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*Peacekeeping
and Regional
Stability*

April 1998

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

Peacekeeping and Regional Stability



“Important U.S. interests...are served every time an area of instability and conflict is transformed into one of peace and development. This contributes to our economic interests, reduces the likelihood of costly humanitarian disasters and refugee flows, and expands the network of societies working to counter global threats such as illegal narcotics, crime, terror, and disease.”

— Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
Before the House Appropriations Committee
Washington, DC, February 25, 1998

As we approach the 50th anniversary of the first UN peacekeeping operation, *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* takes a look at peacekeeping missions around the world and the U.S. role in those efforts. It examines the history and evolution of peacekeeping since the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) — considered to be the first UN peacekeeping operation — was established by UN Security Council Resolution 50 on May 29, 1948. Senior U.S. officials from the State and Defense Departments, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provide an overview of U.S. peacekeeping policy and objectives. Also included are a report on recent public opinion polls conducted in the United States and a fact sheet describing UN peacekeeping operations.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

*An Electronic Journal of the
U. S. Information Agency*

PEACEKEEPING AND REGIONAL STABILITY

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**U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
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AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

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UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: WORTHWHILE INVESTMENTS IN PEACE

By Edmund J. Hull

Director, Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations, Department of State

UN peacekeeping operations, in many situations, enable the United States “to influence events without assuming the full burden of costs and risks,” says Hull. Americans “have a deep stake in whether conflicts are contained, social disruptions are minimized, and international standards of behavior are respected.... We must retain the flexibility to employ UN peacekeeping as a viable alternative” for responding to international emergencies. Hull is Director of the Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

OVERVIEW

During the Cold War, the United Nations could resort to multilateral peace operations only in the few cases in which the interests of the Soviet Union and the West did not conflict. In the 40 years from 1948 — when the first UN peacekeeping mission was established — to 1988, the UN Security Council approved a total of 13 such operations. Thus there was little need for a formal U.S. peacekeeping policy during this era.

The end of the Cold War brought historic opportunities but also historic challenges to the international community. With the world no longer divided into rival ideological blocs, the warring sides in places like Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Angola turned to the international community, and to the United Nations in particular, for help in putting an end to the fighting and achieving political reconciliation. Unfortunately, at the same time, in other parts of the world, the reduced potential for East-West conflict was accompanied by the eruption of a range of conflicts that were not traditional wars, nor were they as amenable to traditional peacekeeping efforts. Meanwhile, the success of the Gulf War coalition in repelling the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait enhanced hopes that international coalitions were now more possible for repelling aggression.

In the Balkans and in parts of the former Soviet Union, the demise of Communist control allowed long-standing ethnic and religious conflicts to resume with new fury. In Africa, governments and political movements took advantage of personal, clan, and

ethnic hatreds to lead campaigns of human savagery on a scale matched only rarely in this century. These types of conflict were marked by displacements of large numbers of civilians whose flight into neighboring states threatened to destabilize their regions and require large-scale international humanitarian and refugee assistance. In several cases, no major power had an interest significant enough to form and lead a coalition, as in the case of Kuwait. Attempts to address these conflicts centered initially, therefore, on the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions.

The result was a revitalization of the long-paralyzed UN Security Council. Conceived as the international community’s guardian of peace and security, the United Nations was faced with an unprecedented demand for intervention and higher expectations regarding its ability to respond. In Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia, these efforts foundered, proving to be well beyond the capacity of the United Nations per se. In other cases, UN operations proved especially helpful in ending conflicts that had cost the United States dearly during the years of the Cold War. UN peacekeepers have been instrumental in assisting Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and, most recently, Guatemala and Liberia to end devastating civil wars.

U.S. INTERESTS

During his administration, President Bush observed that the United Nations was “emerging as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace.” About the same time former President Reagan called for “a

standing UN force — an army of conscience — equipped and prepared to carve out humanitarian sanctuaries through force if necessary.” Former Secretary of State James Baker said in 1992, “UN peacekeeping is a pretty good buy and we ought to recognize that.... We spent trillions of dollars to win the Cold War and we should be willing to spend millions of dollars to secure the peace....” Successive U.S. administrations have understood that U.S. participation in the United Nations serves to advance America’s interests and to promote the cause of world peace.

UN and other multilateral peace operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be more costly and deadly. These conflicts have cost the U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars in support and humanitarian assistance. Emergency aid to conflicts in Africa rivals, and often exceeds, our entire development budget for the continent. Americans pay for conflict in many ways, and we benefit from peace. Where the United Nations continues to use neutral military personnel to separate combatants — in the Middle East, on Cyprus, and on the India-Pakistan border — the risk of renewed conflict is real, and in every one of these cases, important U.S. interests would be affected by renewed war.

UN peacekeeping continues to offer the United States a valuable option for dealing with threats to international peace and security before they affect our interests so directly that we would consider unilateral U.S. military action. The United Nations also provides us an agreed framework for burdensharing. Today, there are fewer than 700 Americans among the 14,700 civilian police and military personnel serving in the 16 missions the United Nations has around the world. And while we are committed to paying 25 percent of the cost of the operations we agree to in the Security Council, working through the United Nations means that others pay the vast majority of the costs. We also benefit by being able to invoke the voice of the community of nations on behalf of a cause we support.

UN peacekeeping fits in a spectrum of options for dealing with conflict and instability. Depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree to which vital U.S. interests are at stake, we may rely on diplomacy or resort to direct U.S. military action. What UN peacekeeping provides for us is a middle ground

between those ends of the spectrum and an agreed structure for sharing the responsibility with others. It is an instrument that, correctly used, has proven its value many times over.

LESSONS LEARNED

The experience of UN peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Somalia taught us all some powerful lessons about the limits of what peacekeepers can achieve when the parties to a conflict are still bent on violence. That is not to say that these operations did not save thousands of lives and allow the delivery of humanitarian relief to innocent bystanders. But the record of these operations made clear that the international community had to consider other options if it judged that a threat to international peace and security required intervention, even though the parties themselves had not yet decided to begin a political process to resolve the conflict.

In mid-1994, the administration adopted a formal policy on reforming multilateral peace operations. Recognizing the UN’s limitations, the administration committed to bringing the rigors of military and political analysis to every new UN peace mission. At our urging, the Security Council acted at about the same time to adopt a similar set of guidelines for its deliberations. The United States will support well-defined peace operations, generally, as a tool to provide finite windows of opportunity to allow combatants to resolve their differences and failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves. Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments, but instead be linked to concrete political solutions. To the greatest extent possible, each UN peace operation should have a specified timeframe tied to intermediate or final objectives, an integrated political-military strategy well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts, specified troop levels, and a firm budget estimate. Where U.S. troops are contemplated for participation, factors for consideration are even stricter. U.S. participation must advance U.S. interests and be considered necessary for the operation’s success. President Clinton has never — and will never — relinquish command of U.S. forces.

Coupled with greater rigor in decision-making has been substantial improvement in the UN’s capacity to plan for and manage its expanded peacekeeping

responsibilities. The UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been expanded and reorganized. A 24-hour Situation Center was set up with modern communications and information processing capabilities. The United States has loaned American military personnel to help staff and professionalize this department. We continue to work with the United Nations to enhance its ability to respond rapidly worldwide.

This cooperation, which builds upon work begun by previous administrations and is informed by the concerns of the Congress and our recent experience, aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective. As one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, we have the ability to veto any UN operation that is inconsistent with our interests. The United States does not support a standing UN army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military units for participation in UN operations. We will provide information about U.S. capabilities for data bases and planning purposes.

As a result of this more disciplined approach, the past several years have seen a dramatic decline in the scale and costs of UN peacekeeping. At the height of UN peacekeeping in the summer of 1993, there were 78,000 blue helmets worldwide. Today, there are fewer than 15,000. Accordingly, the total U.S. annual cost of UN peacekeeping has declined from over \$1,000 million to less than \$300 million for each of the past several years.

UN PEACEKEEPING TODAY

Since the adoption of this new approach to peacekeeping, there have been fewer new UN missions established and a greater tendency on the part of the Security Council to turn to other organizations to carry out operations that exceed the UN's capabilities. This was the case in Haiti, where a U.S.-led multinational force went in first to establish a secure and stable environment in which peacekeeping responsibilities could be turned over to a traditional UN mission. After the Dayton Accords, there was a division of labor between NATO and the United Nations, with IFOR (Interim Force) and now SFOR (Stabilization Force) assuming responsibility for the military aspects of implementation in Bosnia, while the United Nations

handled police reform and the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia.

Other regional organizations have taken the lead in areas of concern to them, often with an endorsement from the Security Council. This happened in Albania, where an Italian-led OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) mission deployed to help stabilize the situation and allow the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, as well as in the Central African Republic, where a French-backed African multinational force intervened to successfully quell a series of military mutinies. There also have been regionally based peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Caucasus, with large-scale deployments of peacekeepers from the Economic Community of West African States (in Liberia and Sierra Leone) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (in Georgia and Tajikistan). In all cases except Sierra Leone, small UN observer missions currently serve as neutral authorities working in concert with these regional efforts.

In the future, the United Nations is most likely to be tasked with leading peacekeeping missions where the parties to a conflict have agreed to a cease-fire and peace accord, but require outside help in implementing that agreement. The UN's record in carrying out that kind of mission is impressive. Successfully concluded peace operations in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Guatemala, and Eastern Slavonia are all examples of the UN's ability to fulfill this role. Ongoing missions of this nature in Angola and Tajikistan are making good progress toward achieving their objectives. Increasingly, UN civilian police will be called upon to monitor, to mentor, and to train local police forces that play an essential role in restoring stability and facilitating the exit of peacekeeping troops.

UN operations served U.S. security and foreign policy objectives in a variety of ways over the past years. For example:

- The UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), working in cooperation with the West African cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), helped to provide a suitable environment for a free and fair presidential election, which brought to an end a decade of turmoil in that country.

- In Guatemala, a small UN observer group successfully oversaw, during a three-month period, the demobilization and first steps of reintegration into society of a guerrilla force that had operated there for almost 40 years.
- The UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) successfully facilitated the peaceful reintegration of the region into Croatia and defused a potential flash point between Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic.
- In Haiti, all UN military forces were able to withdraw, leaving behind only a small UN civilian police operation to continue to work to professionalize, according to international democratic policing principles, the Haitian National Police.
- In Tajikistan, a small UN observer mission continues to assist the government and principal opposition movement to implement a peace agreement ending their civil war.
- In Angola, a small UN mission, drawn down from a UN force of 7,000 in 1996, is supervising the final phases of implementation of the Lusaka protocols.
- UN operations are helping prevent a flare-up of violence in Cyprus between two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece; between India and Pakistan over Kashmir; and between Israel and her neighbors in the Middle East.
- Along the Iraq-Kuwait border, a UN observer mission (financed primarily by Kuwait) is monitoring Iraqi troop movements and demonstrating the world's continued resolve against the expansionist ambitions of Saddam Hussein.
- In Central Africa, a small UN force will work in concert with an Inter-African force to assist in providing basic civil order while the government implements the fundamental political, military, and economic reforms that can help guarantee the Central African Republic's long-term stability.

CONCLUSION

We do not look to the United Nations to defend our vital interests, nor can we expect the United Nations to be effective where the decisive application of military force is required. But, in many circumstances, the United Nations will enable us to influence events without assuming the full burden of costs and risks. It lends the weight of law and world opinion to causes and principles we support. It can provide a measure of confidence to competing factions that are weary of war, but undecided whether to make peace. And the more able the United Nations is to end or contain conflict, the less likely it is that we will have to deploy our armed forces. The United States is not the world's policeman, but we Americans have a deep stake in whether conflicts are contained, social disruptions are minimized, and international standards of behavior are respected. When emergencies arise, we will respond in accordance with our interests, sometimes on our own, sometimes as part of a coalition, and sometimes through the mechanism of an international organization. We must retain the flexibility to employ UN peacekeeping as a viable alternative, lest we be faced with the cruel choice each time a foreign conflict threatens our interests: a morally unacceptable choice between doing nothing and intervening unilaterally with American soldiers taking all the risks.

Peacekeeping has the capacity, under the right circumstances, to separate adversaries, maintain cease-fires, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief, enable refugees and displaced persons to return home, demobilize combatants, and create conditions under which political reconciliation may occur and free elections may be held. Such UN peacekeeping operations — carefully conceived, constantly maturing, and successfully concluded — are worthwhile investments in peace. They can help to nurture new democracies, lower the global tide of refugees, reduce the likelihood of unwelcome interventions by regional powers, and prevent small wars from growing into larger conflicts that would be far more costly in lives and treasures. ©

UN PEACEKEEPING BUILDS ON LESSONS LEARNED, PROGRESS ACHIEVED

*An assessment by U.S. Ambassador Nancy Soderberg
Alternate U.S. Representative for Special Political Affairs, United Nations*

During the past several years, the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has made "significant improvements in operational responsiveness, logistical sustainability, and financial accountability for peacekeeping operations," says U.S. Ambassador Nancy Soderberg. "Now, as the volume of peacekeeping operations levels off, DPKO can capitalize on progress achieved in recent years to meet future peacekeeping challenges with enduring management capabilities." Soderberg is Alternate U.S. Representative for Special Political Affairs at the United Nations. Her primary responsibilities include UN peacekeeping operations. Following are Soderberg's responses to questions posed by "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda."

QUESTION: Describe the extent of U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations.

SODERBERG: As of April 15, there were 16 UN peacekeeping operations under way, involving some 14,700 personnel. All UN peacekeeping operations are authorized and continuously reviewed by the UN Security Council. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States plays a key role in assessing the need for each new peacekeeping operation, deciding to start a new peacekeeping operation, steering the ongoing peacekeeping operation on the right course, and closing down the peacekeeping operation at the right time. Because the United States has a veto in the Security Council, a UN peacekeeping operation cannot be authorized without U.S. support. The United States has long been an important contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping operations. With 681 personnel in February 1998, the United States ranked eighth among the 71 nations contributing troops, military observers, and civilian police monitors to UN peacekeeping. U.S. personnel are now serving in UN peacekeeping and observer missions in various parts of the world including Haiti, Bosnia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Western Sahara, Georgia, and the Middle East.

