

International Security and Nonproliferation

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The International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) Bureau was established in 2005 by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to better position the U.S. Department of State to deal with the different security challenges facing the world today. The new bureau merged the work of the Nonproliferation

Bureau and the Arms Control Bureau and placed greater emphasis on meeting the three pillars of the President's National Security Strategy to Combat WMD to:

- Prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise for weapons of mass destruction through strengthened nonproliferation efforts;
- Deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed through proactive counterproliferation efforts; and
- Respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states, through effective consequence management.

The 12 offices in ISN include: the Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives (ISN/CPI); the Office of Regional Affairs (ISN/RA); the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (ISN/WMDT); the Office of Strategic Planning and Outreach (ISN/SPO); the Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction (ISN/CB); the Office of Missile Threat Reduction (ISN/MTR); the Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction (ISN/CATR); the Office of Export Controls Cooperation (ISN/

ECC); the Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs (ISN/MNSA); the Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety, and Security (ISN/NESS); the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR); and the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Fund Office (ISN/NDF).

While we continue to rely upon many of the international structures and organizations developed during the Cold War, the work of the bureau has been refocused to better combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in today's security environment. The proliferation challenge has evolved significantly in recent years. With the elimination of WMD and missile programs in Libya and Iraq, there are fewer rogue state programs of concern. However, we continue to face



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Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and representatives from the Russian Federation seal a container of highly enriched uranium at the Tajura research reactor near Tripoli, Libya, in preparation for the uranium to be shipped to Russia as part of Libya's commitment to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction programs.



U.S. Department of State/John Kroft

A British officer speaks with Italian marines and a reporter as part of a recently held Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise in the Northern Arabian Gulf.

threats from other countries, such as North Korea and Iran, placing a greater emphasis on the need for successful diplomacy. Challenges that we face include the growth in trade among rogue states and entities, as well as a substantial increase in the role played by non-state actors as proliferators of key technology (e.g., A.Q. Khan) and as consumers (e.g., terrorist groups such as al-Qaida).

In order to effectively address the evolving proliferation challenge, new approaches and tools are necessary. Multilateral arms control agreements and suppliers groups continue to have a significant role to play. At the same time, our approach has been to preserve, and where necessary, strengthen the existing global nonproliferation frameworks and regimes, while adding new approaches and tools. Some hallmarks of this new approach include the use of multilateral initiatives, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI), and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). In addition, tools like Executive Order 13382, regarding proliferation finance, are used to target the finances of proliferators.


We also have worked to reenergize and reform existing mechanisms. In the United Nations Security Council, four key resolutions (UNSCR 1540, calling for states to criminalize proliferation behavior; UNSCR 1718, adopted after North Korea's nuclear test; and UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, calling for Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and imposing some sanctions) provide new international legal

authority to actively counter proliferation activities. ISN plays a key role in our diplomatic efforts to deny Iranian and North Korean nuclear aspirations and deny their proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles.

We also have worked internationally on key efforts to develop an initiative to shore up the nuclear nonproliferation regime, implement reforms to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and broaden the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to assist states beyond the former Soviet Union in safeguarding and dismantling WMD.

Given the global nature of the WMD proliferation threat, international cooperation is essential. The United States continues to pursue important nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts at fora, such as the United Nations Security Council, the IAEA, the G-8, NATO, and multilateral export control regimes, as well as with allies and regional partners. There is a crosscutting nature to these institutions and efforts, whose activities often overlap and often reinforce each other. Our activities are global, flexible, and forward-looking. I am proud to lead the bureau that is at the forefront of these critical efforts. ■

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Members of special units of the Japanese Coast Guard conduct a joint U.S., Japanese, French, and Australian PSI exercise in Sagami Bay, near Tokyo, in 2004.