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Policy in a
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U.S. Security Policy in a Changing World

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“We must remain strong and vigilant against the kinds of threats we have seen already throughout the 20th century — regional aggression and competition, bloody civil wars, efforts to overthrow democracies. But also, our security is challenged increasingly by non-traditional threats, from adversaries both old and new — not only hostile regimes, but also terrorists and international criminals, who cannot defeat us in traditional theaters of battle, but search instead for new ways to attack, by exploiting new technologies and the world’s increasing openness.... We must approach these new 21st century threats with the same rigor and determination we applied to the toughest security challenges of this century.”

—President Clinton
Commencement Address at the U.S. Naval Academy
May 22, 1998

This issue of *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* explores the security challenges facing the United States as a result of the dramatic changes in the world during the past several years. Key U.S. officials discuss the threat from nuclear and chemical/biological terrorism, the scope of the U.S. humanitarian demining initiative, and the importance of democracy-building in promoting regional security. A leading scholar assesses new U.S. foreign policy approaches for the 21st century, and two private sector experts examine the growing influence of nongovernmental organizations on U.S. policy. The journal includes a case study on humanitarian demining in Rwanda, a report on the program to destroy and dismantle nuclear and chemical weapons in the former Soviet Union, and an assessment of the progress of democratization in Central America, as well as a series of fact sheets on security issues.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

*An Electronic Journal of the
U. S. Information Agency*

U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD

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AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

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NEW SECURITY THREATS: THE U.S. RESPONSE

*An Interview with John D. Holum
Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs*

The continued existence of terrorist threats — coupled with the increasing availability of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons — “makes the world a much more dangerous place” for everyone, Holum says. And there is the added threat of information warfare, he warns, which could harm the elements of a functioning modern society “through unconventional kinds of attack.” Holum is Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs and Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He was interviewed by Contributing Editor Jacqui Porth.

QUESTION: U.S. security requirements have changed a great deal in the post-Cold War era. Where there was once a single, identifiable threat — the Soviet Union — there are now many threats demanding U.S. attention. Would you address a few of those and the challenges they pose to U.S. security?

HOLUM: These threats really have changed our whole outlook on the world, and I hope the new reality has fully permeated our security thinking. The sarin (gas) attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 is an example of the kind of problems we could face. It is not the danger of a missile from the Soviet Union anymore; it is the danger of a terrorist bringing in something in a suitcase, or injecting something into the water supply, and endangering large segments of the population.

The continued existence of terrorist threats — coupled with the increasing availability of nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies — makes the world a much more dangerous place for all of us. If you think of the World Trade Center bombing or the Oklahoma Federal Center bombing or the Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta, and consider how much more awful the suffering would have been had there been even primitive weapons of mass destruction involved, you get an idea of what we might be facing.

Q: You have touched on the threat of terrorism from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, but how seriously do you take each of the three, and what is the United States doing to address each threat?

HOLUM: They are all serious. I think, given the challenges, that the least likely threat of the three is

nuclear. On the other hand, the potential consequences are probably the greatest from nuclear terrorism, so it is something we have to devote a lot of attention to.

It is true that, with the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons are being dismantled and the materials that are critical to nuclear weapons are being removed. However, they are not being stored as securely as we would like. And the control systems over those storage sites, and over nuclear research reactors in the former Soviet Union, are much less rigorous than they used to be.

So we are working very energetically to develop, there and elsewhere, much more effective control systems, inventories, consolidation of sites, and security systems, in order to prevent the theft or diversion of the critical ingredients for nuclear weapons. That is an issue of high consequence, and despite its relatively low probability as a threat, it is still significant.

I think chemical weapons are the easiest for terrorists to use because they can be made in a relatively small space and do not require a great deal of technical competence. And the raw materials needed for them are fairly widely available.

Biological weapons fall somewhere in the middle in terms of likelihood of use because they are somewhat more technologically challenging. But again the consequences could be horrendous.

The common view is to group chemical and biological weapons together, setting nuclear weapons apart. But I think biological weapons are closer to nuclear weapons in terms of their destructive potential, because chemical

weapons will disperse and become less lethal in the atmosphere. Biological weapons, in the right environment, can multiply; they are living organisms. And it takes a much smaller quantity to inflict a fatal illness. They also strike me as something particularly outrageous when you consider that humanity has been laboring for generations to wipe out dreaded diseases — anthrax, the plague, and botulism — and now there are perverse people deliberately preserving and culturing and protecting foul organisms for use as weapons of terrorism.

Q: What are U.S. plans for responding to these potential threats?

HOLUM: On all three we have aggressive international efforts to build global norms of behavior against their production and use. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and efforts to enforce its implementation through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are well advanced. The Chemical Weapons Convention has just gone into force and the implementing body (the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) is being set up.

The Biological Weapons Convention needs to be strengthened. It is very strong in terms of its prohibitions, but it is almost entirely voluntary. We need to have a better enforcement mechanism. The president has set 1998 as the time for us to complete a framework agreement. Negotiations have been underway since 1995, and we are working on that effort very aggressively.

That's dealing with the external part of it. There is also a great deal that needs to be done internally. And there have been Presidential Decision Directives dealing with our ability to respond through law enforcement systems, crisis management, and tracking down perpetrators. The most recent of these is Presidential Decision Directive 63, which deals with critical infrastructure and non-conventional threats and terrorism.

Q: What about the nature of the information warfare threat, not only in terms of unauthorized access to American computer systems but also disruption of satellite services, and what can the United States hope to do to avert this threat?

HOLUM: There is the threat of what has come to be known as "info war" or "cyber war," and this is the possibility that very dedicated computer hackers could get into our systems and turn off power grids or air traffic control systems, or destroy our ability to operate large systems, or even transfer money out of peoples' bank accounts. There are new dangers coming in the future, new technological capabilities that we're going to have to deal with that people have been calling "weapons of mass disruption."

Some of our major concerns include the evolution of hacker tools that can cruise the Internet and can stay on line waiting for the target, and then dive in and corrupt a system either by overloading it, by giving it false instructions, or otherwise disabling it. This can be done through international phone lines. It could come through an innocent-looking source so it hides the tracks of the intruder. And we have very little capability to deal with it.

We know that countries like Iran, Iraq, and Libya are pursuing information warfare. We know that our own Department of Defense is under assault — I think 600 times a week — by efforts to hack into its computer systems. Some may be through so-called "innocent pranksters," although there is nothing funny about it, and some may be deliberate attempts to corrupt.

Recognizing the international dimensions of this, there is also the possibility that we would collaborate with others — first, in raising consciousness about the problem and, second, in designing international conventions for protection of information systems. Not because, as is the case in arms control, the convention itself solves the problem, but because it gives a tool for cooperative efforts to deal with the offender.

Q: You mentioned risk to water supply, but how realistic do you think threats of environmental terrorism are? I recall the Gulf war where Iraq used oil well fires.

HOLUM: I think it is very realistic, and that is a good example of where it has actually been used. I was actually in the private sector at the time working as an attorney representing a company that was involved in the cleanup, so I had some very close exposure to the oil field fires. It was hard for me to imagine how anyone could deliberately cause such an appalling physical disaster: the smoke and

the fumes and the pollution of water and air were just incredible to behold. And you can imagine any number of fairly easy steps that could be taken to inflict similar damage, whether it is through introduction of toxic agents like disease, biological weapons, or just despoliation.

Q: What are U.S. priorities in the ongoing effort to eliminate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?

HOLUM: It's really the three I've mentioned — nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons — plus missiles. We have active efforts underway in all of those areas.

I would like to focus attention on the frontline work of non-proliferation — something that is rarely seen in public, but which goes on consistently and very aggressively. That is the laborious process of sifting through intelligence reports, of identifying shipments of dangerous material — whether a chemical weapon ingredient, a growth medium of biological weapons, nuclear materials, or specialized steel that could be used for missiles — and interrupting those shipments and then going to the source and saying, “Somebody in your country is going to sell Iran some speciality steel that is destined for its missile program. You should stop it because you have an international political obligation under the Missile Technology Control Regime not to allow this.”

That's where the day-to-day work of non-proliferation is done, and it illustrates all of the elements of a successful strategy. You have to have a legal or a political obligation, at a minimum, so that you can go to the country involved and say: “You have a responsibility to stop this.” You have to have technology and detection equipment so you learn about it. It may be through intelligence sources; it may be through radiation detectors that are set up at borders. The technology is advancing. And you need diplomatic resources to be on the ground to try to intercept shipments.

Q: Why is the United States promoting a ban on fissile material for nuclear weapons? What is the U.S. strategy and what does the U.S. government want other nations to do?

HOLUM: The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty is the way to confirm, for us and for the other nuclear weapons

states, that we can't renew an arms race. It's another step in the direction of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. It is hard to imagine how we could effectively control and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons if we are still producing the basic ingredient. So for us, it is a limiting factor, a means of locking in the steps that we have taken so far in nuclear disarmament.

It is also the way to prevent the problem from getting bigger in, for example, South Asia. If India and Pakistan were to join such a regime, we wouldn't have the nuclear problem solved there, but we would have a means to make sure it didn't get any bigger than it is. It is a way to help prevent an arms race.

We have been pursuing these negotiations since 1995 in the Conference on Disarmament. Thus far, we haven't been able to get negotiations underway, even though the United Nations General Assembly has endorsed a negotiating mandate, in significant part because India has blocked negotiations. They have recently given some indication that they are prepared to proceed.

Q: Is that diplomatically or publicly?

HOLUM: Publicly and diplomatically. Pakistan has made the argument in the Conference on Disarmament that the limitation should cover existing stocks of fissile material. That would be very hard to do in an international regime because you would have to have the international community involved in deciding how much each country could have. Dealing with existing stocks is really something that needs to be done regionally or bilaterally. But we are still hopeful that there will be a mandate that will allow negotiations to proceed in the Conference on Disarmament.

Meanwhile, we are pursuing our own efforts, both bilaterally with the Russians and trilaterally among Russia, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, to remove excess material from our own weapons program and put it under IAEA safeguards. We have identified more than 200 tons of material. Some of it isn't in the form yet where it can be put under IAEA safeguards, but we have made 12 tons available for IAEA safeguards and more is on the way.

Q: In terms of regional threats, to what extent is the United States prepared to take on those challenges

alone and under what circumstances should coalitions of nations be working together in a crisis?

HOLUM: I think it's always crucial to have the maximum possible international participation. For example, in the Bosnia situation, and as we approach the current crisis in Kosovo, it is certainly highly desirable that we have a coalition of forces. The United States has to be prepared to act unilaterally where the conditions warrant, but as you have seen in our practice of international security policy, we work scrupulously to build and maintain coalitions.

Q: What is the United States doing to counter the perception that, as the world's sole remaining superpower, it has become "arrogant" in its exercise of power?

HOLUM: It's a very complex problem because there is a temptation internationally, sort of reflexively, to say that we are engaging in hegemony. I think the answer is that we pursue our international interests based on values and ideals. I think, by and large, we can explain our approach in those terms.

If we're advancing the cause of democracy or the importance of combating weapons of mass destruction, if we are trying to serve the role of peacemaker, obviously that affects our interests, but it also serves a higher purpose than simply national interest. That more than anything else will help us to be seen as a constructive influence in the world, rather than a country that is trying to throw its weight around.

It is also important that we craft our dialogue with other countries in a respectful way. From what I have seen in the time that I have been back in the government since 1993, there really is a very conscious effort to do that. There isn't much of a tendency in our diplomacy to suggest that countries should do things because we say so, rather than because it is in their national interest. I think we make very careful efforts to ensure that our relations are based on respect for the country's point of view and security needs.