Q: How does the United Nations determine when and where to organize a peacekeeping operation, and is this an effective process?

SODERBERG: The UN Charter tasks the Security Council with the obligation to address situations

around the world that threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Any member of the Security Council, either on its own or at the request of any nation, can formally raise in the Council the existence of a threat to peace and security, including whether a peacekeeping operation should be considered. At the request of the Security Council, and under the supervision of the UN Secretary General, the UN Secretariat prepares detailed contingency plans and budget estimates that help the Security Council make informed decisions on the prudence and utility of a UN peacekeeping operation under consideration. At the same time, members of the Security Council work together informally and consult their capitals to shape the mandate of the operation. In each case, the Security Council is challenged to come to consensus on the appropriate response to threats to international peace and security.

Q: In recent years, the United Nations has changed the scope and mandate of peacekeeping operations, adding, for example, the use of civilian police to train local law enforcement officials. How does the United States view this shift?

SODERBERG: The UN Security Council and the UN Secretariat learned many important lessons from peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and each subsequent operation. The shift you mention reflects this evolution which has been decisively positive, reflecting today's realities. We learned both the limits and utility of UN peacekeeping while developing an understanding of the importance

of contingency planning; more rapid response; streamlined, accountable logistics; and full integration of political, humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts. These lessons have been implemented in today's peacekeeping operations. Peace is greatly enhanced when a credible system of law enforcement is in place, when a genuine political process is available to citizens, and when people can live in their homes and attend their schools and religious institutions. In regard to the civilian police, the United Nations can make an enormously positive contribution to the establishment of stability and peace by deploying international civilian police to help train, mentor, and monitor local and national police.

Q: Since the role of peacekeepers has expanded, are other entities of the United Nations more involved in peacekeeping operations?

SODERBERG: One of the major advances in UN peacekeeping over the past two years has been the integration of the several departments of the UN Secretariat and UN Specialized Agencies in planning and participating in UN peacekeeping operations. One of the most important elements of Secretary General Kofi Annan's Track I package of UN reforms was to ensure full inter-departmental coordination of the political, humanitarian, and military elements of UN peacekeeping operations. Today, the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations is joined by the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of Legal Affairs, the High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights, and the World Food Program in planning and conducting UN peacekeeping operations.

Q: The U.S. government is working hard to reform the United Nations and to make it more efficient. What changes would you like to see in UN peacekeeping?

SODERBERG: Over the past several years, UN headquarters achieved significant progress in effectively planning and executing peacekeeping operations. The UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) made significant improvements in operational responsiveness, logistical sustainability, and financial accountability for peacekeeping operations. Now, as the volume of peacekeeping operations levels off, DPKO can capitalize on progress achieved in recent

years to meet future peacekeeping challenges with enduring management capabilities.

In addition, the United States and other member states are working with the United Nations to streamline the DPKO organization and implement a worldwide asset management strategy — including an integrated automated inventory management, maintenance management, and supply system. We also are continuing the development of the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, as an integral part of the worldwide asset management program. And we are helping to develop the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters. These steps will provide the United Nations with the capability to respond rapidly to peace and humanitarian emergencies; sustain growth in the development of contingency contracts to support peacekeeping operations; complete implementation of the UN's newly published guidelines for information security; and maintain growth of the UN's Standby Arrangement System, whereby the United Nations and member states exchange detailed information to facilitate planning and preparation for peacekeeping.

Q: Before the United States can commit resources to a peacekeeping operation, the administration must follow a procedure of congressional notification. Please describe that process.

SODERBERG: By law, the administration is required to notify Congress 15 days before voting in the UN Security Council to support any new or expanded peacekeeping missions. The purpose of this period is to enable Congress to raise any questions about or objections to the proposals. It also provides the administration the chance to explain to Congress the details of the operation, anticipated costs, the threat to international peace and security, and general U.S. national security interests. While any member of Congress can ask for information, generally the committees with jurisdiction over U.S. expenditures for peacekeeping and the regions involved are consulted. These include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; House International Relations Committee; House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies; Senate Armed Services Committee; and House National Security Committee. In most cases, after extensive consultations, the administration and Congress have agreed on peacekeeping issues.

Q: We recently saw in Sierra Leone a regional organization — the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — organize a military contingent to restore a democratically elected government to power, after it had been overthrown in a military coup. Does the United States support such action by regional peacekeepers?

SODERBERG: In the case of Sierra Leone, the Security Council — including the United States — endorsed the ECOWAS role in restoring the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power. Increasingly, the United Nations is working with regional organizations to help broaden its ability to address

political, humanitarian, and peacekeeping aspects of conflict resolution. While the United Nations remains the world's most capable institution for planning and conducting peacekeeping operations, regional organizations can play an important role in making progress in resolving problems on their own. Regional engagement also can help countries develop capabilities essential for addressing problems before they become international crises. The African Crisis Response Initiative, for example, was developed by President Clinton to help African nations gain the capabilities to work together either as a multinational coalition or under the UN flag in the event of a humanitarian crisis or traditional peacekeeping situation. ●

PEACEKEEPING POLICY: THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT VIEW

By James A. Shear

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance

Effective peace operations require realistic training to address the five elements of modern peace operations: terrain, weather, refugees, non-governmental organizations, and the media. Ultimately though, successful results require the application of a range of military and civilian peacekeeping instruments, Shear says, as well as a healthy dose of patience and a firm commitment by hostile parties to resolve their differences and make the best use of external assistance. Shear is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance.

Few aspects of security policy are more challenging for the U.S. government — and the Department of Defense in particular — than peacekeeping. Without question, such operations can do a great deal of good for the United States. They have tangibly helped to advance U.S. interests in such diverse places as Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Haiti, Guatemala, and Georgia. Regions such as Central America and southern Africa, long known for their past violence and chronic instability, are much more quiescent today, in part because of the conflict-mitigating effects of peacekeeping.

That's the good news. The bad news is that peace operations are not without dangerous or unwanted consequences. Just as they can do things for us, we have to be careful about what they might do to us. If not properly conceived and executed, such operations can be a slippery slope to long-term commitments in unstable areas. What is more, they can at times sap the willingness of parties to assume ownership of their problems; and they can expose our forces to unwanted risks, draw heavily on resources, and have detrimental impact on war-fighting readiness. None of these problems are show-stoppers but they suggest the need to proceed cautiously and selectively.

Beginning in 1994, with its Presidential Decision Directive 25, the Clinton administration has sought to streamline and improve the performance of multinational peacekeeping. In recent years, Bosnia aside, the general trend has been away from large-scale multi-component operations and toward smaller, more focused efforts, some of them UN-led, others organized regionally or in ad hoc coalitions. This shift in emphasis reflects U.S. policy preferences as well as

substantial innovations in the way that peace operations are organized and conducted.

In broad policy terms, peacekeeping should be viewed as a means, not an end. It is not a strategy but a tool to be guided by larger U.S. strategic interests. Although it can be valuable in preventing, containing, and resolving regional conflicts, the hard part is in figuring out when a situation is ripe for the use of peacekeeping instruments. Peacekeeping has the greatest utility when the conflict is stalemated, the parties are exhausted, and continued fighting simply promises more hardship. If, on the other hand, the parties see war as preferable to any feasible negotiated outcome, or if conflict dynamics suggest a military rather than a diplomatic outcome, it's hard to imagine that peacekeeping would have much long-lasting value.

As for U.S. participation in international peace operations, our posture is one of selective engagement. We examine each proposed operation on its merits, assessing whether our involvement would help to improve the prospects for a proposed mission, and also whether the resources required to support our participation would be commensurate with the interests we have at stake in a given situation. But operational engagement — selective as it must be — is only part of the picture. We also believe that peacekeeping training can be a useful focal point for regional cooperation. We stand ready to assist in such efforts, recognizing that the terms and conditions for regional cooperation must be worked out by the parties themselves, and not dictated by outsiders.

While the Department of Defense brings a large number of concerns into discussions of peacekeeping policy, four topics are worth particular attention:

TRAINING

Training is an essential prerequisite for effective operations. Our slogan is “train for war; adapt for peace.” This aphorism means that we must ensure that our military remains prepared to fight and win our nation’s wars, but that it has the capacity to conduct peace operations when called upon to do so. We have learned that the key ingredients to a successful peace operation are well-trained and disciplined soldiers under the command of skilled, competent leaders acting within a clearly defined mandate.

Our soldiers and Marines possess combat skills that are easily transferred to the needs of a peace operation, given the necessary time to adapt to the nature of the operation, its rules of engagement, and terms of reference. Experience has shown we can effectively prepare for peace operations because of the time required to craft a political mandate and identify force contributions. During this preparatory time, visionary commanders, such as Army Major General William Nash, who led IFOR (Implementation Force) personnel, developed effective peace operations training standards for their combat units and conducted intensive, realistic training that incorporated the five elements of modern peace operations — terrain, weather, refugees, NGOs (non-governmental organizations), and the media. Relying on realistic training scenarios, he created a premier force capable of sustaining a highly fragile peace.

Some proponents support the earmarking of specialized forces. We don’t favor this approach because it limits our ability to respond to the many different contingencies our defense strategy requires of our military. While other nations embrace this practice, this is a luxury that we cannot afford, given the worldwide scope of our commitments. Whenever we put an American service member on the ground, the United States is making a political statement. We must be prepared to be challenged because opponents to the peace process will recognize that driving out the United States military will result in their success. American troops trained only as peacekeepers will not deal effectively with that situation.

On the international front, the administration has led the effort in developing common standards for peacekeeping training as well as launching an initiative aimed at improving the training capacity of selected countries.

This initiative is known as the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiative. It focuses on the development of national peacekeeping policies and military education/training programs in selected nations that have the potential to be capable peacekeepers. Congress recently appropriated \$7 million in funding to support EIPC program objectives. In April 1998, the administration proposed that nine countries receive EIPC funding in Fiscal Year 1998. EIPC’s central task is to help advance these countries’ peacekeeping proficiencies to a point where they demonstrate a capability to unilaterally develop and maintain credible peacekeeping capabilities. The program also seeks to promote common, internationally accepted standards for peacekeeping doctrine for the training and education of officers, and for the development of information systems and procedures to enhance the interoperability of forces in field settings.

Last year, the Department of Defense organized a meeting of the commandants of several peacekeeping training centers and representatives from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to develop standards for the selection and training of military observers. This is the first time that such a broad international consensus was reached establishing national training responsibilities for military observers. We expect that the standards will be published by the United Nations in April 1998. As a result of the conference other nations are stepping forward to assist in the development of peacekeeping standards for troop contingents participating in traditional UN Chapter VI missions. We look forward to participating in this effort at the fourth annual meeting of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) in May 1998.

FORCE PROTECTION

Protection of peacekeepers remains one of our paramount concerns. The mission areas in which peacekeepers operate may be unstable, at times chaotic. Further, various leaders may not have adequate control of their factions, while criminal elements outside the control of the factions in the area of operation may want to take advantage of the situation. The Department of Defense recognizes these risks, and that is why our decision to participate is always vetted at the highest levels of the U.S. government. The problem is that the United Nations has traditionally not armed its personnel, particularly military observers, to accentuate their impartiality and thereby

safeguard them from political violence. But while this approach helps on the political front, it also makes these observers tempting targets for criminals and thieves. In Georgia and elsewhere, UN military observers have been taken hostage and suffered other criminal acts.

What can we do? There are a number of steps we can take to improve force protection for peacekeepers. First, we must continue to train our personnel to deal with possible threats, making them aware of the situation on the ground during their pre-deployment training. Second, we can support our military personnel with tactical information, protective equipment, and other support during their tour of duty, and conduct force protection assessments on a periodic basis. Third, we can insist, before deploying any personnel to conduct a peace operation, that the sponsoring organization — whether it is the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or another entity — undertake adequate force protection measures commensurate with the risks and operational requirements. Lastly, we can demand that the parties to the peace accord maintain control of their personnel and promise that they will take visible action against the perpetrators of any violations.

PUBLIC SECURITY

Odd as it seems, public order is often the first casualty of peace. During a conflict, armed factions have a way of maintaining a semblance of order and discipline in areas under their control. Granted, it may not be a just order, but civil crime is often suppressed. After the conflict ends, and the armed factions begin to demobilize, newly unemployed soldiers hit the street. Most often these people will be unemployed and will have access to small arms. To maintain a livelihood, they are apt, in desperation, to resort to crime. Compounding the problem, the indigenous police forces, and the courts and jails, may well have been decimated during the conflict. So they will be unable to control crime by themselves.

Clearly, helping to restore the indigenous criminal justice system is a necessary task of many peacekeeping operations. The international community, in the past couple of years, has begun to understand this dimension of an operation more fully. The U.S. government intends to work with other like-minded countries and international and regional organizations to improve the

world's instruments for this task. There have been innovations in recent operations that may prove useful for more broad application. In Haiti, the international civilian police monitors (CIVPOL) remained in the theater after the UN military peacekeepers departed. Their protection was supported by a special, civilian security unit brought in by the United Nations from Argentina. This was the first instance of the UN CIVPOL remaining beyond the tenure of the military peacekeepers. In the NATO-led peace operation in Bosnia, there are plans to deploy a constabulary force of civilian paramilitary units to help provide public safety.

A GRACEFUL EXIT

In Bosnia, we have learned that what counts are exit conditions, not an exit date. Deadlines do have some use in helping the international community to press local actors toward achieving exit conditions in a timely manner; and it's clear that military forces cannot be deployed to a theater indefinitely. Even so, it stands to reason that success should be measured by a simple condition: Does a durable peace or stability remain for a reasonable period after international forces have departed? The difficulty is that achieving durable stability requires that the social fabric of a society be re-woven before peacekeepers depart. True recovery requires a development approach. This is an extremely difficult task — and military forces are not the correct instrument to do it. The international community needs to have civilian relief and development instruments at its disposal that can help resuscitate a society in the aftermath of conflict. The tasks that are needed are manifold and daunting. They range from helping children recover from psycho-social trauma to rebuilding trust and public discourse to reestablishing governmental institutions to perform the basic services of government, such as criminal justice (as already mentioned), economic regulation, trash collection, and medical services.

