Foreign 
Policy

Foreign Policy
Summer 1998

The Perils of (and for) an Imperial America *

By Charles William Maynes **

 

Should the United States pursue a policy of global hegemony? The idea first arose in the waning days of the Bush Administration when a Pentagon document calling for such a policy was prematurely leaked. The public outcry caused the document to be repudiated. Now the idea has resurfaced in the pages of The Weekly Standard.

It is also reflected in the rhetoric one hears in Washington from both sides of the political aisle. Nowadays, it is hard to find a figure in this country who does not make constant reference to the United States as the indispensable nation or the sole superpower. Recent legislative actions by the Congress indicate that increasingly America expects to get its way internationally and intends to punish others if it does not.

In fact, this growing mood of assertiveness is dangerous. We would be wise now to become more circumspect in our demands and ambitions. Otherwise, we will overtax our resources and corrupt our politics.

As the recent decision to reduce troops in the Middle East from 44,000 to 19,000, Saddam Hussein notwithstanding, suggests, the burden of striving for American hegemony will be high, probably higher than the country can accept. It is true that the percentage of GNP devoted to American defense, now around 3 percent, is the lowest it has been since Pearl Harbor. But what the proponents of global hegemony fail to point out is that the defense spending to which we are now committed is not terribly relevant to the policy of global primacy that they wish to pursue. Today’s hegemonists want to employ U.S. military force to control the spread of "chaos" throughout the international system—whether it be the arms race in South Asia, a revitalized Russia, or the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. But if U.S. forces were to be deployed at every global crisis zone, the defense effort would have to be radically restructured, and the costs would mount exponentially. The U.S. commitment in Bosnia provides a glimpse into the future. The burden of American involvement, initially estimated at $1.5 billion, surpassed $7 billion early this year and will continue to grow for years to come.

A quest for hegemony also would have a corrosive effect on this country’s internal relations. The United States could carry out such a quest only by using the volunteer army, which fills its ranks predominately with people who come from a segment of America that is less internationally minded than those who would wish to use the U.S. military for geopolitical purposes. Former secretary of labor Robert Reich, among others, has pointed out that America is developing into two societies—not so much black versus white, but cosmopolitan versus national, or between those who have directly reaped the benefits from the new globalized economy and those who have paid its price in terms of military service, endangered jobs, and repressed wages. Will America embark on a quest for primacy with those responsible for pursuing this course paying almost no price for its execution?

The pursuit of global hegemony would all but guarantee that America’s foreign relations would suffer as badly as its domestic relations. Already, the surplus of power that the United States enjoys is beginning to metastasize into an arrogance toward others that is bound to backfire. America has begun to command more and listen less. It imperiously imposes trade sanctions that violate international understandings; presumptuously demands national legal protection for its soldiers and diplomats who are subject to criminal prosecution, while insisting that other nations forego that right; and unilaterally dictates its views on UN reforms.

To date, the United States has been able to get away with these tactics. Nevertheless, the patience of others is shortening. The difficulty that the United States encountered in rounding up support in the confrontation with Saddam Hussein over UN weapons inspectors was an early sign of the growing pique of others with America’s new preemptive arrogance.

But perhaps the biggest price Americans would pay in pursuing hegemony is the cost in lost opportunities. A quest for global primacy, whether formally announced or increasingly evident, will drive other nations to resist our control, at first unsuccessfully, but ultimately with effect. A policy of world hegemony, in other words, will guarantee that America ultimately will become outnumbered and overpowered.

Instead, we could use this unique post–Cold War moment to try to hammer out a new relationship among the great powers—a relationship in which military force is employed only for national defense, not for the aggrandizement of power or wealth. The United States does much to influence international behavior by the model it sets. It is still not too late to make a real effort to write a new page in history.

 

Further Reading

America’s Place in the World II (Washington: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, October 1997)

Ted Galen Carpenter & Barbara Conry, eds. NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality (Washington: CATO Institute, 1998)

Albert Coll, "America as the Grand Facilitator" (FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1992)

Richard Haass, "Sanctioning Madness" (Foreign Affairs, November/December 1997)

Josef Joffe,  "Bismarck or Britain?" (International Security, Spring 1995)

Steven Kull, I.M. Destler, & Clay Ramsay, The Foreign Policy Gap (College Park: Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, October 1997)

Christopher Layne, "Less is More" (National Interest, Spring 1996)

Christopher Layne & Benjamin Schwarz, "American Hegemony: Without an Enemy" (FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1993)

Charles William Maynes, "Bottom-Up Foreign Policy" (FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1996)

Eric Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995)

Barry Posen & Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy" (International Security, Winter 1996–97)

John Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995)

 


Notes

*: The following abstract is adapted from Mr. Maynes' article, originally published in the Summer 1998 issue of FOREIGN POLICY. All rights reserved. Back.

**: Charles William Maynes is president of the Eurasia Foundation. Back.