Q: Would you assess the role of conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy in terms of formulating U.S. security policy?

HOLUM: It is a major aspect of our international presence. One of the things we're engaged in, routinely, is trying to develop dialogues between potential antagonists long before a conflict begins. The kinds of diplomacy we have undertaken in the Middle East, Bosnia, and other regions of tension are well known. There is a less visible but no less important effort, wherever there is a potential for conflict, to act as a facilitator to help the parties engage in direct dialogue: in the Aegean, for example; in Ethiopia and Eritrea; and in a variety of other places.

One area that I am very much involved in relates to the risk of arms competitions that involve conventional weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction. We have placed a very high priority, for example, on basic confidence-building steps in Latin America — declarations of military holdings and advanced notification to neighbors of major weapons acquisitions, which by their nature imply the need for some discussion with your neighbors about why you are doing this. And security dialogues between civilian and military authorities can be a way to lessen the danger of existing military resources and other future unforeseen moments of tension.

Q: The Partnership for Peace program has been a great success for the former Warsaw Pact countries and others. How has the partnership concept become a basis for strategic relationships elsewhere?

HOLUM: At the China summit in June, the term "strategic partnership" was used quite extensively. This partnership is obviously of a different character than what we have developed in the Partnership for Peace in Europe, but it has a similar connotation: we are looking for ways to get on the same side of the table in a number of countries, recognizing that we have differences in many cases, but nonetheless trying to unite and pursue a common objective, whether it is non-proliferation, economic progress, or protection against climate change. So I think the concept of partnership has very broad application internationally. In fact, it is one of the valuable counters to the proposition that the United States is trying to run things its way. What we are really looking for are ways to create a common cause with like-minded countries on specific high-priority needs.

Q: What implications does a purely economic phenomenon like the Asian financial crisis have for U.S. security interests?

HOLUM: There are some immediate implications in that countries that find themselves in economic distress — that has certainly been the case in East Asia — tend to reduce their defense modernization. Because of our defense relationships, that is worrisome. In addition to that, there is a concern that economic collapse can create security problems by leading to regional instability and possible international conflict, and certainly to internal dysfunctions in key countries. So there is an important security dimension. That is why we tend to argue that events like those in Thailand or Indonesia aren't purely economic phenomena, because they have political and security dimensions.

Q: What will be the primary concerns in the 21st century for U.S. security policy?

HOLUM: I always tend to think of security as what affects the average American citizen and then look at the international dimensions of that. I think unfortunately we will continue to live with the dangers of drugs and terrorism. We need to reach a political understanding in the United States regarding the importance of issues such as the environment and climate change, which will have enormous future impact.

I think weapons of mass destruction will inevitably be on the agenda. I think we are making headway. We have made considerable headway in the last four or five years, but the difficulty is that technology also has advanced. Technology is more accessible, so the risk — despite our gains — is still very prominent. And there is a whole new realm of danger to our critical infrastructure — whether it is information systems or transportation systems or energy structure. All of the ingredients that make a modern society function could be at risk through unconventional kinds of attack. ●

MEETING THE THREAT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

*By William Cohen
Secretary of Defense*

There is “no single response” to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, says Cohen. “Instead,” he warns, “we’ve got to prevent the spread” of such weapons; “we have to protect ourselves by deterring their use, and we have to prepare for the possibility that they could be used right in the United States.”

We are living in a world in which more powerful weapons are in the hands of more reckless people who are more likely to use them. Countering the threat of weapons of mass destruction, in fact, may represent the most important security challenge of the next decade.

Iraq is one of at least 25 countries that already have or are in the process of developing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver them. Of these, many have ties to terrorists, to religious zealots, or organized crime groups that are also seeking to use these weapons. Chemical and biological weapons, we know, are the poor man’s atomic bomb — cheaper to buy, easier to build, and extremely deadly.

Our American military superiority presents a paradox. Because our potential adversaries know they can’t win in a conventional challenge to U.S. forces, they’re more likely to try unconventional or asymmetrical methods such as biological or chemical weapons. But we can’t afford to allow this vulnerability of ours to turn into an Achilles’ heel.

That’s the reason that I have called for the creation of a new agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), to begin operation in October. It will consolidate the existing On-Site Inspection Agency, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, and the Defense Technology Security Administration, and absorb some of the program functions that have been the responsibility of the assistant to the secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs.

The DTRA will serve as the department’s focal point for our technical work and our intellectual analysis that are required to confront this threat, recognizing that

these weapons may be used — and used early — on future battlefields, and that’s now a key element of our war planning. We also recognize there’s no silver bullet. There’s no single response to this threat. Instead, we’ve got to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We have to protect ourselves by deterring their use, and we have to prepare for the possibility that they could be used right in the United States.

Prevention has to be the first and foremost line of defense. Through our Cooperative Threat Reduction program, also known as Nunn-Lugar, we are helping to destroy and to dismantle nuclear and chemical weapons in the former Soviet Union. We are also actively participating in a range of arms control and non-proliferation regimes to reduce the chance that rogue regimes are going to acquire these weapons of mass destruction.

But I also have to recognize that despite all of these efforts, proliferation is likely to occur. So the second line of defense must be to protect ourselves through deterrence and through defense. We’ve made it very clear to Iraq and to the rest of the world that if any terrorist or nation should ever even contemplate using weapons of mass destruction — chemical, biological, any other type — against our forces, we will deliver a response that’s overwhelming and devastating.

But we also deter adversaries by making sure that our forces are ready to fight and win on any battlefield, even one that has been contaminated. So in December, I directed that we add another billion dollars to our current budget for defense mechanisms and methods. We added a billion dollars over a five-year period to the about \$3.4 billion or \$3.5 billion that we already have

in our budget for this purpose. The purpose of this is to improve the ability of our forces to find and destroy these weapons before they're used against our troops; to arm our forces with the most advanced detection and decontamination equipment; and to give them new, lighter-weight protective suits.

We began vaccinating our military forces in the Persian Gulf this year against the deadly anthrax virus, and we will continue until all of our troops around the world are immunized during the next five to seven years. We go to these lengths because defense itself is a deterrent. The more our forces are prepared, the less likely that we'll see an attack upon them and the more likely it is that these potential adversaries will be discouraged from even thinking about it.

But I am reminded that the front lines are no longer just overseas; they're also in the continental United States. Five years ago, six people were killed and thousands were injured in the World Trade Center blast. Three years ago, the Sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway killed dozens of people and injured thousands. Some believe that this kind of a deadly chemical or biological attack or catastrophe is inevitable in the United States. Nothing is inevitable until it happens, but we have to prepare for this potential.

So we're building a third line of defense that's grounded in domestic preparation. The Department of Defense is leading a federal effort to train the first responders in 120 American cities. The police, the firefighters, and the medical technicians who are going to be first on the scene of an attack — we are now in the process of helping to prepare these first responders.

We have also created the military's first-ever domestic rapid assessment teams to ensure that the Department of Defense is even more prepared with 10 separate and special National Guard teams that will be dedicated solely to assisting local civilian authorities in the event of a chemical or biological attack. These teams, to be located in California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, are designed to move in quickly, assess the situation, and then help local officials identify the types of federal military assets that might be needed to combat an attack or respond to an incident.

Reserve units already trained to respond to such attacks abroad are going to be given more training and equipment and opportunities to assist domestically. Moving from a limited response capability in fiscal year 1999, the plan is to have fully developed, mission-ready Guard and Reserve elements in place after Fiscal Year 2000.

The 10 National Guard rapid assessment teams will be complemented and supported by 127 decontamination and 54 reconnaissance units, drawn from the existing Reserve Component force structure, which will be provided with additional special training and equipment to enable them to perform a response and support mission.

This initiative will be the cornerstone of our strategy for preparing America's defense against a possible use of weapons of mass destruction. ●

PROMOTING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC STABILITY THROUGH DEMOCRACY-BUILDING

*An interview with Steven Coffey
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor*

Clear linkages exist between democratic institutions and political and economic stability, says Steven Coffey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The United States “will continue to promote democracy and foster democratic institutions across a broad range of programs on a large number of fronts,” he says. A key U.S. priority has been to enhance efforts in the rule of law, which Coffey terms “vitally important as a kind of focal point that brings together the democratization process, economic change, and greater respect for human rights.” Coffey was interviewed by Contributing Editor Dian McDonald.

QUESTION: How would you characterize the relationship between democratization and political stability?

COFFEY: We have seen in the current financial crisis in Asia the linkages that exist between democratic institutions and political and economic stability. The countries that have survived the crisis the best, at least to date, have been those that have had democratic institutions — for example, South Korea and Thailand. And I think the reason for that is clear. These crises require sacrifices on the part of the population, and governments in which the people themselves participate are in a much better position to ask for those sacrifices than governments that exclude popular participation.

Indonesia — the country that has had one of the most difficult experiences with the financial crisis — is a country where there has been a lack of popular participation. Hopefully with the changes that have recently taken place there, Indonesia is now on a positive trajectory. But the problems are clear, and the relationship between political participation and stability has been very clearly underscored. And that is one of the reasons why it is so important to promote the building of democratic institutions around the world.

Q: To what extent is the development of U.S. security objectives around the world linked to democracy-building initiatives?

COFFEY: The foreign policies of a government are very intimately related to its internal political structure.

Scholars are debating whether democracies are inherently more peace-loving than other types of government. But it is quite clear that, at a minimum, democracies very rarely go to war with each other. Democracies go to war more reluctantly in my view because the people who make the sacrifices in war are usually ordinary citizens, and when ordinary citizens participate in the decisions on war or peace, they look to see that the issues at stake merit the expected costs.

I think it is clear that if Iraq had a different government and if the people of Iraq had a say in their government, then Iraqi policies would be much different. The Iraqi government’s policies bear no relationship to the interests of the Iraqi people.

And so, in this sense, a country’s form of government can be an important determinant of its foreign policy.

The best example of this would be Russia. Clearly there has been a major change in the outlook in Russia toward the rest of the world as a result of the collapse of communism. The communist ideology defined a very antagonistic relationship between Russia and the so-called “capitalist world.” The present Russian government, popularly elected and representing a broad range of national interests, has come to define Russia’s relationship with the rest of the world differently. And that is why the continued process of democratic and economic reform in Russia is important. As Russia becomes more democratic, it will find an interest in even further involvement in the international

community and its foreign policy will reflect that interest.

Q: What are the chief impediments to efforts to encourage the further growth of democratization around the world?

COFFEY: There are a lot of them. I think one of the chief impediments in places like Russia is inertia. To change governmental and economic structures is not an easy process and takes time. We also are seeing the awakening of ethnic conflict in places like the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Burundi. Extreme nationalism thwarts the formation of democratic institutions, justifies repression, and justifies lack of popular participation. In many parts of the world we have seen the weakening or almost withering away of governmental authority, and into the political vacuum have come corruption, organized crime, and gangs. This, too, is a major impediment to democratic change.

Q: What is the administration's key policy priority right now related to democracy-building and human rights?

COFFEY: We will continue to promote democracy and foster democratic institutions across a broad range of programs on a large number of fronts. We will continue to give support to electoral processes, to representative political institutions, such as parliaments. In many places, these institutions have just been created. They lack experience and resources. It is important for us to continue that work.

One of our key priorities has been to enhance our efforts in the rule of law. We have had enormously important rule of law programs for a number of years, but we are seeking to give greater coherence to these efforts. Secretary of State Albright, who is very much interested in this area, would like us to do more to try to ensure that the work of the various agencies and institutions of government promoting rule of law are well coordinated. Last year she invited Paul Gewirtz of the Yale Law School to examine our rule of law programs government-wide.