In the final analysis, there are no magic formulas for obtaining successful results from peacekeeping. It takes patience and a range of instruments — both civilian and military — to maneuver hostile parties toward peace; and in the end the parties have to want to resolve their differences and make the best use of external assistance. If that is not their intention, the prescription for policy is clear — don't send in the peacekeepers. ©

NATO'S ROLE IN BOSNIA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

*By U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.*

For the NATO Alliance, the significance of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) “goes far beyond Bosnia and the Balkans,” says Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council. “In bringing peace to the region, we have also reinvigorated the Alliance and helped shape its role in the future.” Vershbow believes that “by staying a little longer now, we can make sure that when we do pull our troops out of Bosnia, we can be confident they will not have to return.”

The guns in Bosnia have been silent for nearly two and one half years thanks to NATO, and it seems easy to take the Alliance's operations in Bosnia for granted. A NATO-led operation in Bosnia is now just part of the landscape. But it's important to keep in mind just how rocky a road we traveled getting here. That voyage has a great deal to do with NATO's vitality today and its future development as we approach the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty and a new century.

Today, Bosnia is a success story for NATO and is seen as validating all the work of the past seven years in transforming the Alliance. But we also need to learn from the many mistakes that nearly made Bosnia NATO's undoing. We have to reflect upon, and then reflect, these important lessons in NATO's new Strategic Concept, which we are now starting to review.

In this article we will explain NATO's tasks for the 21st century and the thinking behind our defense planning that will guide the development of the Allied forces needed to accomplish them. If we do not distill and apply these lessons to the way we think about NATO's future, we will have missed the mark.

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

In the beginning, NATO leaders insisted that Bosnia was not a test case for the “new” NATO. Yet Bosnia was, in fact, seen by publics and politicians as a great test case — one that the Alliance was failing. NATO's experience in Bosnia was, until August 1995, a study in frustration and missed opportunities. The decisive language in NATO communiques about the Allies' resolve to stand up to aggression and uphold UN

Security Council resolutions masked serious frictions in the Trans-Atlantic relationship that, at some stages, bordered on an out-and-out rift.

NATO'S ADAPTATION: THEORY OUTPACES PRACTICE

Another way of looking at NATO's early involvement in Bosnia is as an object lesson in the gap between theory and practice. Beginning in 1990, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO — led by initiatives conceived by the United States — embarked on an ambitious effort to redesign itself to deal with the challenges of the post-Cold War period. This included a new strategy that added dialogue, cooperation, crisis management, and peacekeeping to the core task of collective defense. With the creation of NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council), NATO also began to anchor Europe's new democracies in the Alliance's “community of stability.” In short, NATO moved quickly — in theory — to ready itself to deal with local conflicts in Europe, and to create a basis for joint action among NATO and non-NATO states. But as war broke out in Slovenia, then in Croatia and subsequently in Bosnia, NATO's member states chose not to get the Alliance embroiled — militarily or politically.

There were many reasons: Yugoslavia was considered “out of area” and outside of NATO's traditional core functions. Yugoslavia was seen on both sides of the Atlantic as a European problem, to be solved by European institutions. In fact, both sides of the Atlantic grossly underestimated the danger of large-scale war in the Balkans and the threat it posed to stability in the region — and to all Europe.

NATO's inaction reflected the ambivalence of many members of the Alliance about actually using NATO's military power in a non-Article V [see footnote 1], out-of-area role. Hence the decision — by design and default — to give the European Community (EC) the leading role in managing the crisis in tandem with the United Nations. Both institutions took on impossible missions: EC diplomacy without the power to back it up, and traditional UN peacekeeping/humanitarian assistance in the midst of a raging conflict.

NATO's contributions — aerial enforcement of the no-fly zone and maritime enforcement of sanctions in the Adriatic — helped contain the conflict, but did little to contribute to a solution. While militarily effective and politically significant as NATO's first real military missions, they did little to dispel the impression that the new NATO was failing its first real test.

In addition, there was a sharp divergence between American and European views concerning both the nature of the conflict itself and the appropriate method to end it. In the U.S. view, there would be no resolution of the conflict until real military pressure was brought to bear against the Bosnian Serbs to convince them to stop their aggression. This was the rationale for then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher's ill-fated "lift-and-strike" initiative in May 1993: not to propel the Bosnian Muslims to military victory, but to convince the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Vance-Owen plan, proposed by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Secretary David Owen. The peace plan called for dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten ethnically distinct cantons that would prevent the country from dividing into three different ethnic states.

The next two years saw repeated efforts by the United States to bring NATO air power to bear, both to thwart Serb efforts to strangle Sarajevo and the other "safe areas," and to provide needed leverage to the search for a political settlement. These efforts were frustrated by our European allies' understandable concern for the safety of their troops in UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) on the ground, and an obsession with evenhandedness. This was the basis for the invention of the "dual-key," which proved crippling when the Serbs tested NATO's resolve in 1993, 1994, and the spring of 1995.

As NATO proved unable to provide more than "wrist slaps" in response to Serb assaults on the safe areas, the U.S. Congress pressed to lift the arms embargo unilaterally, further exacerbating Trans-Atlantic strains. Just as NATO was about to begin formally preparing for enlargement, the Alliance's credibility was in question and Trans-Atlantic relations were at a low point. At the same time, diplomatic efforts were going nowhere: the Bosnian Serbs would not even use the Contact Group plan as a basis for discussion.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

Many lessons can be drawn from this period. First was the fundamental error in ruling out NATO involvement at the start of the crisis, when the threat of force could have halted the escalation of the conflict and produced a political solution that would have saved tens of thousands of lives. On top of this was the impossible and incoherent mission assigned to the United Nations. Although the Security Council branded the Serbs aggressors and authorized "all necessary means" to confront that aggression, the peacekeepers were never given those means, and instead adopted a posture of impartiality in implementing UN resolutions and delivering humanitarian aid. This incoherence was exacerbated when the United States sought to employ the threat of NATO air power — in effect seeking to marry a coercive mission directed at the Bosnian Serbs with an impartial and reactive UN posture on the ground.

NATO REUNITES

It was not until the summer of 1995 that the Alliance finally got its act together — when President Clinton and other Allied leaders finally declared that enough was enough. In fact, in June, as new Serb depredations were just beginning to unfold, President Clinton — overriding the recommendation of most of his senior cabinet officials to "muddle through" — approved an ambitious initiative aimed at halting the fighting and brokering a comprehensive political settlement. This "endgame strategy," developed under the leadership of then-National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, was premised on combining the decisive use of U.S. and NATO military power with an aggressive, U.S.-led diplomatic effort.

By July, a new wave of Serb hostage-taking of UN peacekeepers and the Serbs' brazen assaults on Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Zepa shocked the world and discredited UNPROFOR decisively. A new French president took office who was more determined to resist Serb aggression. As a result, our Allies agreed at the London Conference in mid-July to the U.S. proposal to do away with the dual-key and, for the first time, threaten the Serbs with massive air strikes if they attacked or threatened the safe areas. They also gave their unequivocal backing to the new negotiating effort, which President Clinton tasked Richard Holbrooke to lead.

When the Serbs attacked Sarajevo, NATO made good on its threat, leading not to the collapse of UNPROFOR as many had predicted, but to a cease-fire and Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan, setting the stage for Dayton. A series of Croatian military victories reinforced the message to the Serbs that the game was over.

DAYTON: NATO ACTION ENDS THE WAR...

There are those who would say that locking up the leaders of the warring factions in a room with Holbrooke for two weeks in Dayton, Ohio, was at least as powerful an incentive as NATO's air strike campaign. But in fact what succeeded was diplomacy backed up with force — a key lesson of the conflict. Dayton turned Bosnia from a big problem into a "big experiment," to quote Bosnian Federation President Ejup Ganic. At Dayton, we essentially reinvented Bosnia — writing a new constitution, establishing mechanisms for enforcing human rights standards, organizing elections, resolving property disputes, returning refugees to their homes, and reforming police forces.

...AND IFOR SECURES THE PEACE

The world now focuses on those complex civil tasks, but that was far from the case in November 1995 as we held our collective breath at the military aspects of Dayton, which NATO took responsibility for implementing: maintaining the cessation of hostilities, separating the armed forces, transferring territory between the two entities, moving forces and heavy weapons into authorized sites, and creating a secure environment for the High Representative Carlos Westendorp and others to implement the civil aspects.

IFOR's successful completion of those tasks without a combat fatality may seem routine, but in fact countless hours were spent in Washington, Brussels, and at NATO's military headquarters refining the framework that made that possible: the fine-tuning of mission, mandate, and force structure; the robust rules of engagement; the unity of command and control; the role of Russia and other non-NATO troop contributors; and relations with the United Nations.

REINVIGORATING CIVIL IMPLEMENTATION

Unfortunately, the successes in military implementation have not always been matched on the civil side, in part because of the inherently different methods involved, but also because civilian implementation took longer to be organized effectively and faced greater than expected obstacles. Last spring, as Ambassador Robert Gelbard took the baton from John Kornblum as the United States' point person for Bosnia, the U.S. government conducted a root-and-branch policy review aimed at reinvigorating civil implementation. Similar reviews were launched in many Allied capitals. When the leaders of the international community sat down in Sintra, Portugal, last May, they agreed on a strategy to jump-start civil implementation before it was too late. We and our Allies acknowledged that fulfilling the military mission we had been assigned was not enough. The parties had to be pressed to implement the civil side of Dayton by a more aggressive and better coordinated effort — backed up by SFOR's (Stabilization Force's) capabilities.

It is now accepted that SFOR will cooperate energetically with the High Representative and the many civilian agencies. The overarching objective is to divest the opponents of Dayton of their instruments of authority and repression — the military, police, the media, and their sources of funding — while ensuring public security through restructured, retrained local police and increasing pressure for the arrest and surrender of indicted war criminals.

We will support those who support Dayton, and resist those who don't. At the same time, the international community has focused on empowering the Bosnian people through democratic elections and more independent media, and by stimulating the revival of the economy.

THE PROGNOSIS IS OPTIMISTIC

There are still pessimists who say that fully implementing Dayton is impossible. But I and many others committed to this peace process say they're wrong — on moral grounds, historical grounds, and in terms of actual events on the ground. The achievement of a self-sustaining peace and democracy in Bosnia is succeeding and accelerating. I say this after paying my first visit to Bosnia in over a year in mid-March. SFOR's aggressive support of civil implementation since Sintra has once again proved how effective force harnessed in the service of diplomacy can be. The outlines of a stable, peaceful society have begun to take shape.

The cease-fire has held for two and one-half years. Armies have been separated and nearly 400,000 troops demobilized. Forces have pulled back to agreed lines, and weapons and units remain in cantonment. Over 6,600 heavy weapons have been destroyed in the region, 4,300 in Bosnia. SFOR has removed the army as a political player and has even brought the special police under supervision as well.

Police reform is proceeding and public security is improving. This police reform will hopefully translate into increased returns of minority refugees and displaced persons. In 1997, 110,000 refugees and 60,000 displaced persons returned home, bringing total returns to 400,000.

Freedom of movement has been restored in much of the federation and parts of Republika Srpska (RS). Iran's connection to Bosnian military and intelligence operations has been broken.

Successful elections are introducing political pluralism step-by-step throughout Bosnia. SFOR support was crucial to staging those elections and implementing the results. The installation of a new, moderate government in the Republika Srpska was a dramatic breakthrough and indicates that the people of the RS have had enough of the Pale regime's extremist policies.

We pressured Croatia to remove hard-line Bosnian-Croat leaders in Mostar, and convinced the Bosniak leadership to arrest Muslim extremists responsible for violent attacks in the Federation. Twenty-five indicted war criminals have been taken into custody, more than

half in the past eight months. SFOR's more aggressive arrest policy may have helped stimulate an emerging pattern of voluntary surrenders — a trend we will encourage while maintaining SFOR's tough stance.

State-controlled media are being restructured and independent media strengthened. The RS radio and TV stations just resumed operation on the basis of open access. Last December, the major international players — with the parties' consent — gave High Representative Westendorp the authority to make binding interim decisions on issues where the parties fail to reach agreement. This removes the ability of any single party to block progress. That decision contributed to major progress on the symbolically important components of a functioning single state: a new single flag, currency, citizenship law, and license plates. Local authorities will no longer be able to harass visitors from other areas simply on the basis of where they come from.

PRIORITIES FOR 1998

For peace to take hold fully and the refugee return process to continue, the people of Bosnia must have the prospect of a better material existence. Dramatic progress has been made on this front, especially in the Federation, which last year had the fastest growing economy in the world (albeit starting from a low base). Getting Bosnian leaders focused on this task, and helping the new RS government catch up, will be a major challenge for 1998.

A key event of 1998 will be the nationwide elections in September — the first really post-war elections, representing an important chance for the Bosnian people to take control of their future by changing the old leadership. It will be central to our strategy to see the Karadzic clique and other opponents of Dayton divested of their last shreds of power.

But making a breakthrough on minority refugee returns may be the toughest task we have set for ourselves, as we seek to reverse the results of the ethnic cleansing of the war, and to counter the ethnic divisions the war unleashed. Here too, we see hopeful signs: the new RS government under Prime Minister Dodik has voiced willingness to support cross-ethnic returns, a program for sizable Serb and Croat returns to Sarajevo

has been adopted, and a coordinated inter-agency approach seeks to create the economic and security conditions that make returns viable. Other priorities include full implementation of the results of the 1997 municipal elections; expanded measures to combat corruption, smuggling, and organized crime; reintegration of the economic infrastructure; and faster market economic reforms.

