Foreign Policy
Spring 1998

The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
by Zbigniew Brzezinski, New York: Basic Books, 1997.

Reviewed by: Helmut Schmidt.

This latest book by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor in the Carter administration, will no doubt cause controversy, if not in the United States then at least in China, Europe, and Russia. The book’s subtitle, American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, does not suggest much empathy for other nations and their legitimate interests. Nevertheless, this is a book to be read and to be taken seriously. “Zbig,” as Brzezinksi is popularly referred to on the international circuit, may not wield quite the same influence as, say, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger. But his strategy for the outreach and extension of American dominance is likely to be referred to as frequently as statements by Kissinger, and with the same kind of misgivings as those displayed toward Harvard professor Samuel Huntington and his “clash of civilizations” thesis. Brzezinski has the merit of offering an intellectual scan of problems around the globe but provides only modest coverage of important events in Africa and Latin America and issues related to significant religious movements such as Confucianism, Hinduism, and Islam. Instead, he chooses to focus on Europe and Asia. European political leaders would do well to emulate Brzezinksi’s global approach if they are to serve Europe’s interests. They should not, however, endorse all his conclusions, least of all his aim and conviction that what is good for the United States is good for the world. The author welcomes further progress in European integration and the eastward expansion of NATO. But he refers to the countries of the region as if they were clients and dependents of the United States. Some British might tolerate such categorizations, but most continental Europeans will not. On the contrary, they will see in Brzezinski’s claim for U.S. primacy yet another reason to build an even stronger European Union that assures the region’s right to self-determination.

The book’s argument is structured in six chapters. The first describes U.S. superpower policy as “hegemony of a new type.” The second surveys the “Eurasian chessboard”—a somewhat unconvincing attempt to lump Lisbon, Tokyo, and Vladivostok all together—on which the United States is supposed to call the shots. According to Brzezinksi, Europe is the United States’ most reliable bridgehead in Eurasia. Russia is the scene of the third section, in which the author criticizes the United States’ inconsistent policy toward that country since the collapse of the Soviet Union. He then looks at Central Asia—the “Eurasian Balkans”—and provides an interesting range of observations and projections for what will be a center of major crises in the future. The Far East is the subject of the next chapter, which, despite all its merits, tends to underestimate significantly China’s future role in world politics. The conclusion, as always with Brzezinski, does not mince words: “The principal geopolitical manifestation of U.S. hegemony is America’s unprecedented role on the Eurasian landmass.” He concedes that U.S. power will wane over time; what drives him is the challenge of maintaining U.S. hegemony regardless. Here, he sketches three phases in what he describes as an evolving process. In the first phase, statecraft, clever tactics, and political manipulation are sufficient to maintain the U.S. position. However, since the American public is likely to be unwilling to carry the related burdens indefinitely, he argues that the second phase will have to involve the most important states of Asia and Europe forming a “Trans-Eurasian Security System” that falls under U.S. leadership. Ultimately, Brzezinski would like to see a “functioning structure of global cooperation based on geographical realities . . . gradually assume the mantle of the world’s current regent,” the United States. Brzezinksi defines this third phase only vaguely, as he views it as occurring in the distant future. What counts for him now and in the foreseeable years to come is to secure the United States’ global hegemony, although he is loathe to parade as an old-fashioned imperialist. Brzezinksi has written a book that is often intriguing and contains many accurate analyses and assessments. Yet, he neglects some important developments that will be crucial to shaping the future of geopolitics: Economic growth among major states will differ as will the growth of populations, inevitably leading to friction over environmental preservation and the distribution of natural resources; globalized electronic information and communications will have profound political and cultural impacts; and religious-cultural conflicts (of the sort against which Huntington warns) could turn violent unless the West avoids the impression of seeking hegemony over a billion Muslims, more than a billion Confucians, and several hundred million Hindus. In discussing these, the harder-to-fathom aspects of international relations, Brzezinski is less at home. His thinking is primarily determined by strategic military considerations. Yet, while readers may share neither his premise, approach, or objectives, this is a book that deserves attention.