis.org/>

Council on Foreign Relations: State Department Reform Task Force Report
http://www.cfr.org/p/pubs/StateDepart_TaskForce.html

Foreign Policy Association
<http://www.fpa.org/>

Foreign Policy in Focus
<http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/>

The Heritage Foundation's Mandate for Leadership Project
<http://www.heritage.org/mandate/>

Hoover Institution
<http://www.hoover.org/>

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<http://www.cia.gov/>

U.S. Commission on National Security
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