SFOR SUPPORT: KEY TO SUCCESS

The success we had in the second half of 1997 owed much to the close cooperation between SFOR and the civilian implementation agencies. In every area I outlined — media reform, police reform, elections, refugee return — SFOR's back-up to the overall implementation effort was critical to success. We have finally hit on the right formula for Dayton implementation — vigorous civilian implementation efforts led by a forceful High Representative, coordinated with and backed up by the international military presence. It was against this backdrop that the Alliance made its decision in February to support a continuation of SFOR's current approach when the present mandate expires at the end of June. The objective of the new force will be to consolidate the gains achieved to date, while sustaining the current pace of civil implementation. The force will remain roughly at its present strength for the remainder of 1998, with the hope that after the September elections, conditions will be sufficiently improved to permit a gradual drawdown of the force to begin as we enter 1999. We have deliberately chosen not to set a specific end date for the completion of the follow-on force's mission. Our ability to reduce and, ultimately, withdraw will be measured against "benchmarks" of progress across the spectrum of Dayton's military and civilian provisions.

A major challenge is to help our publics and parliaments understand that the desired end-state is something that we can broadly define, but which will require judgment to determine when it has been reached. We have accomplished much that we can be proud of in Bosnia. We must now finish the job and make the final push for full success. By staying a little longer now, we can make sure that when we do pull our troops out of Bosnia, we can be confident they will not have to return.

FUTURE LESSONS FOR NATO

The significance of IFOR (Implementation Force) and SFOR for the Alliance goes far beyond Bosnia or the Balkans. In bringing peace to the region, we have also reinvigorated the Alliance and helped shape its role in the future. NATO's success in implementing Dayton demonstrates that NATO practice has finally caught up with the theory — and, in some respects, has overtaken it. It has demonstrated to the foes of the new Europe, especially nationalist extremists, that NATO can deny them the benefits of aggression and manage such conflicts. IFOR and SFOR have shown the value of the NATO integrated military structure as a framework for planning and executing all of NATO's missions, including non-Article V missions.

These were real-world demonstrations of the CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force) concept even though the CJTF initiative as such is still in the implementation phase. They created a model for French participation in NATO military operations that, we hope, will help pave the way for eventual full integration into the military structure.

Bosnia validated the wisdom of NATO's initiatives to prepare for enlargement and to engage all its former adversaries in concrete military cooperation through the Partnership for Peace. IFOR and SFOR have given NATO invitees, aspirants, and other partners the opportunity to serve under NATO command, gain experience, and increase interoperability with Allied forces. In political terms, it demonstrates the readiness of aspirants to shoulder the burdens of NATO membership, as well as to enjoy the benefits.

Russia's service with IFOR and SFOR under U.S. national command helped dispel the myth that Russia's and NATO's interests are wholly divergent, paving the way for the NATO-Russia Founding Act. NATO has established a pattern of regular consultations, contacts, and cooperation with the United Nations and OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) that has altered those institutional relationships for the better.

The Trans-Atlantic link has emerged stronger than ever from the Bosnian challenge, and NATO's operations have been a striking demonstration of "burdensharing"

in a real sense. Moreover, both sides of the Atlantic are determined not to jeopardize that link by allowing their security policies to slip so far out of synch again.

The Alliance has sharpened its “early warning” focus since Bosnia’s tragedy to prevent any repetition — witness the Alliance’s deliberations on ways to prevent a spillover of the crisis in Kosovo. The Alliance has embarked on a revision to the Strategic Concept, to be unveiled at the 1999 Washington Summit. These lessons and other facets of our experience in Bosnia will have significant ramifications as we rewrite NATO theory to match — and hopefully get a little ahead of — NATO practice.

After the end of the Cold War, one well-known article defined the key question for the Alliance as “out of area or out-of-business.” NATO’s Bosnia mission gave a resounding factual answer to that question — NATO is not out of business. But the real question, as we revise the Strategic Concept, is this: How can NATO allies use the structure they have created and maintained for their collective defense to advance the defense of their security interests more broadly viewed?

Bosnia was “out of area” in the most literal sense, but far from “out of range.” Threats to Alliance members’ security are explicitly a subject of consultation under the 1949 Washington Treaty, with no geographic limit specified. In today’s strategic context, risks for the Alliance can come from a variety of directions and take many different forms. We have to prepare for all of them as resources allow.

We will not be able to decide in advance how to intervene in the next Bosnia; that’s not the way the world works. The overarching lesson we must draw from Bosnia is that we must have the military capability, and that our political framework and options must remain open, so NATO can act where we can find the common will.

Thanks to Bosnia, NATO’s vitality and utility are obvious to all. It is up to us to draw wisely on the Bosnia lessons to maintain our momentum and shape our joint future wisely. ●

1. Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, “the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

PEACEKEEPING: ITS EVOLUTION AND MEANING

*By U.S. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley
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“In looking at the history of 50 years of peacekeeping, the record is mixed but, on balance, positive,” says Ambassador Robert B. Oakley. It is essential to remember that UN or regional organization peacekeeping missions “depend almost completely upon the support of member states,” says the former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Zaire, and Somalia. “Standing alone, neither the United Nations nor any regional organization has the independent material or political resources to undertake successful peacekeeping operations.” Oakley is now Visiting Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies in Washington. In December 1992, Oakley was named by then President Bush as Special Envoy for Somalia; in October 1993, he was again named as Special Envoy for Somalia by President Clinton.

I. INTRODUCTION

It is essential to recognize that the many different international peacekeeping operations during the past half-century did not, and were not intended to, stand alone. They were — and are — multinational, limited military actions combined with diplomatic and often other actions — for example humanitarian and human rights activities, economic assistance, or economic sanctions — designed to stop or prevent the recurrence of conflict.

In almost all instances, peacekeeping operations are preceded as well as accompanied by a variety of bilateral and multilateral persuasions and pressures. These can include quiet diplomatic discussions with parties to a conflict by outside governments — for example, U.S. consultations with Israel, Egypt, and Syria after the 1973 war, prior to the establishment of the Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights (UNDOF); informal unilateral or multilateral threats of force — for example, by the United States and the former Soviet Union during the 1973 Middle East war; and the formal or informal multilateral imposition of arms embargoes and/or economic sanctions — as in actions against Haiti by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations in 1993 and 1994 prior to the intervention of the Multinational Force (MNF) and the establishment of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

The purpose of such measures is to persuade the parties to reach agreement to stop the conflict and to begin a

long-term series of steps to bring about sustained peace, usually with the help of the international community. Without these parallel actions, sometimes directly linked to establishing a peacekeeping operation but sometimes not, the peacekeeping mission would not take place nor would it have much chance of success. The essential element of agreement by the parties to the conflict would be absent.

It is also essential to keep in mind that UN or regional organization peacekeeping operations depend almost completely upon the support of member states, first for approval of a mandate, then for the personnel, material, and money needed to undertake the operation, and finally for sustained political support for the duration of an operation. Standing alone, neither the United Nations nor any regional organization has the independent material or political resources to undertake successful peacekeeping operations.

II. BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION

The term “peacekeeping” was first used by UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to describe the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), consisting of some 5,000 lightly armed observers who were sent to the Sinai in 1956 to be positioned between Egypt and Israel after the two countries had reached agreement to end the war between them. It has evolved over 40 years into an umbrella label for a wide variety of internationally authorized, limited military operations accompanied by diplomatic efforts for peaceful objectives. While these were initially only UN operations, approved by the UN

Security Council and under the operational authority of the council and the UN secretary general, the term has come to apply also to operations undertaken by ad hoc coalitions that are endorsed by the council or by regional organizations such as the OAS.

In most cases, the purpose is to maintain and/or assist in the implementation of agreements (including a cease-fire) between previously warring states, or — especially during the past decade — factions engaged in violent conflict within a single state. These are traditional peacekeeping operations. In some instances, when there is less than full agreement between combating parties, a peacekeeping operation has authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enforce or impose an agreement. These are generally called peace enforcement or coercive peacekeeping operations.

Particularly during the past decade, peacekeeping operations have come to have important civilian components, including support for human rights, elections, disarmament, demobilization, demining, and assistance to civil administration — particularly law-enforcement — institutions, as well as humanitarian operations, conducted by a variety of international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), that required protection. These are often called complex or multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The term peacekeeping can be used to cover the entire spectrum.

Between 1948 and 1988 there were 13 UN peacekeeping operations — limited mostly to the Middle East and aimed at discouraging the renewal of conflict after a cease-fire between hostile states. The Middle East actions took place with the blessing of the United States and the Soviet Union, which both wished to avoid escalation that might precipitate unwanted and possibly very dangerous Great Power confrontation. Most other proposals for UN action ran into Soviet veto power in the Security Council, thus severely limiting the number of peace operations. No U.S. units participated, nor did forces from any of the other permanent members of the Security Council. Most of these operations involved deployments by the Security Council ranging from several hundred to 5,000 lightly armed troops under UN command to observe and help police cease-fire agreements, assisted by UN diplomatic personnel. All UN operations were under Chapter VI (voluntary) of the UN Charter rather than Chapter VII (mandatory).

The most noteworthy of these traditional peacekeeping operations were small Middle East observer missions, such as the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) established in 1948 along Israel's borders with its Arab neighbors; the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, and larger interposition forces in the Middle East and Cyprus — UNEF I between Egypt and Israel after the 1956 war; UNEF II after the 1973 war; the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) between Syria and Israel after the 1973 war; the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) between Greek- and Turkish-controlled parts of Cyprus after the 1963 war. UNEF I was terminated in the buildup to the 1967 war. The other missions (or their successors) remain in existence, contributing significantly to prevention of renewed major conflict.

Different kinds of operations during the early period of peacekeeping included a small UN political transition mission in 1962 to West New Guinea — the UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF); and in 1960 to 1964 a large deployment (eventually reaching 20,000) of military and civilian personnel to the Congo — the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Although initially established by the Security Council as a traditional peacekeeping mission, ONUC developed into what was effectively a multifunctional peace enforcement mission, without explicit Security Council authorization. It ended the civil war and assisted in establishing government stability (pro-U.S.), but precipitated a major backlash by the Soviet bloc and its followers that inhibited UN peacekeeping for over a decade.

There were also two major peacekeeping operations not approved by or under the authority of the Security Council: the U.S.-led intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 to help end civil war (with the approval and participation of the Organization of American States) and the Multinational Force and Observer Mission for the Sinai in 1981, as part of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. The former was terminated when elections were held in 1966. The latter is still in existence, involves some 2,000 personnel from 11 countries (half from the United States), and has effectively replaced and succeeded UNEF II. Both operations were denied Security Council approval by the Soviet Union, but can legitimately be included as peacekeeping operations, given their international participation and their missions of stopping conflict and preventing its renewal.

Starting in 1987 a positive attitude emerged in Moscow toward both UN peacekeeping and cooperation with Washington in resolving regional Cold War conflicts underway for more than a decade in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. These were conflicts in which the regimes in power, supported by either the West or the Soviet Bloc, were challenged by an insurgency supported by the opposing bloc. Other regional states often were involved as logistics bases for the insurgency and its supporters. Negotiations, pressure, and persuasion began outside the United Nations in 1987 to 1989, but UN mediation efforts often assisted agreements reached in the period 1989 to 1991 to end these conflicts — as well as the Namibia and Mozambique conflicts, which were settled as a result of the dynamic generated to end the Angola conflict. UN peacekeeping operations were deployed in all instances to facilitate and monitor implementation. Except for Afghanistan, the Security Council approved, and the parties agreed to, a range of activities in the conflict areas going well beyond observation of the agreement. Because of the nature of the problems there following years of internal upheaval, these activities included support for disarmament, demobilization and demining, monitoring of human rights practices, assisting with elections, return and resettlement of refugees, and the development of indigenous police forces.

This series of operations was followed by unprecedented great power cohesion during and after the Gulf War, including frequent use of the Security Council to endorse economic sanctions, military operations, and then peace operations designed to control Iraqi aggression. The initial peacekeeping successes in ending the Cold War regional conflicts, and the enthusiasm following the coalition's victory in the Gulf War, led to a summit of the chiefs of state of Security Council member nations in January 1992 that called for improved and more frequent use of peacekeeping missions. This produced a still more assertive approach by the United States and other key UN members; and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace in July 1992 codified a more active UN role. Units from states that are permanent members of the Security Council began to participate in peacekeeping; the number of operations, the number of UN peacekeepers, and the costs to the United Nations reached all-time highs (17 separate operations; 78,000 persons; \$3,500 million) by 1994.

In addition, the United States organized — outside the formal UN framework but approved by the Security Council — two major coalition peace operations (Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 to 1993 and Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994 to 1995), as well as a more limited multinational mission (Provide Comfort in Iraq, 1991 to 1993). France and Russia also organized and led peace operations outside the UN framework but with its concurrence: France in Rwanda in 1994, and Russia in Georgia and Tajikistan in 1994 to 1995. In addition, involvement of regional and sub-regional organizations in peacekeeping increased markedly during this period — for example, the OAS in Haiti, NATO in Bosnia, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Burundi, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia.

Almost all of these operations were established to deal with internal conflicts, often involving major humanitarian and human rights crises with the suffering of millions of people vividly portrayed on worldwide TV. In several instances — notably the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti — prior agreement among the parties to end the conflict was either absent or nominal or too weak to be sustained. This led to serious, unexpected consequences. The UN mission in the former Yugoslavia evolved from a medium-sized Chapter VI protection operation for humanitarian purposes (UNPROFOR, 1992) into a major Chapter VII military operation of some 30,000 forces, including British and French heavy artillery and tanks, supported from the air by NATO. It was engaged on the ground in irregular warfare with Serb militia, who continued to take a toll of Bosnian civilians, ultimately discrediting the operation.