The secretary and the president have focused on the rule of law because this is vitally important as a kind of focal point that brings together the democratization process, economic change, and greater respect for

human rights. The levels of authority that most individuals in most places come into contact with most frequently are police and judicial institutions. And if these institutions are corrupt, if they are not impartial, then the citizens' interaction with authority tends to be negative. Therefore these institutions are really of fundamental importance in protecting the rights of ordinary citizens and in shaping their attitude toward authority.

Q: What world regions are currently the focus of U.S. efforts and initiatives in this area?

COFFEY: There is no continent that we have singled out for special priority; we have programs on all continents. We have given a great deal of attention to promoting democratic institutions, judicial institutions, free press, and human rights in the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, Africa, and Latin America. The promotion of rule of law in China will be important to that country's development and figured prominently in the recent U.S.-Chinese summit in Beijing. This is an area of future cooperation between the United States and China.

Q: In the context of a specific world region, could you describe how U.S. democracy-building objectives have enhanced regional security?

COFFEY: This has certainly been the case in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. I do not want to attribute the changes there to U.S. programs. There are a lot of causes for the changes, and it is my own view that most of them are internal to these countries. U.S. policy acted to promote change, but in terms of our programs, basically what we have done has been to help these countries to accomplish goals that they have set for themselves.

If you look at the situation in Central Europe, in terms of security, you see an enormous change. A decade ago, an Iron Curtain ran down the center of Europe. Germany was divided. Some of the greatest tensions of the Cold War involved that region. With the collapse of communism, there has been an enormous transformation in the European security environment. Russian troops have left Germany and the Baltic countries, and the countries of Central Europe have recovered their independence. The East-West divide

has been erased. NATO is now in the process of expanding to include some of these countries. At the same time, the enhancement of European unity through expansion of the European Union is clearly on the agenda.

Q: What are the principal factors that have led to the spread of democratization in Africa?

COFFEY: I think there are a lot of factors. Some of them are global, some of them have to do with developments that are contributing to the spread of democracy everywhere. The communications revolution has played a tremendous role here. We really are living in a global village. People everywhere know what is going on everywhere, and this affects the relationship of the individual to authority everywhere. Information is impossible to control. And that has political ramifications.

One of the greatest forces for the promotion of democracy has been the end of apartheid in South Africa and the emergence of a new South Africa, a multi-racial and democratic South Africa. Nelson Mandela has given tremendous impetus to promotion of democracy in Africa. You have now on the African continent a shining example of political change. I do not want to underestimate the challenges that South Africa faces, but I think that it is a success story and that other Africans are looking to South Africa.

Q: Does democracy have a sound footing in Haiti, and do you believe the democratization process will lead to long-term stability there?

COFFEY: It is difficult to say that democratization has a firm footing anywhere. Democracy is something that always has to be won. It is something that always must be protected. What has happened in Haiti has certainly given Haiti a chance to move forward on democracy. There is no question that Haiti faces challenges, but there has been an enormous change for the better. There is still some violence, but it is much reduced compared to what it was before the international community intervened. This is reflected in the emigration patterns. People were getting on boats and risking their lives to flee Haiti just a few years ago. That situation has changed. A lot of progress still needs to be made in economic, judicial, and political

institutions. There is a need for continued effort on the part of the Haitians and for continued involvement by the international community in many important areas. But I think that Haiti is now on a positive path and there are grounds for hope for further progress.

Q: Are conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy given adequate consideration in Eastern Europe and the NIS?

COFFEY: The U.S. government has given a lot of attention to resolving conflicts and to preventive diplomacy in the NIS and Eastern Europe. The efforts that we have devoted to conflict resolution are very obvious. Our experience with Bosnia, the former Yugoslavia, the Dayton Accords — that whole process underscores the importance we have given to resolving conflict in that part of the world. We are also heavily involved in resolving other conflicts that are less well-known or at least are not on the front pages of the newspapers. For instance the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. We are trying to promote the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)-Minsk Group process to resolve that conflict. We very much supported the OSCE effort in the resolution of the conflict in Chechnya. We have supported the OSCE and the UN in the effort to resolve the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

One of the real untold stories of our success in this effort to date has been in the Baltics. In the early days of those countries right after they regained independence, there was considerable potential for friction between the Russian communities and the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian communities. The United States, in cooperation with the OSCE, worked very diligently to promote reconciliation.

Q: How do you see the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in fostering regional security?

COFFEY: NGOs are absolutely crucial to all of the programs that we have been talking about. If you accept the proposition that democracy is important to regional security and that transparent, open institutions — including the media and economic, governmental, and judicial institutions — are important to global security, then you have to recognize that NGOs play a

very important role. NGOs not only do the practical work of building these institutions but are an important expression of civil society in their own right. You cannot have a functioning democracy without them.

The NGOs in the field of human rights are especially important. Promotion of human rights is really no longer principally an effort of governments, although governments have an extremely important role to play. The real spear carriers are NGOs, because they are out on the front line publicizing the abuses and increasingly coming up with solutions and remedies for the abuses.

Q: Are the ideals of civil society easily conveyed to emerging democracies?

COFFEY: This varies with circumstances in individual countries. But often people catch on very quickly. I have been struck by this through my interactions with Russia over the years. I served in Russia from 1980 to 1983 and have been going back and forth since. But between 1987 and 1991, I had no opportunity to go

there. When I returned in 1992, I was astounded by the changes in the sensibility of people — especially young people, their changed expectations, the change in their willingness to participate and engage. This was the product of the changes initiated under Gorbachev's leadership. Once fear was removed, once young people saw that they could say and do things previously prohibited, they were quick to seize the opportunities.

The problem, of course, in Russia and many other places, is that the pace of change is not uniform — geographically or by age groups. Younger people are generally more adaptable and accepting of change. In many places, however, there are substantial forces resisting change. We should not assume that the battle is won and that democracy is inevitably going to win out every place. There are going to be setbacks. The economies in a number of countries are very fragile. And if those economies collapse, then that is going to have important political ramifications. But I believe that given time and the continuation of propitious circumstances, we will see further expansion of democracy around the world. ©

ELIMINATING LANDMINES: A TIME FOR ACTION

*By Ambassador Karl Inderfurth
U.S. Special Representative for Global Humanitarian Demining*

“The United States looks forward to working with its partners in the international community to bring the scourge of landmines that threaten innocent civilians to an end by 2010,” Inderfurth says. The Washington Conference on Global Humanitarian Demining and similar recent events have mobilized international attention, resources, and coordination, and “We believe that a firm foundation for achieving this objective is now in place,” he notes. Inderfurth is the U.S. Special Representative of the President and the Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian Demining and Assistant

As we near the end of the 20th century, the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines has become a tragic legacy of civil strife around the world. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that landmines claim some 26,000 victims every year. Landmines stand in the way of international efforts to help war-torn countries regain their economic and social infrastructures. They divert billions of dollars of assistance from economic development to eliminating the debris of war. Furthermore, they prevent a great deal of land from being put to beneficial uses, such as agriculture and the resettlement of refugees.

As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in her remarks to the May 20-22 Washington Conference on Global Humanitarian Demining, “Landmines keep killing and maiming and pushing people out of their homes long after the guns fall silent. They are cheap to buy, easy to use, hard to detect, and difficult to remove. They prey on the innocent, the young, the unwary, and the unlucky. They inflict the greatest damage on societies that can least afford to clear mines, warn civilians, care for victims, or deal with the loss of farmland made unusable by mines.”

The United States has been at the forefront of efforts to rid the world of the humanitarian crisis caused by anti-personnel landmines. It first adopted a moratorium on anti-personnel landmine exports in 1992 and called for other states to take similar action. In 1994, President Clinton became the first world leader to call for the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines during his speech before the United Nations General Assembly. Last December, growing international

momentum led to over 120 states signing the Ottawa Convention banning the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. Although U.S. security concerns have prevented us from signing the convention, we have made clear that the United States will do so by 2006, if we succeed by then in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to our anti-personnel landmines and mixed anti-tank systems.

Since first calling for states to adopt export moratoria on anti-personnel landmines, the United States has supported global humanitarian demining. Its program is currently active in 19 countries. Since the program's inception, the U.S. government has contributed more than \$150 million to humanitarian demining assistance. In 1997, the United States invested approximately \$40 million in humanitarian demining. Proposed U.S. investment in 1998 will more than double to \$93 million. These facts leave no doubt about the U.S. commitment to eliminate the scourge of anti-personnel landmines.

The United States has remained focused on its leadership of the global humanitarian demining effort. In October 1997, the secretaries of state and defense launched President Clinton's Demining 2010 Initiative, which seeks to eliminate the threat to civilians of uncleared anti-personnel landmines by the year 2010. This goal can be accomplished only through concerted international effort. In announcing the Demining 2010 Initiative, the United States recognized that two factors would be key to its accomplishment. First, the total level of investment in humanitarian demining worldwide would have to increase nearly five-fold to roughly \$1 billion a year. Second, effective

international coordination of demining assistance and activity would be required.

In order to further the goals of the Demining 2010 Initiative, the United States sponsored the Washington Conference in May 1998. Building on the achievements of earlier conferences held in Ottawa, Tokyo, and Bonn, the Washington Conference aimed to consolidate international consensus on coordination and set the stage for action. Participation in the conference was focused on key donor governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that provide the bulk of the resources and expertise for humanitarian demining. The conference agenda was developed in consultation with other governments, the United Nations, and several NGOs to spotlight action items that required international coordination.

For example, conference participants considered projects to consolidate baseline data on the extent of the landmine problem in the most seriously mine-affected countries. They agreed that the widely cited figure of more than 100 million landmines in the ground is probably significantly overestimated, but that, in any case, it was better to measure the problem not by the number of mines, but by the area of productive land rendered unusable by landmines. It was also agreed that the United Nations should proceed with multi-sectoral assessments and that a collaborative effort among the UN, NGOs, and donor governments to produce level one (general) surveys to determine the number of mines in the ground in selected countries should be launched as soon as possible.

Materials developed for the conference showed that the level of resources available for humanitarian demining has been rising significantly over the past six months. The U.S. government, for instance, has more than doubled its investment in humanitarian demining over the last year to approximately \$93 million. Several participants brought examples of new possibilities for raising further resources from private sector sources.

Addressing the question of international coordination, the conference endorsed the establishment of the UN Mine Action Service as the focal point for coordination among UN agencies and for collaborative efforts between the UN and outside partners. Donor governments

agreed to enhance their consultations through the Mine Action Support Group chaired by Norway. Switzerland has opened a Humanitarian Demining Center in Geneva to provide information management services to the United Nations, to develop educational tools for training deminers in mine-affected countries, and to establish information and communication links between Mine Action Centers in mine-affected countries, on the one hand, and the United Nations and other international groups, on the other.

Special attention was devoted to the question of technology and its critical role in accelerating demining activity. The United States and the European Community agreed to collaborate on three specific projects: to develop standards for determining technology requirements, to identify a worldwide network of test and evaluation facilities to assess promising technology for humanitarian demining, and to develop “demonstrator” projects for examining the application of new technologies to specific situations in the field. These initiatives will be closely coordinated with the United Nations and other countries wishing to take part.

Assistance to victims and survivors of landmine incidents was also a major concern at the conference. A number of recommendations were developed to guide the compilation of a better database on victims’ needs and statistics and to ensure that humanitarian demining assistance adequately recognizes the needs of victims.

