CIAO DATE: 12/02
Foreign Policy
Power to the Populists
Richard Herzinger*
Why right-wing is the wrong adjective for European populists
"Apart from the movements of France's Jean-Marie Le Pen and Austria's Jörg Haider, . . . Europe's populism is a genuine manifestation of post-ideological sentiment."
This spring, Rabella de Faria became the first black member of the Rotterdam city government. An educated, witty woman of 42, she is now in charge of health and security policy for the Netherlands' second largest city. The Suriname-born businesswoman was elected on the ticket of Pim Fortuyn's party, whose founder, an allegedly racist, right-wing populist, was assassinated just before the general elections last May. Did de Faria mistakenly join the wrong party? Or does Europe's new breed of right-wing populists deserve a second look?
Foreigners may be bewildered by Europe's strange voting tastes in recent elections, but they needn't be too worried. Rightist populism might be unpleasant, but it should not be confused with the fascism of the 20th century. The populists who continue to gain support in Europe reflect current sentiment rather than ideological underpinning. Their time in the political arena is likely to be short. But during their stint, they could well be the most progressive pieces on Europe's political chessboard.
These parties receive grass-roots support from voters who want to teach a lesson to entrenched leaders. Once in office, though, the populists have consistently lost constituent appeal. Fortuyn's party has lost three quarters of its support since four of its ministers joined the Dutch government last May. Italy's Silvio Berlusconi recently saw 180,000 Italians demonstrating against his government. The populists' short-lived, fiery support is reminiscent of Ross Perot's bid for the U.S. presidency in 1992: He received nearly 20 percent of the popular vote, but where are he and the U.S. Reform Party today?
In an era in which the traditional parties are still rooted in 19th-century conservatism, liberalism, and socialism, never has the mismatch between party platforms and voter wishes been more blatant. As a result, never has election participation in Europe been lower. The continent's diverse group of populists, who generally receive 10 to 22 percent of the vote in most European countries, has vowed to stir things up. In that regard, politicians like Fortuyn, Berlusconi, Christoph Blocher in Switzerland, or Carl Hagen in Norway mirror the unprecedented increase in independent candidates participating in congressional elections across the United States this November.
Apart from the movements of France's Jean-Marie Le Pen and Austria's Jörg Haider, which still derive parts of their agendas from the old, ideological extreme right, Europe's populism is a genuine manifestation of post-ideological sentiment. Mavericks like Fortuyn or Berlusconi constitute a new type of politician who wants to foster democratic rejuvenation through authoritarian solutions. Call them authoritarian liberators. Even when branding Islam backward, for example, the charismatic Fortuyn was no racist. He was openly homosexual. How else, if not backward, should he describe a society that deems homosexuality a deadly sin? His anti-immigrant stance arose from a popular fear that conservative Islamic attitudes would dilute Dutch tolerance. But in extolling individualism and diversity as a way to justify excluding members of what he considered to be an unfree culture, he revealed a contradiction. By deriding immigrants, Fortuyn made them personally responsible for a cultural background into which they happened to be born. Fortuyn combined a libertarian liberation ethos with an authoritarian quest for homogenization. This mix has nothing in common with the phobias and reactionary attitudes of the small bourgeoisie represented by Le Pen or Haider.
Similarly modern is Silvio Berlusconi, a pro-business politician who advocates the demise of state regulations and complains about institutional inertia. In his role as liberator, he praises globalization. Yet in his role as authoritarian patron, he rails against immigrants and is ready to undermine civil liberties and the rule of law. Like any authoritarian liberator, he manages to soothe people with a compellingly simplistic rhetorical response to the complexity around them.
The most persuasive argument that so-called right-wingers are not so "right" is the existence of a parallel phenomenon on the other side of Europe's crumbling political spectrum. Left-wing populism still scores high in Europe, and just like right-wing populism, it seeks trendy democratic rejuvenation instead of unresponsive representatives. In Germany's eastern länder (federal states), the ex-communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) has been tapping into the sentiments of both young, creative nonconformists and the underprivileged. In western Germany, left-wing populism even bears the face of former Finance Minister Oscar Lafontaine, whose new book, Die Wut wächst (Anger Mounting), is a compendium of popular socialism. Free from the responsibility of his former job, Lafontaine leads the renaissance of idealistic simplification and self-righteous protest—a philosophy that has recently propelled the international antiglobalization movement.
The twin populisms reveal a seeming paradox. Populism's supporters have their own motives in the ideological middle ground, far from the old-style fringe. They detest nothing more than big, old parties haggling for a murky spot called the political center while promoting an indistinguishable policy brew of "business as usual, perhaps upgraded a little." Constituents no longer have such streamlined, easy-to-govern demographics that can be satisfied by monolithic parties. They want to vote for ideas rather than lists of candidates who all represent the same policies. Europe's new right wing speaks the language of liberty and modernity and garners cheers not only from the losers of modernization—the working and middle classes whose fears drive them to anti-immigration, anti-European-Union, and antiglobalization views—but also modernization's winners, the monied classes who rail against state bureaucracy, old hierarchies, party loyalties, and high taxes. Consider Berlusconi, who had two posters made for his election campaign in 2000. In one, he wore a sweater, and the caption read: "The workers' leader." In the other, he wore a suit: "The entrepreneurs' leader." Reducing these populists to mere flag bearers for the dissatisfied and confused underestimates their crossover appeal.
What is the message to the established parties? Don't panic. Don't let the populists dictate the government's agenda, as Denmark and Norway have. Don't copy the trendy gladiators, but do read the signals. Promote the advantages of an open, pluralistic society precisely and self-confidently. Voters want the same immediacy and flexibility from politics as they get from communications. Learn from Jean-Pierre Raffarin, the new French prime minister, who earlier this year included not only career left-wingers in his conservative cabinet but also two ministers who were not even born in France.
Endnotes
Note *: Richard Herzinger is a staff writer at Die Zeit in Hamburg and author of Republik ohne Mitte (Republic Without a Center) (Berlin: Siedler, 2001). Back