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CIAO DATE: 12/02
Foreign Policy
Global Newsstand: Nation Building's New Face
Michael Barnett*
International Organization
Vol. 56, No. 2
Spring 2002, Cambridge
During the 2000 U.S. presidential debates, George W. Bush distanced himself from his opponent by denouncing U.S. involvement in nation building, the practice of helping countries overcome conflict and build effective and legitimate political institutions. Bush assured voters that his administration would formulate foreign policy to protect U.S. interests, not to impose U.S. values. Although President Bush's repudiation of nation building may not achieve the historical notoriety of his father's "read my lips" pledge not to raise taxes, President Bush has found himself involved in nation building in Afghanistan and is now on the verge of tackling the most challenging nation-building project ever — in Iraq.
But in reversing a campaign pledge, the president has simply succumbed to a time-honored practice. Throughout history, states have often used force to reform, restructure, or rebuild the domestic institutions of other countries. This tradition is ably chronicled by John Owen, associate professor of politics at the University of Virginia, in a recent issue of the quarterly journal International Organization. Surveying almost 200 cases since the 16th century, Owen identifies the who, when, and why of foreign imposition of domestic institutions. He finds that all types of countries do it: monarchies and republics, democracies and autocracies, and especially the so-called Great Powers — at different times Great Britain, France, Spain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and others — which are more likely to have the means to undertake such projects. Owen identifies three distinctive historical periods (1600-50, 1790-1850, and 1917-present) defined by rapid international change, ideological fluidity, and heightened security concerns. Against this backdrop, he argues, a Great Power is prone to regard unrest abroad as either a threat to its security or as an opportunity to extend its influence; in either case, it will be tempted to recreate target states in its own image.
Owen has identified an important, understudied topic and has done a fantastic job of mining modern history for discernible patterns. However, recent years have witnessed an important change in the nature of foreign imposition. What once was an exclusively unilateral activity monopolized by powerful states has increasingly become a multilateral project. The United Nations has had a starring role in virtually all of the post-Cold War attempts at nation building — from Cambodia to El Salvador to Bosnia — with supporting roles and cameos by other international and regional organizations, states, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Owen misses this development because he insists on seeing Great Powers behind all that takes place. For instance, he claims that the United States was the principal "promoter" of the 1992-95 intervention in Somalia, which sought to demobilize militias, train a new civilian police force, and create representative and working political institutions. But, in truth, the main force behind the U.N. operation in Somalia was former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, not the Bush Sr. or Clinton administrations.
If state building is now an ensemble activity, the "why" of these efforts surely must transcend Great Power ambitions. Many such operations have the United Nations' seal of approval because U.N. staff and the Security Council collectively judge that these operations help mitigate human suffering, build stable institutions, and create legitimate, democratic states.
The "how" of foreign imposition has also changed considerably. In modern nation-building efforts, one lead country might provide the initial military muscle while other states, international organizations, and NGOs do the hard (and sometimes more dangerous) work of trying to help states with the transition from civil war to civil society. Engaged in tasks ranging from refugee repatriation to job training for former soldiers, aid workers are on the front lines of the post-conflict process, frequently without military protection. Nation builders, moreover, do not necessarily attempt to rebuild countries in the image of the leading military power. Instead, they draw from a broader understanding of what legitimate states, societies, and economies look like, and they negotiate their vision with the local population.
These changes in the nature of nation building suggest that the imposing states no longer display imperial ambitions; indeed, they are often unwilling to do what it takes to complete the nation-building process. In recent operations, the Great Powers (namely, the United States) have shown little desire to "impose" and prefer to build states on the cheap. But without constant attention and a steady flow of resources from the international community, such efforts are bound to fail. Great Powers must recognize that effective nation building requires not only the heart of a humanitarian but also the hubris of an imperialist.
Endnotes
Note *: Michael Barnett is professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin and the author of Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). Back