The Washington Conference also took concrete steps to harness the vast potential within our military forces to contribute to solving the landmine problem. At the conference, military participants agreed to apply their expertise in demining training and operations in a variety of ways for the benefit of the demining community. Participants also agreed to facilitate the sharing of information among themselves.

All in all, conference participants brought to the table an impressive array of information and ideas, and the conference made significant progress in identifying strategies to move humanitarian demining ahead at an accelerated pace. Participants agreed that the task is urgent and that, with effective international coordination and adequate resources, we can reach the humanitarian goal of “zero victims” in years, not decades.

Although the many conferences that have already been held and will be held over the coming year have succeeded in mobilizing international attention, resources, and coordination for the cause of eliminating landmines, it is clearly time to translate the results of these conferences into action on the ground in the mine-affected countries. The United States looks

forward to working with its partners in the international community to bring the scourge of landmines that threaten innocent civilians to an end by 2010 — that is, in years, not decades. We believe that a firm foundation for achieving this objective is now in place. ●

U.S. SECURITY POLICY: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

*By Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
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The United States, for the foreseeable future, will continue to have the capability to help shape the global environment, working together with allies and like-minded states to contain and sometimes reduce conflicts, says Nye.

But he notes that the United States faces “a new form of threat” — from terrorists using weapons of mass destruction or launching attacks on critical infrastructures — for which “our traditional security instruments are ill suited.”

Before assuming his present post as dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Nye served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in 1994 and 1995; chairman of the National Intelligence Council, which coordinates intelligence estimates for the president, in 1993 and 1994; and, from 1977-79, as deputy to the under secretary of state for security assistance, science and technology.

The world has seen important changes in the distribution of power over the past decade. The Soviet Union has collapsed and Russian power remains in decline. China's influence, on the other hand, has risen rapidly and is likely to continue to grow. Yet despite these dramatic developments, the central reality of the global balance of power is the same as it was in 1990: the United States remains the only superpower with global assets in all dimensions of power — military, economic, and political. Those who forecast an inevitable American decline only a decade ago have been proven wrong as the world enters a new century.

This does not mean that a unipolar world has replaced the bipolar balance of the Cold War. There are many important security, economic, and political goals that the United States cannot achieve by itself. Nor is it accurate to call the world multipolar so long as every state except the United States lacks one or more key power resources. Instead, power is distributed in a complex pattern something like a three-dimensional chess board. On the top board, military power is largely unipolar, with the United States as the only country with both intercontinental nuclear weapons and large, modern air, naval, and ground forces capable of deploying around the globe. On the middle board, economic power is tripolar, with the United States, Europe, and Japan representing nearly two-thirds of world product. China's growth will make economic power quadripolar after the turn of the century. On

the bottom chess board, the transnational relations that cross borders outside the control of government include actors as diverse as bankers and terrorists. Here power is widely dispersed.

Just as important as these changes in the distribution of power are three changes in the nature of power and the processes through which it can be exercised. First, economic instruments of international power have been growing in importance for several decades. This should not be overstated, however, as some have done by suggesting that economic power has replaced military power as the central medium of world politics. Economic instruments still cannot compare with military forces in their coercive and deterrent effects. Economic sanctions alone were not sufficient to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Moreover, a single regional security crisis can cause stock markets to crash and stifle investments. Instead, economic and political security are closely intertwined, as was seen in the recent Asian financial crisis.

Second, modern weapons have changed the role of military power. There are two contradictory trends. On the one hand, the great powers' acquisition of nuclear weapons has for several decades made the possibility of direct conflict between them seem unthinkable costly. Thus such weapons have become musclebound, and useful only for deterring others. On the other hand, changes in information technology

(including computers, sensors, and satellites) have made possible a new generation of smart weapons that allow great precision and minimal collateral damage. These trends make military power less costly and more usable.

The third and perhaps greatest change in the nature of power has been the increasing importance of soft power, which is due in large part to the information revolution that is transforming the world. Soft power is the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. Hard power, including the coercive use of military force or economic sanctions, seeks to get others to do what we want. Soft power aims to get others to want what we do. Such soft power can rest on the appeal of one's ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others. The United States remains a global leader in soft power resources, as is evident in the movement toward democracy and free markets in more than 30 states over the past decade.

Yet the paradox of American security and foreign policy in the 21st century remains: even as the most powerful state, the United States cannot achieve all its international goals by acting alone. The country lacks both the international and domestic prerequisites to resolve every conflict. In each case, its role must be proportionate to the American interests at stake and the costs of pursuing them. Thus the United States must continue to enable and mobilize international coalitions to address shared security threats. The Gulf War and the peacekeeping force in Bosnia are cases in point.

The end of the Cold War reduced but did not eliminate the possibility of world wars among great powers. Regional and local wars are more likely than global conflicts. Nonetheless, security among states is greater because territorially defined resources have declined in importance among the great powers. In the past, leading states were tempted to acquire land for its raw materials, agricultural potential, industrial factories, or strategic importance as either a platform for military attacks or a buffer against attacks by others. These motives for forcible acquisition of territory are much less powerful today. Modern economic production depends as much on human capital and services as on territory. Perhaps most important, great power conflict has become less likely because many of the great powers are either already democratic or

aspiring to become so, and history shows that liberal democracies are less likely to fight one another. For this reason the advancement of democratic processes in Russia and of pluralization and human rights in China are security, as well as moral, objectives of American policy.

Regarding regional and local conflicts, American power can be an important factor in limiting their frequency and destructiveness. In some cases, it is even possible to reduce the level of conflict in civil and domestic disputes. While the United States cannot be a lone global policeman — the American public does not want such a role — it can at times serve as “sheriff of the posse” that leads shifting coalitions of friends and allies to address shared security concerns. This requires sustained attention to the institutions and alliances that add leverage to American power. It also requires investment in military forces and attention to their global deployment.

The American military budget has been cut by 40 percent and the armed forces personnel by a third since the Cold War peak. Nonetheless, we still station about 100,000 troops in Europe, another 100,000 in Asia, and 20,000 in and around the Persian Gulf. Combined with the prepositioning of equipment and joint exercises with allies and friendly countries, these capabilities help to shape the political environment in those critical regions and thus act as a form of preventive defense. These forces are welcomed by major countries in these regions. NATO has not lost its popularity in Europe and is adapting its mission to a post-Cold War world. In Asia, many leaders fear that an American withdrawal would lead to an arms race in the region and the loss of the political stability that has provided a foundation for the region's remarkable economic growth. When the Defense Department issued its East Asian Strategy Report in 1995, promising to keep up its alliances and forward deployments, the report was widely welcomed.

A critical security threat in the post-Cold War world is the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Thus far the nuclear non-proliferation record is impressive. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy predicted that there would be dozens of nuclear states by now. Certainly there are that many states capable of developing such weapons. But most have chosen to forego the bomb.

There are the five nuclear weapons states enumerated in the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China); India and Pakistan, which recently carried out nuclear tests; and, by reputation, Israel. South Africa, which had developed a half dozen bombs in the 1980s, subsequently gave them up. And rogue states such as Iraq and North Korea have had their programs halted. The permanent extension of the NPT in 1995 was an encouraging sign that the non-proliferation regime was holding.

The greatest threat in the nuclear area now is the problem of so-called "loose nukes," the danger that bombs or nuclear materials might escape from control in states of the former Soviet Union and become available on the black market. American assistance to Russia in this area, through the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, is a new and different type of security policy for a new world. Non-proliferation policy in all its dimensions, including the spread of chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, remains at the heart of our security policy.

Finally, there is a new dimension of security problem that cannot be solved by classical military means. That is the threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. For 40 years, Americans lived under the fear of Soviet nuclear attack. The end of the Cold War reduced the prospect of a nuclear holocaust, but ironically, prospects of a nuclear explosion inside the United States have probably increased. And the threat is not exclusively nuclear. Terrorist access to biological and chemical weapons such as anthrax, ricin, or sarin is easier than access to nuclear materials.

Recent years have seen the rise of a new type of terrorist less interested in promoting a political cause and more

focused on the eradication of what they define as evil. Their motives are often a distorted form of religion, and they consider weapons of mass destruction to be a suitable means to their ends. Such devices are becoming more available. The rise of mafias in former Soviet states has brought an increase in the smuggling of nuclear materials (mercifully in small amounts thus far.) Chemical and biological agents can be produced by graduate students or lab technicians. General recipes are available on the Internet. In 1995, a Japanese sect used sarin in the Tokyo subway, killing 12 people. They also experimented with biological agents. Recently President Clinton signed presidential directives designating terrorism and threats to critical infrastructures (including information systems) as top priorities for American security policy.

In conclusion, the world after the Cold War has good and bad news for American security policy. At the military and economic levels, the United States is likely to remain the preponderant power for the foreseeable future. No other state can match American strength. The prospect of great power war is unlikely. The United States has the capability to help shape the environment so as to reduce the prospects of future threats. While this does not mean that the United States can (or wishes to) act as a world policeman or would be able to control all conflicts, it does mean that when it chooses to organize coalitions with allies and like-minded states, there are reasonable prospects for containing and sometimes reducing conflicts. On the other hand, the bad news is that at the transnational level, where there is great dispersion of power and no one is in control, a new form of threat has arisen for which our traditional security instruments are ill suited. This is an area that will require more attention in the future. ●

BUILDING REGIONAL SECURITY: NGOS AND GOVERNMENTS IN PARTNERSHIP

*By James Notter and John McDonald
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy*

Partnership between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and governments “enables both groups to be more powerful and effective in achieving their missions,” say the authors. When these two actors work together in harmony, respecting and capitalizing on their differences in structure, resources, and abilities, “the system of building peace and regional stability around the world will work more productively.” Ambassador McDonald is chairman and co-founder of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy in Washington, D.C. Notter is a program associate at the institute.

In dealing with issues of global security and regional stability, the U.S. government has a major, but often unrecognized, ally in the community of nongovernmental organizations. In fact, over the past several decades, there has been growing evidence that unofficial actors, including NGOs, are playing an increasingly important role in the development and implementation of government policies. There is a specific part of the NGO community that focuses on issues of “conflict resolution” or “track two diplomacy,” where NGOs work unofficially — often in cooperation with governments — to help resolve ethnic conflicts around the world that constitute a major threat to regional stability and peace.

The notion that governments can and should work in concert with unofficial actors in developing and implementing foreign policy is, of course, not new. The term “track two diplomacy” was coined in 1981 by former U.S. diplomat Joseph Montville to describe the efforts of ordinary citizens and unofficial organizations to resolve conflict. The basic notion behind track two diplomacy is that peace and conflict resolution cannot be achieved by governments alone. Unofficial, informal, behind-the-scenes contact plays a vital role in conflict resolution and in promoting regional security.

The real challenge of track two diplomacy lies in the interrelationship between the official and unofficial spheres, which can be a sensitive one. Those working unofficially do not want to feel pressured or unduly constrained when they explore a policy or process that government officials oppose. Official rejection of a multi-track plan can preclude project implementation.

Government officials, on the other hand, should be kept informed. Track two practitioners must recognize that if their initiative is to succeed, they will probably have to coordinate their activities with officials at the government level. It is governments, after all, that are responsible for negotiating, signing, and ratifying treaties and other formal documents that may be needed to seal the unofficial, successful initiatives.

These two important parts of the peacemaking system become more effective when they work in cooperation with each other, instead of on parallel tracks. When there is mutual acceptance and support, both elements can benefit. This is especially true in the area of security and regional stability, where both NGOs and governments are simultaneously working to resolve ethnic conflicts but are using different means and different points of entry.