The United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia started in December 1992 with some 20,000 U.S. and 10,000 other forces, achieved its humanitarian protection objective, ended the worst of the civil war with few casualties, and gave way to the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in May 1993. The latter was a UN-commanded, much weaker military force with indirect support by a small U.S. combat unit but with much larger, more intrusive, provocative objectives. UNOSOM II and separate U.S. units soon found themselves in combat with General Mohamed Farah Aideed's forces, inflicted and took heavy casualties on both sides, leading to withdrawal of U.S. forces in

March 1994, followed by the failure of the mission and its total withdrawal by March 1995. In Rwanda, the UN peacekeeping force was withdrawn in the summer of 1994 as Hutu-Tutsi genocide exploded and 10 Belgian peacekeepers who had surrendered were hacked to death by the Hutus. Humanitarian assistance was provided to Hutu refugees and former Hutu regime members when they fled to Eastern Zaire.

In Cambodia, the large UN force assembled in 1992 shifted from disarming and administering the entire country to the more limited objective of holding elections in face of confrontation by the Khmer Rouge and the failure of its disarmament and demobilization objectives. The operation was terminated in 1993 after elections. In Haiti, the initial U.S. Multinational Force of over 20,000 quickly achieved its objectives with almost no casualties and was reduced to about 10,000; the old army and police were disarmed and demobilized, presidential elections were held, and a UN force — the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) — of some 8,000 took over smoothly in April 1995. It continued the mission, originally established in July 1994 by the UN Security Council for both the MNF and UNMIH, including the development of a capable Haitian National Police to play the primary role in maintaining security, and the holding of Parliamentary elections.

Starting in 1994, the perceived failure of UNOSOM II in Somalia and the quasi-failure of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, plus the huge increase in UN peacekeeping costs — with heavy additional bilateral costs for the United States and a few other major force contributors — produced a marked diminution in enthusiasm for peacekeeping in general and particularly for large-scale, expensive operations in dangerous situations (complex peacekeeping/peace enforcement) with a potential for UN forces to be caught up in local conflicts. The U.S. Congress began withholding funds to pay peacekeeping obligations, the number of new UN operations shrank, and the number of UN peacekeepers fell from a high of some 78,000 in 1993 to about 14,000 at the end of 1997, including nearly 3,000 civilian police monitors (CIVPOL). Significant increases in this CIVPOL program are foreseen during 1998, particularly in Bosnia, Western Sahara, Angola, and the Central African Republic. Costs to the United Nations fell from \$3,500 million to \$1,200 million over the period. At the same time, the UN Secretariat was substantially

reorganized to improve peacekeeping capabilities: Several different elements were consolidated under the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, over 100 seconded military officers arrived to complement a score of full-time officers, a 24-hour-a-day operations center was established, and very weak logistics and procurement procedures underwent improvement.

On January 3, 1995, the United Nations issued a much more restrained Supplement to the ambitious 1992 Agenda for Peace. The Supplement called for ad hoc coalitions in which major military powers would assume command and control for complex peacekeeping/peace enforcement, with Security Council approval. This was the approach that had already been followed for the successful intervention of multinational forces under U.S. leadership in Somalia in December 1992 (UNITAF) and Haiti in September 1994 (MNF). The Security Council was used to legitimize the powerful NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) for Bosnia, which replaced UNPROFOR in December 1995 and was followed by the Stabilization Force (SFOR). IFOR numbered over 30,000, and deployed three Multinational Divisions led by the U.S. First Armored Division, with strong air support. IFOR's mission was to ensure security and to support indirectly the several international civilian elements assisting the parties to the conflict in implementing elements of the Dayton Peace Agreement on return of refugees, elections, and retraining of police.

During the period 1995 to April 1, 1998, several ongoing peacekeeping operations were reorganized, including Angola and the former Yugoslavia (which became four separate operations); UNMIH in Haiti was successfully concluded militarily, but the civilian police element of that operation was extended; a modest observer mission was established to monitor the agreement between the Guatemala regime and former insurgents; and a French-commanded operation outside the United Nations of some 1,300 African and French forces in the Central African Republic was converted by the Security Council to a regular UN peacekeeping mission. Despite political criticisms and serious financial problems, plus serious problems with specific missions, UN peacekeeping operations — as well as operations outside but approved by the United Nations — continued. They included a wide variety of missions, from simple observation (such as Guatemala)

to complex, multifunctional military-civilian operations (such as Bosnia) designed to help rebuild key institutions of troubled states as well as ensure security and achieve humanitarian/human rights objectives.

Military forces from more than 110 nations have participated in peacekeeping, as have police forces from some 50 countries. Military forces around the world are conducting frequent unilateral and multilateral peacekeeping training exercises, such as the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and NATO in Europe, the United States and Central American and South American countries, and the U.S. and Asia-Pacific countries. African forces are beginning to do the same, with help from France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries to improve their peacekeeping capabilities. Many of these exercises have civilian components, notably humanitarian assistance, and involve participation of international organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the World Food Program as well as NGOs from the United States and Europe. Civilian organizations are placing greater emphasis on cooperation with military forces. Military schools, civilian universities, and think tanks in many countries are devoting considerable attention to improved peacekeeping doctrine; they are focused upon better operational procedures and technology for peacekeeping as a critical means of dealing with the expected continuing problems for troubled states and their neighbors stemming from such causes as economic, ethnic, religious, environmental, and population pressures, exacerbated by the information revolution.

III. ASSESSMENT OF SUCCESS AND SHORTCOMINGS

In looking at the history of 50 years of peacekeeping, the record is mixed but, on balance, positive. Evaluating success or failure is subjective and needs to take account of such issues as whether the explicit and implicit objectives were realistic, whether partial and/or delayed success leaves the situation on the ground better than before, and how to assess operations that are revised and/or prolonged in mid-trajectory. For pre-1989 peacekeeping, one can make the case that the only real failure was the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a 2,000-person plus force, established in 1978, which has singularly failed to stop or prevent Israeli low-

intensity combat with various Lebanese militias in southern Lebanon and along the Israeli border. Even here, it may be that the Security Council is correct in repeatedly extending UNIFIL in order to prevent a recurrence of major hostilities such as existed prior to its initial deployment. UNEF I helped keep the peace between Egypt and Israel for 11 years, but was not intended or able to resolve the basic dispute that burst into war again in 1967. UNEF II and the Multinational Observer Force which succeeded it in the Sinai, and UNDOF on the Golan Heights, traditional interposition forces, have made very significant contributions toward preventing recurrence of conflict between Israel, Egypt, and Syria, and to preserving de jure peace between Israel and Egypt. ONUC, the first large, multifunctional peace enforcement operation, was more messy and controversial but indisputably left the Congo reunited and much more peaceful and stable than when it was deployed.

The second major period of peacekeeping operations, to help resolve Cold War regional conflicts, took place without much serious, systematic thought or planning and turned out to be multifunctional. In actual execution, they fell at different places on the continuum between Chapter VI (voluntary, consent) and Chapter VII (mandatory, enforced), as the various parties to the conflict shifted positions from nominal agreement to renewed conflict — for example, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the government in Angola, and the Khmer Rouge and the government in Cambodia. Cambodia and Angola are widely judged to have been failures, but that is a superficial judgment. The objectives in both cases were very far-reaching; they included disarming and demobilizing large, well-organized military forces that had been engaged in heavy combat for well over a decade, and holding elections — a totally unfamiliar process which, it was assumed, would somehow cause powerful, entrenched political/military organizations and their leaders to accept peacefully the verdict of the majority, even if it accorded what appeared to be total victory to their enemies.

In Angola, Savimbi and UNITA refused to disarm, rejected the results of what appeared to be loser-gets-nothing elections in 1992, and returned to war. It took renewed external pressure and persuasion, significant combat between the government and UNITA, and three

renewals and revisions of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) before UNITA and the government finally reached what appears to be a lasting agreement, including UNITA demobilization, in early 1998. On the other hand, the Namibia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua operations had Security Council mandates and objectives which better matched the realities on the ground, including the actual degree of consent of the parties. They proceeded smoothly, with demobilization and disarmament, free and fair elections, revitalized and retrained police forces, and human rights monitors.

The third wave of major peacekeeping operations, focused upon internal conflicts, has obviously been the most controversial. Rwanda can accurately be described as a total failure — a situation in which nothing was done to avert or stop genocide in April to June 1994, and in which there was a blatant display of the absence of political will by the Security Council and key members of the United Nations who rejected UN involvement. This followed the decision by the United States in October 1993 to pull out of Somalia its forces which had been supporting the UN operation there (UNOSOM II) and which had taken (and inflicted) major casualties in a fight with a Somali faction. The result was a March 1995 termination of that operation with little progress on its objectives, which included coercive disarmament, political reconciliation, administrative reconstruction, and police reform. On the other hand, the combined effect of UNITAF and UNOSOM II effectively ended large-scale death from war, famine, and disease, reduced civil war to minor clashes, and established a basis for gradual movement toward political reconciliation.

UNPROFOR failed to achieve the confusing series of goals, often unrealistic, contained in more than 60 Security Council Resolutions. It was too weak internally and had too little external political-military support, especially once the evolving objectives and conflicting Serb ambitions pushed the two into conflict. The decision by the United States and NATO to mount a much more muscular military operation (IFOR) in support of a nominal agreement of the parties at Dayton (Ohio) opened up a new vista. The evolution of effective coordination on the ground among the several international civilian entities (United Nations, International Police Task Force, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office of the

High Representative), a large number of NGOs, the IFOR/SFOR military, and the three main Bosnian parties and Serbia and Croatia is a slow, erratic, constantly evolving process. Slower-than-expected progress on the civilian side has caused the military force to be twice extended — despite early achievement of narrow security goals — the last time to start in June 1998 and continue indefinitely.

In Haiti, the combination of the U.S.-led MNF and the follow-up UNMIH operations have achieved almost all principal objectives in a realistic manner, although domestic political rivalries have been primarily responsible for failure to revive the economy and for weaknesses in other areas, including reform of the judiciary. The decision by the Security Council to continue the civilian police mission, with protection by Argentine gendarmes, after the end of the military peacekeeping effort has established a precedent for the future in helping troubled states deal with public security problems.

IV. CONCLUSION

As can be seen, the overall balance of peacekeeping operations has been positive — even though they have sometimes failed and often have not produced the idealistic outcomes projected and expected by politicians and political institutions such as the Security Council and the parliaments of member states. In looking ahead, consistent application of the following principles by key member states, as well as the Security Council and the UN secretary general, are most likely to lead to success and avoid failure:

- Assess the situation carefully to determine general, realistic objectives, military and/or civilian international resources required, a degree of difficulty and/or danger, and approximate time frame;
- Identify the degree of political support as well as the availability of material, personnel, and financial resources required from key countries (including regional states and major powers) for military and civilian activities;
- Establish a clear, precise international mandate for all critical military and civilian elements of operation, and identify phases (for example the initial security phase,

implementation phase, transitional phase, and self-sustaining phase);

- Prepare a combined flexible implementation plan, including basic civilian and military elements of operation (for example, military, civilian police/justice, political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, information, civic action, human rights, elections) with

agreed mechanisms for command, control, and coordination plus approximate timelines for key program actions;

- Measure ongoing implementation of operations against initial assessment of situations on the ground and objectives, as well as against evolving requirements for external political and material support; seek any necessary modification in mandate and support. ●

ACRI: POSITIVE U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA

*By U.S. Ambassador Marshall McCallie
Special Coordinator, United States' African Crisis Response Initiative*

The goal of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) "is to enhance the capacity of our African partners to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges in a timely and effective manner," says Ambassador McCallie. "While we are able to provide bilateral training and can work with African partners in sub-regional training exercises," he says, "we recognize that it is Africans who will determine the ultimate role of the Organization of African Unity and sub-regional organizations in peacekeeping endeavors on the continent." McCallie is Special Coordinator for the United States' African Crisis Response Initiative, Department of State.

The recent visit of President Clinton to Africa has generated a significant amount of public interest in the African Crisis Response Initiative. It is a positive part of America's partnership with Africa. At the same time, it is important to place the African Crisis Response Initiative in the context of a broader vision of multinational peacekeeping training, which extends far beyond the capabilities of any one nation or group of nations.

We must recognize at the outset that peacekeeping is only one task on a much broader continuum of efforts required to maintain peace and stability. Those efforts range from conflict identification, mediation, management, and resolution, to peacekeeping, peace-building, reconciliation, and reconstruction. In addressing the African Crisis Response Initiative, we are dealing with that portion of the continuum which focuses specifically on peacekeeping and the creation of a safe environment for humanitarian assistance in a crisis.

The goal of the African Crisis Response Initiative is to enhance the capacity of our African partners to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges in a timely and effective manner. Our objective is to assist in developing rapidly deployable, interoperable battalions and companies from stable democratic countries that can work together to maintain peace on a continent that has too often been torn by civil strife. Our intention is not to create a standing army in Africa. Nor is our intention to withdraw from Africa. As President Clinton has demonstrated, the United States intends to remain very much engaged on the African continent, working with our African partners to promote economic growth, democracy, and stability.

Our effort is in keeping with the goal enunciated in the peacekeeping report of the Secretary General of the United Nations in November 1995. In that report, he called for the international community to place more emphasis on the development of the capacity to respond rapidly and effectively to emergency situations in Africa — a sentiment that we have heard repeated by numerous African leaders.

At the same time, we recognize that many African countries have been conducting peacekeeping operations for years, not only in Africa but in other parts of the world under United Nations sponsorship. We also realize that there have been very productive partnerships in peacekeeping training between African states and non-African states for a number of years. France has worked with its West African partners extensively and, just one month ago, completed a very successful peacekeeping exercise in West Africa with officers and battalions from Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania. That exercise also involved smaller contingents from several other West African states as well as from the United Kingdom and the United States. France also has agreed to assist Cote d'Ivoire in establishing a peacekeeping training center. The United Kingdom, in partnership with Zimbabwe and Ghana, is supporting the development of Centers of Excellence to include peacekeeping training, and Denmark, in cooperation with the Government of Zimbabwe, has placed a peacekeeping officer at the Zimbabwean Staff College.

