Foreign Policy

The Arms Trade: Business As Usual?

By William W. Keller and Janne E. Nolan

Question: How was Saddam Hussein able to obtain the more than $80 billion worth of weapons that made it possible for him to invade Kuwait, wage war in the Persian Gulf, and still, to this day, remain a threat to his neighbors? Answer: He bought them. When it comes to conventional arms sales, almost everyone sells almost anything to just about anyone who can pay--and often to some who cannot. Long-term consequences take a back seat to short-term profit. Clearly, the world needs a new concept of proliferation that can override parochial economic interests and the fanciful notion that conventional arms are commodities that should be traded freely. But, as matters now stand, there is no clear global policy toward arms exports and the transfer of military technology.

Worldwide, heads of state have shown little interest in seriously addressing this problem. Just a few months ago, British prime minister Tony Blair told his Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to moderate his stated policy of restricting arms sales to countries that commit serious human rights violations. In 1995, when President Bill Clinton issued his "Policy on Conventional Arms Transfer," it turned out to be a non-policy. Officially, the White House paid lip service to the idea of restraint, but for the first time also explicitly sanctioned arms exports as a way to shore up U.S. military industrial interests. One of several principal goals was "to enhance the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet U.S. defense requirements...at lower costs."

The absence of policy in the world's largest arms dealer has given way to a frenzy of global marketing. Today, the U.S. approach to arms exports closely resembles that of the Europeans--economically driven, with ambassadors and cadres of industry representatives lobbying foreign procurement officials, Saudi princes, and heads of state everywhere. America's share of the global arms market is nearly 43 percent, with Western Europe coming in at second place with a 41 percent share. In recent years, companies and their governments have upped the ante, offering a broad array of inducements to offset the foreign exchange importing countries would need to finance their military shopping sprees.

Although there are a series of international agreements that seek to stem the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, no such treaty exists for conventional weapons. The closest equivalent is the Wassenaar Arrangement on Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, signed by 33 nations in July 1996. But, Wassenaar does not have the enforcement "teeth" to control arms exports. It only serves as a forum for exchanging information about weapons sales.

The complacency toward controlling the spread of conventional weapons is explained, in part, by the narrow definition of what constitutes "weapons of mass destruction." If it is not nuclear, biological, or chemical, it is seen as being less lethal. But, as the Gulf War demonstrated, the destructive power of a coordinated conventional attack can achieve levels of devastation associated with weapons of mass destruction. The increased accuracy, power, and lethality of conventional weaponry will only be enhanced as future generations of weapons platforms incorporate more sophisticated electronics, mostly from the commercial sector. International mergers and corporate alliances are now accelerating the global proliferation of this technology.

Increasingly there are calls for the United States, as the world's primary arms merchant, to exercise restraint and exert some leadership. Even if a full-fledged international arms control regime is still a distant possibility, there are initial steps that the White House could undertake to address the situation.

First, the United States might consider multilateral steps to monitor the end use of highly advanced commercial technologies that have possible military applications and have not yet widely proliferated. Such end use arrangements would require heightened levels of transparency in international trade and effective enforcement mechanisms.

Second, the administration could establish a mechanism to give a higher degree of scrutiny to cross-border investments, mergers, and acquisitions of arms companies. There could be a presumption against the globalization of military industry that would have to be pursued on a multilateral basis.

Third, even if the administration does not decide to join the multilateral convention to ban land mines, it should consider negotiations to identify and oppose exports of a broader range of "weapons of ill repute" that are deemed unethical in warfare. Trade in such weapons could be stigmatized on a multilateral basis, and trade in technologies directly associated with such weapons could be carefully screened to identify the destination and purpose of the transfer.

Even these tentative steps would require a degree of political will and leadership uncommon in the post-Cold War era. But, given the high price the world is still paying for allowing unrestricted arms sales to Iraq, it is an effort well worth undertaking.

William W. Keller is Executive Director of the Center for International Studies at MIT. Janne E. Nolan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. This editorial is adapted from an article appearing in the Winter 1997-98 issue of FOREIGN POLICY magazine.