During the Cold War, even before the term was coined, many NGOs and individuals were involved in track two diplomacy, attempting to build bridges between the two superpowers and working to de-escalate conflicts and crises, which, given the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union, represented very serious threats. The American Friends Service Committee and Moral Re-Armament worked unofficially on relations between East and West Germany, and between France and Germany, in the 1950s and 1960s. Several prominent individuals and journalists have been involved in unofficial dialogues in crisis situations, including the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The Dartmouth Conference, a nongovernmental dialogue

group that focused on Cold War issues, started in 1959 and continued through the late 1980s. The group met many times during those decades, discussing informally the important differences of the day in U.S.-Soviet relations. Even at times when government officials of the two nations refused to meet, the officials actually requested that Dartmouth Conference groups continue to meet, to keep the door open and information flowing between the two adversaries.

As we enter the next millennium, it appears that unofficial actors, in particular NGOs, will continue to play an important role in foreign policy development and implementation. This can occur in a variety of ways, including very specific links between two or more NGOs working directly in a specific conflict situation (as in Cyprus), indigenous NGOs working in a region plagued by ethnic conflict and instability (the Horn of Africa), and links between intergovernmental organizations and NGOs (Bosnia).

CYPRUS

The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) in Washington, D.C., and the Conflict Management Group (CMG) in Cambridge, Massachusetts, have joined together under the name of the "Cyprus Consortium" in order to implement a training program in Cyprus focusing on conflict resolution. The U.S. government has put an emphasis on resolving this conflict, as evidenced most recently by the appointment of Bosnia peace broker Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as Special Presidential Emissary for Cyprus. Holbrooke and the other U.S. government staff who are working to help resolve the Cyprus conflict are focusing on the political dimensions of the conflict and on the official, UN-sponsored negotiations. The work of the Cyprus Consortium, however, focuses on the social level, providing opportunities for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to work together, build trust relationships, and demonstrate to their communities the potential for cooperation between the two sides in this conflict. The Consortium has trained several hundred Greek and Turkish Cypriots in conflict resolution skills, project development and management, and training design and delivery. This group of grass-roots peacebuilders has organized dozens of bicomunal projects including musical concerts and youth programs, and has facilitated dialogue sessions on the Cyprus conflict.

From the beginning, the relationship between the Consortium and U.S. government personnel has been one of cooperation and mutual support. The Consortium continuously keeps the U.S. government staff well informed of its activities, and the U.S. Embassy and officials in Washington have often called upon Consortium staff to consult on issues they are working on. Similarly, the Consortium has often enlisted the support of embassy staff in developing and implementing its training programs. Once the grass-roots work in Cyprus reached a certain level, the embassy even appointed a special coordinator for bicomunal affairs to serve as a liaison between the embassy and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots doing bicomunal conflict resolution work.

When bicomunal contact was cut off by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in December 1997, the U.S. Embassy issued a statement urging that the bicomunal activities be allowed to resume. An embassy spokesperson stated that while bicomunal activities "will not solve the Cyprus problem," the "free association" that they permit "is what civil society is all about." Such a statement demonstrates that the work of governments and of NGOs in resolving conflicts and enhancing regional stability are not so separate and distinct. Official U.S. foreign policy efforts and the grass-roots work of NGOs can work together to support the unique goals of each party to the partnership.

HORN OF AFRICA

Another example of government-NGO cooperation related to the issue of regional stability and conflict resolution comes from the Horn of Africa. In 1994, President Clinton launched a Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In an initial concept paper entitled "Building a Foundation for Food Security and Crisis Prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa," GHAI representatives laid out the concept for their program to address the issue of regional stability and food security in the Horn. They recognized the link between development and emergency aid on one hand, and conflict prevention, crisis management, and conflict resolution on the other.

More importantly, they also explicitly recognized, from the very beginning, the link between governments,

intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs. In the report, GHAI describes itself as a “collaborative effort among African states, nongovernmental organizations, concerned citizens, Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development, and the international donor community to address the root causes of food insecurity in the Horn.” The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy was one of several NGOs that were consulted in the development of the report and the set of activities that followed from the report. IMTD also cooperated during a training program organized by the United States Institute of Peace (an independent, non-partisan organization funded by the U.S. Congress) and GHAI staff.

Finally, GHAI recently requested proposals looking for a team of NGOs to manage a grant-making program for NGOs in the Horn of Africa that would implement activities in support of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. The program includes direct grants to local NGOs as well as an institutional strengthening program that will support the development of the NGO sector in the Horn. In this example, NGOs assisted USAID in the development of the \$10 million program, NGOs are primarily responsible for the implementation of the program, and the target recipients of aid are NGOs in the region.

OSCE

A final example highlights the link between NGOs and an intergovernmental organization. The Organization

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is working closely with many NGOs, both from the United States and locally, in organizing and implementing programs to support the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia. IMTD was approached in December 1996 by the OSCE to see if the two groups could work together on the matter of social peacebuilding. With funding from the U.S. Information Agency, IMTD trained 70 Bosnians from the Bosnian-Serb, Bosnian-Muslim, and Bosnian-Croat communities. The OSCE played a vital role as the convener, in the five cities in which the training took place, because it provided a “safe haven” for all participants.

As all of these examples indicate, government/NGO cooperation in the area of security policy and regional stability is increasing. NGOs, both domestically and, in particular, in the regions where conflict and instability exist, are not merely valuable resources to government policy makers, but they also represent important partners. Partnership between NGOs and governments enables both groups to be more powerful and effective in achieving their missions. Both NGOs and governments retain their particular characteristics; the goal is not to merge the work of these two actors in the system. Rather, as in any system, when component parts work together in harmony, respecting and capitalizing on their differences in structure, resources, and abilities, the system of building peace and regional stability around the world will work more productively. ●

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING IN RWANDA: A SUCCESS STORY

*By Matthew F. Murphy
Senior Program Manager, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs
Department of State*

Today, the U.S. humanitarian demining program in Rwanda has reached “the sustainment phase,” which is “the measure of success” for U.S.-sponsored demining efforts, Murphy says. The United States, he notes, will continue to provide the necessary resources to help the Rwandan government rid the country of “the scourge of landmines.”

Murphy is a senior program manager in the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Department of State, which is the lead agency in coordinating U.S. humanitarian demining efforts worldwide.

The purpose of the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program is three-fold: to relieve human suffering, to develop an indigenous demining capability, and to promote U.S. interests in peace, prosperity, and regional stability.

The primary measure of effectiveness for the program is the self-sustaining capability of a partner nation to manage, direct, and control its own demining effort. Rwanda, one of the six Sub-Saharan countries in Africa where the United States has a humanitarian demining program, has reached that stage. Similar U.S. demining efforts are under way in Angola, Chad, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.

When the U.S. humanitarian demining program began in Rwanda in 1995, most of the country was infected with landmines and unexploded ordnance as a result of the fighting there in 1991 and 1994. In 1995, the Rwandan National Demining Office (NDO), established under a U.S.-Rwanda bilateral arrangement, estimated that there were some 250,000 mines and pieces of unexploded ordnance to be cleared. Continued fighting in the northwest is producing additional unexploded ordnance.

Although mines and unexploded ordnance are scattered throughout approximately two-thirds of the country's land area, the heaviest concentration is in the northeast, among the rural farmlands and tea plantations near Kigali. Here, Rwandan soldiers mined roads, footpaths, and fields to impede the advance of the rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, who were

entering the country from Uganda. During the fierce, three-month battle for control of the Rwandan capital in 1994, areas near schools, hospitals, and factories were heavily mined. Today parts of Kigali and areas around it have been and are continuing to be demined.

By the time U.S. demining efforts started, ethnic-based insurgences had devastated habitable areas, the work force, and the prospects for economic recovery. Both military personnel and civilians were casualties of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Once the conflict subsided, and refugees began to return and work the soil, landmine casualties began to rise among non-combatants. In 1994, the United Nations reported that there were, on average, two civilian casualties a day in mined areas of the country.

Today, however, the returning citizens of Rwanda are put into housing built by non-governmental organizations on land cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance by the National Demining Office. For example, thousands of returning refugees from Uganda, who fled the anti-Tutsi pogroms by the majority Hutu population, are currently being resettled in demined parts of the Kagera National Park.

In May 1995, U.S. military personnel from the European Command established a training program for the Rwandan People's Army, which already had very capable combat engineers, many of whom had received training in mine-clearing from either the United States or Belgium. Within six months, U.S. soldiers had trained 85 Rwandan military personnel in demining

techniques and arranged to provide them with 18 “sniffer” dogs to locate mines. The United States also provided 250 mine detectors for the program.

The 85 Rwandan military personnel assigned to the National Demining Office are organized into operational squads of 8-10 deminers, one medical staffer, and one communications expert. The NDO has established a database to collate information from the field.

U.S. efforts in 1996 focused on U.S. Special Forces “Train the Trainers” instruction in mine clearing, mine survey techniques, basic Explosives Ordnance Disposal, computer training for the NDO, the planning and conducting of a mine awareness campaign, and emergency medical training. Under the “Train the Trainers” concept, Rwandan military personnel themselves become qualified instructors and train other Rwandan soldiers to be deminers.

In 1997, the demining program emphasized providing demining equipment — as well as dogs and dog handlers — for support of the U.S.-trained deminers and to complement the training of a fourth demining platoon.

The impact of U.S. and U.S.-supported efforts is apparent. More than 100 miles of road essential to economic recovery and over 5,000 acres of farmland have been made safe for productive use. Rwandan deminers destroyed more than 200 anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and almost 7,500 pieces of unexploded ordnance in clearing these areas.

The commander of the National Demining Office estimates that there are about 5,000 mines and 100,000

pieces of unexploded ordnance remaining to be cleared. In addition, NDO deminers have located seven suspected minefields, each of which will take about three months to clear.

The NDO also implements a mine awareness program that puts information out by radio, TV, T-shirts, banners, and posters. The NDO targets areas where heavy fighting took place, focusing on children to warn them about the dangers of mines and unexploded ordnance. The mine awareness program also informs the general population where and to whom they should report suspected landmine and unexploded ordnance locations.

Today, the United States considers the Rwandan Humanitarian Demining Program to be in the sustainment phase, the measure of success of our demining efforts. The National Demining Office is a very successful solution to the landmine/unexploded ordnance problem in Rwanda, and it is justifiably proud of its achievements. While the NDO is technically capable of doing the job at hand, it still needs outside funding.

From 1995 through 1998, the United States has spent \$6,000,000 on its humanitarian demining Program in Rwanda. The U.S. will continue to provide the resources necessary for the government of Rwanda to continue to administer the program effectively. For fiscal year 1999, the United States is recommending that another \$1,200,000 be spent to help this beleaguered nation rid itself of the scourge of landmines. ●

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION: REDUCING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

*By Dr. Susan Koch
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction Policy*

*The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program “is one of the most effective and efficient tools wielded by the U.S. government to ensure a more stable international environment, reduce weapons of mass destruction and prevent their proliferation, while forging strong and enduring ties with the former Soviet republics,” the author says.
Koch is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction Policy.*

The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, approved by Congress in 1991, provided a key instrument in meeting one of the highest priorities of the U.S. government: preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The legislation, sponsored by Senator Richard Lugar (Republican-Indiana) and former Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat-Georgia), is now known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program — one of the Department of Defense’s most effective tools in the post-Cold War world.

