Foreign Policy
Summer 1999

Editor’s Note
By Moisés Naím

 

In early 1999, any discussion about Europe would have centered on its impressive turnaround. By then, Euroeuphoria had replaced Europessimism. In a spate of transatlantic megamergers, European companies were taking over the corporate flagships of America’s industry and finance, deleting “Eurosclerosis” from the lexicons of the chroniclers of the continent’s decay. In addition, the unthinkable had happened—11 countries had shed their currencies in favor of one, the euro. Because of the common currency, participating countries were now required to meet macroeconomic goals that a few years ago seemed simply unattainable. Contrary to the predictions of most experts, the demanding goals were met. Finance ministers and parliaments had agreed to abdicate the authority to determine their own national monetary policies. Now, the monthly payments of home mortgages or credit card balances of Berliners, Parisians, and Romans were going to be decided by an obscure supranational bureaucracy, the European Central Bank.

As one Belgian commentator noted, Europe had stopped being just a museum and was rapidly becoming the most exciting laboratory in the world. Europe was now a continent where the most innovative, creative, and promising experiments on how to organize political and economic life in the next century were tested daily. Obviously, these experiments were deeply rooted in contemporary European values: democracy, low tolerance for inequality, an important role for government, and social policies that embodied a commitment to minimize the suffering of those unable to perform adequately in society.

Surely, it was thought, European values and approaches would inform the world’s socioeconomic organization in the new millennium.

Then came Kosovo. Suddenly, the televised images beamed from the continent had more in common with the horrors of the 1940s than the triumphs of a region ready to tackle the challenges of the globalized world of 2000. Scenes of European managers launching new overseas ventures and of European ministers meeting to agree on a new layer of common initiatives gave way to images of trains hauling terrorized women, children, and frail elderly couples mourning the brutal killing of their families. Yet again, it seemed, murderous Europe was burying civilized Europe.

Which of these two Europes will prevail in the future? The exciting laboratory of modern civilization or a continent addicted to periodic bouts of genocide? The tragedy of Kosovo can be seen as a sobering reminder that behind the façade of European humanism, civility, democracy, and modernity lies an intractable array of conflicts that will periodically shake the continent’s and the world’s stability. It can also be seen as the event that brings an ironic and anachronistic closure to this century. Perhaps, what happened there will, in retrospect, be seen as the spark that unleashed the will of Europe to develop, at last, the means and institutions to ensure that Kosovo is the last European carnage of this century and not a preamble of those to come in the next.

The means and institutions that equip Europe with the autonomous capacity to deal with situations such as Kosovo will emerge neither swiftly, efficiently, nor soon. Although adopting a single currency is difficult, it is relatively easier than adopting a common military and security policy. Yet, one has to hope that the sense of shame and moral indignation that envelops civilized Europe will serve as more than just material for outraged editorials and speeches. One could assume that the embarrassment of having to rely on the American armed forces to deal with what is a highly localized security threat and far from a formidable military challenge will prompt some sort of action among European leaders. Perhaps, the fact that Germany’s entire defense expenditures are a fraction of the United States’ intelligence budget will become less a badge of honor than an incentive to play a greater role in maintaining European security.

Developing such autonomous capabilities for the European Union will force Europe to answer crucial questions. What are the boundaries of Europe? In other words, what is Europe? Can Yugoslavia be legitimately included as part of the European laboratory? What about Turkey? Would a Kosovo-like conflict, with ample international coverage of refugees, atrocities, and wholesale killings in Nagorno-Karabakh justify the intervention of European forces? Would it in Chechnya?

This issue of Foreign Policy focuses on Europe and, therefore, on these kinds of large, vital questions that are facing the continent today. We asked Spain’s former prime minister Felipe González, one of the recognized forefathers of the current European renaissance, to identify the next steps for the continent’s integration. We also asked Dominique Moïsi, editor of France’s Politique étrangère, to reflect on Europe’s identity and on how different definitions can lead to diverging assumptions about goals, policies, and institutions.

Huge gaps sometimes exist, however, between such sweeping ideas and the realities encountered in more day-to-day European contexts. In this issue of Foreign Policy, we also probe more deeply into some specific aspects of the continent’s current situation. Analyzing the unique characteristics of Europe’s private companies and its stance on terrorism offers fascinating illustrations of some of the larger questions raised by González and Moïsi. Franco Amatori, a historian of European business at the Bocconi University in Milan, examines the factors that make Europe’s companies “different.” In doing so, Amatori illuminates issues concerning Europe’s economy, its integration into the rest of the world, and the political role of the private sector—points often lost in more abstract discussions about European politics or economics. The same applies to the dissection of the European approach toward terrorism undertaken by the rand Corporation’s Bruce Hoffman. His analysis highlights how European democracies seem to be much more ready than the United States to sacrifice individual rights and other basic tenets of a democratic system when terrorism threatens fundamental societal values.

Both of these examples—the evolution of the European corporation and the European approach toward terrorism—reveal a Europe that has greatly improved its capacity to respond effectively to new challenges. And there are many more such instances. European integration is the microcosm in which many of the powerful trends at work in the world today have unique saliency. The challenges confronting the “new” Europe will soon confront us all: the erosion of borders and the redefinition of sovereignty, the elimination of national currencies, the changing role of the state in education and health, the impact of migration, the transnational coordination of security and law enforcement efforts, and the need to reconcile the costs of social safety nets with fiscal restraint. By examining Europe’s experience and gauging its successes and failures, we will be able to divine better the shape of things to come. Hopefully, this future landscape will not be blighted with scorched earth and mass graves.

—Moisés Naím
June 1999