Further, Africans themselves are addressing this issue head-on. In April 1997, the Government of

Zimbabwe, assisted by the United Kingdom, hosted an impressive peacekeeping exercise with troops of ten southern African states in its rugged eastern highlands. The Zimbabwean-led “Blue Hungwe” exercise provided a model for future peacekeeping exercises. Undoubtedly, South Africa will build upon its success as it works with its southern African partners to develop a sub-regional exercise for 1998. Other regions of Africa have seen the success of ECOMOG (Economic Community Monitoring Group) peacekeepers in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the effective deployment of peacekeeping units from West and Central Africa during this past year in the Central African Republic.

It is in this broader context that we must view the African Crisis Response Initiative. The initiative was first proposed in September 1996 in response to a very real fear that we might see an eruption of ethnic violence in the Great Lakes Region comparable to the great tragedy that we witnessed in Rwanda in 1994. With our partners in Africa and Europe, the U.S. government explored the idea of creating an African Crisis Response Force that could intervene to save lives in drastic humanitarian crises. Diplomatic teams from the United States visited numerous African and European capitals and consulted extensively with officials of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The advice received was interesting and helpful. “Don’t create a force,” we were told. “Create an interoperable capacity.” The clear thinking behind this advice was that such capacity could be deployed by international organizations already in existence, such as the United Nations, the OAU, or sub-regional organizations in Africa. Likewise, units could be deployed as part of a multinational force arrangement. Such operations should in any case be conducted with the approval and endorsement of the UN Security Council.

Quite appropriately, our African and non-African partners also advised that we should establish strong linkages in any international training initiative with the OAU and the United Nations. Interestingly, our European and African partners suggested that we narrow the gaps between the initiatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, so that there would be no perception of competition in the peacekeeping arena. It is as a result of this advice and a good deal of diplomatic work that we arrived at an agreement among France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in

May 1997 to support a coordinated peacekeeping training effort in Africa based upon long-term capacity enhancement, legitimacy, openness, and transparency.

Some of our partners suggested that we should carefully review the question of whether to train and equip for [UN Charter] Chapter VI peacekeeping operations or to focus, instead, on the greater challenge of Chapter VII peace enforcement operations. This is a particularly difficult subject because many conflicts in Africa would appear to require robust intervention forces. However, as the ACRI team discussed the challenge to the international community of building peacekeeping capacity, we agreed with the advice of the UN military experts to concentrate initially on Chapter VI peacekeeping and to emphasize training, not equipment. To develop a training curriculum that would be useful to African units for service in every part of the world, we drew heavily upon the peacekeeping doctrine and procedures of the United Nations, NATO, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Nordic countries. This international doctrine is flexible and can incorporate other useful additions. For instance, African countries with considerable peacekeeping experience will undoubtedly contribute to this developing curriculum.

In addition to common training, we realized that it would be important to provide standard communications equipment. Again, we sought the advice and counsel of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As a result, we have developed a communications package including off-the-shelf Motorola radios with frequency adjustment capacity that will enable international battalions to communicate with one another and up the chain of command with their respective headquarters and with the United Nations, if that is the convening authority.

In approaching the task of developing interoperable peacekeeping capacity, we are following two tracks: training and consultation. In the first instance, we are working on a bilateral basis with several African partners to enhance their capacity to do peacekeeping. Specifically, U.S. Special Forces are training African battalions to a common standard based on the doctrine and procedures cited above. Our initial training, which includes 70 trainers for approximately 70 days, emphasizes the development of basic soldier skills,

working with refugees, operating effectively with humanitarian organizations, and the observance of human rights. Needless to say, strong emphasis is placed upon specific skills of peacekeeping and humanitarian protection of refugees. We have been particularly pleased that several humanitarian organizations have participated in our training exercises.

Following the initial training, smaller teams (20-30 trainers) return to the host nation every six months or so for sustainment training and command post exercises, emphasizing logistics, battalion and brigade leadership, train-the-trainer skills, and the development of civil/military operations in humanitarian emergencies.

We have completed initial training with battalions in Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, and Mali and are currently training with a Ghanaian battalion, in cooperation with Belgian and Ghanaian trainers. And later in the year, we are scheduled to begin training in Ethiopia, which has committed two battalions and a brigade headquarters for this training effort. We look forward to extending that cooperative relationship to many other African countries. In the interest of the sovereignty of all nations, we continue to believe that the training relationship should be voluntary and should be conducted on a willing partner/willing partner basis.

We are sometimes asked why we have begun bilateral training before the OAU or the international community has settled on one unified approach. The answer to this question is twofold. First, crises continue to occur, and we and our training partners have deemed it wise to start preparing for such crises now. Second, none of this training precludes a broader African approach, whether at sub-regional or regional levels. The training is designed to international standards, and the communications equipment has been specifically chosen to be interoperable anywhere in the world. We believe that it is prudent to begin strengthening peacekeeping capacity and allow cooperation and coordination to grow organically among nations.

Thus, we have been actively exploring with other countries the means to generate greater confidence and cooperation in peacekeeping training efforts. We

recognize that the United Kingdom, France, and the United States — even together — do not have sufficient resources to meet the needs of all of our African partners. Further, we believe that it is important for a broad range of African and non-African states to become involved in this multinational peacekeeping enhancement process. For this reason, we were delighted when UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Bernard Miyet invited interested member states to meet informally in New York on December 5, 1997, to discuss how best to coordinate our mutual efforts. Some 60 nations attended and representatives of almost 30 countries delivered remarks. Representatives of many African nations indicated the importance they attach to the involvement of the OAU and the UN Security Council in peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. We believe that significant progress was made, laying the foundation for broad international cooperation.

In conclusion, we do not expect that the African Crisis Response Initiative or any combination of international training initiatives will address the full range of problems subsumed under Africa conflict management. That heavy burden falls particularly to the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. We do believe, however, that preparing for peacekeeping is an important element in creating stability and sustaining an environment of safety and security. While we are able to provide bilateral training and can work with African partners in sub-regional training exercises, we recognize that it is Africans who will determine the ultimate role of the OAU and sub-regional organizations in peacekeeping endeavors on the continent.

Based on comments by African leaders, it is becoming clear that African nations together, in cooperation with international partners, sub-regional organizations, the OAU and the UN, will develop stand-by command structures that will enable them, with appropriate logistical and financial support, to field and command the requisite peacekeeping units rapidly and effectively. This critical issue calls specifically for African leadership. With strong African leadership and willing and supportive external partners, we can, as an international community, make a significant difference. ©

DRAMATIC STEPS TOWARD LASTING PEACE, STABILITY IN BOSNIA

By U.S. Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard

Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords

Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard, who has served for most of the past year as the Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, says “vigorous U.S. leadership is, and will remain, the key component of international efforts to restore stability to the Balkans.” Much remains to be done, he notes, but there are now “real opportunities to make further dramatic steps forward” to fulfill Dayton’s ambitious agenda.

U.S. leadership has produced a great deal of progress in the past year on even the toughest issues involved in implementing the peace accord in Bosnia. Moreover, the pace of progress has recently accelerated, and political developments in the Republika Srpska (RS) offer real opportunities to make further dramatic steps forward, including progress on the key issues of allowing refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes and bringing indicted war criminals to justice.

Make no mistake about it — bringing peace to Bosnia is not possible without U.S. leadership. Our national interests and the Balkans’ unstable history both argue in favor of a consistent policy that will leave the region more stable. We are determined to get it right. By staying engaged in Bosnia we can ensure that when our troops leave they will not have to return.

FOLLOW-ON FORCE

On February 18, NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided in favor of a Follow-on Force with a mission similar to SFOR (Stabilization Force) and including new, specialized units to address public security. The number of U.S. troops in the Follow-on Force will decline, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total. The Follow-on Force will remain similar in size to SFOR, but the United States’ contribution will be reduced from an authorized level of 8,500 under SFOR to about 6,900 under the Follow-on Force. Consultations with non-NATO troop contributors are continuing.

The mission of the Follow-on Force — which will continue to be called SFOR — will remain largely

unchanged. The introduction of specialized units will enable SFOR to respond appropriately and flexibly to security threats in an evolving security environment. The force’s mandate will not expire on a specific date. Rather, we will work with our NATO allies to develop a definitive list of benchmarks or criteria. We have developed a comprehensive package of benchmarks for Dayton implementation, including the conduct of elections in accordance with democratic standards, media reform, a functioning and orderly minority return process, reform and restructuring of the local police, cooperation with the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) in the arrest and prosecution of war criminals, and economic recovery and restructuring. SFOR’s benchmarks will be tailored to support these goals effectively.

We have worked hard to demonstrate our resolve to see Dayton through. This has begun to affect the calculations of even the most hardened Bosnian opponents of the peace accords. For example, four Bosnian-Serb indicted war criminals recently voluntarily surrendered. Our demonstrated resolve was a key factor in their decision. Similarly, authorities in the RS have promised to facilitate the return of tens of thousands of refugees and displaced persons.

CIVILIAN IMPLEMENTATION

We will continue our policy of pressuring the parties to implement fully the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords. The peace agreement clearly gave the primary responsibility for implementation to the former warring sides themselves. Our role is to support those Bosnian leaders who are trying to implement the

peace agreement, and oppose those who are not. Our policy is not based on personalities. Rather, it is based on the principle of strict conditionality.

Civilian implementation would have been difficult even if the Bosnian parties had been led by forward-looking men who wanted to build the new Bosnia which Dayton envisaged. However, all three sides had leaders who, to varying degrees, were not ready to put the war and its causes behind them. This was especially true in the RS, which until recently was led by the same clique of corrupt xenophobes who were largely responsible for the war and most of the human suffering that accompanied it.

In May 1997, President Clinton approved a new, comprehensive U.S. strategy to reinvigorate implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. That new approach has brought fragile, but clear, progress. Most significantly, the November 1997 election in the Republika Srpska produced a democratically oriented government under President Biljana Plavsic and Prime Minister Milorad Dodik. More broadly, pluralist, multi-ethnic government has become a reality in many municipalities and in the RS; the return of refugees and displaced persons continues, including, for the first time, thousands of minority returns; a non-partisan media environment is being created; eight of the ten cantons in the Federation have completed the first phase of police restructuring, and 7,000 police in the RS have been provisionally certified by the IPTF (International Police Task Force); the power of ethnic nationalists throughout Bosnia, and especially in the RS, is declining; and many of the symbols of a single Bosnian state — a national flag, license plates, ambassadors, a currency coupon, a customs code, and a passport and citizenship law — have become a reality.

The success of our policy can be attributed to a number of key factors:

- We have held Belgrade and Zagreb accountable for delivering on their Dayton obligations.
- The NATO-led peacekeeping force, SFOR, has demonstrated its ability and readiness to support civilian implementation efforts when deemed appropriate. SFOR has been able to play an active role in support of the IPTF and local police forces — to ensure a secure environment for civilian implementation.

- Other members of the Contact Group and the Peace Implementation Council have followed our leadership. Secretary of State Albright was able to secure approval of a more aggressive, coordinated international focus on Bosnia at the ministerial meeting in Sintra, Portugal, of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council. Sintra established a series of specific deadlines on key implementation issues, as well as penalties for non-compliance, and charged the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, to take action to facilitate compliance with those deadlines.

Political change in the RS was key to our success in further reinvigorating Dayton implementation. RS President Plavsic realized, and had the courage to state publicly, that Pale's obstructionism and corruption were impoverishing the people of the RS. Under her leadership, internationally supervised elections for a new RS Assembly were held. Those elections led to the formation of a pro-Dayton government in the RS which is supported by a multi-ethnic coalition in the RS Assembly. The Dodik government has brought a dramatic new approach to Bosnian-Serb implementation of Dayton. This includes real efforts to improve cooperation with the Federation as well as improved peace implementation within the RS. In the first month of the new Dodik administration, we have already seen a series of important steps: the surrender of four Serb war crimes indictees and agreement for the ICTY to open an office in Banja Luka; agreement on a common license plate for all of Bosnia (to facilitate freedom of movement between the entities); restoration of railroad service between the RS and the Bosniak-Croat Federation; and delivery of the mail between the two entities. These initial gains are significant but need to be continued and expanded on in the coming months.

During his recent visit to Washington, Prime Minister Dodik met with Secretary of State Albright, National Security Adviser Berger, and other senior-level administration officials. We told him that however refreshing his promises of cooperation on Dayton were, we expect deeds as well as words. We will hold Dodik to his promises, and his willingness to follow through will be the standard by which we will judge his government.

It is important to remember that the positive developments in the RS came about not by chance, but

by design. They are a direct result of our policy of firm diplomatic pressure and robust action including involvement by SFOR, when necessary. Recent progress demonstrates that our approach is sound and will lead to further progress, if we stay the course.

NEED FOR FURTHER PROGRESS

We understand that despite all that has been accomplished in the past few months, much more needs to be done. Peace in Bosnia is still fragile, and the forces of division, intolerance, and ethnic hatred have not been defeated. Political pluralism and independent media must be expanded to all parts of Bosnia, including the Federation. Ironically, there is today more political pluralism and freedom of expression in the RS than in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The presiding arbitrator for the Brcko arbitration rendered his decision on March 15. We expect both parties to fully implement that decision.

While we have made considerable progress on bringing indicted war criminals to justice during the past year — the number of indictees in the custody of the international criminal tribunal has quadrupled since April 1997 — more must be done, particularly to ensure delivery of Serb indictees to The Hague. The United States will continue its strong support for the tribunal. It was our pressure on the Croatian government that was largely responsible for the voluntary surrender of ten indicted war criminals late last year. While we encourage the remaining indictees to surrender voluntarily, we will continue to keep our options open to ensure that all remaining indictees are transferred to the tribunal's custody.

FOCUS OF U.S. POLICY

Over the next six months, the efforts of the United States will focus on several tracks:

- Consolidating the political gains we have seen in the past three months. The September elections offer the possibility of a breakthrough in our effort to establish firmly democracy's values and principles in Bosnia. Elections will be held for almost all national and entity-wide offices in Bosnia. These elections will be key to our effort to develop throughout Bosnia pro-Dayton leadership whose focus is on the future rather than the past.