CTR has been guided since its inception by five goals: to assist Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in becoming non-nuclear weapon states and eliminate from their territory strategic delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction infrastructure; to assist Russia in accelerating strategic arms reductions to Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START) levels; to reduce nuclear weapons and fissile material in the former Soviet Union and enhance the safety and security of the weapons and material that remain; to assist states of the former Soviet Union to eliminate and prevent proliferation of chemical and biological weapons capabilities; and to encourage military reductions and reforms and reduce proliferation threats in the former Soviet Union. CTR has made considerable progress over the past seven years toward achieving these goals.

The CTR Program began in December 1991 by addressing immediate concerns regarding nuclear weapons in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. This part of the program has proven to be an unqualified success. Approximately 3,400 nuclear warheads were returned to Russia from the Soviet

“successor states.” Kazakhstan became a non-nuclear state in 1995, with Ukraine and Belarus following in 1996. All three are non-nuclear signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Programs are continuing in Kazakhstan and Ukraine to dismantle strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the infrastructure related to nuclear weapons, which includes storage and training facilities.

CTR is working with Russia to ensure that requirements for the elimination of strategic offensive arms under START and other arms control agreements are met. Ongoing projects include the elimination of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles and silos, heavy bombers, rocket motors, and liquid propellant.

Another key CTR concern is to enhance the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons during transport and in storage. CTR has provided Russia with security upgrades for weapons storage sites and with an automated inventory control and management system that allows the Russian Ministry of Defense to improve monitoring of their weapons. To ensure the security of nuclear weapons during transportation, CTR has provided the Russian Defense Ministry with supercontainers, heavy ballistic blankets, and security systems for rail cars.

One of the major obstacles to the development of nuclear weapons is the acquisition of sufficient quantities of fissile material. CTR has recently launched a major new initiative with its counterparts in Russia to convert reactors which now produce weapons-grade plutonium to designs which will allow

them to continue badly needed energy production without producing plutonium. In this way, CTR is ensuring that these production reactors are no longer fissile material proliferation risks. CTR also is funding a project to provide safe, secure, and ecologically sound storage of fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons.

The CTR Program also works to promote the elimination of chemical weapons capabilities. CTR is currently engaged in designing and building a chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuch'ye, Russia. Other CTR projects will help eliminate existing chemical weapons production capabilities.

CTR sponsors defense and military-to-military contact programs in order to foster a cooperative atmosphere in U.S. relations with states of the former Soviet Union as well as to promote better understanding among military counterparts. The CTR Program also has funded government-to-government communications links in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan that provide reliable means for the parties to meet arms control reporting requirements. These measures also build confidence and deepen mutual respect.

CTR has launched a number of new initiatives over the past few years, including the signing of umbrella agreements with Moldova, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. Under these agreements, the United States purchased 21 MiG-29 jets from Moldova in 1997 in order to deny the acquisition of these nuclear-capable jets to rogue states that had shown interest in the planes. This year, CTR successfully removed five kilograms of highly-enriched uranium from a defunct research reactor facility just outside Tbilisi, Georgia.

The success of the CTR Program in reducing threats to the United States makes it an indispensable part of national security. CTR-funded programs have led thus far to the deactivation of 4,700 nuclear warheads; the destruction of 319 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); the elimination of 254 ICBM silos; the dismantling of 37 long-range bombers and more than 1,000 air-launched cruise missiles; the elimination of 96 submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers; and the sealing of 131 nuclear test tunnels.

The CTR Program constantly looks for new opportunities to reduce proliferation risks and further the work of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. Programs have already started the work of bringing Russia's nuclear arsenal below START II levels. President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin discussed further reductions last year in the Helsinki Initiative, expressing the desire by the United States and Russia to negotiate START III. CTR currently is involved in examining how best to implement this new initiative.

The CTR Program is one of the most effective and efficient tools wielded by the U.S. government to ensure a more stable international environment, reduce weapons of mass destruction and prevent their proliferation, while forging strong and enduring ties with the former Soviet republics. CTR demonstrates the mutually held belief that weapons proliferation is a problem that all nations must face, and that the problems of tomorrow can be solved through cooperation today. Congress has appropriated over \$2 billion for CTR over the past seven years — still less than 0.5% of the defense budget over the same time period. Without CTR the costs to the United States in potential conflicts or terrorist attacks might be incalculably higher. ●

CENTRAL AMERICA: SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY FOSTERS PEACE, SECURITY

*An interview with Paul Trivelli
Former Deputy Director of Central American Affairs
Department of State*

The spread of democratization in Central America has led to a greater stability in the region, says Paul Trivelli, who will assume his new role this month as Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

He says there is a continuing U.S. commitment to support democracy-building in the region while simultaneously encouraging economic liberalization there. Trivelli, former Deputy Director of Central American Affairs, Department of State, was interviewed by Contributing Editor Dian McDonald.

QUESTION: How would you describe the principal factors that have led to the growth of democratization in Central America?

TRIVELLI: I think that the growth of democratization in Central America most recently has been an outgrowth of the end of the Cold War. And I think that enabled Central America, and particularly places like El Salvador and Nicaragua, to move toward democracy and consolidate the democracy they have had.

There was a remarkable situation in Nicaragua with the election to the presidency of Violetta Chamorro in 1990 and the defeat of the Sandinistas at the ballot box, and then the passage of elected government to Arnaldo Aleman some 19 months ago. That was really the first transition of civilian power from one elected president to another in the history of Nicaragua. And that's a great example of the beginning of institutionalization of democracy in the region.

In the same way, in El Salvador, the end of the Cold War nudged the peace process along. The 1992 peace accords were negotiated with the help of the United States, the United Nations, and others. Now there is a situation where the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) — the former guerrilla movement — has instituted itself into a political party. They did pretty well in the elections a year ago. In fact the mayor of San Salvador was elected on a ticket in coalition with the FMLN. So those are really incredible changes that have taken place in this region over the past eight to ten years.

Q: Could you define in specific terms how the end of the Cold War had an impact on democratization in Central America?

TRIVELLI: In the most immediate terms, it was simply that the support that the Soviets, the Cubans, and other groups were able to give to guerrilla forces in the region was essentially withdrawn, or it just became impractical or impossible to provide such support. And then the beginnings of democratization in places like Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and all of those other things made it obvious to everyone that a statist, Marxist government is just not the way to go. It also became apparent that, with the end of the Cold War, a whole new series of issues was going to become more important. It was not simply an ideological struggle; it was not simply an East versus West military-geopolitical struggle. But it was going to become important to begin dealing with other kinds of transnational issues, and all of that started really in 1989-1990.

Q: How has the spread of democratization in Central America led to increased stability in the region?

TRIVELLI: With the signing of the peace accords in Guatemala in December of 1996, for the first time in three or four decades the region is at peace, totally. And that is a good thing. The governments are not fighting wars, and that enables them to concentrate more on building institutions, rebuilding their economies, strengthening the democratic process. It has enabled the U.S. government — including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) — to begin to devote more resources to exactly those sorts of issues —

for example institution-building, administration of justice, and helping civilian police forces become more professional.

So democratization really has led to, I think, a greater stability in the region, which, of course, is in the U.S. interest. It is always in our interest to have stable neighbors that are not at war, that are not sending us illegal immigrants and refugees, and whose populations and economies are growing. As a result, we sell more and encourage economic reform in the area as well. So all of that is to the good.

We have, of course, been deeply involved in Central America throughout most of our history, and particularly deeply involved since roughly the late 1970s. There has been a whole host of programs that we have supported — for example, IMET (International Military, Education, and Training) programs, funded by the U.S. Department of Defense and related to the importance of civilian-military relations and the pre-eminence of civilian power over military power. We have sponsored many programs in judicial reform and helped provide the judiciary and lawyers with the training, resources, and new codes needed to modernize their judicial systems and to give people faith for the first time that the judiciary is functioning in a fair, transparent, and expeditious way.

We have given support to electoral councils to try to ensure that they have the training and the machinery necessary to conduct fair elections. We have been election observers ourselves and funded many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to be election observers. That is only a small part of what we have done, but it is those sorts of things that I think have encouraged the deepening of democracy in the area.

It is also important to emphasize that there are at least two countries in Central America that have fairly long democratic traditions. Belize, a British Commonwealth country that gained its independence in 1981, has had a long tradition of democracy. And Costa Rica has had democracy since 1949 when it disbanded its army.

Q: As the democratic process increases in the region, will there be a concomitant decrease in U.S. efforts to foster or sustain democracy there?

TRIVELLI: I think that we all understand that the institutionalization of democracy is not a quick process, so we know that we have to be there over the long haul. And, as we all know, the gross amount of resources available for assistance writ large seems to be getting smaller every day. But I see no reason why we would not keep our administration of justice, police training programs, and IMET programs at roughly the same level as now. In fact, in Guatemala, after the signing of the peace accords, we were able to come up two years ago with a 100-million-dollar, five-year pledge to support the peace process in Guatemala. So I think there is a commitment, and it is likely to remain over the medium term.

I think it is also important that in tandem with our encouragement of democratization we have simultaneously encouraged economic liberalization as well. I think those trends tend to reinforce each other. In Central America we have seen substantial economic liberalization at the same time that we have seen substantial growth in democracy. And I don't think that is by accident. In fact the region has come to us in no uncertain terms to say, "Look, we are interested in a free trade agreement with the United States; we think that would be a good thing."

So that's sort of the other side of the coin. We are seeing substantial liberalization; we are seeing substantial economic growth; we are seeing increased interest by foreign investors in the region. That strengthens democracy — at least indirectly because certainly if an individual feels that he has an economic future, that his lot in life is increasing, he is that much more likely to be concerned about democracy and participate in a democratic system. You can't have a democratic system for long in which the populace does not see any benefits. You can't successfully argue, "We need democracy" if the electorate does not see direct benefits from democratization. Part of those benefits is economic progress. I believe we are seeing that in Central America.

Q: How have regional organizations and U.S. support to those entities fostered democratization and regional security in Central America?

TRIVELLI: One of the efforts that we have made over the past couple of years in particular is to deal with Central

America at least to some degree on a regional basis. For example, the secretary of state has met with the regional foreign ministers as a group to discuss various regional issues, including such things as immigration and deportation, sustainable development and the environment, and free trade issues — the large 21st century global issues. And following on President Clinton's visit to San Jose last year, Attorney General Janet Reno and General Barry McCaffrey, director of the Office of Drug Control Policy, met with their counterparts in the region to talk about anti-narcotics and law enforcement issues and to discuss what they could do as a group.

Subsequent to that, Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman met with labor ministers in the region to talk in regional terms about strengthening labor ministries and strengthening labor legislation, particularly in such areas as labor conditions and child labor. In addition U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky met with the group to discuss trade issues, specifically what Central America will do as this hemisphere moves toward free trade.

So all those efforts together, I think, indicate that we are really trying to bolster the region as a region, and to take advantage of the fact that there is some measure of regional identity there. There are, of course, other regional organizations that we have supported. For example, the Central American Alliance for Sustainable Development, an organization supported by USAID and other U.S. funds, deals largely with environmental and sustainable development issues. That has been in place for the past four or five years. So we are starting to move on a multilateral front.

Q: Could you elaborate on the role of NGOs in Central America?

TRIVELLI: There is no doubt that NGOs have become increasingly important in the region and in serving as both implementers of and commentators upon our policy on a whole series of issues. For example, NGOs related to labor have been very interested in labor conditions in Central America. The environmental groups have an impact on these countries in terms of their sustainable development policies and getting them interested in larger climate change issues. NGOs also have been involved in election observation and in working with organizations that try to promote

political dialogue and consensus in many of these countries. One thing we found was that the art of skilled dialogue on a level of courtesy among political entities that disagree with each other was at a low level ten years ago. So, little by little, I think that the quality of the domestic political dialogue in Central America has improved enormously, and at least some of that has been encouraged by NGO participation.

Q: Do you foresee an increasing role for NGOs in the next five to ten years?

TRIVELLI: I would have to say yes. I think that is certainly the trend. NGOs have had an intense interest in Central America, and I don't see that lessening over the medium term.

Q: Do you see any problems that are peculiar to the region in establishing civil societies?

TRIVELLI: I think there are probably some, but there are many problems that are common to other countries in other regions of the world as well. Certainly one thing that makes it more difficult in Central America is the relatively short history of political participation by the masses in the political process. It is just now that we are seeing a kind of grassroots participation in government policy. Many of these countries had relatively weak assemblies or legislatures. Those are being strengthened over time. In many of these countries, for example, the military and civilians did not have much of a dialogue 10 to 15 years ago. More and more we are seeing a cadre of civilians who are beginning to develop some expertise in civil-military affairs.

And I think simply the relatively low education level in these countries makes the process difficult. The better educated the electorate is, the more they tend to participate in the political process. So one could reasonably assume that as educational levels improve, as literacy improves — as it has in the past 15 years in Central America — there will be more activity at the grassroots level.

Q: To what extent are narcotics and corruption threatening democracy in Central America?

TRIVELLI: It is certainly not the same scale of problem as it may be in a place like Colombia. But there is a

substantial amount of narcotics trafficking in Central America. You just have to look at a map to know that that is probably happening. Central America is on the land bridge between the producing-consuming areas. That being said, the governments of Central America have cooperated with us in counternarcotics activities. We have active programs in all of the countries in the region. But narcotics is a problem, and it is a problem that is almost inevitably going to be with us in the coming years.

In terms of corruption, I think it is even a more sensitive topic. It is among the themes that have been discussed at the Summit of the Americas and at the Organization of American States (OAS). And I think there is a recognition that governments in this region have to take steps against corruption. Therefore anti-corruption, greater transparency, greater professionalism in the public sector are all issues in which we are seeing greater and greater interest.

Q: Are there other threats to the region?

TRIVELLI: One of the most troubling threats we see right now in Central America is a growth in criminal activity. I think this is an offshoot, unfortunately, of the wars of the 1980s. Now, of course, there are demobilized soldiers and demobilized guerrillas, but there are still many weapons and many people who know a lot about violence. A whole new set of civilian police forces has been created over the past few years; they are under civilian rather than military control, but they are not yet as effective perhaps as they could be, in terms of professionalization. There is also a question concerning the amount of resources that these countries have to devote to police activity. What we are seeing is unfortunately a rise in organized criminal activity in places like Guatemala and El Salvador and perhaps to a lesser extent Honduras.

Q: Do you worry about backsliding once nations have been launched on the road to democracy? What are the warning signs and what mechanisms should be brought to bear when these warning signs appear?

TRIVELLI: Certainly in the Central American case, the roots of democracy are still fairly shallow. But they are strengthening every year. We go from election to election; every election builds on the next as institutions like legislatures and judicial systems have more and more experience, as militaries continue to be subservient to civilian control. All of those factors tend to build on each other, in fact consolidate democracy.

But backsliding, I suppose, is always possible. There are many ways it could conceivably happen. Economic distress, for example. Problems between nations — border issues, for example — could cause problems. Internal domestic situations could conceivably cause problems — created, for instance, by charismatic leaders of the “old school.” But I think that the chances of that happening are reduced every day because the world example, the world trend, is toward greater and greater democratization. I think that countries now also can gain support from their neighbors in terms of democratization. This could conceivably happen in Central America; if one country begins to backslide, its own neighbors would find that distressful. And, if there is an anti-democratic move afoot, the OAS as an organization could conceivably step in and issue the warning that this is not something that should take place.

So we are pretty hopeful that backsliding won't happen. We believe that the international system and the regional system are in place there that would make it more difficult. ●

FACT SHEET: PROTECTING AMERICA'S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

(Presidential Decision Directive 63)

The following fact sheet on Presidential Decision Directive 63 was released by the White House on May 22, 1998.

This Presidential Directive builds on the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. In October 1997 the Commission issued its report, calling for a national effort to assure the security of the United States' increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures, such as telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, and essential government services.

Presidential Decision Directive 63 is the culmination of an intense, interagency effort to evaluate those recommendations and produce a workable and innovative framework for critical infrastructure protection. The President's policy:

- Sets a goal of a reliable, interconnected, and secure information system infrastructure by the year 2003, and significantly increased security for government systems by the year 2000, by:
 - a) Immediately establishing a national center to warn of and respond to attacks.
 - b) Building the capability to protect critical infrastructures from intentional acts by 2003.
- Addresses the cyber and physical infrastructure vulnerabilities of the federal government by requiring each department and agency to work to reduce its exposure to new threats;
- Requires the federal government to serve as a model to the rest of the country for how infrastructure protection is to be attained;
- Seeks the voluntary participation of private industry to meet common goals for protecting our critical systems through public-private partnerships;

- Protects privacy rights and seeks to utilize market forces. It is meant to strengthen and protect the nation's economic power, not to stifle it.

- Seeks full participation and input from the Congress.

PDD-63 sets up a new structure to deal with this important challenge:

- a National Coordinator whose scope will include not only critical infrastructure but also foreign terrorism and threats of domestic mass destruction (including biological weapons) because attacks on the United States may not come labeled in neat jurisdictional boxes;

- The National Infrastructure Protection Center at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which will fuse representatives from the FBI, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Secret Service, the Departments of Energy and Transportation, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector in an unprecedented attempt at information sharing among agencies in collaboration with the private sector. The Center will also provide the principal means of facilitating and coordinating the federal government's response to an incident, mitigating attacks, investigating threats and monitoring reconstitution efforts;

- An Information Sharing and Analysis Center is encouraged to be set up by the private sector, in cooperation with the federal government;

- A National Infrastructure Assurance Council drawn from private sector leaders and state/local officials to provide guidance to the policy formulation of a National Plan;

— The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office will provide support to the National Coordinator's work with government agencies and the private sector in developing a national plan. The office will also help coordinate a national education and awareness program, and legislative and public affairs.

For more detailed information on this Presidential Decision Directive, contact the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office at (703) 696-9395 for copies of the White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection. ●

FACT SHEET: COMBATING TERRORISM

(Presidential Decision Directive 62)

The following fact sheet on Presidential Decision Directive 62 was issued by the White House on May 22, 1998.

Since he took office, President Clinton has made the fight against terrorism a top national security objective. The President has worked to deepen our cooperation with our friends and allies abroad, strengthened law enforcement's counter-terrorism tools and improved security on airplanes and at airports. These efforts have paid off as major terrorist attacks have been foiled and more terrorists have been apprehended, tried and given severe prison terms.

Yet America's unrivaled military superiority means that potential enemies — whether nations or terrorist groups — that choose to attack us will be more likely to resort to terror instead of conventional military assault. Moreover, easier access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive power available to terrorists is greater than ever. Adversaries may thus be tempted to use unconventional tools, such as weapons of mass destruction, to target our cities and disrupt the operations of our government. They may try to attack our economy and critical infrastructure using advanced computer technology.

President Clinton is determined that in the coming century, we will be capable of deterring and preventing such terrorist attacks. The President is convinced that we must also have the ability to limit the damage and manage the consequences should such an attack occur.

To meet these challenges, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 62. This Directive creates a new and more systematic approach to fighting

the terrorist threat of the next century. It reinforces the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism; it also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs, from apprehension and prosecution of terrorists to increasing transportation security, enhancing response capabilities and protecting the computer-based systems that lie at the heart of America's economy. The Directive will help achieve the President's goal of ensuring that we meet the threat of terrorism in the 21st century with the same rigor that we have met military threats in this century.

THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR

To achieve this new level of integration in the fight against terror, PDD-62 establishes the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator will oversee the broad variety of relevant polices and programs including such areas as counter-terrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness, and consequence management for weapons of mass destruction. The National Coordinator will work within the National Security Council, report to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and produce for him an annual Security Preparedness Report. The National Coordinator will also provide advice regarding budgets for counter-terror programs and lead in the development of guidelines that might be needed for crisis management. ●

FACT SHEET: PREPAREDNESS FOR A BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ATTACK

(Issued by the White House, May 22, 1998)

President Clinton recognizes that the availability of biological agents and advances in biotechnology mean that the United States must be prepared for an attack involving biological weapons against our armed forces or civilians.

Already, the U.S. military is working hard to defend against this danger. The possibility that during the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf region our forces might be confronted with biological weapons produced by Saddam Hussein's secret program demonstrates the urgency of this effort. Under President Clinton's leadership, the Department of Defense has made real strides to protect American troops:

An additional \$1 billion for chemical and biological defense was added to the Five-Year Defense Plan.

Starting today, the Defense Department's vaccination program against the lethal anthrax bacteria is being expanded to include not just troops in the Gulf region but all active and reserve American armed forces personnel.

America's military is also playing an important role in domestic preparedness.

Under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Program, military experts are participating in the training of emergency personnel in our 120 largest cities for response to a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Today, the Department of Defense is announcing the selection of ten states in which National Guard units will be specially trained to assist state and local authorities to manage the consequences of a WMD attack. The states are: Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Illinois, Texas, Missouri, Colorado, California and Washington.

President Clinton believes we must do more to protect our civilian population from the scourge of biological weapons. In his commencement speech at Annapolis, he announced that the government would develop a comprehensive strategy to address this threat. There are four critical areas of focus:

First, if terrorists release bacteria or viruses to harm Americans, we must be able to identify the pathogens with speed and certainty. The President's plan will seek to improve our public health and medical surveillance systems so the alarm can be sounded fast. These improvements will benefit not only our preparedness for a biological weapons attack — they will pay off in an enhanced ability to respond quickly and effectively to outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases.

Second, our emergency response personnel must have the training and equipment to do their jobs right. Building on current programs, President Clinton's plan will ensure that federal, state, and local authorities have the resources and the knowledge they need to deal with a crisis.

Third, we must have the medicines and vaccines needed to treat those who fall sick or prevent those at risk from falling ill because of a biological weapons attack. President Clinton will propose the creation of an unprecedented civilian medical stockpile. The choice of medicines and vaccines to be stockpiled will be made on the basis of the pathogens that are most likely to be in the hands of terrorists or hostile powers.

Fourth, the revolution in biotechnology offers enormous possibilities for combating biological weapons. President Clinton's plan will set out a coordinated research and development effort to use the advances in genetic engineering and biotechnology to create the next generation of medicines, vaccines, and diagnostic tools for use against these weapons. ●

FACT SHEET: U.S. GOVERNMENT HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAM

(Issued by the State Department, May 20, 1998)

People in over 60 countries, mostly in the developing world, face a daily threat of being killed or maimed by millions of landmines in place today. All estimates of the numbers are very rough; what is known is that anti-personnel landmines and unexploded ordnance claim thousands of casualties each year. Because most landmines are long-lived and very difficult to detect, they will remain a threat to civilian populations for decades unless action is taken now to remove these hidden killers. The U.S. program is indeed supporting ongoing mine clearance operations to remove mines now. Every mine removed from the ground is potentially another life saved.

Since 1993, the United States has committed over \$245 million to global humanitarian demining. Congressional support for demining has been strong. The U.S. contribution of \$92 million in 1998 is expected to make up a large portion of the world's commitment to humanitarian demining.