- Securing greater progress in the Federation. With a reform government in the RS taking positive action, the Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats can no longer hide behind Bosnian-Serb obstructionism. Much more needs to be done on establishment of a working and cooperative Federation government and genuinely democratic institutions at the local and cantonal levels. As President Clinton bluntly told the Bosniak and Bosnian-Croat leaders during his December 1997 visit to Bosnia, the Bosnian Croats must give up their separatist ambitions and cooperate on the important issues at hand, such as getting an IMF (International Monetary Fund) agreement and reintegrating the Bosnian economy. At the same time, the Bosniaks must effectively share power, and resist their instincts to dominate the Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Returning Sarajevo to its pre-war status of a truly multi-ethnic city can serve as a model. That was why in February I co-chaired the Sarajevo Return Conference. The conference called for at least 20,000 Croat or Serb returns to Sarajevo Canton by the end of the year, identified specific actions to achieve this goal, and set deadlines for their accomplishment. Bosniak leaders, including President Izetbegovic, said they were committed to achieving these goals. Nevertheless, the Bosniaks and Croats failed to meet the initial deadline set by the conference. They must do better or we and our allies will cut assistance to Sarajevo that benefits the political elites blocking reform and use it elsewhere where Dayton is being implemented.

- Return of refugees and displaced persons. Restoring genuine multi-ethnicity in both entities is a key to Dayton's long-term success. In this regard, we must work harder to create conditions for the voluntary, orderly return of refugees and displaced people. Working actively through the UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) "Open Cities" program, we have already laid the groundwork for substantially stepped-up returns in 1998. We adamantly reject linkage by the parties (that is, nobody can return until everyone is allowed to return), but we understand the need for a regional approach if only because housing is limited. We are, therefore, working with UNHCR, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the High Representative, and others to develop an integrated regional strategy for 1998 returns.

We will move our focus to a more comprehensive regional approach and will strictly hold all sides to their Dayton commitments on returns. This includes President Franjo Tudjman's promise to allow all Croatian Serbs to return to their homes in Croatia.

We also will continue to emphasize the linkage between public security and returns. To date, the United States has provided the bulk of the funding for non-military public security. In the future, we expect the Europeans to pick up a larger share of these costs, especially as reform takes hold in Republika Srpska.

- Pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) and Croatia. Continued strong international pressure will be needed to ensure that both Zagreb and Belgrade play a constructive role in Bosnia. Dayton is not the only issue on the agenda.

Regional stability will be assured only when both the FRY and Croatia embrace real democratic institutions based on the rule of law. Both countries' records on freedom of media and democratization must be substantially improved in order for them to be able to integrate into European institutions.

While much remains to be done to fulfill Dayton's ambitious agenda, we now have the right formula for successful implementation — a vigorous civilian implementation effort led by a forceful High Representative in coordination with the NATO-led military force and coupled with robust diplomatic engagement in the region. Developments in Kosovo will have an impact on regional security and Bosnia. We of course will be focused on this at the highest levels. Vigorous U.S. leadership is, and will remain, the key component of international efforts to restore stability to the Balkans. ©

A HALF CENTURY OF U.S. PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

*By Colonel Larry M. Forster
Director, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute*

The U.S. support for “innovations in peacekeeping” in the Middle East reflects the U.S. government’s resolute commitment to long-term peace in the region, says Colonel Forster. The pragmatic attempt to find “the right mix of peacekeeping forces, under both UN and non-UN mandates, acceptable to all of the belligerent parties and impartial in its conduct of operations, is characteristic of U.S. peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East,” he says.

Forster serves as Director of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

The United States has been deeply involved in efforts to promote peace in the Middle East for more than 50 years. With the twin interests of backing Israel and supporting Arab friends while curbing Cold War and other international rivalries, U.S. efforts in the region to resolve conflict have been both complicated and frustrating. The urgency and importance of U.S. policy was underscored by the oil crisis initiated by OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in the early 1970s, a situation which had global consequences.

The United States has been either front-and-center or immediately behind the scenes in the effort to prevent conflict and to promote peace, reconciliation, and development in the Middle East. Joining other states, the United States has supported UN innovations in peacekeeping, periodically providing strong diplomatic impetus to the peace process and working outside the United Nations when necessary to resolve specific obstacles to peace in the Middle East.

The United States was involved in the creation of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948 to monitor the cease-fire between Israel and her Arab neighbors and quickly saw the potential of this prototype peacekeeping operation. UNTSO dispatched an international group of military officers to monitor the agreement that stopped the fighting and permitted confidence-building measures to be implemented. The mission was successful because the belligerent parties desired to end hostilities. Eight years later, in 1956, the United States also supported the initiative to establish a force of lightly armed peacekeeping troops, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), in the Sinai to oversee the

withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. This international force under UN control remained in the Sinai as an inter-positional peacekeeping force until 1967 to ensure the integrity of Egypt’s borders while adding to the security of Israel; it was replaced by UNEF II, 1973-1979. In both cases, the United States provided equipment, transport, and the occasional military observer or staff officer, but no national contingent of troops.

During these years a pattern was established for the “permanent five” nations of the UN Security Council to create and support peacekeeping missions, made up of both observer and armed troops, with the United States paying 31 percent of the UN peacekeeping bill but not directly participating by providing troops. Other nations, however, were encouraged to contribute troops to lessen superpower rivalry and to enhance the perception of impartiality, and thus the acceptability, of peacekeeping soldiers.

Under UN auspices, Cold War peacekeeping, as applied to interstate conflicts, evolved to include the following primary elements: consent of the parties, impartiality of peacekeeping forces, international mandate (usually by the UN Security Council), minimum use of force for self-protection, and adequate resources. The United States and the former Soviet Union expanded their commitment to the region after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war when the two superpowers agreed to provide 36 military observers to UNTSO. They also supported the creation of a new observer mission in 1974 on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), as well as a new peacekeeping force in

1978, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to oversee the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon.

In 1979, as part of the Camp David Accords, the United States agreed to support and participate in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai between Egypt and Israel. The MFO, activated in 1981, is a non-UN multinational peacekeeping force that has been instrumental in ensuring stability between the two neighbors. In addition, the accords were sweetened by U.S. subsidies to Israel and Egypt for concessions made by the two nations during the negotiations.

Unfortunately, the non-UN Multinational Force (MNF) established in Lebanon in 1983 did not enjoy the same success as the MFO. Members of the MNF in the uncertain environment around Beirut took excessive casualties while trying to keep the peace because they were perceived by some of the parties as taking sides and becoming part of the conflict. The MNF was withdrawn in 1984. A key lesson learned in the Lebanon intervention, and relearned in Bosnia with UNPROFOR (1991-1995), was not to attempt peace enforcement missions — where not all parties may agree to the presence of an international force to separate combatants — with forces configured for peacekeeping missions — where all parties agree to external forces to separate fighting factions. Also, in both Lebanon and later in Bosnia, the international peacekeeping forces were hobbled by inappropriate rules of engagement.

The pattern of UN and non-UN peace operations in the Middle East was repeated after the Gulf War when in 1991 a U.S.-led coalition, Operation Provide Comfort, conducted a humanitarian operation within the framework of a peace enforcement mission to support the Kurds in the mountains of northern Iraq. Later that same year, the United Nations established the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) to monitor the border between the two countries. Meanwhile, U.S.-led coalition aircraft denied airspace to the government of Iraq over the northern and southern portions of its country in accordance with the cease-fire agreement.

Overall, the pragmatic effort to find the right mix of peacekeeping forces, under both UN and non-UN mandates, acceptable to all of the belligerent parties and

impartial in its conduct of operations, is characteristic of U.S. peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East. This reflects the attention of the international community on the Middle East — a region so rich in natural resources yet so prone to feuds, conflict, and turmoil. In addition, the nexus of three great religions in the area, the complex cultural and political tensions between and within these groups, and the political and economic legacies of the two world wars and the Cold War add great emotion and, at times, extremism to the conflict.

Those involved in conflict resolution in the Middle East must be especially sensitive to cultural distinctions and historical dimensions in order to have any opportunity to craft trust-building strategies. The progress that has been made in conflict resolution often has been achieved because peacekeeping efforts have reduced the probability of direct combat while allowing periodic high profile “shuttle diplomacy,” steady behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts, and long-term “dual-track” confidence-building measures. The efforts that have worked best have been holistic and comprehensive — involving the parties to the conflict and the international community at large, and led by the strong diplomatic support of countries, like the United States, that can exert influence in the process. For all the frustration often experienced over the seemingly slow pace of the peace process in the Middle East, the efforts of peacekeepers have minimized the actual outbreak of hostilities and have saved untold human lives.

The United States remains resolutely committed to long-term peace in the Middle East. U.S. efforts to achieve this objective include conflict resolution on Arab-Israeli issues, initiatives to constrain aggressive nations in the region from threatening neighbors, and maintenance of international trade and commerce. To achieve these aims, the United States is committing troops to the Sinai (about 1,000 in the MFO), prepositioning equipment and stationing forces in the Gulf, enforcing the Northern and Southern Watch aerial surveillance operations over portions of Iraq, contributing to UN observer missions in the region, and conducting military training exercises in Egypt, Kuwait, and elsewhere in the region. These efforts underscore unstinting U.S. diplomatic and economic support to comprehensive peace initiatives, and they benefit the inhabitants of the region and the international community. ©

U.S. PUBLIC'S VIEWS ON PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: THE BOSNIA CASE

*By Alvin Richman, Senior Research Specialist
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Various polls have shown that nearly three-fifths of Americans support, in principle, the participation of U.S. troops in UN peacekeeping operations. And recent polls show that public support for a U.S. troop "presence" in Bosnia has risen about 10 percentage points since the Dayton peace agreement in late 1995. This increase in support probably stems partly from greater public confidence that the mission can secure peace in Bosnia.

A survey by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) conducted in June 1996 found a 57-36 percent majority in favor, "as a general rule," of "contributing U.S. troops to UN peacekeeping operations." A CBS/NY Times poll conducted in February 1996 showed a 56-38 percent majority believed the United States has a "responsibility to contribute military troops to enforce peace plans in trouble spots around the world when it is asked by the United Nations." However, support has fallen short of a majority in certain specific situations when polls described the involvement as "unilateral" (for example, Haiti, 1994-1995) or for the purpose of "stopping the war" (for example, Bosnia, 1994).

Support for U.S. troop participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping operations has not been much greater than support for participation in UN missions. A recent poll by PIPA conducted in February 1998 showed that a 64-27 percent majority approve of using "NATO forces, including U.S. troops, to provide peacekeeping in countries bordering NATO members, such as Bosnia." When asked to compare the two institutions, a slight plurality preferred that the United States participate with NATO (42 percent) rather than with the United Nations (37 percent) in peacekeeping missions generally.

The amount of risk suggested by the description of a peacekeeping mission can have a much greater effect on public support than can the fact of whether the mission is being carried out under UN or NATO auspices. A

poll by the UN Association of the United States in December 1995 asked about the best option for dealing with the previously "warring parties" in Bosnia after the Dayton peace agreement. Exactly half favored a UN peacekeeping force that would "monitor" the peace settlement; 17 percent preferred a NATO military force to "enforce" the settlement; and 25 percent opted for "no organized international presence in Bosnia at all."

Americans generally prefer to share whatever risk is involved in a situation. A PIPA poll in June 1996 revealed that fully two-thirds said that "when it is necessary to use military force to deal with trouble spots in the world," they preferred that the United States "contribute to a UN military action" (69 percent) rather than "take military action by itself" (24 percent). Most Americans usually are willing to use U.S. military forces unilaterally to defend U.S. vital interests or mount relatively low-cost humanitarian and counter-terrorist actions. Building majority support for U.S. involvement in peacekeeping or political rehabilitation missions, however, has required that such operations be part of a multinational effort.

THE BOSNIA PEACEKEEPING MISSION

The most recent poll on public support for the Bosnia peacekeeping mission, conducted by PIPA in February-March 1998, finds a 65-33 percent majority favor the United States "participating with other countries in the Bosnia peacekeeping operation." But when asked whether they approve of keeping U.S. troops there beyond June 1998, a somewhat smaller majority favors doing so (57 percent versus 35 percent opposed).

Support for U.S. troop presence

When respondents are asked simply, "Do you approve or disapprove of the presence of U.S. troops in Bosnia," their approval has averaged 49 percent in recent polls,

about 10 points greater than two years ago. The 16-point difference between the support for the U.S. troop “presence” reflected in this 49 percent average and the 65 percent in PIPA’s poll (February-March 1998) is due largely to differences in how the issue was presented: PIPA specified the peacekeeping mission of U.S. troops and indicated U.S. troops would be joined by troops from other countries — features which have boosted support on previous polls.

Recent polls indicate that college graduates are much more supportive of keeping U.S. troops in Bosnia (about three-fifths in favor) than are individuals without college education (about two-fifths in favor). Most supportive, however, are U.S. “influentials,” individuals with key roles in government and in various private sector groups. About four-fifths of these leaders support keeping U.S. troops in Bosnia; this was the average for 10 different leadership groups surveyed by the Pew Research Center in late 1997.

Opposition to “deadline” extensions

Two recent polls stressing that President Clinton wanted to extend the U.S. mission in Bosnia beyond the originally proposed June 1998 “deadline” found 50 percent of the respondents “disapproved” and 43 percent approved of this decision. The surveys were conducted by the Pew Research Center in January 1998 and Gallup/USA Today in December 1997. However, the PIPA poll (February-March 1998) that omitted reference to a deadline found that 57 percent approved of extending the NATO mission as a whole, including

U.S. troops, rather than extending the mission of U.S. troops alone.

Confidence in mission’s success

The PIPA analysts report that a key factor boosting support for U.S. participation in the Bosnia peacekeeping mission is the growing perception that the mission is succeeding: Forty-nine percent in February-March 1998 (versus 27 percent in September 1997) believe the peacekeeping mission has “improved the chances of finding a way to permanently end the fighting there.”