Since the U.S. program was initiated in 1993, 19 countries have been included in U.S.-supported humanitarian demining programs:

AFGHANISTAN (UNOCHA, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan)	CAMBODIA CHAD COSTA RICA (OAS/IADB, Organization of American States/Inter- American Defense Board)	HONDURAS (OAS/IADB) LAOS LEBANON MOZAMBIQUE NAMIBIA NICARAGUA (OAS/IADB)
ANGOLA (UNDP, UN Development Program, and USAID, U.S. Agency for International Development)	ERITREA ETHIOPIA GUATEMALA (OAS/IADB)	RWANDA (USAID) YEMEN
BOSNIA- HERZEGOVINA	JORDAN	ZIMBABWE

In fourteen of these countries, mines are coming out of the ground now. Programs are being started this year in Yemen, Chad, and Lebanon, and programs for Guatemala and Zimbabwe were approved in early February. Other countries have begun to make preliminary inquiries about participation in the program.

The U.S. government is a world leader in strong support for humanitarian mine action. In Cambodia, the United States, in cooperation with other international donors, supports the Cambodian Mine Action Center, whose work has reduced the death rate from landmines by one-half. This program has become largely self-directing through multilateral funding support. In Namibia, deminers have been able to reduce the casualty rate by 90 percent. Rwanda, with U.S. assistance, has cleared nearly a quarter of its landmine-contaminated territory. In several countries, the scourge of anti-personnel landmines and unexploded ordnance is close to being eradicated. Within the next several years, Central American countries may be able to declare themselves mine-free, and Namibia and Eritrea are making consistent progress.

Elsewhere, the United States supports humanitarian demining through international organizations such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan (UNOCHA), enabling that organization to continue its successful record of demining operations. U.S. support for UNOCHA is continuing in 1998, in some of the most difficult terrain in the world for clearing landmines and unexploded ordnance.

The United States has trained and equipped about one quarter of the active deminers in the world today. In 1997 and 1998, 276 U.S. soldiers and 20 civilians have trained over 1,600 deminers in Africa, Latin America, Indochina, and Bosnia on mine awareness, clearance techniques, emergency medical care, and establishment

of national mine action centers. The United States encourages public and private partnerships, such as the Time-Warner/DC Comics, UNICEF (UN Children's Fund), and U.S. government cooperation in the development and distribution of an internationally acclaimed Superman mine awareness comic book aimed at children in the former Yugoslavia. A Spanish version for Central America is planned for mid-1998.

HOW THE U.S. HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAM WORKS

The United States implements this program in cooperation with international agencies and host governments of mine-affected nations. Once hostilities have ceased, and at the invitation of the host government, the United States supports mine clearance operations and mine awareness programs by providing training, expertise, and equipment support through programs administered by the Department of Defense. Once an indigenous program is established, the Department of State provides funding for continued equipment support of demining operations. In some countries where a direct U.S. military training mission is not appropriate, the United States contributes to programs administered by the United Nations, the Organization of American States, or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The United States sponsors demining research and development to examine existing and proposed technologies for practical and affordable solutions to mine detection and clearance. In Bosnia, Namibia, and other nations, technical solutions to demining are field tested by experienced host-nation deminers, who are assisted in their efforts while simultaneously evaluating the applicability of new mechanical and technical developments. Over 120 applications, specifically designed for humanitarian demining, have already been reviewed, with 21 selected for development. Over \$17 million in funds managed by the Department of Defense are projected for humanitarian demining research and development in 1998.

The principal source of assistance for landmine and unexploded ordnance victims is the Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund managed by USAID. The core objective of the fund is to provide prostheses for civilian amputees to help reintegrate them into civil

society. The fund also assists children who contract paralytic polio during periods of strife when immunization programs are discontinued. The fund works through nongovernmental organizations to develop the capacities that should result in the provision of sustainable services for amputees. The programs are an inherent element of national reconstruction and recovery.

U.S. LANDMINE PROGRAM EVOLUTION

The United States Government Humanitarian Demining Program was created in late 1993 to relieve human suffering and to foster national and regional security, social and political stability, and economic development by reducing civilian landmine casualties through support for mine clearance training and operations, mine awareness, and research and development of demining technology. The program seeks to establish sustainable, indigenous, humanitarian demining capabilities in mine-infested countries that will continue after direct U.S. involvement is complete.

Speaking at the September 1994 UN General Assembly, President Clinton was the first world leader to call for the elimination of anti-personnel landmines. At U.S. urging, nations in the UN voted to pursue a comprehensive agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines.

In May 1996, President Clinton announced unilateral U.S. plans to destroy U.S. stockpiles of three million non-self-destructing anti-personnel landmines by 1999. Destruction of these mines is on schedule, and over half have been already destroyed. Only those landmines for use in Korea or needed for defensive training will be retained until alternative means can be developed.

In January 1997, the United States began working with other nations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to negotiate an effective global ban on anti-personnel landmines. On September 17, 1997, the President renewed our commitment to working aggressively to establish negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, with reaching agreement on an export ban as a first step.

On January 17, 1997, the President announced that the United States would make permanent its

moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines. Additionally, the President capped the U.S. inventory of self-destructing landmines at existing levels.

On September 17, 1997, the President announced significant initiatives for eliminating landmines and expanding efforts to remove existing mines. He directed the Department of Defense to develop alternatives to anti-personnel landmine use outside of Korea by 2003 and within Korea by 2006. General David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was appointed Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense in connection with this process. The President also announced a significant expansion of the humanitarian demining program into new countries and directed increases in funding for training, operations, and research and development. In 1998, we will devote over \$80 million to this effort, an increase from last year's level of \$40 million. In victim assistance, the Leahy War Victims Fund has also been increased to \$7.5 million.

The administration is seeking the Senate's early advice and consent for the ratification of the Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol II on anti-personnel landmine use or employment. The protocol establishes new norms to protect civilians even as countries move towards the goal of an enforceable ban on anti-personnel landmines.

In October 1997, President Clinton pledged continued U.S. leadership in eradicating, by the year 2010, anti-personnel landmines and unexploded ordnance which threaten civilians and their countries' economic, social, and political stability. On October 31, 1997, Secretary of State Albright announced the appointment of Assistant Secretary Karl R. Inderfurth as Special Representative of the President and the Secretary of State for Humanitarian Demining. In connection with this announcement, the Secretary launched a new initiative, "Demining 2010," to greatly accelerate global humanitarian demining operations and assistance to end the plague of landmines posing threats to civilians. Through this initiative, it is hoped that the international community will develop, marshal, and commit the resources necessary to accomplish this goal by 2010.

THE WAY AHEAD

In September 1997, three new countries were added to the program — Chad, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe — and a U.S. demining office was established in Sarajevo. Other steps include continuing the expansion of the U.S. humanitarian demining programs into other countries, developing and fielding new mine detection and clearing technologies, and expanding U.S. financial support for sustainable indigenous capabilities in humanitarian demining in three areas: mine awareness education, mine clearance training and operations, and medical support. In cooperation with USAID, the United States also seeks to expand victim assistance programs.

Enhanced legislative authority from the Congress will allow the Department of State to investigate innovative mechanisms for disbursing funds. Such new measures may involve direct contracting of mine action through nongovernmental organizations, commercial consultants and demining firms, and direct funding of governmental operations. To avoid mismanagement, these new mechanisms will be initiated in 1998, with full implementation expected in 1999.

The U.S. humanitarian demining program continues as a practical effort to alleviate global suffering and economic stagnation by returning land and facilities to safe use. The United States supports the spirit of international cooperation that led to the Ottawa Convention banning the use, stockpiling, production, or transfer of anti-personnel landmines. Beyond the provisions of a ban, the United States actively engages in programs of practical benefit in solving the global landmine crisis by clearing the vast numbers of landmines already in place. Since its inception, the U.S. humanitarian demining program has significantly augmented mine awareness, technical training, actual mine clearance, and victims assistance in several countries. And, most importantly, it has saved lives. ●

U.S. Security Policy in a Changing World:
ARTICLE ALERT

Berkowitz, Bruce D.; Goodman, Allan E. THE LOGIC OF COVERT ACTION (The National Interest, no. 51, Spring 1998, pp. 38-46)

With the advent of "information warfare" — the use of, or attacks on, information systems for military or political advantage — "the issue of covert action may soon become more important than ever," the authors say. Citing the mishandling of covert operations in Iraq and elsewhere, they urge a public debate on the general principles of U.S. covert action in order to avoid a repeat of "the mistakes in oversight, accountability, and effectiveness that have plagued covert action in the past."

Booker, Salih. THINKING REGIONALLY ABOUT AFRICA (Current History, vol. 97, no. 619, May 1998, pp. 200-203)

Booker argues that U.S. engagement with Africa must focus on promoting American interests in all five regions of the continent. Citing a "new, if cautious, optimism about Africa's prospects," the author says the United States must stop emphasizing partnerships with "successfully reforming states," and begin assisting countries with big problems yet big potential for promoting America's interests in economic development, security, and democracy on the continent.

Freedman, Lawrence. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: CHANGING TARGETS (Foreign Policy, no. 110, Spring 1998, pp. 48-63)

Freedman looks at conflicting views on the study of international security in the post-Cold War world. The focus on NATO's central front and the nuclear balance, he says, has been replaced by a strong interest in how force is being used in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and post-communist Europe. The current challenge for the United States "is to find a level of engagement in international affairs that prevents small problems from becoming large ones without imposing unacceptable burdens at home."

Joseph, Robert G.; Reichart, John F. THE CASE FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE TODAY (Orbis, vol. 42, issue 1, Winter 1998, pp. 7-19)

The authors believe that for the United States and its allies, "deterrence rather than disarmament through denuclearization remains the basis for sound policy"

because deterrence has succeeded in saving "countless lives by making the prospect of war horrific." Outlining a rationale for keeping a credible nuclear weapons posture, they cite the need "to provide a hedge — an insurance policy — against a reversal in relations with Russia and China." Both nations, they note, have shown a tendency for "radical shifts in their political orientation" and also "an enduring commitment to possess nuclear weapons."

Karatnycky, Adrian. AS GOOD AS IT GETS (American Spectator, vol. 31, issue 5, May 1998, pp. 54-57)

"We may be in the middle of a period of remarkable human progress," contends the author, who is president of Freedom House. Although there are international threats posed by dangerous tyrants, biological and chemical terrorism, and a "clash of cultures," he says, "the reality is that by every indicator, the globe is becoming increasingly freer in its politics and increasingly more open in its economics." Cautioning that democratic and free market momentum must be encouraged if recent gains are to be sustained, Karatnycky says "such an effort requires greater coordination by the world's expanding community of democracies."

Mann, Paul. PENTAGON CALLED UNPREPARED FOR "POST-MODERN" CONFLICT (Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol. 148, no. 17, April 27, 1998, pp. 54-56)

Some U.S. military theoreticians are making the case that the Defense Department should be preparing for a future in which cyber-states may replace nation states as adversaries, the author says. Mann writes about a new "virtual" borderless enemy that will avoid the battlefield, take no territory, and "seek no victories" in the classic sense, but would try "to inflict social panic" via computer viruses or chemical and biological weapons attacks. A redefinition of national defense might be needed to cope with a 21st century enemy that could rely on non-lethal weapons such as high-power microwaves, robots, lasers, acoustics, or sticky foam to gain strategic advantage, he says.

The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered on the home page of the U.S. Information Service:

<http://www.usia.gov/admin/001/wwwhapub.html>

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