Previous surveys have shown the American public’s support for the Bosnia mission springs partly from its altruistic motives in foreign affairs and partly from its sense that U.S. security is linked to stability in Europe. The importance given to European ties is illustrated by a PIPA poll that tested the persuasiveness of two contrasting arguments about continued U.S. military involvement in Bosnia: A majority (63 percent) agreed more with the pro-involvement argument that stated that because NATO is involved in Bosnia, “it is only fair that Europeans should expect that the United States should also do its share.” A minority (35 percent) sided with the view that “Bosnia is in Europe, therefore the Europeans should be ready to take responsibility for the problem themselves.” ●

ACTION ON CAPITOL HILL

(as of April 17)

SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING FOR BOSNIA PEACEKEEPING, IRAQ OPERATIONS

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 3579, S. 1768

DESCRIPTION: Provides an additional \$2,300 million for overseas operations including peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and the recent military buildup in the Gulf, as well as funds for domestic U.S. disaster relief.

HOUSE ACTION: Approved its version March 31, 1998.

SENATE ACTION: Approved its version March 31, 1998.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: The two versions now go to a conference committee of House and Senate members. The White House has warned of a possible veto over domestic spending cuts added to the bill by Republicans to make room for the new spending items without increasing the overall annual budget.

REJECTION OF MOVE TO PULL U.S. TROOPS FROM BOSNIA

RESOLUTION NUMBER: H Con Res 227

DESCRIPTION: Would have directed President Clinton to pull U.S. armed forces out of Bosnia within 60 days, unless Congress specifically authorized their use in the meantime.

HOUSE ACTION: Rejected the measure March 18, 1998, by a vote of 225 to 193.

SENATE ACTION: The measure did not go to the Senate; House rejection of the resolution effectively ended congressional action.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: The issue — congressional powers with regard to U.S. troop deployments abroad — is of concern to many members of Congress and may well come up again. Key members voting against this resolution argued, however, that the Bosnian operation is the wrong question on which to test the issue. Pulling out the troops “would send an untimely signal that this House no longer supports the Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia,” said Chairman Benjamin Gilman of the House International Relations Committee.

ETHNIC CONFLICT IN KOSOVO

RESOLUTION NUMBER: H Con Res 235

DESCRIPTION: Calls for a range of steps to resolve the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, including sanctions against the government of Serbia and Montenegro, intensification of efforts by the International Contact Group in support of a resolution of the conflict, and unspecified measures “to promote human rights and democratic government throughout Serbia and Montenegro.” As a “Sense of the Congress” resolution, the measure does not have the force of law, but rather sets forth the position of the legislature.

HOUSE ACTION: Approved the resolution March 18, 1998, by a vote of 406 to 1.

SENATE ACTION: Referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has not yet acted on the measure.

PAYMENT OF U.S. ARREARS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

BILL NUMBERS: H.R. 1757, S. 903, Conference Report: H. Report 105-432

DESCRIPTION: Authorizes fiscal years 1998-99 funding for the Department of State and includes the payment of \$819 million in U.S. arrears to the United Nations — most of that amount for peacekeeping operations.

HOUSE ACTION: Approved conference report on March 26, 1998.

SENATE ACTION: Approved its version of the measure June 17, 1997. Expected to take up the conference report after returning from spring recess April 20.

STATUS/OUTLOOK: The Senate is expected to follow the House's lead in approving the compromise measure, according to Senate Democratic Leader Thomas Daschle. He notes, however, that President Clinton may veto the bill because of anti-abortion language in it to which he objects. ©

FACT SHEET: UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

(With State Department data on U.S. funding assessments)

The United Nations has conducted a total of 48 peacekeeping operations — 13 in the 40-year period from 1948 to 1988; the other 35 from 1988 to the present. In 1996 some 26,000 military and civilian police personnel were serving in 16 operations with a total fiscal year cost of about \$1,400 million. By the end of 1997 fewer than 14,000 military and civilian police personnel served in 15 operations with a total fiscal year cost of \$1,088 million.

Peacekeeping missions are approved by the UN Security Council based on plans and costs developed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Operating costs for the missions are borne by all 185 UN member states on a scale of assessments set by the UN General Assembly. The scale is calculated using each country's total national income relative to that of other nations — a formula that is similar to the one used to determine assessments for the regular UN budget.

The five permanent members of the Security Council — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States — are assessed at 20 percent above the basic scale. The United States is assessed the largest amount of any country — 25 percent of the UN regular budget and 30.5 percent of UN peacekeeping costs. The U.S. Congress — in legislation that took effect October 1, 1995 — limited the U.S. payment to no more than 25 percent of peacekeeping costs; the U.S. assessment is currently under negotiation between

the United States and the United Nations. The next highest contributors to UN peacekeeping are Japan (18 percent), Germany (9.6 percent), France (7.9 percent), the United Kingdom (6.2 percent), and the Russian Federation (3.5 percent). Most countries are assessed less than 0.1 percent of the costs.

The following list incorporates the 16 UN peacekeeping missions that were in operation as of April 15, 1998, and three others that were closed out in 1997 or 1998. It includes the amount of the U.S. assessment for the missions in operation in fiscal year 1997, and, for the current missions, the contributions of U.S. personnel as of February 28, 1998.

The assessment amounts were provided by the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs and are shown at the U.S. mandated payment rate of 25 percent rather than the UN rate of 30.5 percent, with the exception of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which are funded in the UN regular budget for which the United States is assessed at a 25 percent rate.

*In the following list:
SCR = Security Council Resolution
Personnel Strength is as of February 28, 1998
Assessments are for Fiscal Year 1997*

Peacekeeping Operation	Location	Date Established	Current Mandate (Security Council Resolution - SCR)	Personnel Strength (as of 28 Feb. 1998)	UN Assessments (Fiscal Year 1997)	U.S. Share of Assessments (Fiscal Year 1997)
AFRICA						
UN MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (MINURCA)	Central African Republic	March 27, 1998	April 15, 1998- July 15, 1998 (SCR 1159)	Authorized up to 1,350 troops	Data Unavailable	
UN OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA (MONUA) <i>(Assessment amounts include Fiscal Year 1997 figures for the UN Verification Mission in Angola [UNAVEM III], February 1995-June 1997)</i>	Angola	July 1997	January 27, 1998- April 30, 1998 (SCR 1149)	347 Civilian Police, 885 Troops, 94 Military Observers	\$236.2 million	\$59 million
UN MISSION FOR THE REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO)	Western Sahara	September 1991	October 20, 1997- April 20, 1998 (SCR 1148)	78 Civilian Police, 21 Troops 203 Military Observers U.S. Personnel 15 Military Observers	\$5.5 million	\$1.4 million
AMERICAS						
UN CIVILIAN POLICE MISSION IN HAITI (MIPONUH) <i>(Assessment amounts include Fiscal Year 1997 figures for the UN Support Mission in Haiti [UNSMIH], June 1996-July 1997, and the UN Transition Mission in Haiti, July 1997-November 1997)</i>	Haiti	December 1997	December 1, 1997- November 30, 1998 (SCR 1141)	286 Police U.S. Personnel 30 Police	\$64.2 million	\$16 million
ASIA						
UN MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP)	India/ Pakistan	January 1949	Ongoing	44 Military Observers	\$6.4 million	\$1.6 million
UN MISSION OF OBSERVERS IN TAJIKISTAN (UNMOT)	Tajikistan	December 1994	November 14, 1997- May 15, 1998 (SCR 1138)	62 Military Observers	\$2.9 million	\$729,000
EUROPE						
UN MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (UNMIBH)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	December 1995	December 19, 1997- June 21, 1998 (SCR 1144)	2,019 Civilian Police 3 Troops U.S. Personnel 203 Civilian Police	\$158.2 million	\$39.6 million
UN MISSION OF OBSERVERS IN PREVLAKA (UNMOP)	Croatia	January 1996	January 13, 1998- July 15, 1998 (SCR 1147)	28 Military Observers	Cost included in UNMIBH	
UN CIVILIAN POLICE SUPPORT GROUP	Croatia	January 16, 1998	January 16, 1998- October 16, 1998 (SCR 1145)	180 Civilian Police U.S. Personnel 46 Civilian Police	Data Unavailable	
UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP)	Cyprus	March 1964	December 23, 1997- June 30, 1998 (SCR 1146)	35 Civilian Police 1,222 Troops	\$26.6 million	\$6.7 million

Peacekeeping Operation	Location	Date Established	Current Mandate (Security Council Resolution - SCR)	Personnel Strength (as of 28 Feb. 1998)	UN Assessments (Fiscal Year 1997)	U.S. Share of Assessments (Fiscal Year 1997)
UN PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE (UNPREDEP)	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	March 1995	December 4, 1997-August 31, 1998 (SCR 1142)	25 Civilian Police 801 Troops 35 Military Observers U.S. Personnel 400 Troops	\$45.3 million	\$11.3 million
UN OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA (UNOMIG)	Georgia	August 1993	January 30, 1998-July 31, 1998 (SCR 1150)	105 Military Observers U.S. Personnel 4 Military Observers	\$13.4 million	\$3.3 million
MIDDLE EAST						
UN DISENGAGEMENT FORCE (UNDOF)	Golan Heights	June 1974	November 30, 1997-May 31, 1998 (SCR 1139)	1,053 Troops	\$28 million	\$7 million
UN IRAQ/KUWAIT OBSERVER MISSION (UNIKOM)	Iraq/Kuwait	April 1991	Ongoing (SCR 689)	917 Troops 192 Military Observers U.S. Personnel 11 Military Observers	\$14.5 million	\$3.6 million
UN INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL)	Southern Lebanon	March 1978	February 28, 1998-July 31, 1998 (SCR 1151)	4,466 Troops	\$101.4 million	\$25.4 million
UN TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO)	Middle East	June 1948	Ongoing	157 Military Observers U.S. Personnel 2 Military Observers	\$23.7 million	\$5.9 million
MISSIONS CLOSED OUT IN 1997 OR 1998						
UN OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNOMIL)	Liberia	September 1993-September 1997			\$23.6 million	\$5.9 million
MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP OF THE UN VERIFICATION MISSION IN GUATEMALA (MINUGUA)	Guatemala	March 1997-May 1997			\$4 million	\$1 million
UN TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION FOR EASTERN SLAVONIA, BARANJA AND WESTERN SRMIUM (UNTAES)	Croatia	January 16, 1996-January 15, 1998			\$220.5 million	\$55.1 million
TOTALS				2,970 Civilian Police 9,368 Troops 920 Military Observers U.S. Personnel 249 Police, 400 Troops 32 Military Observers	\$1,088 million	\$272 million

Peacekeeping and Regional Stability:
ARTICLE ALERT

Brooks, John P.J. A MILITARY MODEL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, vol. 27, no. 4, Winter 1997/1998, pp. 108-120)
Noting that Africa has "a history of conflict and instability for which there is no end in view," the author outlines a proposed new model for deterring and settling regional conflicts. "There is an increasing willingness among Africans to solve their own problems," he notes. However, many factors inhibit the success of regional peace operations, "the most pressing of which is a general lack of resources." The author's model is based on lessons learned from past peacekeeping efforts and on the potential contribution of South Africa, which "has the means and can be the catalyst, if so inclined, for successful future peace operations in Africa."

Diehl, Paul; Druckman, Daniel; Wall, James. INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A TAXONOMIC ANALYSIS WITH IMPLICATIONS (The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 42, issue 1, February 1998, pp. 33-55)
This article seeks to classify international peacekeeping missions by function, using a theoretical framework derived from scholarly literature on conflict management and resolution. The authors divide peacekeeping operations into 12 categories: traditional, observation, collective enforcement, election supervision, humanitarian assistance, state/nation building, pacification, preventive deployment, arms control verification, protective services, intervention to support democracy, and sanctions enforcement. They conclude that "divergent missions are best handled by different sets of personnel or separate operations." They also discuss how peacekeepers should be trained for varied missions.

Franke, Volker C. WARRIORS FOR PEACE: THE NEXT GENERATION OF U.S. MILITARY LEADERS (Armed Forces and Society, vol. 24, no. 1, Fall 1997, pp. 33-57)
The author examines the extent to which military socialization at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point prepares future officers for the changing security requirements of the post-Cold War world. The increasing U.S. involvement in operations other than war requires military personnel to adjust "both cognitively and affectively" to the military's shifting strategic aims, he says. "If recent trends hold, and the armed forces continue to be charged with peace operations, leadership training should foster the capacity of future officers to shift focus and adjust effectively between combat and noncombat roles."

Khanna, Jyoti; Sandler, Todd; Shimizu, Hirofumi. SHARING THE FINANCIAL BURDEN FOR UN AND NATO PEACEKEEPING, 1976-1996 (Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 42, no. 2, April 1998, pp. 176-195)
The authors examine peacekeeping financial burden-sharing for three groups of UN members that accounted for most of the UN's peacekeeping spending from 1976 to 1996. In the 1990s, they contend, "there is evidence that rich countries are carrying a disproportionate burden for the poor countries in terms of the financing of peacekeeping and enforcement missions." The article also speculates on how NATO and UN peacekeeping burdens will be shared during the coming decade.

Sharp, Jane M.O. DAYTON REPORT CARD (International Security, vol. 22, no. 3, Winter 1997/98, pp. 101-136)
Sharp gives an overview of the Dayton peace agreement and the West's contributions to the peace process in Bosnia. The author discusses what she terms the "structural problems" of the Dayton agreement and offers recommendations for future policy in the region. Sharp contends that "the tendency to appease rather than punish the aggression still drove western policy in trying to consolidate the peace in Bosnia during 1996 and 1997." ©

The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered on the home page of the U.S. Information Service:
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Please note that USIS assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below which reside solely with the providers.

America's Air Force in Bosnia
<http://www.af.mil/bosnia/>

America's Army in Bosnia
<http://www.dtic.mil/bosnia/army/>

BosniaLINK
<http://131.84.1.34/bosnia/index.html>

The Carter Center
http://www.emory.edu/CARTER_CENTER/homepage.htm

Global Beat: Keeping the Peace
<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/keep.html>

International Affairs Network: Peacekeeping
<http://www3.pitt.edu/~ian/frames/peacekp.htm>

International Peacekeeping Home Page
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The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International
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